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2ABSTRACT
Taking a comparative perspective, the current research examines national and 
European identities in Britain and Italy, using a multi-methodological approach. 
The aims of the research are twofold: firstly, to examine current limitations with 
psychological theorising on social identity, and secondly, to enhance social 
psychological knowledge of European integration and its effects upon national 
and European identities. The theoretical perspective adopted is a hybrid 
synthesis of social identity (Tajfel, 1974; Turner, 1987) and social representations 
(Moscovici, 1984) approaches. Evidence for a European identity amongst British 
respondents and interviewees proved to be minimal: few felt any sense of 
European pride, and most construed European integration in instrumental terms. 
Italian constructions of European identity were more robust than those of the 
British, and consisted of both instrumental and symbolic attachments to the 
European ideal. Some of the social psychological bases for such cross-national 
differences are explored, and the prospects for the development of a European 
identity examined. Applying social identity theory to questions of national and 
European identity construction, raises questions about the current applicability 
of the paradigm to large-scale social categories of this type. The social 
representational context of intergroup relations has often been ignored, and 
social influence processes in large-scale entities seem more complex than 
previously assumed. It becomes apparent that issues of key conceptual 
importance to the social identity and self-categorisation paradigms are in need of 
urgent clarification. These include: the differences between face-to-face groups 
and abstract social categories; the adequacy of motivational constructs within the 
paradigm; and the role of the wider ideological milieu in which identity 
construction takes place. Along with a discussion of these issues, some of the key 
features of social identity construction in large-scale social categories and groups 
are examined, and ways in which the social identity and social representations 
paradigms might be reconciled explored.
Keywords: Social identity; European integration; European identity; national identity
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OVERVIEW
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The current discussion has two primaiy aims: firstly, to further social 
psychological understanding of social identity mechanisms - i.e. the means 
by which membership of social groups comes to form an important part of 
the self; and secondly, to explore such theoretical questions by focusing on 
an externally valid set of social identities currently of social significance - 
national and European identities in the context of European integration. To 
the extent that European integration and its effects upon national and 
European identities, raise key conceptual issues about social identity 
processes, it is a particularly fruitful domain for the exploration of social 
identity. Furthermore, since there is as yet relatively little published research 
examining the social psychological factors of European integration, such a 
focus has the additional benefit of filling this void in the literature. The 
research about to be described sought to fulfil these two primary aims by 
means of an interplay between theoretical and empirical endeavours. The 
discussion will therefore focus around three separate empirical studies, and 
use these studies to generate theoretical insights about both social identity 
processes, and the psychological effects of European integration on national 
and European identities.
Chapter 1 -  Introduction to the social identity paradigm
In this chapter, the reader is introduced to the topic of social identity, with 
particular attention being paid to the Social Identity Theory (SIT) developed 
by Tajfel (1974), and Turner's related Self-Categorisation Theory (SCT) 
(Turner, 1987). Some of the conceptual weaknesses present in both theories, 
and which will be examined via the empirical research, are introduced, 
including weaknesses in the explanations of salience, social influence, and 
stereotyping, and problems associated with the application of the social
16
identity paradigm to large-scale social categories and groups, such as 
nations.
Chapter 2 - A  theoretical basis fo r  exploring national and European
identities
This chapter explores the current state of social scientific knowledge 
pertaining to national identity and European integration. Particular emphasis 
is placed on how national and European identities might be influenced by 
the process of European integration, and how identities of this diffuse and 
large-scale nature raise conceptual and empirical problems for the social 
identity paradigm. Existing research in this area, of a largely attitudinal 
nature, indicates that Britain continues to be the least enthusiastic of all EC 
nations about European integration, and some possible bases for this 
phenomenon are examined.
Chapter 3 - The design o f  the cross-national questionnaire
In this chapter, the design of the first phase of the empirical research is 
described. This involved a cross-national questionnaire study, examining the 
effects of European integration upon national and European identities and 
their associated social representations (Moscovici, 1984). Questionnaires were 
administered to higher education students in both Britain and Italy, during 
1991.
Chapter 4 - The cross-national questionnaire data - 1: the British
The British results emerging from the 1991 questionnaire study are 
presented and discussed in this chapter. In congruence with the existing 
body of attitudinal data, the British respondents manifested a British 
national identity significantly stronger than their sense of European identity. 
Further analyses indicated that British identity may conflict with a sense of 
European identity. Observations arising from both quantitative and
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qualitative data are used to map-out some of the interrelations between 
national and European sentiments in Britain. In addition, a number of key 
issues pertaining to social identity theory are examined. These include: the 
measurement of social identity; the nature of stereotypes and their 
situational fluctuation; prototypes; and the adequacy of the social identity 
paradigm when applied to large-scale identities such as national and 
European identities.
Chapter 5 -  The cross-national questionnaire data - 2: the Italians
This chapter details the 1991 questionnaire data collected in Italy, and 
examines some of the social psychological aspects of national and European 
identities as manifested by the Italians. Data indicate that the Italians 
construe national and European identities as highly compatible, and cross­
national comparisons highlight a stronger sense of European identity 
amongst Italian, compared to British, respondents. Some of the probable 
bases for the marked differences in European identity between British and 
Italian respondents are examined, and interpreted in the light of previous 
research.
Chapter 6 - An interview study o f  British and European identities
In the second phase of research which is detailed here, a qualitative in- 
depth interview methodology was used to explore in greater detail the 
construction of British and European identities, and how these identities 
challenge current conceptualisations of social identity. Focusing solely on 
British respondents, some of the qualities of British national identity are 
examined, including British prototypes, objects of national pride and 
embarrassment, and situations associated with national identity. Similar 
issues are also addressed in relation to British constructions of European 
identity. The data emerging from this study indicated that, in congruence 
with the earlier questionnaire study, empirical evidence suggests a weak and
18
ambiguous British orientation to European integration, with little sense of 
pride in Europe or perception of dimensions other than economic. The 
utility of qualitative and idiographic approaches to social identity is 
discussed, together with a further refinement of some of the differences 
between large-scale social category membership and identification with 
smaller, more concrete entities, developed in earlier chapters.
Chapter 7  -  The Social identity paradigm: new horizons
This chapter looks back at the first two empirical phases of research, using 
them to draw some general observations about the nature of social identity 
processes. Some of the ways in which social identity processes operate in 
the context of large-scale social categories and groups are suggested, with an 
important theoretical emphasis being placed upon the need to incorporate 
the notion of social representation (Moscovici, 1984) into social identity 
theory. Recent developments in the social identity paradigm are discussed 
in relation to the current focus, and weaknesses in research on 
individualism-collectivism (Triandis et al., 1985;1986;1988;1990), and non­
comparative social groups (Brown et al., 1992) examined.
Chapter 8 -  Some new horizons explored
The third and final phase of empirical research is detailed in this chapter, 
which focuses on the results emerging from a fixed-response questionnaire 
study examining some of the issues relating to social identity outlined in 
Chapter Seven. In particular, British constructions of national and European 
identities are examined in relation to: Brown's Autonomous-Relational 
dimension (Brown et al., 1992); Individualism-Collectivism (Triandis et al., 
1990); perceptions of interdependence (c.f. Rabbie & Horwitz, 1988); 
motivational bases; and possible selves (Markus & Nurius, 1986).
Chapter 9 - Conclusions 1: National and European identities
19
In this first concluding chapter, the empirical and theoretical investigations 
in previous chapters are re-considered and drawn together to provide an 
overall impression of the social psychological dimensions of national and 
European identities in Britain and Italy. As well as charting some of the 
peculiar properties of these identities, general theoretical observations are 
made about national and international identities. The chapter concludes 
with a discussion of how the observations made have practical implications, 
firstly for those who might wish to encourage a European identity, and then 
for those who might wish to suppress such allegiances.
Chapter 10 - Conclusions 2: Social identity theory: where next?
The final chapter examines the implications of the research discussed for the 
study of social identity, with particular reference to the Tajfel-Tumer social 
identity paradigm. It is argued that, if the social identity paradigm is to 
prove robust and useful in the future, current weaknesses will have to be 
overcome, especially those relating to individual differences, social belief 
systems, and operationalisation of concepts. One possible means of 
strengthening the social identity paradigm is via a synthesis with some of 
the key ideas associated with the study of social representations (Moscovici, 
1984), since social identities are almost always associated with related social 
representations. Such a synthesis could, in fact, prove beneficial to both 
traditions. Some of the directions this kind of integrative endeavour might 
take are examined in the final section of the chapter.
Chapter 1
20
INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIAL IDENTITY PARADIGM
OVERVIEW
The following four chapters describe a questionnaire-based study investigating 
aspects of national and European identity. The questionnaire was administered 
simultaneously to university students in the United Kingdom and Italy, and 
contained both open and closed-type questions examining features of national and 
European identity, stereotype processes, attitudes toward, and social representations 
of, European integration. The questionnaire was formulated using the broad 
theoretical framework provided by Social Identity Theory (SIT) as defined by 
Tajfel, Turner and associates (Tajfel & Turner, 1979;1986; Hogg & Abrams, 1988). 
The text of the English language questionnaire appears in Appendix C.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
1.1 On the choice of Research Method in the study of Social Identity
The broad concept of social identity - that part of a person's self-concept which 
derives from social group membership and placement in a system of categorization 
- has been the subject of much empirical research within the social sciences. It is 
not surprising that the different theoretical orientations of researchers have given 
rise to the employment of a quite diverse collection of research techniques for the 
measurement of social identity and related constructs. One of the earliest and most 
influential techniques was the 'Twenty Statements Test" (TST) developed by Kuhn 
and McPartland (1954). Using this paper and pencil projective test, respondents had 
to answer the question "Who am I?" twenty times.
Whilst being criticized for its crudeness, and the difficulty involved in 
interpreting the results obtained (see, for example, Zavalloni, 1973), many
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researchers continue to sympathize with the idea, implied in the research method, 
that it is important to consider the complete identity repertoires of respondents, 
rather than attempt to focus on a single identity in isolation. Furthermore, the 
notion (again emerging from Kuhn and McPartland's work) that identities are 
hierarchically ordered, has continued to figure prominently in theories of social 
identity. One of the most contentious issues concerning the TST is related to its 
interpretation. It could be argued, for example, that the order in which identities, 
personal characteristics, and so forth, are mentioned in a TST, might say something 
about the underlying salience or importance of these elements for the self-concept 
However, the issue of the salience of identities is a highly complex one, and it is 
rather difficult to establish whether identities elicited by such techniques are 
influenced by the current situation rather than some underlying dimension of 
importance for the self. R.H. Turner has raised rather similar doubts about the TST, 
suggesting that respondents might give leisure or "escape" identities, whilst 
ignoring other, more important aspects of the self (Turner, 1987).
However, it is worth noting that, whilst losing favour with many (but not 
all) social psychologists, Kuhn and McPartland's measurement technique and its 
later derivatives continue to enjoy popularity amongst sociologists and political 
scientists interested in identity. In addition, interesting new possibilities have 
emerged for using the TST to investigate the existence of individualistic and 
collectivistic belief systems, and their relationship to the self (c.f. Triandis, 
McCusker, & Hui, 1990). Clearly then, the TST has certainly not outlived its 
usefulness.
Whilst some theorists have attempted to further develop and refine the 
Twenty Statements Test (see, for example, Hutnik, 1985; Yardley, 1987), others have 
attempted to utilize different measurement procedures, or develop their own. 
Zavalloni (1971;1973) for example, who, like Kuhn and McPartland, was influenced 
by personality theory, developed a projective measurement technique which she 
christened Focused Introspection. However, largely due to the time-consuming and 
complex nature of its application, focused introspection is not commonly utilized 
as a measure of social identity. For similar reasons, the application of variants of
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the Kelly repertory grid technique (Kelly, 1955; Bannister, 1966) seems not to hold 
the potential its proponents once promised (e.g. Liebkind, 1982).
Both social psychologists working within the Tajfel/Tumer tradition of 
Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979,1986), and an increasing number of 
social scientists from other disciplines, have come to focus on the use of 
questionnaire methodologies in the measurement of social identity. Hooper (1976), 
a political scientist, proposed a questionnaire-based technique which utilized the 
Twenty Statements Test as a starting point, and went on to investigate, via the use 
of fixed-response numerical ratings, the perceived importance for respondents of 
their various social identities. Like Hutnik (1985), Hooper suggests the addition of 
a negative identification format along the lines of "Is it important for you to think 
of yourself as n o t ...?". It is interesting to note how this assumption that ingroups 
are always related to outgroups, identification with disidentification, etc., is in fact 
common to many theories of social identity (e.g. Apter, 1983; Tajfel, 1974; Turner, 
1987; Wallman, 1983). Hooper (1976) goes on to suggest that the responses elicited 
by this methodology can finally be subjected to factor analysis, and thus indicate 
the underlying structure of identity.
Whilst there is something to be said for a methodology which examines the 
complete identity structures of individuals, followers of Tajfel and Turner have 
preferred to utilize the survey approach for the isolated study of particular social 
identities. Although there is some disagreement as to whether social identities may 
be studied in isolation (see, for example, Scheibe, 1983), recent theorizing on the 
salience of social identities (Oakes, 1987) would suggest that, generally speaking, 
at any point in time one of our social identities will be the most salient It follows 
from such theorising, that in situations which are thought to encourage the salience 
of a particular social identity, one might be able to study this identity, its related 
stereotypes, etc, in relative isolation. Assumptions of this nature will be questioned 
on numerous occasions throughout this and the following chapters.
This kind of focus on particular intergroup contexts is in fact indicative of 
a fundamental difference between the Tajfel-Tumer tradition of Social Identity 
Theory (SIT), and the approach to identity taken by personality and role theorists
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(e.g. Sarbin & Scheibe, 1983). From the beginning, Tajfel (e.g. 1974) made it clear 
that social identity theory was primarily intended to be a theory of intergroup 
behaviour - its implications for the self-concept were secondary. In contrast, role 
theorists like Sarbin and Scheibe (1983), are also interested in a fuller appreciation 
of the individual functioning of identity structures. It is only in recent years that 
social psychologists have come to recognize the necessity to end this false division, 
and work towards a multi-level analysis of identity which allows for both 
individual and social level variables (see, for example, Abrams, 1990,1992; 
Breakwell, 1986,1991; Deaux, 1992; Doise, 1988).
Some of the most productive recent work within SIT has been conducted by 
Rupert Brown and associates (e.g. Brown, 1978; Brown et al, 1986). Much of this 
work is noticeable for its application of questionnaire-based survey methodologies 
within ecologically valid field settings, such as bakeries, hospitals, and factories. 
Like Hooper (1976), the notion of perceived importance of the identity for the 
individual, figures strongly as a measure of social identity in these studies. 
Additionally, following on from Tajfel's theorizing (e.g. Tajfel, 1974), the affect 
linked to the particular group membership under investigation is also measured, 
as are perceptions of similarity with other group members. The kinds of fixed- 
response questions utilized by Brown and associates have become fairly common 
within the SIT/SCT tradition.
A further technique which has become increasingly popular within the 
SIT/SCT framework is the analysis of stereotype ratings. Hogg and Turner (1987) 
for example, had their respondents rate the in-group, out-group, and self on various 
stereotype dimensions. A standard measure of the strength of identity in such 
studies is the correlation between in-group and self-stereotype (see Huici, 1984, for 
a criticism of this procedure). Whilst a number of objections to a purely 
quantitative trait-based approach to stereotype measurement are raised in other 
chapters, the notion that social stereotypes should form an integral part of any 
study of social identity is an important one. Furthermore, Hogg and Turner's point 
that we must recognize the inherently situational nature of social stereotypes is 
addressed at some length in this and other chapters, as is the relationship between 
identity and self-stereotyping.
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It is disturbing to note the lack of discussion within the Tajfel-Tumer 
school of thought of the advantages and disadvantages associated with the various 
research techniques typically employed in the study of social identity. Hofman 
(1988), whilst not working within the strict confines of Social Identity Theory, has 
made a welcome contribution here. As he emphasizes, whilst a multitude of 
research techniques have been employed in the study of identity - questionnaires, 
semantic differential scales, graphic representations, etc. - no single method is 
especially suited to the task. We are in full agreement with Hofman that the best 
solution is to utilize a number of methodologies, and to capitalize on the benefits 
associated with each particular method. At the same time, one should recognize that 
a number of the existing methodologies carry their own "theoretical baggage" - i.e. 
they have been designed with a particular theory of identity or self in mind.
It is our opinion that social psychologists working within the confines of 
Tajfel's Social Identity Theory, or Turner's Self Categorization Theory, have yet to 
discover a research methodology which is particularly well-suited to the empirical 
investigation of social identity. This being the case, the only acceptable option 
would seem to be to follow Hofman's (1988) suggestions and make use of a variety 
of research techniques. We would add to this, the urgent need for research into the 
strengths and weaknesses of the ever increasing number of methodologies 
available. In its use of a number of different question formats, as well as both 
questionnaire and interview methodologies, it is hoped that the current research 
might, in a limited sense, contribute to our knowledge of how these research 
methods may be utilized for the study of social identity.
1.2 Tajfel's Social Identity Theory (SIT) -  central issues
For Tajfel (1974,1981), social identity represents the individual's awareness of being 
a member of a social group, together with the affect associated with that 
knowledge. Enlightened by his earlier work on the categorization of objects (Tajfel 
& Wilkes, 1963), Tajfel went on to hypothesize that categorization into in-group 
and out-group(s) involves an accentuation of differences between groups and 
similarities within groups, and later research was to provide empirical support for
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this assumption (Doise et al., 1978; Eiser & Strobe, 1972; Tajfel et al, 1964). In 
common with a number of conceptualizations of social identity, Tajfel postulated 
that the perception of ingroup membership is crucially linked to the perception of 
outgroups: there can be no in-groups without out-groups of which one is not a 
member.
We may consider a social identity to be positive or negative for an 
individual, depending on whether the particular group membership is associated, 
respectively, with positive or negative affect The determinant of the latter is the 
extent to which the social identity affords the individual the opportunity of 
attaining positive ingroup distinctiveness. This may be achieved by making 
favourable comparisons between the in-group and relevant comparison groups, on 
appropriate dimensions of social comparison.
It is clear from Tajfel's writing (e.g. Tajfel, 1981), that his Social Identity 
Theory is built on the foundations of Festinger's (1954) theory of Social 
Comparison, extended by Tajfel from the interpersonal to the intergroup domain. 
For Tajfel, following Festinger's ideas, the maintenance of self-esteem became the 
most important motivation behind social identity processes. Only in recent years 
has the focus solely on self-esteem as a motive been seen as restrictive and 
simplistic (see, for example, Abrams, 1990; 1992).
In support of his theory of social identity, the minimal group series of 
experiments (Tajfel et al., 1971) seemed to indicate that the mere process of 
categorization into a social category was sufficient to elicit differentiation between 
social groups. This suggested the inadequacy of individualistic theories of group 
formation and conflict, such as those based on interpersonal attraction (Lott & Lott, 
1965), or frustration-aggression (e.g. Berkowitz, 1962). Similarly, the influential 
theory of Realistic Conflict proposed by Campbell and others (e.g. Campbell, 1965) 
could not account for differentiation in the minimal group scenario. For Tajfel and 
his followers, the notion of social identity and the drive towards differentiation 
provided the most parsimonious explanation of minimal group phenomena.
26
This interpretation of the minimal group has not been without its critics, 
however, with a number of alternative explanations of minimal group phenomena 
being forwarded by, amongst others, Rabbie and associates (Rabbie & Horwitz, 
1988; Rabbie, Schot & Visser, 1989), and, more recently, Schiffman & Wicklund 
(1992). Amongst the key issues in such debates are: a) the significance of the 
minimal group paradigm for social identity theory; b) the explanation of minimal 
group phenomena; and c) the ecological validity of minimal group studies. In the 
current discussion, the merits of social identity theory are assessed on the basis of 
its overall contribution to social psychology, rather than on the strengths or 
weaknesses of one particular series of studies.
One of the papers which indicates that social identity theory is certainly 
much more than just the minimal group studies, was published in 1979, when 
Tajfel and Turner examined some of the macro*level implications of the theory. It 
became clear to them that the shared conceptions of reality held by members of a 
group were of crucial importance to an understanding of intergroup relations. 
Tajfel and Turner suggested that in general, there are two kinds of subjective belief 
structure (S6S) which influence the course of intergroup relations. The social 
mobility  belief system involves the assumption that group boundaries are relatively 
permeable, and thus that inadequate social identity can be alleviated via individual 
movement between groups. In contrast, the S6S of social change suggests that 
intergroup relations are characterized by stratification, and that it is impossible or 
at least very difficult for those dissatisfied with their social identity to move into 
another group.
In their model of intergroup relations, Tajfel and Turner demonstrate how 
the SBS accepted by group members in turn determines the nature of the strategies 
utilized to maintain or enhance social identity. Further refinements of the model 
included the notions of the perceived legitimacy and stability of the intergroup 
milieu, which interact with the perception of cognitive alternatives in determining 
intergroup strategies. It is suggested here that Tajfel and Turner's model seems to 
rely, implicitly, on the notion of social representations (Moscovici, 1961;1984;1988) - 
shared constructions of reality generated in the course of social interaction. The 
final model seems to stand up quite well to empirical validation (see, for example,
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Turner & Brown, 1978) and application in ecologically valid field settings (e.g. 
Bourhis & Hill, 1982). It remains one of the most promising models of macro-level 
intergroup relations.
1.3 Turner's Self-Categorization Theory (SCT)
Whilst Tajfel was primarily interested in developing a model of social identity able 
to contribute to our knowledge of intergroup relations, Turner (1982,1984,1987) went 
on to develop a theory, the aim of which was to provide a parsimonious 
explanation of the whole spectrum of inter and intra-group processes. Turner's 
Self-Categorization Theory postulates that self-categorization is the mechanism by 
which group behaviour becomes possible. For Turner (1987), self-categorization may 
be seen as accomplishing two things: it causes one to perceive oneself as "identical" 
to other members of the category, and thus places the group "in one's head"; and 
it generates category congruent behaviour on dimensions which are stereotypic of 
the category.
Self-categorization, according to Turner, involves a qualitative change in 
self-perception, termed depersonalization. Turner stresses that this process does not 
involve a loss of self, but merely a change in the focus of the self-concept from that 
of individual to that of group member. The depersonalization process also involves 
self-stereotyping, whereby the individual internalizes the perceived beliefs, 
behaviours, etc., of the in-group, and comes to view these as his/her own. In-group 
members come to perceive the appropriate norms, stereotypes, etc, of their group 
via the process of referent informational influence, which involves emulating the 
beliefs and actions of those who are seen as prototypical of the in-group. It is 
generally assumed that the most prototypical group member will be the individual 
perceived to be most similar to the ingroup, and most different to the outgroup, on 
currently valued dimensions of social comparison (Turner, 1987). It is important to 
recognize how this definition of prototypicality differs significantly from its use 
in models of memory, such as Cantor and Mischel's (1979) prototype theory.
There remain, however, a number of difficulties associated with the notion 
of referent informational influence, most of which seem to stem from a focus on 
the laboratory as a research environment For example, whilst it may be possible 
to derive, using Rosch's (1978) notion of metacontrast ratio, a prototypicality score 
for members of a group faced with a judgement task, it is difficult to see how such 
a procedure might be utilized outside the confines of the laboratory to study 
prototypes in large-scale social categories such as gender and race. A further 
problem involves Turner and associates' assumption of the situational specificity 
of prototypes, since this does not allow for the presence of group status and 
leadership structures which might institutionalize the role of group prototype. It 
seems a rather simplistic and convenient strategy to merely re-define leadership in 
terms of degree of prototypicality, as Turner and Oakes (1989) appear to do. The 
notion of prototypes being situationally derived, also does not seem to allow for 
the possibility that prototypes might be contained within stereotypes and broader 
social representations of the group, which, at least in terms of core elements, often 
do evince a degree of cross-situational stability. Furthermore, little attention has 
been paid to Hogg and Abrams' (1988) suggestion that subgroups may sometimes 
constitute in-group prototypes. Finally, it is suggested here that Cantor and 
Mischel's (1979) postulation of numerous sub-prototypes within a category may be 
of value, especially where large-scale social categories are concerned.
Whilst Turner (1987) and other proponents of the theory have tended to 
assume that a strong social identity will be associated with perceptions of similarity 
between in-group members, we should be aware of a number of phenomena which 
may act as caveats to this assumption. Codol (1975) for example, found evidence for 
a primus inter pares (PIP) or "superior conformity of the self' motivation which 
encourages group members to perceive themselves as slightly superior to the 
average group member. This might suggest that strong identity need not be 
reflected in perceptions of strong similarity with other in-group members. 
Furthermore, it raises the possibility that some people might feel they themselves 
deserve to be the prototypical in-grouper, even when the majority of other group 
members disagree. This highlights how both individual and group-level processes 
can and do operate simultaneously, and challenges Turner's (1987) suggestion that
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in-group members perceive themselves as interchangeable exemplars of the 
categoxy.
A number of theorists have also recognized the flexible and self-serving 
nature of self-stereotyping procedures (see, for example, Jaspars and Wamaen, 
1982). One method of maintaining positive self-esteem, for example, is to project 
any negatively evaluated attributes of the in-group onto group members who are 
then labelled as "deviants". Marques and associates (Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988; 
Marques et al., 1988) have demonstrated how the creation and marginalization of 
such "black sheep" actually serves to strengthen social identity and the cohesion of 
the in-group. Codol later went on to suggest that, whilst social reality testing 
(Festinger, 1954) might be valued for attitudes and beliefs, individuals do not strive 
to be similar in terms of personality dimensions, raising further doubts about the 
likelihood of self-stereotyping taking place on personality dimensions (Codol, 
1984). All of these aspects of social identity construction tend to lend weight to 
Liebkind's recent suggestion that partial identification with groups tends to be the 
norm - placing all of one's self in a single social identity, even briefly, may be a 
rather unusual thing to do (Liebkind, 1992).
Tajfel (1982a) suggested that one of the major benefits of Turner's SCT is 
its applicability to all manner of social groups - from small decision-making bodies 
to large-scale social categories such as religions or nations. It is suggested here that 
the applicability of SCT to large-scale social categories is still a matter for empirical 
validation, not least because there remain a number of conceptual problems with 
current formulations of the theory. We would like to suggest, for example, that 
Rabbie and Horwitz's (1988) distinction between social groups and social categories 
deserves greater attention. According to Rabbie and Horwitz (1988), a social group 
is a social entity within which members feel a sense of interdependence, whereas 
a social category is essentially a categorization of people who share at least one 
attribute in common. Whether or not interdependence is the crucial difference 
between groups and categories, it is argued throughout the course of the current 
discussion that some kind of distinction between groups and categories would be 
useful. The work of Emler and Hopkins (1990) for example, on the manipulation 
and negotiation of reputation in social groups, would seem to imply that there may
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be certain aspects of behaviour in social groups which might not characterize 
behaviour in terms of large-scale social categories which, of necessity, are more 
reified entities. The research described below, which focuses on national and 
European identity, may be considered, in part, as an attempt to examine the 
applicability of SCT to large-scale social categories.
1.4 Social Stereotypes
It is suggested here that TajfeTs notion of the social stereotype (Tajfel, 1981) should 
be considered as an integral element of his Social Identity Theory, and one which 
is highly compatible with the notion of social representations. For Tajfel, social 
stereotypes are shared conceptualizations of social reality - in particular, they 
constitute representations of social groups: the behaviours, attitudes, and so on, 
typically associated with the group in question. At the level of the individual, 
social stereotypes serve the twin functions of imposing an order on an otherwise 
bewilderingly complex social environment, whilst at the same time acting to 
preserve the individual's system of values.
However, as Tajfel's use of the prefix "social" implies, the fact that 
stereotypes come to be shared necessitates a social level of analysis to complement 
the focus on individual functions. Thus, Tajfel went on to discuss three social 
functions served by social stereotypes. He noted, for example, how social 
stereotypes may be utilized to help understand and explain complex events. 
Additionally, social stereotypes are crucially involved in the process of identity 
maintenance, via their function as providers of comparison dimensions for the 
achievement of positive group distinctiveness - they therefore serve a differentiation 
function. Finally, Tajfel postulated that social stereotypes serve a justificatory 
function, by means of which past, present, and future treatment of outgroups is 
legitimized.
It is important to note how Tajfel's notion of the social stereotype is one 
which accords much significance to the content of shared beliefs. Furthermore, it 
seems that such a conceptualization of stereotypes implies the need to go beyond
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the traditional trait-based analysis and measurement procedures frequently 
employed by social psychologists in the past (e.g. Katz & Braly, 1933), as well as 
the purely cognitive approaches which often dominate North American research on 
stereotypes (c.f. Stephan, 1985). Whilst the research described below makes use of 
a trait-based stereotype measure, its purpose is not to elicit the contents of social 
stereotypes, but instead to focus on some of the accentuation and comparison 
processes involved in stereotyping.
Recently, the notion of the differential salience of social identities (Oakes, 
1987) has drawn attention to the fact that social stereotypes are unlikely to be 
completely static entities. Hogg and Turner (1987) for example, suggest that social 
stereotypes are likely to be rather sensitive to the particular intergroup context, and 
there has been recent experimental evidence to support this assertion (Spears and 
Manstead, 1989; Haslam et al., 1992). We would like to suggest here that, whilst 
social stereotypes might possess a relatively stable core structure (and this remains 
a matter for further investigation), only certain aspects of the social stereotype will 
be salient in a particular intergroup situation. Furthermore, aspects of the social 
stereotype may be exaggerated in order to achieve positive distinctiveness in the 
current situation. One would therefore expect that the most significant aspects of 
a social stereotype in any situation, and those most likely to become salient, will 
be those dimensions best able to provide positive distinctiveness. Of course, this 
assumes that the intergroup context is one in which the outgroup(s) is a relevant 
comparison group. Additionally, different groups within a society have different 
access to the mass media and other symbolic forms which might help them impose 
a particular definition of the intergroup context. This highlights the fact that social 
stereotypes and social identities are intimately involved in differences of power (c.f. 
Deschamps, 1982). We also note with interest here how the suggestion that social 
stereotypes are situationally variable seems to fit-in quite comfortably with the 
arguments of discourse analysts and proponents of a rhetorical approach, 
concerning the variability of accounts (c.f. Billig, 1987; Potter & Wetherell, 1987).
If one accepts the notion of situational variation in social stereotypes, this 
carries with it the necessity to allow for the latter in one's research methodology. 
The research described below utilized an experimental manipulation in an attempt
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to assess the nature of this situational variance in stereotype content, and its 
implications for the elicitation of stereotypes in questionnaires. We would like to 
suggest that the question of whether there is any pattern to the variations observed 
in social stereotypes should also be an important topic for future research. The 
social cognition literature pertaining to social schemata (c.f. Crocker et al., 1984) 
would certainly suggest the likelihood of relatively invariant core structures, as 
does Abric's notion of the nucleus at the heart of social representations (Abric, 
1984).
1.5 Salience
Recently, there has been a long overdue re-awakening of interest in the question 
of the salience of social identities (Oakes, 1987). Working within Turner's 
(1982;1984;1987) Self-Categorization framework, Oakes (1987) proposed a 
modification of the model suggested by Bruner (1957) in which the salience of a 
particular category is determined by an interaction between cognitive structure and 
environmental stimuli. Specifically, Bruner suggested that salience is a function of 
Accessibility x Fit. Oakes suggests we may consider accessibility as the current 
significance of a particular social identity for an individual. Factors such as recent 
activation of the social identity, the positive contribution of the social identity to 
self-esteem, etc., are among the most significant determinants of accessibility. Fit 
represents the degree to which environmental stimuli can be categorised along 
dimensions in a way congruent with the particular stereotypes associated with the 
social identity in question. Thus, "fit" is not simply a function of the most 
distinctive categories in the perceptual field, but depends upon perceived 
differences being congruent with expectations. The salient identity in any situation 
is therefore considered to be that which maximizes accessibility and fit in the 
current situation.
Much work remains to be done in order to develop and validate Oakes' 
framework. At present, the salience model seems able to explain and predict 
categorization of out-groupers more efficiently than it can explain self­
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categorization. Perhaps the notion of our social identities varying in salience is 
most valuable for helping us conceptualize the functioning of the repertoires of 
different identities each individual is likely to possess. If our social representations 
(Moscovid, 1984), attitudes, stereotypes, and so on, fluctuate as our social identities 
fluctuate in salience, it seems clear, at least to the current researcher, that further 
development of our knowledge of the salience mechanism should perhaps be the 
primary objective of social psychologists working within SIT/SCT. Predicting when 
and by what processes our sodal identities become salient would greatly enhance 
the allure of the social identity paradigm, and open the way for an integration with 
theories of the attitude, social representations, and discourse analysis.
It is hoped that the research described below might highlight some of the 
situations and outgroups linked to the salience of national and European identities. 
We feel at this point the need to state our hope that much more work on salience 
in the future will be conducted outside of the restrictive confines of the laboratory. 
The laboratory experiment can be an excellent research tool for the "fine-tuning" 
of theoretical concepts and hypotheses, but in the early stages of exploratory 
research, it should at least be supplemented by ecologically valid research 
techniques.
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CHAPTER 2
A THEORETICAL BASIS FOR EXPLORING NATIONAL 
AND EUROPEAN IDENTITIES
2.1 National identity
Whilst enjoying a brief spell of popularity in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the 
topic of national identity has failed to attract the interest in Social Psychology 
which it has instilled in some of the other social sciences. Nevertheless, the social 
psychological work which has emerged in this area has often provided valuable 
insights and shown how nationalism can be studied at a psychological level of 
analysis. For example, Tajfel and associates' (e.g. Tajfel Sc Jahoda, 1966) early work 
on the development of national loyalties in children indicated that we seem to 
learn affective responses to our own and other nations before we have any concrete 
knowledge about them. Earlier, Floyd Allport (1927) had made the controversial 
claim that nationalism could be understood solely in terms of the early 
conditioning of favourable responses to national symbols - any other explanations 
of nationalism simply represented the "nationalist fallacy". To their credit however, 
Tajfel and associates preferred an altogether more social explanation, suggesting 
that at least our early images of nations are almost totally determined by the 
"propaganda environment" created by the mass media, parents, peer groups, and 
so on. It would appear that at an early age, we are more susceptible to the affective 
content of this informational data-base than any other aspects of the data.
In a later article, Tajfel (1970) noted how the issue of national and ethnic 
loyalties should be of central concern to social psychologists, not least because it 
raises questions relevant to many of the crucial debates within the field of 
psychology. Whilst Tajfel was never to develop his ideas about nationalism much 
beyond those expressed in this seminal paper, his conclusion that any study of 
nationalism must include an examination of nationalist ideologies and "collective 
representations" is well-taken, as is his plea for an inter-disciplinary approach 
which is not limited to the laboratory as a research environment. Following-on
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from Tajfel's suggestions, the research described below included an analysis of the 
social representations associated with national and European identities.
In fact, Tajfel's plea for an examination of the collective representations 
associated with national loyalties was not altogether original, for the 1960s 
witnessed a growing interest in what were variously termed national "images", 
"stereotypes", "ideologies", and "perceptions". Scott (1965) for example, focused 
specifically on the psychological aspects of international images, which he 
suggested consist of three interacting components - cognitive, affective, and 
conative (behavioural). One of the more interesting (although un-tested) 
postulations made by Scott was that common themes running through an 
individual's nation-images might represent a person's "world-view" - an ideological 
organizing structure representing views of world politics, history, and so on. It will 
be interesting to note whether the current research suggests evidence for such over­
arching conceptions of world affairs.
A further significant point raised by Scott, albeit rather obliquely, is the link 
between power and the diffusion of international images. It seems that certain 
groups in society are likely to attempt to disseminate international and national 
images which serve their own ends. Thus, for example, Scott notes how it may well 
be in the interest of a government, when engaged in a military conflict with 
another nation, to disseminate international images which are relatively simplistic, 
and which define the conflict in terms of "us" and "them". Such conceptions of the 
link between power and national/international images are compatible with Tajfel's 
(1981) analysis of the social functions served by social stereotypes.
Kelman (1969), taking a slightly different approach to Scott, attempted to 
elicit the psychological mechanisms behind personal involvement in the nation. For 
Kelman, the perceived legitimacy of the ruling elite of a nation is crucial in 
maintaining national loyalties. Like Tajfel (1970), Kelman noted how the ideology 
of nationalism serves to justify the existence of the nation-state and prescribe the 
relationship of the individual to that state. Those who adopt a sentimental 
orientation to their nation tend to endorse nationalistic ideologies, and to manifest 
a strong degree of affective attachment to their nation and its varied symbols. For
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those who do not internalize such ideologies, allegiance to the nation can be 
maintained via instrumental attachment, which focuses on role as national and 
citizen, rational analyses of the benefits associated with citizenship, and so forth. 
Interestingly, Hinkle and Brown (1990) have recently suggested the resurrection of 
Bales' (1950) similar notion of task versus socio-emotional orientation to the group, 
proposing that orientation may determine the kinds of comparison dimensions we 
utilize in the struggle to achieve positive distinctiveness. In a similar vein, 
Inglehart and Reif (1991) stress the utility of a homologous distinction between 
utilitarian and affective orientation, this time in terms of kinds of support for 
European integration.
It will be interesting to note whether there is evidence for different 
orientations to national and European identity in the current research. However, it 
should be noted that Kelman's notion of orientations is not unproblematic. At 
times, it can be difficult to perceive clear-cut boundaries between sentimental and 
instrumental orientations, and it is left rather unclear how stable one might expect 
such orientations to be. Bloom (1990) has made the additional point that Kelman 
leaves unspecified the probable motivational bases for the different kinds of 
orientations.
An extremely important aspect of Kelman's (1969) theorizing is the 
significance he assigns to the notion of nationalist ideology. Whilst we might prefer 
here to substitute the concept social representation (Moscovici, 1984;1988) for 
ideology, we retain Kelman's interest in socially constructed and shared 
interpretations of the nation and its relationship to individuals. In line with this 
approach, it may be constructive at this stage to briefly examine some of Goffman's 
ideas concerning the nature of identity. Studying those labelled as "mentally ill", 
Goffman (1959a;1968) noted how the assignment of such a label required the re­
adjustment of individual's "life-stories". Specifically, he suggested that individuals 
create narrative-like life-stories which have past, present and future elements. 
Generally speaking, it is psychologically beneficial if all three temporal 
components are in harmony (Breakwell, 1986), and thus we quite frequently re­
interpret and re-construe elements of our life-stories to achieve some kind of 
equilibrium. We would like to suggest the extension of this idea to social
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representations of the nation and national populace. In fact, sociologists like 
Anthony Smith (1991;1992) have also realised how national myths have an 
important temporal dimension. The notion that changes in identity require 
consummate changes in social representations, including re-interpretations of the 
past and the possible future, will be an important consideration when we come to 
examine European integration.
Samuel (1989a), taking a historical perspective on patriotism and British 
national identity, has also recognized the significance of the temporal dimension 
in national culture. In common with a number of other theorists, he points to the 
pervasiveness of individualism as a possible threat to national and other socially- 
derived identities. He suggests that an important aspect of British identity today 
is its focus on the tradition of the past It is noticeable, for example, how interest 
in national heritage seems to have increased in recent years, and how we seem to 
have developed a fascination with relics of the past, which has manifested itself in 
the current popularity of Victoriana, "classic" fashions such as Laura Ashley, the 
success of the heritage industry, and even in that epitome of British milieux, the 
garden (Samuel, 1989a).
For Samuel, this fascination with the national past, together with feelings 
of pride at the apparent depth and richness of national heritage and culture, may 
well serve to maintain British national identity in a potentially powerful, but 
dormant state. We should note that at the present time of writing, in the aftermath 
of Gulf-war nationalism, British national identity is likely to have been 
"resuscitated" from such a dormant state, perhaps to once again slowly fade into the 
background as patriotic fervour dissipates.
Ross Stagner (1967), in an interesting analysis of the psychology of 
nationalism, suggested that individual desires and needs are reflected in national 
identity. He argued, for example, that individuals tend to have a desire for 
autonomy, which is reflected at the level of the nation, by the doctrine of 
sovereignty. Similarly, Stagner contends that we have a desire for power, which is 
reflected in international power struggles in which we may enjoy vicariously, the 
power of the nation. Whilst Stagner's work may be criticized for its implicit
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reliance on Psychoanalytic theory, its underlying assumption that psychological 
aspects of attachment to the nation are worthy of study is an important one: after 
all, as Stagner emphasized, "Nations begin in the minds of men" (Stagner, 1967, 
p.vii).
The subject of pride in one's nation, and what form the latter might take, 
has gained some of the attention of social scientists, and is worthy of brief 
discussion since it is investigated in the current research programme. Almond and 
Verba (1963), who collected their data in 1959, found that their British subjects 
deemed the political system to be their primary object of national pride. For Shils 
and Young (1956), the combination of constitutional monarchy and political 
democracy were responsible for the creation of a moral consensus within Britain, 
and intimately bound-up with the maintenance of national identity. More recently, 
Topf and associates (1989), as the table below indicates, found that the primary 
object of British national pride in their survey was the monarchy, closely followed 
by scientific achievements.
A word of caution is in order regarding any possible comparisons between this 
previous research and the current questionnaire study. Whilst the earlier study of 
Almond and Verba utilized an open-response format like that utilized in the 
current study, Topf et al. had their respondents make choices from a list of pre­
defined categories. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note any changes over time 
apparent from the results obtained by the current study.
Common to many analyses of national identity, is the assumption that 
national symbols serve important functions. Kelman (1969) for example, noted how 
national symbols might be used by governments in attempts to increase the 
salience of national identity, and thus national solidarity. Presumably, the primary
% expressing national 
pride in: %
monarchy
scientific achievements 
welfare state 
Parliament
sporting achievements 
artistic achievements 
economic achievements
65
61
52
33
29
21
•oureai Topf «t (1.(1111, pill)
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means of achieving the latter would be via the mass media, although national 
military service would provide an alternative. In an interesting study, Opie (1985) 
also discussed how national symbols and nationally-manufactured products have 
a long history in marketing and advertising. Furthermore, it is interesting to note 
how Doob, in his lengthy treatise on patriotism and nationalism, frequently 
stresses the significance of national symbols diffused by the mass media, especially 
in terms of the role such symbols serve in maintaining the salience of national 
identity (Doob, 1964; see also Bloom, 1990). An extremely important point made by 
Doob, and one which is echoed throughout many chapters of this discussion, refers 
to the fact that these national symbols can be interpreted differently by different 
sub-groups within society. Thus, as Doob suggested, 'To comprehend patriotism 
and nationalism fully...it is necessary to observe in detail how the media of 
communication function not in general but within important groups of a society' 
(Doob, 1964, p. 44, our emphasis).
Clearly, the national territory is one of the most affect-laden symbols 
associated with national identity (Mitchell, 1981), not least because the spatial 
component is perhaps the most salient aspect of lay conceptions of "nation". The 
national flag is also a particularly potent symbol of a nation and its people 
(Lawson, 1963;1975) - it appeared regularly in the British tabloid press during the 
recent military conflict in the Gulf for example, and has a prominent presence in 
the North American schoolroom. Other symbols and images include the association 
of particular animals with nations. Chilton (1982;1988) for example, noted the 
implications of the "bulldog versus bear1' metaphor once utilized by the British 
Ministry of Defence to portray the relationship between Britain and the Soviet 
Union.
Kelman (1969) also noted with interest the frequent emergence of the family 
as a metaphor for the nation - note, for example, the use of "father/mother-land", 
"Mothertongue", etc. This may also be a further example of how we tend to think 
of nations in terms of people (Scott, 1965; Stagner, 1967). Thus, for example, the 
prominence of national leaders in our images of our own and other nations. One 
significant aspect of this personalization of nations is reflected in the British 
fascination with the royal family, who enjoy an extraordinary level of coverage in
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the British mass media. As Tom Naim (1989) points-out, there is a surprising lack 
of research into the nature of this apparent "royal romance". Kavanagh (1985) has 
also recognized the symbolic power of the British monarchy, suggesting that 
'Today the monarchy is the most prominent symbol in British public life and still 
stimulates popular emotions".
For Naim (1989), "Britain's royal symbolism has a specifically fetishistic 
character" which involves the "worship" of royalty as if it embodied the essential 
elements of the nation, and a taboo against criticism. The change in emphasis from 
king/queen to royal family  had the benefit that it allowed royalty to symbolize the 
larger family represented by the national community. There are indications that, 
contrary to intuition, royal ideology with its current focus on ordinariness, may act 
to enable the royal family to serve as prototypes in the sense implied by Social 
Identity theory. Thus, as Naim suggests, "They're just like us" also implies the 
converse: "We're just like them". Despite the unprecedented crises faced by the 
British monarchy in the early 1990s, national opinion polls continued to indicate 
overall levels of support for the institution of royalty itself. Furthermore, there are 
some indications from opinion data that the Queen herself has lost little of her 
apparent popularity, despite the well-publicised marital problems of her children.
It is interesting to note how Topf et al. (1989) found in their survey study 
that in Britain, the monarchy is more popular amongst women, the over-sixties 
rather than 18-24 year olds, and for those with "intermediate" or no qualifications, 
more than for graduates. Furthermore, Topf and associates found the monarchy to 
be more popular amongst Church of England members than people of other or no 
religious convictions. Finally, they noted how the monarchy is much more popular 
in England than in Scotland or Wales. We would suggest that these findings 
together lend weight to the hypothesis that social representations of the nation, and 
the choice of national symbols, may vary across sub-groups within British society. 
This also seems to support Zavalloni's (1973) contention that national identity is 
mediated by other identities.
More recently, Billig (1992a; 1992b) has collected data which seems to 
confirm the widespread popularity of the royal family amongst the British public
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Significantly, Billig also makes the point that the royal family is often construed 
as an essential element of British national identity, and one which engenders a 
considerable desire to resist change. Perhaps the most powerful evidence to support 
such conclusions, derives from the observation that many British subjects were able 
to utilize the royal family as a means of apparently attaining positive 
distinctiveness for Britain in comparisons made with other nations (e.g. the U.S.A.).
A study of national and international symbols and metaphors would hold 
much promise for an integration of social identity theory with the theory of social 
representations (Moscovici, 1984). For example, since the existence of "prototypical" 
group members seems such a crucial yet problematic aspect of social identity 
theory, one might endeavour to examine the national heroes and heroines created 
by the mass media, present in national mythology, folklore, literature, etc The 
truth of the matter is that social psychologists who turned to such phenomena 
would find they have already been subjected to detailed study by academics in 
other disciplines (see, for example, Samuel, 1989b). The task of the social 
psychologist thus becomes one of applying the social identity paradigm as an 
explanatory framework, to the existing body of research on national folklore and 
myth. It is hoped that a number of the open-ended questions included in the 
current research might elicit national symbols. Additionally, the degree of 
attachment to the national flag and anthem is assessed, and its relationship with 
identity variables examined.
The reader may be wondering whether we should locate nationalism as a 
phenomenon, in individuals or in society. The only acceptable answer can be that 
we must locate it in both. We are in agreement with Scheibe's (1983) argument that, 
whilst the particular manifestations of nationalism are likely to be temporally and 
culturally relative, the psychological mechanisms behind nationalism should be 
fairly stable and universal. Naturally, the latter claim is a matter for empirical 
investigation, and this is one of the reasons behind the cross-national nature of the 
current research project For Scheibe, national identity is perhaps the most crucial 
of all identities, since it establishes an individual's birthrights - the basic rights all 
citizens are entitled to. According to Scheibe, the birthright represents an 
institutionalization of a particular representation of human nature. As part of such
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a perspective, we may view nationalist movements as "searches for missing 
birthrights" (Scheibe, 1983, p.137).
The discussion so far has avoided the rather difficult question of actually 
defining "national identity". Whilst there is a growing trend within sociological 
approaches to focus on ethnicity, national and ethnic identities are not necessarily 
equivalent, as Smith has recently noted (A.D. Smith, 1991). In fact, Hewstone (1986) 
found interesting evidence that, whilst the Italians seem to rate the concept "Italy" 
as inferior to that of "Britain" or "German/' for example, they rate the concept of 
"Italians" as superior to "the British" or "the Germans" on a range of dimensions. 
There is therefore evidence that one's perceptions of the nation can be divergent 
from one's perceptions of the national populace. It may be useful to consider there 
to be two sets of social representations - one pertaining to the nation itself, and 
another set pertaining to the national population. The nature and possible 
interactions of these sets of social representations should perhaps be addressed by 
future research.
We would like to suggest a working social psychological definition of 
national identity as the self-categorization of an individual as a national or citizen 
of a particular nation, and the internalisation by the individual of this self­
categorisation AS A SOCIAL IDENTITY. This is, by necessity, an over-simplified 
conception of national identity, but a useful compromise for the purposes of the 
current theorising. Following-on from Tajfel (1974;1981) and Turner (1982;1984;1987), 
it is proposed that self-categorization and, crucially, social identification, as a 
national, leads to the internalization of the social representations, social stereotypes, 
etc., associated with the national group, together with the self-stereotyping of these 
perceptions. There are good indications that these representations and perceptions 
often include notions of a national territory, a body of historic national myths and 
memories, and notions of a cultural and political community (A.D. Smith, 1991).
As a vehicle for furthering our current understanding of social identity 
processes, the study of national identity seems particularly promising. It is not at 
all clear-cut, for example, whether SIT/SCT can be unproblematically applied to 
such large-scale social categories as race, gender, and nationality, especially since
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so many of the important experiments within the paradigm have tended to focus 
on transitory group memberships created by the experimenter (Lalonde et al, 1989). 
This issue is of particular significance for the SIT/SCT paradigm, since one of its 
most attractive aspects has been its supposed applicability to all manner of social 
groupings (Tajfel, 1982a).
Prior to the crystallization of Tajfel's ideas into his Social Identity Theory, 
Marisa Zavalloni (1973) had suggested that large-scale social categories such as 
gender and nationality are only experienced via the mediation of smaller, more 
concrete social groups. Her own research seemed to suggest, for example, that 
political affiliations seemed to mediate national identity. Interestingly, this kind 
of embedding of one social identity within another may also be reflected in the 
way regional identity may influence identity at the national level.
The consequences of this mediation of national identity remain to be 
examined by future research - there seem already to be good indications though, 
that being British for example, might mean something quite different to those who 
adhere to opposing political ideologies. Recently, Brewer and Schneider (1990), 
noting the difficulties facing environmentalists trying to encourage a sense of 
"global awareness", have suggested that large-scale social categories tend towards 
sub-grouping, and do not meet identity needs as satisfactorily as smaller-scale 
social groups. Yet whilst national identity may be mediated by our other social 
identities, this certainly does not mean that such an identity is impotent. Turner 
(1984) for example, was well aware of the intense emotions national identity can 
engender - these are particularly noticeable in times of war. Furthermore, Turner, 
like a number of other researchers, was impressed by the ability of national 
identity to unite a previously divided populace. For these reasons, he had no doubt 
that nations can and do constitute meaningful psychological groups, a conclusion 
which we readily endorse. The current research attempts to examine how national 
identity might be mediated, taking the specific examples of British and Italian 
identity. Clearly, the question of the applicability of the Social Identity paradigm 
to large-scale categories will require further detailed and varied examination.
2.2 Hewstone's (1986) study o f attitudes to the European Community
44
Given that European integration has been on and off the political agenda for a 
number of decades now, it is somewhat surprising to note the relatively scant 
attention social psychologists have paid to this subject area. Since Hewstone's 
(1986) detailed and thoughtful consideration of attitudes towards the European 
Community represents one of the most significant social psychological analyses of 
European integration to emerge in recent years, we will examine aspects of this 
study in some depth. It would seem that Hewstone's primary aim was to develop 
a model predicting overall attitude towards the Community. However, his 
monograph is noteworthy for its attempts to examine a number of related issues, 
such as national stereotypes, social representations of the European Community, 
and relevant work conducted in the other social sciences. Paradoxically, this very 
strength of Hewstone's work - namely its apparent scope - is also in some respects 
its weakness, since Hewstone does not show particularly well how stereotypes, 
identity, social representations, and attitudes might be interlinked. As Hewstone 
readily admits, his study does not show where these attitudes "come from” - i.e., 
how they are formed, how they might change, etc. There seem good reasons to 
expect attitudes to be linked to social identity processes. In particular, attitudes may 
well be learnt and internalized via the process of self-stereotyping (Turner, 1987). 
One might go on to predict that, as our social identities fluctuate in salience, so to 
do the related attitudes. Clearly, such ideas are in need of further empirical 
investigation, but are at least suggestive of how identity and attitudes might be 
interlinked (see also Hogg & Abrams, 1988).
It is worth briefly examining at this point, the responses of the British and 
Italian respondents in Hewstone's study, since the current research focuses on the 
same populations. It is of particular interest to note that Hewstone found his Italian 
respondents to have a more favourable attitude towards the E.C than the British. 
This result is in fact compatible with trends apparent in the European Community 
Eurobarometre series of opinion polls. This is doubly interesting since the Italians 
also appeared to be the most ethnocentric in terms of stereotyping and liking 
ratings. However, whilst the Italians rated their own nationality highly, they rated 
the other nations in the study more positively than their own. As mentioned earlier,
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this might suggest that, at least for the Italians, images of one's nationality and 
one's nation can be divergent - at least in terms of general evaluations. What is 
interesting to examine is whether this relatively inferior rating of the Italian nation 
by Italians may be linked in some way to their strong support for the European 
Community. Unfortunately, Hewstone's analysis does not allow us an 
understanding of what particular aspects of the Italian nation the Italians may be 
dissatisfied with.
Interestingly, Barzini (1983) had earlier suggested that the Italians were 
strong pro-Europeans since the European Community was seen as offering a 
possible alternative to unstable and often inefficient Italian governments. 
Hewstone (1986) also suggested that the Italians might support the E.C. strongly 
since they perceive it as good for Italy - there are indications, for example, that 
"objectively", Italy may be the only nation with net economic gains from the 
Community. Both Barzini and Hewstone's explanations of Italian pro-Europeanism 
would therefore suggest that the Italians do not perceive the E.C as an alternative 
to Italy, but rather as an institution which can strengthen the Italian nation, and 
make up for some of its faults. This interpretation is further supported by 
Hewstone's finding that national image and attitude towards the E.C. were 
positively correlated for his Italian respondents. We hope that the measures of 
national and European identity in the current study might further elucidate the 
nature of Italian support for the European Community.
In stark contrast to the Italians, the British, according to the Eurobarometre 
polls, are the only nation to have a large minority who believe the United Kingdom 
should actually leave the Community. Furthermore, in contrast to the Italians in 
Hewstone's study, for the British respondents, national image was negatively 
correlated with overall attitude towards the E.C. There are a number of indications 
that the issue of sovereignty is particularly salient to the British - in the 1979 
Eurobarometre for example, the British respondents were alone amongst their E.C. 
partners in expressing concern about the encroachment of the European Parliament 
upon Britain's national parliament
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Hewstone highlights at least four interlinked reasons for the relatively low 
levels of support for the Community in Britain. Firstly, he notes how historical 
factors such as the decline of the British empire may have encouraged the view that 
threats to Britain's sovereignty are indicative of how advancing European 
integration might further reduce the United Kingdom's power and prestige. One 
might also add that social representations linked to the time of the British Empire 
are likely to have considerable longevity, and to remain with us, and affect more 
recent representations of Britain and its current status, role in world affairs and so 
on. In other words, social representations associated with the time of the British 
empire may form the representational foundations into which modern-day views 
of Britain are anchored. Such a view is compatible with Crick's suggestion that 
Britain continues to have an exaggerated sense of power and importance as a result 
of the aftermath of the British empire (Crick, 1991). Hewstone also pointed to the 
long history of British distrust of the French - this will be significant if the British 
perceive France and the European Community to be closely associated with each 
other.
A further important point made by Hewstone is that British politicians past 
and present, who we may assume represent important "opinion leaders" (Lazarsfeld 
et al, 1944), have expressed anti-European sentiments more frequently and to a 
greater degree than in other European nations. There has certainly been heated 
political debate as to what Britain's role should be in a unified Europe. Such 
political debate is likely to have a significant effect upon the social representations, 
attitudes, and so on, expressed by the general public, since it continues to gain 
considerable media attention. We note with interest here, Hewstone's (1986) finding 
that Britain was the only nation in his study where political affiliation was 
significantly linked to attitude towards the E.C. Since the mass media of television 
and newspapers constitute the primary source of information on the E.C. and 
European matters for the general public, it becomes imperative to study the varying 
social representations being diffused in this way, and how they are internalized by 
individuals and groups.
We find it both disappointing and surprising that much of the work 
conducted in the social identity paradigm continues to ignore the mass media,
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especially since Turner himself suggested that one of the likely ways new identities 
might be internalized is via "persuasive communications" (Turner, 1987). Hewstone 
made a modest start by pointing to the way the mass media in the United Kingdom 
seem to encourage perceptions of the E.C. and European integration in terms of 
"gains versus losses". He also noted how the metaphors associated with the E.C. are 
often predominantly negative in evaluative undertone • witness "butter 
mountains","wine lakes","cod wars","bureaucracy", etc. It is however, rather 
disappointing to note how Hewstone seems to have reduced the richness of his 
open-ended questionnaire responses to a simple positive-negative affective 
dimension.
Clearly then, despite important historical and sociological factors, it is still 
highly valuable to investigate some of the social psychological reasons behind the 
apparently quite different orientations to Europe adopted by the British and the 
Italians. In the following chapters, some of the factors behind such differences will 
be explored, and it will be suggested that Hewstone and Barzini have perhaps 
stressed the instrumental elements of orientations towards Europe too greatly, 
especially when considering the Italians and their boundless enthusiasm for 
Europe.
2.3 Elements of European identity
One useful way to examine the psychological effects of European integration is to 
focus on changes in identity. If we consider national and European identities to be 
social categorizations in the Tumeresque sense, we might examine how these 
interact We might, for example, ask whether these categorizations/identities are 
consonant, dissonant, or indifferent? (Hofman, 1988). Guetzkow (1955) suggested 
that two identities can exist together harmoniously if each one furnishes compatible 
solutions to different needs. One conceptual problem with such issues concerns the 
level of analysis at which they are examined. Turner (1987), for example, defines 
the self-concept as "the set of cognitive representations of self available to a person" 
(Turner, 1987, p.44, our emphasis).
48
This would suggest that one level of analysis would be the individual- 
cognitive level, with the primary focus on "cognitive representations of self'. We 
would like to suggest that schema theory (e.g. Crocker et al., 1984), and especially 
the notion of schema perseverance, might in the future provide useful pointers as 
to the nature of changes in self-categorization at the cognitive level. For example, 
if we can treat national identity at one level of analysis as a schema-like construct, 
then schema perseverance would suggest that national identity might be quite 
difficult to change and modify. This is clearly an important issue, especially if the 
development of a European identity is dependent upon changes and modifications 
to national identity schemata.
There are numerous problems with a purely cognitive approach to social 
identity, not least of which is the danger of neglecting both its shared element, and 
likely association with social representations. However, it is certainly not being 
suggested here that social identity theory be reduced to a purely cognitive level of 
analysis. At the same time, we note the frequent dissociation of social and cognitive 
psychology with disappointment One of Turner's (1987) most crucial points was 
that the social (i.e. group membership) is represented in the cognitive. For this 
reason we actually see Turner's Self-Categorization Theory as a useful attempt at 
integrating cognitive and social levels of analysis. As Turner himself suggested, 
"...if the self is a cognitive system, then it is a socially mediated one, one that 
reflects and interacts with social relations" (Turner, 1988, p.115). The problem here 
is that it is somewhat debatable as to how far Turner has in fact managed to bring 
the social into his cognitive theorising. At present, it seems that SCT often remains 
overly-cognitive, although this certainly need not be the case.
Breakwell's (1986) illuminating analysis of threatened identities is also 
noteworthy here, since it is illustrative of how identity can be examined usefully 
at a variety of levels. As Doise continues to argue (Doise, 1988; Lorenzi-Cioldi & 
Doise, 1990), this kind of multi-level approach to social psychology is long-overdue. 
It remains to be seen whether future research will actually attempt an integration 
of the different levels, something which as yet remains to be achieved for the 
phenomenon of social identity.
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At the social level of analysis, socially constructed and shared interpretations 
of reality, which have been referred to as social representations (Moscovici, 1984), 
are of key importance for any study of European integration. It seems, for example, 
intuitively reasonable to hypothesize that the representations of European 
integration, the E.C., etc., circulating in the mass media and within social groups 
will have significant effects on national and European identity structures. 
Furthermore, it is likely that particular groups within a nation will endorse and 
attempt to circulate particular representations which serve their own ends. If 
national identity is mediated by smaller-scale identities as Zavalloni (1973) 
suggested, it is likely that particular sub-groups will have their own varying social 
representations of the nation, its people, customs, etc. This is just one example of 
how social representations are likely to be inherently linked to processes of social 
identity.
Whilst Tajfel and Turner's seminal 1979 paper on macro-level intergroup 
relations tended to focus on conflict between groups, it contains a number of useful 
conceptual tools for the current analysis of European integration. Thus, for 
example, it seems likely that perceptions of the permeability of national group 
boundaries will be significant for the question of whether a European identity 
might ever replace a national identity. In addition, the effects of what Tajfel and 
Turner referred to as social mobility belief structures, upon national and other 
social identities, seem likely to be significant, although there is as yet little 
published research on this issue, which is only now beginning to attract the interest 
of social identity theorists (c.f. Brown et al., 1991;1992). If a European identity was 
perceived as an alternative, rather than a complementary identity to national 
allegiance, then the Tajfel-Tumer framework would suggest that the conditions 
most likely to lead to the abandonment of national identity for a European 
equivalent would be:
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1. When national group membership boundaries are seen as 
permeable - i.e. leaving the group is perceived to be
a realistic option.
2. When a social mobility belief structure is accepted.
3. When the current intergroup structure is perceived to 
be unstable and illegitimate.
4. When a European identity is perceived as a realistic 
alternative to national identity.
5. When a European identity is perceived to serve social 
identity needs (e.g. self-esteem) more efficiently 
than national identity.
Clearly this is a simplistic framework, especially when applied to such a complex 
issue. Furthermore, the decision process behind a sub-group changing its identity 
may not be identical to the decision processes an individual utilizes. However, the 
above framework at least provides a starting-point for an analysis of the kind of 
factors which might influence the conscious decision to abandon national for 
European identity. It is of course, by no means being suggested here that the only 
way a European identity will be adopted is as an alternative to national identity. 
The point being made here is that the Tajfel-Tumer macro-social framework has 
some useful predictions if this were the case. Furthermore, we perceive the Tajfel- 
Tumer framework to be of value since it acknowledges the significance of social 
representations of the intergroup milieu.
Accepting that social representations of the nation, Europe, etc., are 
important determinants of any psychological aspects of European integration, it is 
interesting to note their apparent persistence and resistance to change (Moscovici, 
1984). Even if our perceptions of Europe and our own nations are undergoing 
change, these changes are likely to be mediated by our previous representations. 
As Moscovici (1984) argues, the unfamiliar, which is disturbing and threatening, is
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typically interpreted in terms of the familiar - this is the process of anchoring. It is 
interesting to note how the idea of an integrated Europe is far from a recent one, 
but has fluctuated in salience for thousands of years. This is an important point, 
and one indicative of the danger of focusing on social representations of the 
European Community to the exclusion of other relevant social representations. 
Whilst the European Community may be the major vehicle through which 
European integration is being achieved, social representations of Europe are likely 
to have been present for hundreds, if not thousands of years. Furthermore, 
European integration comprises a myriad of different aspects apart from the 
political, such as improvements in communication and transport networks (e.g. the 
Channel Tunnel), increased contact with other Europeans due to tourism, etc.
The application of the theory of social representations to the study of 
European integration might benefit the theory itself by encouraging an analysis of 
the processes through which social representations change. As mentioned earlier, 
we would like to suggest, as an extension of Goffman's (1968) analysis of changes 
in identity structure at the individual level, that changes in social representations 
are likely to involve re-interpretations of the past, present, and future, in order to 
make these temporal elements as congruent as possible. Changes in key social 
representations - such as those of the nation - are likely to have significant 
reverberations within a society, since social representations tend to be inter­
connected in a web of socially constructed meaning. Changes in especially central 
social representations might have consequences not unlike those proposed by 
Thomas Kuhn in his theory of paradigmatic change within scientific institutions 
(Kuhn, 1970).
Victor Turner's illuminating work on ritual (Turner, 1969) would also seem 
to be relevant here. Heavily influenced by van Gennep (1960), Turner noticed how 
changes in identity in many diverse societies seem to involve similar processes. For 
the individual, this often involves a period of liminality during which s/he leaves 
the social structure and enters a norm-less, role-less, state of limbo, possessing no 
definite sense of identity. Eventually, the individual re-emerges with a new identity 
- this "coming-out" process is typically marked by cathartic rituals in what have
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been called "primitive" societies. What is significant for the current discussion is 
Turner's suggestion that whole communities may pass through states of liminality.
It is interesting to postulate as to whether European nations are currently 
entering such a stage in which identities are being re-moulded and perhaps new 
identities formulated. Turner's analysis indicates that such processes of identity 
change tend to follow certain patterns for both individuals and social groups. 
Furthermore, his work suggests that we would be foolish to disregard the ritualistic 
aspects of nationalism in the Western industrialized world - military parades, 
national anthems, flag-waving, and so on.
It certainly seems to be the case that European and national identities are 
in a state of flux at present, with the fate of one being tightly bound-up with that 
of the other. Political and economic integration in Europe has given rise to new 
social constructions of reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1967), new social 
representations of Europe, some of which are compatible with existing notions of 
nationhood, others which seek to construe national and European identities as 
incompatible. At the same time, one should note that existing social representations 
of nations and Europe constitute a context and background within which new 
social representations may be negotiated. These new representations may therefore 
derive in part from a re-working of existing social beliefs.
A further interesting issue raised by the social identity paradigm refers to 
the question of out-groups. An assumption common to both Tajfel and Turner's 
accounts is that in order to identify oneself as a member of a particular group, there 
must be meaningful outgroups which allow for intexgroup comparisons. This raises 
interesting questions for the emergence of a European identity (presuming one does 
not already exist). It is hoped that the present study might elicit some of the 
relevant outgroups for a European identity. An analysis of the latter should then 
indicate at what level European identity operates. For example, is Europe compared 
with other nations or continents? The level at which social comparisons are made 
should also have noticeable reverberations in the social stereotypes and 
representations of Europe and the European Community circulating within society. 
If national and European identities operate at different levels in this way, they
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should not become salient at the same time (Turner, 1987). We would thus expect 
their salience to be linked to different situations, different outgroups, and so on.
If national and European identities operate at different levels (e.g. national 
versus continental) then this might be one way in which both identities may be 
internalized by individuals without any integrative problems. In fact, Turner's SCT 
and Oakes' model of salience both suggest that social identities linked to quite 
different and sometimes opposing social representations can be internalized by 
individuals without causing problems, as long as the two identities are seldom or 
never salient at the same time. If social representations are linked to social groups, 
it is therefore possible that individuals might adhere to quite different views about 
their own nation, European integration, etc., depending on whether their national 
or European identities are currently salient
Whilst commentators have tended to express guarded optimism for the 
prospects of a European sense of identity, some have argued that such an identity 
is within reach of most Europeans. Inglehart (1967,1970a,b, 1971,1977) argues that, 
at least amongst the youth of Europe, there is already evidence for a sense of supra­
national European identity. Inglehart's optimism appears to be shared by both the 
original architects of the Community, and the authors of recent official Community 
publications (see, for example, CEC, 1985), which appear to reflect the belief that 
a common European identity is already flourishing across Europe. To the extent 
that such assumptions might discourage further efforts to foster a Euro-identity, 
they might have the somewhat ironic effect of actually reducing the chances of such 
loyalties developing, if, as seems to be the case at least in Britain, they are in fact 
in a very embryonic and critical stage, marked by the possibility of both their 
development or their rejection.
2.4 British perceptions o f European integration: are we really Barzini's (1983)
"reluctant Europeans" ?
In fact, when one examines more closely the record of British public opinion on 
European integration and the EC, it becomes clear that the British have certainly
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not embraced the European dream with the same fervour as some of the other 
nations in the EC (e.g. Italy). Commentators such as Jowell and Hoinville (1976) 
have noticed the particularly emotional way in which the British have often sought 
to defend their sovereignty from the perceived threat posed by the EC (see also 
Eurobarom&tres 2,3,4, which show that the British tend to prefer action taken by 
sovereign states above collective European action). When Britain joined the EC in 
1973 it did so in a half-hearted manner, still mourning the loss of empire (Lewis, 
1987). Upon entry to the EC, only 37 per cent of Britons polled were favourable to 
efforts to unify Europe - half the level of support witnessed in France, West 
Germany and Italy (Inglehart & Reif, 1991). Perceptions that, following its late 
entrance into the EC, the UK was being asked to contribute unfair amounts to EC 
coffers, seemed to come to a head in 1975 when the first nation-wide referendum 
in the UK posed the question of whether the UK should remain in what was then 
usually referred to as the Common Market Some 17 million Britons voted "Yes", 
compared to 8 million who voted "No", apparently indicating a willingness to give 
the Common Market a chance to fulfil its ambitious aims.
Politically, the issue of EC membership and European integration has 
sometimes followed party political lines in Britain, however support has waxed and 
waned such that at times, there have been few clear-cut party differentiations (c.f. 
Himmelweit et al., 1981; MacFarlane, 1981). This floating, changeable quality of 
British political reactions to Europe appears to be mirrored in many attitudinal 
measures of British support for the EC (Pinder, 1991). Whilst far from clear-cut, 
Eurobarometre data indicate that there is a slight tendency, across the Community, 
for those on the left of the political spectrum to evince slightly more positive 
attitudes towards the EC and integration than those on the right (see, for example, 
Eurobarometre #34).
Despite a perceptible long-term trend indicative of increasing British 
support for the EC, Eurobarometre surveys almost always show the British as 
possessing a markedly lower level of attitudinal support for both the Community 
and integration, than most of the other EC member states (see also Hewstone, 1986). 
Pinder (1991) has recently suggested, for example, that Britain usually has a ten per 
cent mean deficit from the rest of the Community in enthusiasm and support for
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the EC and integration. It should not be forgotten, however, as Hewstone (1986) 
stresses, that there always seems to be net support for the EC in Britain. Whether 
this is a trend set to continue indefinitely is something of a moot point Hewstone, 
himself usually eager to stress that the British are far from anti-European, 
nevertheless recently concluded that "there is a lack of a reliable reservoir of 
support for the Community in the U.K." (Hewstone, 1991, p.82). Recent polls seem 
to indicate a slight wane of British support for the EC - for example, Eurobarom&tre 
data for December 1990 (Eurobarometre #34) indicated that only 53 per cent of 
Britons polled thought EC membership was a good thing, this being the lowest 
level of support of all EC nations. More recently still, in the wake of Danish doubts 
about Maastricht, an N.O.P. opinion poll conducted for the Independent on 
Sunday, 20th September, 1992, indicated that if the British had a referendum on the 
Maastricht treaty, they might reject it by a margin of at least two to one. Of those 
polled, 47 per cent indicated that they would reject the treaty, whilst only 24 per 
cent supported i t  In-keeping with the general trends apparent in the 
Eurobarometre, Conservative voters were more strongly opposed to the treaty than 
respondents of other political orientations. Despite the problems inherent in 
judging the import of such public opinion surveys, what is perhaps most noticeable 
is how the results of this survey were quite congruent with those of other surveys 
conducted at the time, all of which tended to indicate a rather low level of pro- 
Europeanism amongst the British.
One of the problems, however, for the current discussion of European 
identity, is how questions of identity tend to have been overshadowed by questions 
of attitudes and opinions, especially in the otherwise highly informative 
Eurobarometre surveys (see Hewstone 1991 for an evaluation of the Eurobarometre 
and its merits). When the question "Do you ever think of yourself as a citizen of 
Europe? Often, sometimes or never?" was posed in polls 17 and 19, large groups of 
respondents (especially in the UK) "never" thought of themselves as citizens of 
Europe. A further question of interest asked whether respondents felt the EC 
should go further than a single Common market. It is interesting when considering 
the possibility of a European identity being embraced by the British, to note how 
some 57 per cent of British respondents in 1988 suggested that the EC should NOT 
go furtherthan a common market, with only 24 per cent being in favour of going
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further. This contrasts sharply with the responses of the Italians in the 1988 poll, 
which indicated that some 71 per cent were in favour of going beyond a common 
market, with only 12 per cent being against such moves (c.f. Eurobarometre 29). 
Compatible results were obtained by Fumham & Gunter (1989) in a study of British 
adolescents' attitudes towards the EC and integration. Here, it emerged that such 
adolescents were not at all keen on closer political union, instead feeling that the 
economic dimension of integration was the most important
Eurobarometre and similar attitudinal indices provide data which is broadly 
congruent with that emerging from Sotirakopoulou's detailed analysis of social 
representations of European integration (SotirakopouLou, 1991). In general, 
Sotirakopoulou found little evidence to suggest even an embryonic sense of 
European identity in Britain. In-keeping with Hewstone's results, she discovered 
that her measures of nationalism were negatively correlated with views about the 
EC and unification. Britain was often perceived as superior to most or all other 
nations, with other European nations appearing to constitute outgroups for the 
British, in the sense that comparisons were made with such nations. Furthermore, 
in a valuable analysis of Times and Guardian representations of European 
integration, Sotirakopoulou found that these two newspapers, supposedly of rather 
different ideological inclinations, in fact carried rather similar, and, significantly, 
negative, representations of the EC and integration. Certainly, it was discovered 
that the public concern with issues of sovereignty was mirrored in the press - 
according to Sotirakopoulou, social representations in the press suggested that 
"National identity and sovereignty, as well as everything that the British people are 
proud of, are in danger from the E.C. " (Sotirakopoulou, 1991, p.180).
2.5 A European identity for the 90s?
It seems to be the case that the majority of commentators remain somewhat 
sceptical as to the likelihood of a harmonious integration of national and European 
identity. Barzini (1983) for example, concluded that national pride continues to 
remain a powerful obstacle to European integration, and even where respondents 
in survey studies seem to evince pro-EC attitudes, this does not necessarily signify
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an accompanying sense of European identity. It is significant that Hewstone (1986), 
himself often eager to stress British attitudinal support for the Community, 
nevertheless suggests that the forging of a supra-national identity seems "a 
Herculean task" (Hewstone, 1986, p.13).
Social Psychologists interested in this area face the added problem that the 
expression of pro-European opinions may in some instances be due to impression 
management (Hewstone, 1986). However, while there may be evidence which 
suggests societal pressures to express a pro-European orientation, this does raise the 
question of whether the mere expression of such opinions, even in the context of 
impression management, might actually lead to their eventual internalization (cf. 
Bern, 1972). We note with interest Turner's (1987) likening of self-categorizations 
to attitudes, and his suggestion that acting in terms of a particular self­
categorization might lead, in time, to its internalization.
Within the International Relations and Political Science literature, there has 
grown the tendency to stress the importance of "identity units" (e.g. Burton, 1985) 
and how the interests of the latter tend to be overlooked by large-scale bodies such 
as nations and supra-national organizations. Many theorists remain ambivalent as 
to whether international communities can be made to serve the needs of such 
identity groups and thereby maintain a sense of equilibrium and world order. In 
fact some go as far as to suggest that even nation-states, in their modem multi­
ethnic guise, are inherently unstable structures, which should be replaced by de­
centralized modes of organization.
Anthony Smith (1991;1992) suggests that national identity is unlikely to ever 
be fully replaced by a wider European identity. For Smith, allegiance to one's 
nation provides the most fundamental of all social identities. This, he argues, is 
largely because it offers a common bond between all members of a nation, and in 
addition, offers citizens a stable sense of continuity and immortality. Whilst 
recognizing the globalizing tendencies of world-spanning corporations and 
advances in communications technology, Smith suggests that the latter have the 
paradoxical effect of actually enhancing the salience of national identities, since 
they simply involve a re-working of existing national symbolic forms. For Smith,
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perhaps the only way a European identity might develop is through the 
development of "pan-nationalism", which involves movements to create a single 
cultural and political community on the basis of states perceived to belong to a 
"family of cultures" which share certain cultural characteristics. Such a European 
identity would probably complement, rather than replace, national sentiments.
A.D. Smith (1992) suggests that further research examine the representations 
of Europe and European integration in the mass media, history textbooks, and so 
on, and criticizes attitude-oriented and similar research which has focused on 
individuals. What he fails to realize is that, whilst a study of symbolic forms is 
extremely valid, we also need to gain an awareness of how individuals and social 
groups interact with, interpret, and attempt to disseminate, symbols. Furthermore, 
a focus on the interactions between social groups and symbols would seem valid - 
as Tajfel (1984) argued, we can not gain a clear understanding of social myths 
without at the same time examining the intergroup milieu in which they were 
disseminated, and in which they are currently interpreted.
It is also important to appreciate that national identity and its related 
symbols, mythology, and so on, are represented in the minds of individuals as well 
as in the pages of newspapers and books. As Farr (1993) has suggested, in order to 
appreciate social representations, we must sample both culture and cognition. 
Perhaps one of the most important challenges facing Social Psychology in the 
future will be to develop our understanding of how individual and society interact 
We would like to suggest that one of the theoretical tools which might point us in 
the right direction is the Social Identity paradigm.
In the next chapter the rationale for an empirical investigation of some of 
the issues raised earlier is presented. This research should be interpreted as an 
element of the wider research programme described throughout the following 
chapters. The aim of this programme is to provide a social psychological 
perspective on at least some of the issues arising from European integration. This 
has the additional benefit of enabling us to raise some crucial questions pertaining 
to the current adequacy of the social identity paradigm. The perspective associated 
with the empirical research shortly to be described is meant to complement that
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provided by sociologists, political scientists, and other researchers, to add a piece 
to the jigsaw, but not to replace or be an alternative to this existing body of 
research.
Chapter 3
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THE DESIGN OF THE CROSS-NATIONAL QUESTIONNAIRE
3.1 METHOD
The research reported herein derived from a questionnaire-based study 
investigating aspects of national and European identity. The questionnaire was 
administered to university and polytechnic students in the United Kingdom and 
Italy.
3.2 PROCEDURE
3.2.1 Respondents
Respondents were university and polytechnic students from a variety of disciplines, 
mainly studying at the various colleges of the University of London in the U.K., 
and at the University of Bologna in Italy. Due to the nature of the questionnaire, 
it was necessary to limit respondents to current British and Italian nationals. Owing 
to the limited resources available it was not possible to utilize sampling 
procedures, and it should be recognized that the respondents did not constitute a 
representative sample of students, or the general population (British and Italian 
nationals). Respondents were recruited on a volunteer basis, with the research 
described as "a questionnaire-based study of opinions about Britain/Italy and 
Europe". Overall there were 107 British respondents (63 female, 44 male), and 137 
Italian respondents (99 female, 38 male). Demographic data for these respondents 
is presented in Chapters 4 & 5, respectively.
It is fully acknowledged here that the use of students may introduce a 
source of error when attempting to make generalisations to the population as a
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whole - Sears (1986) amongst others has suggested that university students may 
constitute a far from representative sample. However, a case could be made for 
utilizing students when attempting to make generalizations about the nature of 
social processes which are postulated to exist across whole societies. Whilst the 
questionnaire discussed here explores aspects of identity and stereotypes, its focus 
is intended to be primarily directed at the consummate processes involved, rather 
than the contents of stereotypes, or the evaluative nature of attitudes in the 
populations concerned. This argument can also be extended to counter some of the 
problems associated with the possibility of volunteer bias (Rosnow & Rosenthal, 
1970).
Since we have identified some of the possible pitfalls involved in utilizing 
a student sample, it is perhaps fitting to highlight how there are also some benefits 
attached to the use of student respondents. The current questionnaire, for example, 
makes use of open-ended questions. Whilst university students are 
unrepresentative of the population in that they are likely to be more literate, at the 
same time this means that significant differences in open-ended responses between 
respondents should not be simply due to differences in linguistic ability. It may 
also be the case that university students might be more likely to actually have 
attitudes, opinions, etc., about European integration, and not be simply responding 
in a random fashion, as Converse's (1964;1970) notion of the non-attitude might 
suggest
In fact, Hewstone (1986), who utilized a similar student sample in his 
research on closely related issues, made the more general point that the use of 
university students allows us to control for the effect of different levels of 
education, as well as providing a relatively homogeneous age distribution. He 
found the results of his own research to be broadly comparable with that of the 
European Community Eurobarom&tre ongoing survey, which is based on much 
larger, representative samples. In the case of the current study, the use of a 
university student sample also allows us to make comparisons with Hewstone's 
(1986) data. It is, of course, recognized that comparisons with previous research 
must be interpreted with caution, not least because the current questionnaire differs
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in a number of respects from those typically utilized in this subject area (Turner 
& Krauss, 1978).
3.2.2 Pilot work
The questionnaire utilized in the current study was the product of extensive 
background research into the social science literature associated with the 
phenomena of national and European identity, stereotypes, European integration, 
and the general functioning of identity processes. Whilst some specific hypotheses 
were under consideration (detailed in the corresponding description of the related 
questions), in general the questionnaire served an exploratory function, not least 
because many of the issues explored had not been raised by previous researchers 
in quite the way done here. As the biologist Szent-Gyorgyi (1971) has emphasized, 
such exploratory endeavours are a crucial aspect of the scientific approach. This is 
even more so in cases where the particular subject domain is broad and only poorly 
defined.
In fact, it is suggested here that the subject focused on in the current 
research deserves a variety of different methodological approaches in recognition 
of both its significance and its likely complexity. In any case, as Campbell and 
Stanley (1966) have emphasized, a multi-method approach has the benefit of 
allowing one to assess the concurrent validity of one's research findings, and to 
appreciate and allow for the error variance associated with the particular research 
techniques employed. Therefore, the aim of the current research is to elicit some 
of the processes associated with social identity functioning, in the hope that these 
processes might be isolated and studied in greater depth at a later date using 
different research methods.
Pilot studies were utilized to assess, amongst other things, the 
appropriateness of question format and wording, the adequacy of instructions, and 
the average completion time for the questionnaire. Both interview and self­
completion methods of administration were utilized during pilot work, with 
interviews proving especially important in assessing question comprehension. Pilot 
work was conducted in both the U.K. and Italy, and the functions served by the
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pilot work in terms of the cross-national aspects of the questionnaire are examined 
later in the discussion.
3.2.3 Method of Administration
The questionnaire, as mentioned earlier, consisted of both open and closed-type 
questions, and was specifically constructed with self-completion in mind. Whilst 
self-completion often presents a number of difficulties (Moser & Kalton, 1971; 
Hoinville et al., 1978) - especially when open-ended responses are required - many 
of the associated drawbacks may be overcome through the use of a "controlled 
administration" technique, as utilized for the purposes of the current study. Such 
a technique involves respondents (who in this case were volunteers) completing the 
questionnaire in fairly large groups in a quiet, distraction-free environment, and 
under the supervision of the researcher and his/her assistants. This technique at 
least ensures that the respondent who completes the questionnaire is the one 
expected by the researcher, that the respondent completes the questionnaire alone 
(i.e. without discussion with peers), and that it is completed in a single sitting. 
Additionally, preliminary pilot work indicated that the controlled administration 
method also seems to discourage the answering of questions out of sequence, and 
to reduce the willingness to read ahead of the current question. Self-completion has 
the added benefit of reducing the possible error variance associated with 
interviewer bias. This is not to say, however, that self-completion questionnaires 
are necessarily free from what might be labelled "reactivity bias". The U.K. and 
Italian data were collected simultaneously between March and April of 1991 using 
the controlled administration procedure outlined above.
It should be noted that, in order to facilitate controlled administration of the 
questionnaires within lectures, some of the questions contained in the British 
questionnaire were omitted from the Italian variant. This meant that the section 
prefixes which appear in the Italian questionnaire may be different to those 
pertaining to the English-language version. The sections omitted from the Italian 
questionnaire are indicated in the discussion below.
3.2.4 Cross-national aspects of the research
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The problems associated with the design of cross-national research are numerous 
(see, for example, Manaster & Havighurst, 1972). Where a questionnaire is to be 
utilized, the most intractable problem will be that of adequate translation (Peabody, 
1985; Davis & Jowell, 1989). As Davis and Jowell (1989) emphasize, one can never 
be sure that a particular question, word, or phrase, will have an equivalent 
meaning when translated into another language and ultimately answered by a 
subject in another country.
For Brislin (1970), after a detailed investigation of translation procedures, the 
crucial factor appeared to be the quality of the translators, who ideally would be 
familiar with both the relevant languages and the nature of the material to be 
translated. In a later work, Brislin went on to argue that it is generally better for 
translators to translate into their preferred language (Brislin, 1976). The 
recommended remedy against nonequivalence in translation is back-translation by 
a second bilingual, with comparisons being made between the back-translated text 
and the original, and differences being discussed by the translators.
The Italian version of the current questionnaire was translated by a team of 
bi-lingual social scientists in both the U.K. and Italy. Particular attention was paid 
during pilot work in Italy to the comprehension of the questions, and by the end 
of the piloting period the researcher and translators were satisfied that the Italian 
and English versions of the questionnaire were as equivalent as the restrictions of 
the two languages would allow. Most of Brislin's recommendations were 
implemented where possible, for the purposes of the current research. These 
included the use of psychologists as translators, translating into preferred language, 
and the implementation of back-translation. In addition, key issues, such as the 
nature of national and European identities, were addressed by means of multiple 
measures, meaning that a weak translation of one question should not invalidate 
all information pertaining to the issue (c.f. Hofstede, 1980).
When cross-national differences emerge in comparative studies, considerable 
caution must be exercised in their interpretation, since they may simply represent
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measurement error associated with translation problems, or simply differences 
between the languages. Furthermore, a whole myriad of cultural, demographic, and 
other variables may be operating on the data, adding further complexity to any 
possible interpretation.
Nevertheless, as long as the researcher is aware of the consummate problems 
inherent in cross-national research, the technique may prove extremely valuable, 
especially where the researcher is interested in making comparisons between 
nations. The latter allow some kind of assessment of the extremity and strength of 
attitudes, stereotypes, etc. (Davis & Jowell, 1989). Such an argument is often crudely 
expressed by the belief that we can gain a better understanding of our own society 
or culture by comparing it with others. Another useful function of cross-national 
research is in testing the cross-cultural validity of social psychological theories or 
hypotheses. As Shweder and Bourne's (1984) revealing study emphasizes, we 
should not take the cross-cultural validity of major psychological theories (in this 
case attribution theory) for granted (see also, P.B. Smith, 1991). It is hoped, 
therefore, that the current study will, amongst other things, provide some measure 
of the cross-cultural validity of social identity theory.
3.2.5 Questionnaire design and construction - some eeneral points
The reactive nature of questionnaire administration is fully acknowledged by the 
current researcher. Whilst scientific knowledge concerning questionnaire design 
and construction remains rather limited (Schuman & Kalton, 1985), the relevant 
literature was consulted during the design of the current questionnaire. For 
example, the usual practice of guaranteeing respondent anonymity was followed. 
It is generally recommended that the anonymity of respondents be stressed, in the 
hope that this might encourage more open self-reflection and reduce the possibility 
of social desirability bias (Manstead & Semin, 1988). For similar reasons, the 
questionnaire instructions stressed that there were no right or wrong answers to the 
questions, and that the researchers were only interested in opinions and beliefs. It 
is, however, interesting to note that recently, doubt has been raised as to the 
pervasiveness of social desirability bias in questionnaires (Schuman & Kalton,
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1985) - there is evidence, for example, that we tend to think that our own attitudes 
are shared by others. It was also hoped that by stressing the important contribution 
to knowledge respondents were making, this might enhance motivation to complete 
the questionnaire diligently, answer the questions fully, etc.
The questionnaire made use of both open and closed-type question formats. 
One of the justifications for using both formats was the exploratory nature of the 
research - it might well be argued that such exploratory endeavours are most 
informative if conducted from a number of perspectives. Open-ended questions 
allow respondents to utilize their own language and subjective frame of reference 
to formulate an answer. In doing so, they may allow respondents to communicate 
beliefs which might not have been elicited by closed-type questions (Hoinville et 
al., 1978). The rich data provided by such answers can then be subjected to content 
analysis (see, for example, Holsti, 1969; Weber, 1990), and the language utilized 
studied for the use of metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) and other linguistic 
devices. Disadvantages associated with open-ended questions include the low 
reliability and long time-period often associated with the coding of responses.
Closed-type questions suffer less from coding problems, but must be most 
carefully worded. Furthermore, the interpretation of answers to closed-type 
responses must proceed with caution, since in this kind of question the researcher, 
rather than the respondent, has defined the frame of reference in which the 
question is answered. As Schuman and Kalton (1985) argue, the tendency to forget 
the latter can be considered an example of the fundamental attribution error (Ross,
1977). Since neither open nor closed questions are problem-free, it was deemed 
preferable to utilize both types in the spirit of the multi-method approach proposed 
earlier - the use of multiple indicators for a construct is often a recommended 
strategy for reducing unwanted response effects.
It was not feasible during the course of the current research to allow for or 
investigate question order effects. Where possible, question order was designed to 
minimize boredom (by interspersing different question formats) and the 
consistency bias sometimes associated with order effects. It is worth noting 
however, that Schuman and Kalton (1985) came to the conclusion that order effects
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are not necessarily common or pervasive, and that in any case, it is rather difficult 
to control for them.
Pilot work indicated that the questionnaire took on average around 40 
minutes to complete (30 minutes for the shorter, Italian variant). Whilst the 
questionnaire text may seem quite long, separate sub-sections and sectional 
question numbering were utilized to help reduce the apparent length of the 
questionnaire as recommended by Hoinville and associates (1978). Additionally, the 
use of back-to-back printing reduced its perceptible length.
3.2.6 The questionnaire; section-by-section breakdown
There were in fact three variants of the English questionnaire, due to an 
experimental-type manipulation involving different combinations of stereotype 
questions. These variants are briefly described below and discussed more fully in 
the description of section C of the questionnaire.
Variant 1: Section C.1 asks respondents to rate the British 
Section C.2 asks respondents to rate the Italians
Variant 2: Section C asks respondents to rate the British
Variant 3: Section C asks respondents to rate the Italians
There were no other differences between the variants of the questionnaire.
Section A
This section contains seven fixed-response questions of an identical format, 
designed to tap different aspects of national identity. For the purposes of the 
questionnaire, national identity was treated as an example of one of Turner's self­
68
categorizations (Turner, 1987). The questions are similar in format to those typically 
used in the semantic differential scale (Osgood et al., 1957) in that they combine 
both verbal and diagrammatic dimensions. A seven-point response scale was 
utilized, with responses providing quantitative measures of national identity.
Question 1, which asks respondents how much they feel British/Italian, and 
question 5, focusing on the perceived importance of national identity, might be 
linked to Oakes' (1987) notion of accessibility discussed earlier, or may equate as 
a more general measure of the current salience of national identity. (Oakes, 1987; 
Hofman, 1988). The notion of feeling a strong attachment to other group members 
tapped by question 2 is typical of many theories of identity and group formation 
(e.g. Tajfel, 1974; Lewin, 1948), and similar questions are often used in studies of 
social identity (e.g. Brown, 1978). Questions 3 and 7 might be interpreted as tapping 
the affective aspects of national identity, and as such are important for the 
traditional Tajfellian definition of social identity (Tajfel, 1974).
Question 4 on perceived similarity to the average British/Italian is 
interesting since we might predict different results depending on whether or not 
Codol's (1975) P.I.P. effect (discussed earlier) is operating. If this were the case, the 
"first among equals" motivation might lead to respondents with high levels of 
national identity as measured by the other questions in this section, but a low 
perceived similarity with the average British/Italian.
Question 6 is interesting in that it could tap a number of rather different 
concepts. The Tajfel and Turner approach to social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979;1986) would suggest that strong national identity will be associated with the 
belief that one's own views about Britain/Italy are those of most British/Italian 
people - i.e. the group's normative beliefs. However, if Zavalloni's (1973) suggestion 
that we encounter national identity through the mediation of other identities is 
correct, then we might not expect views about Britain/Italy to be perceived as 
shared by all Britons/Italians, but just those who are members of the mediating 
identity group. Alternatively, Codol's P.I.P. effect might explain the response that 
one's own views about Britain/Italy are not shared by most other Britons/Italians.
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Section B
The questions contained in this section are complementary to those in section A, 
and focus on some of the qualitative aspects of national identity. Questions 1 and 
2 examine what makes respondents pleased to be, or regret being British/Italian. 
It is hoped that answers to these questions might shed light on the social 
representations linked to national identity - whether, for example, respondents 
seem to mention people rather than other attributes of the nation itself.
Question 3, which asks for examples of typical Britons/Italians is an attempt 
to elicit in-group prototypes (Turner, 1987). It is of particular interest to note 
whether the prototypes given represent individuals or groups, and whether they 
include prototypical deviants or "black sheep" (c.f. Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988) as 
suggested earlier in the discussion.
It will also be of interest to compare the affective tone of responses to all 
three questions with the responses to the national identity measures in section A. 
Should these questions produce interesting responses it might encourage social 
psychologists working within the social identity theory framework to appreciate 
the value of utilizing both open and closed-type question formats. The questions 
in this section could readily be adapted to another identity group besides that of 
nationality.
Section C (this section was omitted from the Italian study)
The contents of this section, which was concerned with national and international 
stereotype processes, varied depending on the particular version of the 
questionnaire :
Version 1: This version contained two separate sections. The first section, C.1, 
presented respondents with a list of ten trait adjectives, and asked them to estimate 
what percentage of their own national populace possessed each trait This question 
is virtually identical to that used by Hewstone (1986), with the only difference
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being a slight change in the wording of the instructions, and the addition of an 
importance-rating task at the end. Hewstone's format was utilized in order to allow 
a direct comparison with his data, and therefore some indication of any possible 
chronological changes which might be occurring. It is, however, noted here that the 
interpretation of this kind of comparison must be undertaken with care.
Whilst the limitations of trait-based approaches to stereotypes have been 
emphasized throughout this discussion, this type of format is used here in order 
to study the processes behind stereotype functioning, rather than the actual 
contents of stereotypes themselves, which are perhaps more amenable to open- 
ended question formats. The instructions for section C.1 made it clear that 
respondents would, after rating their own nationality, be given the task of rating 
a foreign nationality (the Italians). It was hoped that these instructions would make 
the comparative nature of the task salient to respondents while they were rating 
their own and the foreign nationality. Section C.2 goes on to present respondents 
with the task of rating the foreign nationality on the same set of adjectives. It is 
postulated here, following the earlier discussion of stereotypes, that the stereotypes 
elicited in this comparative context are likely to be different to those elicited in a 
non-comparative context In particular, it is predicted that respondents will 
accentuate those traits thought to be most important in differentiating their own 
nationality from the Italians (c.f. Hogg & Turner, 1987).
Whilst any foreign nationality could have been chosen for section C.2, 
Hewstone's (1986) results indicated that the British seem to differentiate themselves 
quite strongly from the Italians, at least in terms of likeability. Furthermore, 
research into national stereotypes also suggests that the British perceive their 
national character as quite different to the "Latin" temperament exemplified by the 
Italians (see, for example, Peabody, 1985). This being the case the Italians were 
used as examples of a foreign nationality in section C.2.
Version 2: This version only presented respondents with the task of rating their 
own nationality group on the ten adjectives.
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Version 3: This version only presented respondents with the task of rating a foreign 
nationality group (the Italians) on the ten adjectives.
Section D (this section was omitted from the Italian study)
This section of the questionnaire required respondents to rate how well each of the 
ten trait adjectives presented in section C could be said to describe their own 
character. It is hoped that by this stage in the questionnaire, respondents' most 
salient social identities will be their national identities. This being the case, it is 
anticipated that self-stereotypes will be influenced by national identity. Again, it 
is the processes involved in this self-stereotyping procedure (Turner et al., 1987) 
which are our primary focus. In particular, it is interesting to examine the 
similarities between national and self-stereotype ratings, and the possible 
interactions between these ratings and the national identity measures contained in 
section A. The Tajfel-Tumer social identity approach would predict that a strong 
national identity should be associated with self-stereotyping of the perceived 
national attributes. However, as suggested earlier, Codol's (1975) P.I.P. effect may 
prove a mediating influence here. Whilst this question keeps to the Hewstone-type 
format, it was not in fact posed by Hewstone in his own study (Hewstone, 1986).
Section E (this section was omitted from the Italian study)
Respondents are requested in this section to rate each of the ten trait adjectives 
from sections C and D on an evaluative dimension. Again, this task derives from 
Hewstone's (1986) earlier study and keeps closely to his original format, which in 
this case involves seven-point scales with anchoring labels of "extremely good" and 
"extremely bad". Answers to this section allow the responses to the stereotype 
questions in sections C and D to be scored for evaluative content, as described in 
Chapter four.
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Section F
In this section respondents are presented with the task of rating pairs of concepts 
in terms of similarity, on the standard seven-point rating scales used in previous 
sections of the questionnaire. The concepts included in the task were: Myself; 
Britain; Italy; France; Germany; and The European Community. Whilst the task 
might seem intuitively rather difficult and ill-defined, previous research (e.g. 
Liebkind, 1982) has shown that the similarity-rating approach is generally 
straightforward for subjects and quite promising in eliciting interesting results. In 
addition, pilot work for the current questionnaire failed to elicit any problems with 
the similarity judgement task. All possible combinations were presented, allowing 
for a multidimensional scaling analysis (MDS) of the responses. Such an analysis 
will prove especially useful in assessing aspects of the representations of the 
European community, respondent's self concepts, and so on. The inclusion of self, 
Britain, and Italy will allow for the study of possible associations between 
stereotypes and similarity measures, whilst the inclusion of France and Germany, 
the other two members of the "big-four" of the E.C., allows a comparison with 
Hewstone's (1986) stereotype measures. The inclusion of the European Community 
as a concept allows for the study of possible associations between the similarity 
judgements and European identity as measured by section H.l. of the 
questionnaire.
Section G
The two open-ended questions in this section focused on the perceived role of 
one's own nation in Europe, and the role of Europe in world affairs. Both questions 
examine aspects of the social representations of one's own nation, Europe, and the 
European Community, held by respondents. They may also tap a wider ideological- 
type structure such as that of world-views (Scott, 1965) discussed earlier. It is also 
hoped that answers to these questions might elicit outgroups for national and 
European identity.
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Section H.1
The questions in this section are concerned with European identity. They are 
identical in every way to those in section A, apart from the substitution of the 
words "Europe" and "European" where applicable. The inclusion of separate 
measures of both national and European identities in the questionnaire allows for 
a number of comparisons to be made. As discussed earlier, for example, Hewstone's 
(1986) earlier work suggests that British and European identity may be negatively 
correlated, whereas there is evidence for a positive correlation between Italian and 
European identity. Similarly, it will be of some interest to note the relationships 
between the similarity judgements and identity measures, as well as the qualitative 
answers to section G on the role of one's own nation within Europe, and Europe's 
role in world affairs.
Section H.2
The two open-ended questions in this section attempt to examine whether 
particular significant others or reference groups are perceived to share the 
respondents' views about their own nation and Europe. In particular, it is hoped 
that responses might shed light on Zavalloni's (1973) contention that other groups 
serve to mediate our national identity, by at least identifying the kind of groups 
likely to fulfil this mediating role. Similarly, responses will be of relevance to 
Brewer and Schneider's (1990) assertion that large-scale social categories tend 
towards subgrouping.
Question 3 is a variant of the routine voting intentions-type question, with 
the addition of instructions allowing respondents to answer with a "not vote" 
response. Schuman and Kalton (1985) have suggested that in general, answers to 
this type of question prove quite successful predictors of actual voting behaviour. 
Question 4, which utilizes the seven-point fixed response scale common to other 
questions, focuses on the perceived importance for respondents of their political 
beliefs. It will be of some interest to examine possible differences in national and 
European identity across different political groupings, as well as the relationship
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between these differences and the perceived importance of political beliefs. As 
mentioned earlier, whilst Zavalloni (1973) suggested that political beliefs have an 
important relationship with national identity, Hewstone (1986) found that political 
beliefs were only significant for his British sample. It will therefore be interesting 
to note whether the current research supports the assertions of Zavalloni or 
Hewstone.
Section I
The questions in this section concentrate on respondents' attitudes and opinions 
about the future of Europe and European integration. All the questions are of the 
fixed-response variety, and stick closely to the formats already used in previous 
sections of the questionnaire.
Question 1 utilizes Hewstone's (1986) exact wording and format to assess the 
respondent's overall attitude towards the European Community. The researcher 
thought it interesting to also include an identically-worded question on overall 
attitude towards European integration (question 4), in order to assess how closely 
related the responses would be to those for question 1.
Questions 2 and 3, which examine interest in European affairs and 
frequency with which respondents discuss European matters with other people, are 
perhaps especially open to social desirability bias (c.f. Hewstone, 1986). It is 
however, worth noting that one might at least expect respondents who express a 
reasonable degree of interest in European affairs to actually possess attitudes about 
Europe, thus perhaps negating the possibility of responses merely linked to non­
attitudes (Converse, 1964;1970). Furthermore, one might reasonably expect the 
attitudes associated with subjects discussed frequently with others to represent 
salient and important attitudes for the holder (c.f. Eiser & van der Pligt, 1983).
Question 5 was intended to elicit the compatibility between respondents' 
views about their own nation, what it represents, what its future should be, etc., 
and their views about Europe. One would hope that responses to this question will
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be associated with attitudes towards European integration and the European 
Community, as well as the general national and European identity measures.
Question 6 examines respondents' reactions to the hypothetical replacement 
of their own national anthem and flag with a European Community equivalent. It 
is hoped that the relationship between responses to this question and responses to 
the identity measures might shed light on the significance of symbols in the 
identity process, as discussed earlier.
Questions 7a and 7b are concerned with examining respondent's 
commitment to a European super-state. The inclusion of these questions was 
suggested by a number of studies which have indicated that favourable attitudes 
towards European integration tend to diminish when the possibility of integration 
is defined in concrete terms, using examples, etc. The inclusion of a separate sub­
section measuring how certain respondents are about how they would vote in a 
referendum concerning a European super-state provides a measure of whether 
attitudes, etc concerning European integration are fairly crystallized, or remain in 
something of an early developmental stage, not unlike Victor Turner's (1969) 
previously discussed state of "liminality".
Question 8 examines how much respondents feel their national populace 
have gained from membership of the European Community. Hewstone (1986) 
interpreted favourable responses to this type of question as indicating utilitarian 
support for the European Community, and found utilitarian and affective support 
to be the most significant predictor variables in his model of overall attitude 
towards the European Community. It will thus be of some interest to note the 
significance of responses to question 8 in terms of their contribution to the 
prediction of overall attitude towards the E.C.
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Section J
In this section, respondents are requested to provide their age, sex, country of 
origin, and current nationality. In addition, question 5 asks respondents to list any 
newspapers currently read.
Section K
The final section invites respondents to make any comments regarding the 
questionnaire, placing particular emphasis on comprehension difficulties. As 
suggested by Hoinville et al. (1978), respondents were informed by the instructions 
at the beginning of the questionnaire, that space was provided for comments and 
criticisms in this final section. Obviously, responses to this final section were paid 
especially close attention during the self-completion trials conducted as pilot work.
The results of the questionnaire study are presented separately, for the 
British and Italian data. This is congruent with Kuechler's (1987) recommendations, 
which are to focus on the data for each nation separately, and then to move on to 
cross-national comparisons at a later stage. Thus, in Chapter Five, the Italian data 
are discussed, but comparisons are frequently made with the data emerging from 
the British questionnaires. It is this British data which will be our focus of 
attention in the next chapter.
Chapter 4
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The cross-national questionnaire data -1; the British
4.1 SELECTED RESULTS & DISCUSSION
4.1.1 Demographic data
Table 1 below provides details of basic demographic data pertaining to the current 
study.
Table 1 - Demographic data for British respondents (1991 study) 
QUESTIONNAIRE VARIANTt
count %
1 (rate British only) 38 35.5
2 (rate Italians only) 29 27.1
3 (rate both) 40 37.4 (n-107)
SEX: AGE:
count '%
Mean: 22 years
Female 63 58.3 Mode: 18 years
Male 44 40.7 Range: 18-48 years
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN?
count %
Groat Britain 101 94.4
Other 6 5.6
PREDICTED VOTE IN GENERAL ELECTION:
Frequency Percent
CONSERVATIVE 34 31.8
GREEN 8 7.5
LABOUR 23 21.5
SDLP/LIBERAL 18 16.8
(NOT VOTE) 15 14.0
(MISSING DATA) 9 8.4
Total 107 1 0 0 . 0
4.2 FIXED RESPONSE QUESTIONS
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4.2.1 Section's (A) and (H.1): British and European identity
Preliminary analysis of descriptive statistics indicated that all of the British identity 
variables have means close to the neutral scale point of 4, or towards the positive 
British identity end of the scale. It should be emphasised quite strongly that, due 
to the limited resources for data collection available, the term British identity could 
not be broken down into possible constituent elements, such as separate English, 
Irish, Scottish, and Welsh, or indeed, regional, identities (see, for example, Crick, 
1991; Parek, 1989). This does not mean that we assume here a homogeneous British 
identity, but rather that the broad focus of the current research precluded analysis 
of how British identity might contain sub-identities of this type.
Means for the European Identity variables also tended to converge on the 
neutral scale point of 4, perhaps reflecting the documented tendency of 
questionnaire respondents to avoid the extremes of bi-polar scales (Hoinville et al.,
1978).
Principal Components Analysis
In order to examine the relationships between the British identity variables, a
Principal Components Analysis (PCA) was conducted, with a Varimax rotation, on
the section A variables. A summary of the results obtained is presented in Table
2 below.
%
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Table 2 - Summary of PCA results for section Ax British identity
The PCA extracted 1 component/factor with an Eigen value of 4.228, 
which accounted for 60.4% of the variance; variable loadings on this 
component were as follows:
Variable Loading
A1 .841
A2 .828
A3 .845
A4 .637
A5 .821
A6 .745
A7 .698 (n*107)
(since only 1 component was extracted, rotation was not possible)
An examination of Table 2 above indicates that all British identity variables load 
highly and positively on the extracted component, which would therefore lend 
itself to the intuitive label of "British identity". This conclusion is supported by an 
analysis of the correlation matrix (presented in Table A, Appendix (A.1)) which 
indicates that all British identity variables correlate highly, in a positive direction, 
and significantly (2-tailed p <.001 for all correlations).
We note with interest how variable A4, which referred to the perceived 
similarity of the respondent to the "average British person" had the lowest loading 
of any variable on the component. An analysis of the correlation matrix in Table 
A also indicates that the correlations between this variable and the other British 
identity variables tended to be lower than those observed for the other variables. 
One may recall from the previous chapter, that it was suggested that responses to 
this question might indicate the presence of a P.I.P or "superior conformity of the 
self' motivation (Codol, 1975). Thus, relatively low levels of perceived similarity 
to the "average British person" might not reflect low levels of British identity.
The presence of the P.I.P. effect is surely linked to the ideology of 
individualism (Ichheiser, 1949) which seems pervasive in Britain and other Western 
nations. The results obtained in the current study are inconclusive and merely 
suggestive of the need to allow for P.I.P. and similar effects in measures of social 
identity. The similarity measure did not possess the lowest component loading for 
the European identity analysis, for example. There are, in conclusion, at least
80
preliminary indications that Turner's (1987) suggestion that self-stereotyping leads 
to group members perceiving themselves as interchangeable exemplars of the 
category might be inaccurate when P.I.P. motivations are in effect.
A PCA was also conducted, with the same specifications, on the European 
identity variables contained in section H.l. An inspection of Table 3 highlights 
that, as for section A, the European identity variables may be described quite 
parsimoniously by a single underlying component upon which all contributing 
variables load highly and positively. Similarly, the correlation matrix (Table 6, 
Appendix (A.1)) indicated that all European identity variables correlate highly, 
positively, and significantly with one another (2-tailed p <.001 for all correlations).
Table 3 - PCA results for section H.l: European identity
The PCA extracted 1 component/factor with an Eigen value of 4.593, 
which accounted for €5.6% of the variance; variable loadings on this 
component were as follows;
Variable Loading
HI .854
H2 .752
H3 .868
H4 .827
H5 .862
H6 .807
H7 .681 (n«107)
(since only 1 component was extracted, rotation was not possible)
Reliability analysis
Since both the British (section A) and European (section H.l) identity variables 
seemed to be described well by single underlying components, it was decided to 
calculate reliability measures to further investigate the usefulness of each 
component as a scale. As can be seen from Table 4, both the British and European 
identity variables seem likely to form reliable scales. A frequently used measure 
of the reliability of a scale is Cronbach's Alpha, which Kline (1986) has described 
as "the estimated correlation of the test with another test of the same length from 
the item universe". As indicated in Table 4, coefficient Alpha meets the usual
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criterion of 0.85 specified for psychometric tests, for both the British and European 
identity scales.
Table 4 - Reliability analyses for sections A and H.l
(British) (European) 
n>107 mean inter-item correlations: section A section H.l
.532 .594
corrected item-total correlations:
Al: . 7 6 6 HI: . 7 8 6
A 2 : . 7 4 1 H2: . 6 5 6 -internal consistency reliability-
A3: .7 6 5 H3: . 803
A 4 : .5 2 2 H4: . 748 Cronbach's Alpha: A*.882 H . 1 - . 9 0 6
A 5 : .736 H5: . 8 0 0
A 6 : .6 4 1 H6: .732 Standardized
A 7 : .598 H7: .586 Item Alpha: A s . 888 H . I s . 911
Whilst the results presented above are promising for the construction of scales to 
measure British/national and European identity, there are a number of conceptual 
problems involved in measuring social identities, as outlined earlier in Chapter 
One. It was not feasible in the current study to calculate split-half reliability, nor 
was it feasible, or deemed theoretically valid, to ascertain test-retest reliability, 
since this contradicts the assumption of salience discussed earlier.
Researchers who utilize measures of the "strength" of social identities must 
recognize that the results obtained must be treated as temporally relative. However, 
one useful application of such strength measures is to verify whether experimental 
or other manipulations intended to make an identity salient have succeeded. In 
addition, longitudinal studies focusing on fluctuations in the salience of social 
identities might be extremely valuable if they help us develop a knowledge of the 
mechanisms and processes behind such fluctuations. Such longitudinal studies 
would ideally combine subject-oriented research with mass media and "cultural" 
analysis.
Since the theoretical basis of the current investigation was that social 
identity is likely to be a complex, multidimensional construct, further analyses 
focused both on the separate identity variables and scores on composite British or 
European identity scales. Clearly, this question of whether social identity can
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adequately be encapsulated by a single construct is one which requires detailed 
investigation in the future. However, as some of the results shortly to be discussed 
indicated, reducing a potentially multi-dimensional construct to a single scale can 
mask the relationships between individual variables and other theoretical 
constructs (see also Garza & Herringer, 1987; Hinkle et al., 1989).
In addition, the current results raise the question of whether a single scale 
might be developed which could be utilized for the measurement of any social 
identity. This is an issue for further research to address, but is interlinked with a 
number of other themes which emerged in Chapter One. For example, for a single 
social identity scale to be feasible, we must assume that all social identities involve 
the same underlying dimensions and processes. The latter is certainly a claim made 
by the SIT/SCT paradigm, and one which is supported by a large body of research 
(c.f. Hogg & Abrams, 1988). However, as we suggested earlier, the unproblematic 
application of the Social Identity paradigm to all manner of social groups should 
not be taken for granted. A theme which will emerge as this discussion progresses, 
is that Social Identity Theoxy may need modifying in order to adequately 
encompass aspects of large-scale social categoxy membership.
Whilst there are likely to be numerous difficulties involved in developing 
a general social identity scale, such a scale would perhaps prove useful in wide- 
ranging studies where social identity is but one aspect of the research focus, and 
thus a short, succinct measure is required. However, we remain doubtful as to the 
potential use of such scales. As the current research indicates, social identities are 
intimately associated with social representations. This being the case, the utility of 
a single, quantitative measure of social identity is clearly limited.
Correlations between identity and other relevant variables
Table 5 below details the correlations between the British identity variables and 
four other variables which were theoretically likely to be associated with them.
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Table 5 - Correlation matrix for section A variables with 
DEXT, E10, FI, AND 16.
British Identity varle&les
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7
DEXT . 4 1 1  
p— . 0 0 0
. 452  
p a . 0 0 0
. 5 0 3
p a . 0 0 0
. 352  
p a . 0 0 0
. 5 3 3  
P a . 000
. 4 6 7  
P a . 000
.518
p a . 0 0 0
E10 . 4 3 6
p— . 0 0 0
. 4 8 1  
p a . 0 0 0
. 4 4 1  
p a . 0 0 0
. 423  
p a . 0 0 0
. 5 4 1
P a . 0 0 0
. 4 5 3  
P a . 000
.514
p a . 0 0 0
PI . 6 3 5
p s . 0 0 0
. 5 8 0
p a . 0 0 0
. 6 6 8  
p a . 0 0 0
. 6 3 2  
p a . 0 0 0
. 6 2 8  
p a . 0 0 0
. 5 4 1
P a . 0 0 0
. 508  
p a . 0 0 0
16 - . 4 2 8
P « . 0 0 0
- . 3 1 4
P a . 0 0 1
- . 5 4 2
p a . 0 0 0
- . 3 2 4
p a . 0 0 1
- . 5 5 4  
p a . 0 0 0
- . 3 9 0
p a . 0 0 0
- . 4 6 0
p a . 0 0 0
(Pearson Product Moment Correlations)
(all probabilities are 2-tailed)
DEXT= "HOW WELL YOU THINK 'EXTREMELY NATIONALISTIC' DESCRIBES YOU" 
E10 -EVALUATIVE RATING OF "EXTREMELY NATIONALISTIC" AS A TRAIT 
FI -SIMILARITY RATING OF "BRITAIN-MYSELF" (X/7)
16 -IN FAVOUR/AGAINST REPLACEMENT OF BRITISH FLAG & ANTHEM
As indicated in Table 5 above, one may note that all seven of the British identity 
variables correlate significantly and positively with how well subjects felt the label 
"extremely nationalistic" described themselves. Similarly, all British identity 
measures correlate significantly and positively with evaluative ratings of the trait 
"extremely nationalistic", indicating that, as British identity increases, evaluative 
ratings of the trait "extremely nationalistic" become more positive. Whilst not 
examined in the current study, such results are suggestive of the possible links 
between language use and social identity, which are already well documented (see, 
for example, Giles & Johnson, 1981). There seem to be good indications that the 
linguistic labels we use in order to describe ourselves both reflect, and are 
influenced by, our social identities (see also Hogg & Abrams, 1988). The same 
pattern of significant and positive correlations was observed for the variable 
measuring the perceived similarity between Britain and "myself', perhaps 
suggesting that the conceptual "closeness" of these concepts is reflected in level of 
national identity.
A significant but negative association was discovered between all British 
identity variables and the variable examining support for the replacement of the
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British flag arid anthem by European Community equivalents. This indicates that 
high levels of British identity are associated with increasing unwillingness to have 
the British flag and anthem replaced. Thus we find support for the contentions of 
many commentators that national symbols are intimately related to national 
identity (c.f. Bloom, 1990; Doob, 1964; A.D. Smith, 1991).
We would like to suggest that the flag and anthem of a nation are likely to 
be particularly potent symbols since they are intimately involved in nationalistic 
ritual. The national flag seems an especially central symbol, since in a single visual 
image it is able to encapsulate the nation and what it stands for. The anthem serves 
a similar function in the auditory modality. In the case of Britain, the national 
anthem also serves the purpose of confirming the intimate links between the 
British nation and royalty. Symbols such as the flag and anthem of a nation, which 
can apparently encapsulate the social group, are perhaps especially significant for 
large-scale social groups, since they provide a focus and a concrete image of what 
is potentially a reified and diffuse entity. It should be noted, however, that the 
questionnaire administration closely followed the Gulf conflict which the British 
mass media tended to present as a victory for British and allied forces. Thus, the 
current study's finding that attachment to the flag and anthem are related to 
national identity, might in part be a reflection of the salience of these symbols in 
mass media reporting of the Gulf war.
However, a link between national identity and symbols is in keeping with 
much previous research and, we would argue, unlikely to be a temporal artefact 
This is not to say that the salience of national symbols will not fluctuate with 
differing mass media attention. We would suggest the latter is in fact quite likely.
Table 6 details a similar correlation matrix, this time examining associations 
between the European identity measures and variables likely to be correlated with 
them.
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Table 6 - Correlation matrix for section H.l variables with 
F4 AND F15.
Europe em identity variables
HI H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7
F4 .161 .150 .210 .233 .104 .214 .334
p*.098 p*.122 p*.030 P* .016 ps.286 P-.027 p*.000
F15 .404 .484 .520 .397 .494 .427 .340
p>.000 p*.000 p* .000 p>.000 pa.OOO ps.000 p>.000
(Pearson Product Moment Correlations)
(all probabilities are 2-tailed)
F4 *SIMILARITY RATING OF "U.K.-E.C(A/7)
FI5^SIMILARITY RATING OF "E.C.-MYSELF" (X/7)
One may note from Table 6 above that European identity measures H3, H4, H6, and 
H7 correlate significantly and positively with the perceived similarity between the 
United Kingdom and the European Community. However, the magnitude of the 
observed correlations is low, signifying that other variables are responsible for a 
large part of the variance. All seven European identity variables correlate 
significantly and positively with the perceived similarity between the E.C. and 
"myself', although the magnitudes of these correlations are less than those 
observed for the association between British identity and question Fl. Nevertheless, 
the results for British and European identity, taken together, would seem to suggest 
that the cognitive "proximity" of the concepts "self' and "Britain / the E.C." are 
related to the strength of British/European identity.
British versus European identity
In order to compare the pattern of overall responses on the British and European 
identity measures, a with in-subjects design Multivariate Analysis of Variance 
(MANOVA) was conducted, the results of which are summarized in Table 7 below.
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Table 7 - MANOVA comparing British and European identity 
(n-107)
Overall multivariate effect (Plllais Test):
Value-.504 F-14.503 D.F.-7,100 Sig. of Fx.001
Significant univariate effects:
A1 v HI "To what extent do you feel British/European?"
Meanst British-5.075 European-4.131 F(l,106)-21.335, Sig of Fx.001
A2 ▼ H2 "To what extent do you feel strong ties with other 
British people/Europeans?"
Means: British-4.495 European-4.000 F(l,106)-6.040, Sig of F-.016
A4 v H4 "How similar do you think you are to the average 
British/European person?"
Means: British-3.673 European-4.075 F(l,106)-5.064, Sig of F-.026
A7 ▼ H7 "When you hear someone who is not British/European 
criticize the British/Europeans, to what extent 
do you feel personally criticized?"
Means: British-4.178 European-3.290 F(l,106)-17.930, Sig of Fx.001
From an analysis of Table 7, one may observe that the overall multivariate effect 
is highly significant, indicating a significant overall difference between British and 
European Identities. An examination of the means indicated that in general, British 
identity is significantly stronger than European identity. However, the univariate 
results in Table 7 above should be consulted for a more detailed understanding of 
the differences. From the latter it emerges that British is significantly higher than 
European identity specifically on questions Al/Hl, A2/H2, and A7/H7.
Variables Al/Hl may perhaps be regarded as a measure of the current 
salience of the identity: thus the results would suggest national identity was more 
salient for respondents than European identity. We would suggest that at the time 
of the study, this probably reflects the status of European identity as a rather 
obscure and as yet poorly defined "cognitive alternative" (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979;1986) to national identity.
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Respondents who indicated feeling strong ties with other Britons/Europeans 
(variables A2/H2) were arguably expressing sentimental rather than instrumental 
attachments (Kelman, 1969). Similarly, one might suggest that this question 
measures Bales' (1950) notion of socio-emotional orientation to the group. The 
current results would seem to indicate that the respondents expressed a 
significantly greater level of socio-emotional attachment to the national, rather than 
European, membership group. In some ways this is to be expected, in as much as 
a socio-emotional orientation is likely to be linked to attachments to symbols, 
which are perhaps more salient and accessible at the national than European level. 
Furthermore, the responses to the open-ended questions, which are examined at 
length later in this discussion, seemed suggestive of an instrumental orientation to 
European identity, with a focus on Europe as a geographical and political, rather 
than cultural, entity. If, as A.D. Smith (1991;1992) suggests, the British in time come 
to perceive a truly "European" culture, then this might be reflected in a change 
from an instrumental to a socio-emotional orientation to European identity.
The observed pattern of responses to variables A7/H7 indicates that 
respondents felt more personally criticised when Britain, rather than Europe, was 
the subject of criticism. This result is in-keeping with the general superiority of 
British over European identity in the current data.
Interestingly, respondents also reported feeling more similar to the average 
European than the average British person (A4 v H4). We suggest that this is 
perhaps an indication of how European identity is more general and diffuse than 
British identity. Thus, it may well be the case that respondents felt they could 
maintain a sense of "individuality" while still accepting they are similar to the 
average European. This apparent desire for individuality was in fact expressed in 
a number of the responses to the open-ended questions. We would suggest, 
following Shweder and Bourne (1984) that this is likely to be a culturally relative 
phenomenon, perhaps indicative of Western industrial society, and reflective of a 
pervasive ideology of individualism (Ichheiser, 1949; Farr, 1990). In fact, the likely 
impact of individualistic beliefs on social identity construction is a subject we will 
return to in future chapters.
Do British & European identities vary zvith political affiliation?
88
A between-subjects MANOVA was conducted in order to examine whether British 
and European identities might fluctuate with political affiliation. The analysis 
focused solely on Labour and Conservative voters, thus representing both ends of 
the traditional left-right political dimension. Tables 8 and 9 present the significant 
results for British and European identity respectively.
Table 8 - MANOVA examining British Identity across vote
(n-57; Conservative-34, Labour-23)
Overall multivariate effect (Plllais Test)s
Values.301 p (exact)*3.010 D.P.=7,49 Sig. of F=.010
Significant univariate effectst
A1 "To what extent do you feel British?"
Means: Con-5.765 Lab-4.478 F(l, 55) -15 .637, Sig of Fx.001
A3 "To what extent do you feel pleased to be British?"
Means: Con-5.176 Lab-4.043 F(l,55)*8.978, Sig of F« .004
A5 "How important to you is being British?"
Means: Con-4.500 Lab-3.348 F(l,55)-6.351, Sig of F- .015
A6 "How much are your views about Britain shared by other 
British people?"
Means: Con-4.441 Lab-3.913 F(l,55)-4.555, Sig of F- .037
A7 "When you hear someone who is not British criticize the
British, to what extent do you feel personally criticized?"
Means: Con-4.853 Lab-3.304 F(l,55)-8.736, Sig of F- .005
Con * Conserva tlve Party Lab* Labour Party
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Table 9 - MANOVA examining European Identity across vote
(n-57; Conservative-34, Labour-23)
Overall multivariate effect (Plllais Test):
Values.299 F (exact)*2.897 D.F.-7,49 Sig. of F-<.025
Significant univariate effectss
HI "To what extent do you feel European?”
Means: Con-3.647 Lab-4.652 F(l,55)-5.407, Sig of F-.024
H2 "To what extent do you feel strong ties with other Europeans?” 
Means: Con-3.706 Lab-4.783 F(l,55)*6.295, Sig of F-.015
H3 "To what extent do you feel pleased to be European?”
Means: Con-4.412 Lab-5.609 F(l,55)-10.628, Sig of F-.002
H5 "How important to you Is being European?”
Means: Con-3.441 Lab-4.609 F(l,55)-5.306, Sig of F-.025
Con-Conservative Party Lab-Labour Party
From an examination of Table 8 above, it is apparent that there is a significant 
overall multivariate difference between the level of British identity expressed by 
Conservative and Labour voters. The univariate analyses indicate that the 
significant differences occur specifically on variables Al, A3, A5, A6 and A7, all of 
which indicate higher levels of British identity for Conservative compared with 
Labour voters. This lends support to Zavalloni's (1973) finding that political 
affiliation tends to mediate national identity. What the current results suggest, is 
that level or strength of British identity varies across political affiliations. Further 
research should perhaps examine whether this is reflected in differences at the 
level of social representations, attitudes, and so on, pertaining to the nation.
An examination of Table 9, which pertains to European identity measures, 
indicates that we have again discovered a significant multivariate difference 
between Conservative and Labour voters, this time on European identity measures. 
One might recall from Chapter Two, that Eurobarometre data suggests that one
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might expect there to be a slight tendency for Labour voters to evince a stronger 
sense of European identity than Conservative voters. The univariate results support 
such a difference, suggesting that for European identity measures 111,112,113 and 
H5, Labour voters express a significantly stronger European identity than 
Conservative voters. This result is also congruent with Hewstone's (1986) discovery 
that political affiliation affected attitude towards the E.C. for his British 
respondents, as well as recent research conducted by Lyons and Sotirakopoulou 
(1991). Thus, there is evidence that both British and European identities may be 
mediated by political affiliation. This finding does require further examination, 
especially since the question on which it was based was not intended to be a direct 
measure of political identity, but simply a measure of voting intentions. However, 
as we shall see in later chapters, there are strong indications that political 
affiliations often are networked with national and European identities, at least in 
the case of the British.
Should further research support the current findings, it would suggest that 
the social identity paradigm may need modification if it is to be applied to national 
and European identities > and perhaps any large-scale social identity. Specific 
attention might, for example, be given to how this kind of association Or 
networking of identities affects the salience mechanism, social stereotypes, and the 
self-stereotyping process. Furthermore, in the case of national and European 
identities, there is no reason why there might not be other social id.entities which 
act as mediators, such as regional or ethnic identity. Such mediating identities need 
not act as barriers to national identity. The Italian example indicates how regional 
identity and national identity can co-exist (Barzini, 1983). However, what does seem 
likely is that these mediating identities might determine the ,,flavour,, of national 
identity, in terms of the particular national stereotypes, customs, prototypes, etc., 
adhered to.
It is worth stressing that we are not siding with Brewer and Schneider's 
(1990) aigument that large-scale social groups are not able to serve social identity 
needs particularly well. This remains a matter for future investigation, suffice to 
say that the finding that other identities might mediate national identity, does not 
imply that national identity itself does not serve identity needs. As a number of
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other authors have indicated, it is likely that there are certain times when national 
identity may well be an extremely potent provider of security, self-esteem, and a 
sense of continuity/stability over time (c.f. Stagner, 1967; A.D. Smith, 1991).
Do British & European identities vary across sex?
Once again a MANOVA analysis was conducted, this time investigating whether 
British and/or European identity vary across sex. It is virtually impossible to have 
strong a priori hypotheses about the role of sex on national and European 
identities, at least, in terms of hypotheses suggested by existing research. This is 
largely because there is virtually no research on this issue, and analysis of relevant 
Eurobarom&tre data suggests no conclusive findings as ye t This being the case, the 
current analysis should be considered as exploratory in nature. There were found 
to be no significant sex differences on the British identity measures. However, a 
significant multivariate effect of sex upon European identity emerged, as detailed 
in Table 10.
Table 10 - MANOVA examining European Identity across sex 
(n-107)
Overall multivariate effect (Pillais Test):
Value>.186 F (exact)=3.236 D.P.=7,99 Sig. of F=.004
Significant univariate effects:
H4 "How similar do you think you are to the average European person?" 
Means: M=3.591 F-4.413 F(l,105)=10.563, Sig of F-.002
H5 "How Important to you is being European?"
Means: M-3.367 F-4.206 F(l,105)=5.741, Sig of F-.018
M*male F* female
From an examination of Table 10 above one may note how European identity 
variables H4 and H5 elicit stronger responses from female respondents. In fact,
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across all the European identity variables, sex differences, though failing to reach 
significance, were in-line with this result
Table 11 - Breakdown of political affiliation by b o x
- Party -
Conservative Labour
Male 17 8
Female 17 15
It is interesting to note from Table 11 that, whereas there are equal numbers of 
male and female Conservative Party voters, there is almost a 2:1 ratio of female to 
male Labour Party voters. However, a further MANOVA indicated that there was 
no significant multivariate interaction between sex and vote in terms of the 
European identity measures. It is somewhat beyond the scope of the present 
discussion to deliberate over these observed sex differences. There is clearly a need 
for further investigation of the role of such demographic variables in influencing 
national and European identities.
Sections C l  and C2 - Stereotypes of the British and Italians
Descriptive statistics
Table 12 shows the mean stereotype ratings for the British and Italians. Inspection 
of these results indicates that, on average, the trait which is perceived to be most 
frequent among the British is "reserved" - this was also the case for Hewstone's 
(1986) respondents. The trait perceived to be most frequent amongst Italians was 
"passionate" - a result which is also congruent with the data from Hewstone's (1986) 
respondents, who gave joint primacy to "passionate" and "quick-tempered". These 
traits also represented the modal responses to the questions asking respondents to 
list the most important trait in describing the British/Italians.
Since stereotypes were similar across the current and Hewstone's (1986) 
studies, there may be indications of a certain stability, or perhaps evidence for a 
core structure, as mentioned in Chapter One. Since Hewstone's study was
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conducted in 1986, there are indications that stereotypes might possess both cross- 
situational and temporally stable dimensions. It is also worth noting that the 
current study used a similar subject base to that used by Hewstone - namely higher 
education students. This stability might conceivably be indicative of the persistence 
of social representations, since we regard the concepts of social stereotype and 
social representation to be virtually synonymous, despite Moscovici and 
Hewstone's (1983) suggestion that stereotypes are much more rigid, inflexible, and 
simplistic than social representations (an argument which we do not endorse). 
However, this evidence for the stability of key elements of social stereotypes should 
be interpreted in light of the evidence for variation in stereotypes across type of 
questionnaire presented below.
Table 12 - Mean stereotype percentage ratings 
Trait British Italians
INTELLIGENT 48.47% 53.87%
(50) (44)
PROGRESSIVE 38.76% 46.38%
(42) (36)
CONCEITED 49.36% 55.22%
(52) (51)
RESERVED 53.82% 25.53%
(65) (25)
DOMINEERING 44.57% 50.75%
(47) (41)
INDUSTRIOUS 45.73% 47.25%
(49) (41)
AGGRESSIVE 47.77% 53.76%
(45) (51)
PASSIONATE 41.26% 72.91%
(36) (66)
QUICK-TEMPERED 44.06% 65.58%
(37) (66)
EXTREMELY 49.61% 65.88%
NATIONALISTIC (63) (62)
MEANS IN BRACKETS DERIVE FROM HEWSTONE'S (1986) BRITISH RESPONDENTS
One may also note how the traits "reserved" and "passionate" could be regarded as 
almost bipolar opposites. Since these were the traits which respondents felt were 
most important in describing the British and Italians respectively, it is perhaps not 
surprising that Hewstone's (1986) British respondents perceived themselves as most 
different to the Italians, when comparing themselves with their European partners.
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This also justifies the choice of the Italians as a comparison group in the current 
study.
However, we should bear in mind that the stereotype measures included in 
the current study were primarily intended to enable a focus on stereotype processes. 
We remain convinced that qualitative approaches are of most value when 
stereotype content is the main focus of interest. It is interesting to consider the 
implications of these two most important traits for the process of differentiation. 
Whilst the trait "reserved" was judged by respondents as relatively neutral in 
evaluative terms, "passionate" had a mean evaluative rating which was positive. 
This being the case, it seems that comparisons on these most important dimensions 
were not likely to maintain the positive self-esteem of British respondents. This 
was reflected in the way respondents appeared to modify their stereotypes, when 
faced with the "rate both nationalities" variant of the questionnaire, in order to 
make more favourable intergroup comparisons, as described below.
The effect of questionnaire variant on stereotyping
Table 13 details the results of a series of independent groups f-tests calculated to 
examine the effect of questionnaire variant upon British stereotypes. As explained 
earlier, some respondents were required to rate only the British, whilst others were 
required to provide stereotype ratings for both the British and Italians. It was 
predicted that stereotypes should vary across these conditions such that those traits 
which are deemed important in the current situation would be accentuated, and 
perhaps those deemed unimportant minimized, when both groups were rated.
As the results presented in Table 13 suggest, for the stereotype traits 
"industrious", and "reserved", the percentage of British people deemed to possess 
each trait was greater when both the British and Italians were rated. One may note 
from the mean evaluative ratings (responses to section 'E')/ that the trait 
"industrious" was on average rated as positive, and "reserved" as close to neutral - 
evaluative ratings were coded 1 (-ve) to 7 (+ve). There were found to be no 
significant changes in these evaluative ratings across questionnaire variant It was
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therefore the case that changes in British stereotype ratings across the questionnaire 
variants took the form of accentuation of traits. That "reserved" was accentuated is 
perhaps not surprising since it is the trait which was deemed most important for 
the British, and which discriminates most efficiently between British and Italian 
stereotypes. That "industrious" is deemed to describe more British in the "rate both" 
condition is suggestive of attempts to maintain self-esteem through positive group 
distinctiveness.
Table 23 - Significant changes in British stereotype traits 
across questionnaire variant
INDUSTRIOUS Rats British only: M«an=38.816% (n*38)
Rate both: Means52.838% (n=37)
(mean evaluative rating^. 953: +ve)
t«3.28, 2-tailed significance of t*.002
RESERVED Rate British only: Mean«49.316% (n»38)
Rate both: Maan«58.459% (n=37)
(mean evaluative rating>3.832: neutral)
ts2.04, 2-tailed significance of ts.045
Table 14 below examines changes in Italian stereotype ratings across the 
questionnaire variants. The results indicate that Italians are rated as less 
"intelligent" and "progressive" when respondents have previously rated the British 
on these traits. An examination of the mean evaluative ratings indicates that, on 
average, "intelligent" and "progressive" are rated as the two most positive traits by 
respondents. Thus, in contrast to changes observed in the British stereotype ratings, 
the changes observed for the ratings of Italians involve the reduction in certain 
traits, as opposed to accentuation. This observed reduction in Italian stereotype 
ratings is in-line with an interpretation in terms of attempts to obtain positive 
group distinctiveness on valued comparison dimensions.
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Table 14 - Significant changes in Italian stereotype traits 
across questionnaire variant
INTELLIGENT Rato Italians only: MeanB61.714% (n«29)
Rate both: Mean«48.324% (n«37)
(mean evaluative rating«6.168: +ve)
t«3.37, 2-tailed significance of t«.001
PROGRESSIVE Rate Italians only: Mean«52.500% (n«29)
Rate both: Mean>42.108% (n»37)
(mean evaluative ratings5.991: +ve)
t s 2 . 1 4 ,  2-tailed significance of t*.036
The results obtained would appear to have a number of consequences for past and 
previous research. For example, we have shown how the content of social 
stereotypes appears to be, at least partly, context dependent, thus supporting the 
findings of Hogg and Turner (1987). This suggests the futility of attempting to elicit 
the contents of social stereotypes, if these contents are assumed to be completely 
stable. Whilst the results reported earlier are perhaps suggestive of at least a 
potentially stable core structure, the stereotype dimensions which are significant for 
intergroup comparisons are often dependent upon the current intergroup context 
This also raises the interesting question of whether situational fluctuations in 
group stereotypes are also reflected in self-stereotyping. i
These conclusions seem to support the focus upon particular intergroup 
contexts, often utilized by proponents of the Social Identity paradigm (e.g. Bourhis 
& Hill, 1982). When we are interested in the intergroup relations between two 
social groups, it is reasonably straightforward to elicit the relevant stereotypes and 
examine the functioning of differentiation processes. It should be noted however, 
that intergroup relations usually take place in a complex web of multi-group 
interactions, and this common focus on two interacting groups in some senses is 
artificial in its tendency towards over-simplification of social identity.
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British versus Italian stereotypes
Table 15 below summarizes the results of a series of ANOVAS examining 
differences between mean British and Italian stereotype ratings when the 
questionnaire variant required the rating of one or the other nationality, rather than 
ratings of both.
Table 15 - comparison of mean stereotype ratings when
questionnaire 
Italians only
varlantssrate British
Trait British Italians prob
INTELLIGENT 46.710% 60.965% .003
PROGRESSIVE 36.210% 51.724% .001
CONCEITED 43.737% 50.793% .232
RESERVED 49.316% 21.172% .000
DOMINEERING 41.579% 51.429% .060
INDUSTRIOUS 38.816% 51.138% .003
AGGRESSIVE 43.763% 50.517% .169
PASSIONATE 39.105% 75.069% .000
QUICK-TEMPERED 42.158% 63.759% .000
EX. NATIONAL. 48.368% 69.793% .001
An analysis of Table 15 indicates that the Italians are rated significantly higher 
than the British on seven out of the ten stereotype traits. The British are only rated 
significantly higher than the Italians on the stereotype trait "reserved", which, one 
may recall from earlier in the discussion, was the most frequently given trait in the 
"most important in describing the British" question. It is worth noting that, in 
general, respondents were more willing to assign higher percentages to the Italians 
than the British: the mean percentage across stereotype traits for the British was 
42.98, compared with 54.64 for the Italians. Hewstone (1986) also noted how his 
British respondents seemed more willing to stereotype foreign nationalities. Table 
16 below examines differences between British and Italian stereotypes in the 
condition where respondents rated both nationalities.
Table 16 - Comparison of moan stereotype ratings when 
<piQstlonnalrs varlantorate both nationalitlsst 
significant results
Trait British Italians prob (2-t)
RESERVED 58.46% 28.30% .000
INDUSTRIOUS 52.84% 44.14% .029
PASSIONATE 43.49% 71.84% .000
QUICK-TEMPERED 46.03% 67.43% .000
EX. NATIONAL. 50.89% 63.24% .004
It can be seen from Table 16 that the British are perceived as significantly more 
reserved and industrious than the Italians when respondents are asked to rate both 
nationalities. This seems to support the suggestion made earlier that the traits 
"reserved" and "industrious" were utilized by respondents in order to maintain 
positive group distinctiveness. Additionally, the Italians are rated as significantly 
more passionate, quick-tempered, and extremely nationalistic than the British in 
this condition. Taken as a whole, these stereotypes are somewhat reminiscent of 
those obtained by Peabody (1985), with the Italian stereotype being rather similar 
to the generic "Latin" stereotype Peabody discovered.
Combining stereotypes with their evaluative ratings
A composite score was calculated in order to combine the percentage ratings for 
each trait with their evaluative ratings (i.e. the responses to section 'E'). Following 
Hewstone (1986), for each respondent, the percentage allocated to each trait was 
divided by 10, multiplied by the evaluative rating (-3 to +3), and summed across 
the ten traits. This gives a single composite variable with a potential range of -300 
to +300. The mean of this composite variable was found to be +10.339 for ratings 
of the British, and +10.849 for ratings of the Italians.
ANOVAS and f-tests were calculated in order to assess whether these two 
composite variables varied significantly across the different questionnaire variants, 
and whether the composite rating of the British was significantly different to that 
of the Italians. There were found to be no significant differences across the 
different variants of questionnaire, and the difference between the score for the 
British and Italians was not significant Hewstone's (1986) British respondents had
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composite scores of -17.77 for the British and -87.27 for the Italians. We would 
suggest that the failure of this composite score to reflect the changes in stereotypes 
highlighted by a focus on individual traits, is yet further evidence of the dangers 
associated with collapsing potentially multidimensional constructs into composite 
scales.
4.23 Section D - self-stereotype ratings
Following Hogg and Turner (1987) a set of difference scores were calculated, which 
examined the differences between ratings of the British on the stereotype 
dimensions compared with ratings of self on these traits. The difference scores 
were calculated by converting British and self-stereotype scores to the same scale 
of 0-10, and then subtracting British scores from self scores. This results in a 
separate score for each respondent, on each of the ten traits. These scores have a 
potential range of -10 to +10, where negative values indicate greater stereotyping 
of the particular trait to the British rather than self, and positive values indicate 
greater stereotyping of the trait to the self. Table C (Appendix (A.1)) provides a 
trait-by-trait breakdown of these difference scores. Hogg and Turner's further 
suggestion of focusing upon positive, negative and neutrally-evaluated traits 
separately using composite scores was also followed. Four composite scores were 
calculated:
MEDIFF : which represents the overall mean of all the
difference scores, regardless of the evaluative 
ratings of the traits.
NEGDIFF : which represents the mean of the difference scores for
those traits the respondent rated as negative.
NEDIFF : which represents the mean of the difference scores for 
those traits the respondent rated as neutral.
POSDIFF : which represents the mean of the difference scores for
those traits the respondent rated as positive.
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It should be clear from the above that the particular stereotype traits which 
comprise each component will differ for each subject, as the evaluative ratings of 
the traits differ. The means for these scores are compared in Table 17.
Table 17 - Comparison of composite difference scores
Score Mean
MEDIFF + . 5881
NEGDIFF - .623*
NEDIFF - .2191
POSDIFF +2.1701
Means with the same superscript are significantly different from each 
other at the <.001 2-tailed level, using t-tests.
One may note from an examination of Table 17 that respondents tended to attribute 
negative traits less to the self than to the nation, whereas positive traits were 
attributed more to the self than to the nation, thus suggesting a form of self-serving 
bias. A series of ANOVAS indicated that there were no significant differences in 
these composite scores when respondents rated only the British, compared with 
when they rated both the British and Italians.
This supports the suggestion made earlier that both individual level and 
social-level processes are involved in social identity. We would like to suggest that 
social identities linked to large-scale social groups such as national identity, may 
well offer more opportunity for the use of self-serving biases than smaller social 
groups, precisely because of their rather diffuse and reified nature. This might 
especially be the case when the "black-sheep" strategy of maintaining self-esteem 
is utilized (c.f. Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988).
Self-serving biases, which have gained the attention of those working 
within the social cognition paradigm for some time now (c.f. Fiske & Taylor, 1984), 
are likely to involve both cognitive and social level aspects. Whilst previous social 
cognition research has tended to focus on the cognitive aspects of self-serving
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biases, it seems that such biases are also likely to involve discursive practices, and 
we see no reason why self-serving biases might not be utilized by sub-groups as 
well as individuals, in much the same manner as appears to occur with Pettigrew's 
"ultimate attribution error" (Pettigrew, 1979).
Unravelling the rather confusing interactions between self-serving biases 
and self-stereotyping is a task for the future. There are indications however, that 
we may have to modify our understanding of the self-stereotyping process, for it 
seems reasonable to hypothesize that those who only stereotype in-group traits 
perceived to be positive, are quite likely to have a strong sense of social identity - 
after all, they have manufactured an identity which is characterized solely by traits 
which they evaluate positively! If the standard procedure of assessing the similarity 
between self and in-group stereotype was utilized, it may well indicate a 
misleadingly low level of social identity in such instances, since the individual has 
distanced him or her self from aspects of the in-group stereotype they perceive as 
negative. This suggests that, if researchers wish to utilize self-stereotyping as a 
measure of the strength or level of a social identity, they must allow for self- 
serving tendencies biasing their results.
Correlations between difference scores and national identity
Table 18 below presents a series of Pearson Product Moment Correlations 
calculated to examine any possible associations between the composite difference 
scores and the British identity variables contained in section 'A' of the 
questionnaire. As mentioned earlier in the discussion, it is generally assumed that 
self-stereotyping may be taken as an indication of the strength of a social identity. 
Thus, one would expect small differences between self and British stereotypes to 
be associated with strong British identity, and large differences to be associated 
with weak British identity. One should note, however, the caveats to this 
assumption discussed earlier, such as self-serving biases, P.I.P. effects, and so on. 
The difference scores utilized for the correlations were identical to the composite 
scores MEDIFF, NEGDIFF, NEDIFF, and POSDIFF described earlier, except that the
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scores were this time based on absolute differences, since it was the magnitude of 
the differences which was of primary interest to the analysis.
Table 18 - PPM correlations between absolute difference scores 
and British Identity variables
British Identity variables
Al A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7
MEDIFF - . 2 1 6  
p a . 031
- . 1 4 4
p = .1 0 9
- . 2 5 6  
p a . 018
- . 4 0 2  
p a . 000
- . 3 9 1  
p a . 000
- . 3 2 7  
p a . 002
- . 1 4 7  
p a . 104
NEGDIFF -  . 1 4 0  
P - . 1 1 5
- . 2 1 0
P - . 0 3 5
- . 2 1 8  
p a . 030
- . 2 0 8  
p « . 035
- . 2 4 4  
p a . 017
- . 2 7 8
p a . 008
- . 0 1 8  
pa . 438
NEDIFF . 038
P - . 3 7 8
. 1 1 1  
p a . 182
.073  
p a . 277
- . 1 5 8  
p a . 098
- . 1 0 3  
p a . 202
- . 1 4 0
p a . 128
- . 0 5 3  
p a . 3 3 5
POSDIFF - . 1 7 2
P - . 0 7 1
- . 0 9 6
P - . 2 0 9
- . 1 2 9
P - . 1 3 6
- . 3 9 2
p a . 000
- . 3 4 2  
P a . 001
- . 2 0 9
P - . 0 3 7
- . 1 7 5
p a . 068
(probabilities are 1-tailed - see hypothesis discussed above)
An examination of Table 18 above indicates that overall difference (MEDIFF) 
correlates significantly with British identity variables Al, and A3 to A6. The 
negative direction of the observed correlations confirms the hypothesis that, as 
British identity becomes stronger, so the difference between British and self 
stereotype becomes smaller. For traits rated as negative by respondents (NEGDIFF) 
there were significant correlations on variables A2 to A6, again in the expected 
negative direction. Traits rated as positive by respondents (POSDIFF) correlated 
significantly with A4 to A6, in the same negative direction. There were no 
significant correlations between traits which respondents rated as neutral, and the 
British identity measures.
Overall, therefore, the hypothesis that self-stereotyping is related to level of 
social identity was supported. It is worth noting, however, the generally low 
magnitude of observed correlations between difference scores and social identity 
measures. This suggests that a large amount of the variance in the identity and self- 
stereotyping measures is linked to other variables, once again highlighting how a 
single measure of social identity - in this case self-stereotyping - does not 
adequately capture the complex nature of identity phenomena.
4.2.4 Section E - evaluations of stereotype traits
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Table D (Appendix (A.1)) presents the mean evaluative ratings of the stereotype 
traits. There were found to be no significant changes in these evaluations across the 
different types of questionnaire.
4.2.5 Section F - similarity judgements
This section of the questionnaire contained what amounted to a lower-triangular 
matrix of similarity judgements, with the European Community, "Myself"', Britain, 
Germany, France, and Italy as stimulus objects. The resulting similarity 
judgements, which were on a seven-point scale, were used as the input to an 
INDSCAL individual differences Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) program. MDS 
is a useful tool for exploring cognitive representations in graphical format (cf. 
Kruskal & Wish, 1978). Although it can be used to formulate and develop 
predictive theories, it is used here in perhaps its most helpful application, as an 
instrument for exploratory data analysis (Tukey, 1977).
For the purposes of the current analysis, the SPSS* ALSCAL procedure was 
utilized to obtain non-metric INDSCAL solutions in a number of dimensions, with 
an ordinal level of measurement specified, and the "ties=untied" option selected. 
The latter option was specified following Davison's (1983) recommendation that the 
untied or Primary approach tends to result in a better fit to the data. Non-metric 
MDS attempts to provide monotone rather than linear transformations from 
(dis)similarities to distances, and thus makes less assumptions than its metric 
equivalents, or indeed than factor analysis. An individual differences analysis was 
preferred since this allows for the fact that individuals are likely to differ in terms 
of the importance they attach to criteria in making judgements about objects. 
Furthermore, the solution obtained by an INDSCAL procedure should be relatively 
unambiguous, since the particular rotation obtained is (hopefully) meaningful, and 
should not, ideally, be subjected to rotation.
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Since the three dimensional solution obtained was not significantly greater 
than the 2-dimensional solution in terms of fit to the data/ the latter solution will 
be focused on in this discussion. The 2-dimensional solution obtained had an 
averaged stress of 0.179 and averaged R-Squared of 0.730. Using the rule-of-thumb 
criteria of Rabinowitz (1986) and others, these figures indicate a "fair" solution. 
Whilst steps were taken to eliminate some of the more common causes of weak 
solutions, such as degeneracy, local minima and lack of convergence (c.f. Davison, 
1983; Schiffman et al., 1981), it should be noted that, ideally, an MDS solution will 
have at least ten stimulus objects - space and time restrictions associated with the 
length of the current questionnaire forced the adoption of only six stimuli. 
Nevertheless, although the solution obtained is far from perfect, it may serve its 
purpose as an exploratory tool to investigate respondents' cognitive representations. 
The 2-dimensional solution obtained is presented in Figure 1 below - more detailed 
results may be found in Table E (Appendix (A.1)).
Figure It derived stimulus configuration for MDS analysis 
dim 1 (horizontal) vs dim 2 (vertical)
2 . 0  —
1 . 0
0 . 0
I J I I 1 1 I
MYSELF
*
BRITAIN
*
ITALY GERMANY
* E ,C. *
*
FRANCE
•- 1 . 0  —
- 2 . 0  —
t i r i r  
- 2 . 5  - 1 . 5  - 0 . 5
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1 . 5  2 . 50 . 5
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Dimension 1 (horizontal) in Figure 1 above appears to contrast Britain and 
Germany with Italy and France. The European Community and "myself' appear to 
be fairly neutral on this dimension. The contrast between Britain and Germany 
compared to Italy is quite noticeable on this dimension, perhaps supporting 
Hewstone's (1986) finding that the British tend to perceive Britain and the British 
as more similar to Germany than Italy, and corroborating the earlier suggestion that 
the British see themselves as more different to the Italians than to their other 
European neighbours.
The observed contrast of Britain and Germany with Italy and France might 
be open to a number of interpretations. Further research might endeavour to 
investigate whether this apparent difference is based on perceptions of nations, 
peoples, or both. We note with interest however, how, once again, the data are 
reminiscent of Peabody's (1985) finding that stereotypes of the French and Italians 
tend to be rather similar, suggesting a generic "Latin" stereotype, which might have 
been reflected in the form of a "Latin - non-Latin" dimension in the current MDS 
analysis.
Dimension 2 (vertical) appears to contrast "myself and "Britain" against the 
other stimulus objects, suggesting that this might be thought of as a self/nationality 
vs non-self/foreign dimension. It is interesting to note here how the European 
Community is also distanced from Britain and "myself. If we for the moment 
make the assumption (supported by the observed correlation between European 
identity measures and variable FI5) that the perceived similarity between self and 
the E.C. is roughly equivalent to a measure of European identity, the observed 
solution seems to support the earlier finding that British identity is stronger than 
European identity.
In addition to the two dimensions, one may note the cluster formed by 
France and the European Community. If this may be interpreted as suggesting 
respondents' cognitive "maps" closely link France with the E.C., then this might 
partly explain the apparently low levels of European identity found in the current 
study. The latter hypothesis depends on the significance of the apparent British 
tradition of distrust of the French highlighted by Hewstone (1986) and others. In
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conclusion, we note the apparent potential of MDS as an exploratory tool for the 
analysis of intergroup perceptions. It should be stressed however, that the 
interpretation of MDS solutions utilized in the study of social identity should be 
informed by the results of other research techniques.
4.2.6 Section I - Attitudes and opinions about the E.C. and European
integration
Preliminary remarks
Appendix (A.2) contains descriptive statistics for the attitudinal questions relating 
to Europe and the E.C. We may note from these, how the mean attitude towards the 
European Community (question II) is 5.121 ("slightly in favour")/ and how 65.4% 
of all responses were towards the "in favour" end of the scale. This certainly 
suggests a degree of support for the European Community. However, as the 
responses to the open-ended questions (examined later in the discussion) revealed, 
support for the European Community can take a number of forms, and need not 
be linked to a European identity. Furthermore, one should recall the earlier 
findings that British identity was significantly greater than European identity, and 
that the concepts "self' and "the E.C." seemed to be contrasted in the 
multidimensional scaling analysis. A similar point should be made about attitudes 
toward European integration (question 14) - again, mean responses indicated a 
moderately favourable attitude (mean=4.991) - but as previously suggested, this 
need not indicate high levels of European identity.
The frequency distribution for question 12 indicates that most respondents 
reported a high level of interest in European affairs. This is not surprising, given 
the intensity of mass media coverage of European issues, and the fact that 
respondents were university students. The high levels of interest reported at least 
allow us more confidence in examining attitudes, since we might assume that 
interest in an issue is likely to be reflected in the possession of relevant attitudes, 
thus negating problems associated with "non-attitudes" (Converse, 1964;1970).
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The underlying structure of attitudes to the E.C. and Europe
Table 19 summarizes the results obtained from a Principal Components Analysis 
(PCA) conducted to examine the underlying structure of some of the attitude and 
opinion questions contained in section I of the questionnaire.
Table 19 - Principal Components Analysis of attitude questions
Variables entered Into the analysis:
II: overall attitude to the E.C.
12: Interest in the future of Europe
13: how often respondents discuss European affairs
14: overall attitude to European integration
15: compatibility of views about Britain and Europe
16: willingness to have British flag & anthem replaced
I7A: certainty about European super-state vote
18: How much Britain has gained from membership of the E.C,
PCA extracted 3 factors with Eigen values over 1.00:
Elgen values % variance Cum % var 
Factors: 1 3.24 40.4 40.4
2 1.19 14.8 55.3
3 1.08 13.5 68.8
Rotated factor matrix (varlmax rotation specified): 
FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3
11 .852
12 .815
14 .766
13 .712
18 .688
15
16 (.401)
I7A
.815
-.650 (-.361)
.862
(loadings below 0.35 not shown; n*107)
An examination of Table 19 indicates that the PCA extracted three components with 
Eigen values of 1.00 or greater. Together, these three components accounted for 
68.8% of the overall variance, which indicates a good fit to the data. From an 
inspection of the rotated factor matrix, one may note that attitude variables 
11,12,13,14 and 18 load highly and positively on the first component. Since these 
variables seem to combine both attitudinal orientations towards the E.C and 
measures of interest/involvement, this component will be assigned the label 
"attitude and involvement”. We also note with interest how the composition of this
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component suggests that attitudes about European integration are closely associated 
with attitudes towards the European Community.
An examination of Table F (Appendix (A.1)) indicates that variable 12 
(interest in the future of Europe) correlates most highly with variable II, 
Hewstone's key question on overall attitude towards the E.C (r=.610, sig. <.0000 2- 
tailed). One should also note the support for Hewstone's (1986) finding that 
instrumental support is related to overall attitude to the E.C. - variable 18 (how 
much Britain has gained from E.C. membership) correlated highly with variable II 
(r=.584, sig. <.0000 2-tailed).
The second component consists of variable 15 (compatibility of views), 
which loads highly and positively, and variable 16 (willingness to have British 
flag/anthem replaced) which loads highly but negatively. In some ways variable 15 
may be considered to measure self-perceived cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) 
between views about Europe/the E.C and Britain. When scores on this variable are 
high, there is little or no dissonance - i.e. the views are highly compatible.
Variable 16 was designed to assess attachment to symbols associated with 
Britain, and in some sense could be thought of as tapping what Kelman (1969) 
referred to as "sentimental" attachment to the nation. As such, one would expect 
respondents who express a strong desire to retain Britain's own flag and anthem 
to possess strong affective associations with these national symbols. We note with 
interest that responses to the flag/anthem question indicated that the majority of 
respondents (64.5%) were against replacement, and only 17.8% in favour. The 
second component might, therefore, usefully be interpreted in terms of "cognitive 
and emotional compatibility of national and European attitudes and 
representations". Thus, as indicated by the component loadings, when factor 2 is 
high, views about Britain are seen as compatible with views about Europe, and 
there is little resistance to replacing the British flag and anthem with European 
Community equivalents.
The third component extracted from the PCA consisted solely of variable 
I7A, which loaded highly and positively. This variable measured respondents'
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certainty about how they would vote in a referendum proposing that Britain 
become part of a European "super-state”. It is interesting to note from the 
correlation matrix in Table F (Appendix (A.1)), that this variable does not correlate 
significantly with any of the other attitudinal variables. (Responses to question I7b 
which required respondents to predict how they would vote in such a referendum, 
were not entered into the PCA since this would have resulted in a reduction in 
sample size).
Predicting "attitude and involvement" (component 1)
In order to investigate whether any of the other variables examined in the 
questionnaire might prove good predictors of the first component highlighted in 
the PCA analysis, "attitude and involvement", a multiple linear regression analysis 
was conducted. Component scores were calculated by simply summing responses 
to those variables which constituted component one: 11,12,13,14 and 18 - thus 
component 1 constituted the dependent or criterion variable. The independent or 
predictor variables entered into the analysis are listed below - note that composite 
variables were utilized where responses to questions in a section were highly 
correlated, so as to minimize problems associated with multicollinearity:
BRITISH A composite score made up of the sum of the 
IDENTITY: British identity variables (Section A)
EUROPEAN A composite score made up of the sum of the
IDENTITY: European identity variables (Section H.l)
FACTOR 2: "Cognitive & emotional compatibility of national and 
European attitudes and representations". Comprised 
of the sum of responses to questions 15 and 16.
I7A: Certainty about European super-state vote
I7B: Predicted vote in Euro super-state referendum:this variable 
was dummy-coded as "for" or "against".
SEX: This variable was dummy coded.
AGE: In years.
FI: Similarity rating of "Britain-Myself"
F4: Similarity rating of "Britain-E.C."
F15: similarity rating of "E.C.-Myself"
110
Table 20 contains a summary of the results of the multiple regression analysis. For 
the purposes of the analysis the "Enter+Stepwise" method of equation building was 
requested.
Table 20 - Summary of multiple regression analysist 
criterion variable=FACTOR 1
Final Equation:-
Multiple R 
R Square
Adjusted R Square 
Standard Error
.67204 
.45164 
.43014
4.68573 ANOVA F-21.002 
Variables in the Equation ---
Sig=<.0001
Variable B S.E. B Beta t Sig. t
F15 1.095 .335 .285 3.265 .001
Z7B -2.421 .612 -.292 -3.957 <.001
EURO IDEN .246 .061 .354 4.041 <.001
FI -.484 .287 -.124 -1.683 .095
(constant) 16.315 2.034 8.022 <.001
EquationV& 1TX&DX68 HOC XXX
Variable Beta In Partial Min Toler t Sig. t
FACTOR 2 .088 .098 .674 .988 .325
I7A -9 .638E-03 -.012 .688 -.123 .902
SEX -.076 -.096 .687 -.969 .335
BRIT ID -.014 -.011 .359 -.113 .910
F4 .066 .076 .671 .761 .448
AGE -.019 -.026 .671 -.247 .806
From an analysis of Table 20 one may note that the enter+stepwise selection
procedure constructed a "best subset" of predictor variables which consisted of:
FIS Similarity rating of NE.C. - Myself
17B Predicted vote in Euro super-state referendum:this
variable was dummy - coded as "for" or "against"
European A composite score made up of the sum of the 
Identity European identity variables (Section H.l)
FI Similarity rating of ’Britain Myself1
Together, these predictor variables are able to account for some 43% (adjusted R 
Square) of variance in the criterion variable, Factor 1. Examination of the
I l l
standardized regression coefficients (Beta scores) indicates that variable I7B has a 
negative regression coefficient. Since this variable was binary coded such that 
O=vote for a European super-state and l=vote against, this indicates that votes for 
a super-state are associated with higher scores on factor 1, "attitude and 
involvement".
Although included in the final equation, the Beta coefficient for variable FI 
is not in fact significant However, since the beta coefficient is approaching 
significance, it is interesting to note how the beta weight is negative for this 
variable, indicating that high degrees of perceived similarity between Britain and 
self are associated with low levels of factor 1, i.e. negative attitudes towards 
Europe/low interest in European affairs. Since the perceived similarity between 
Britain and self was earlier found to be significantly correlated with a number of 
the British identity measures, this is perhaps an indication that higher levels of 
British identity might be associated with low levels of factor 1. This, in turn, could 
be interpreted as suggesting that British and European identity might be dissonant 
(Hofman, 1988) - i.e. that they conflict with each other. This is a theme which will 
also emerge in the analysis of the open-ended responses.
It is also interesting to note how the composite variable "European identity" 
makes a significant contribution to the overall prediction, thus supporting the 
suggestion made throughout the chapters of this discussion, that social identities 
are linked with attitudes, opinions, social representations, and so on. Since the beta 
coefficient is positive, this indicates that as European identity increases, so scores 
on Factor 1 also increase. We hope that the current results serve to emphasize to 
other researchers how studies of attitudes and opinions could benefit from an 
analysis of the social identities likely to inform them. The exact nature of this link 
is as yet rather unclear, especially as far as the likely order of causality is 
concerned. For example, the Social Identity paradigm would seem to suggest that 
social identification precedes the internalization of attitudes and social 
representations. However, Moscovici's (1990) definition of a social group as 
essentially a collection of individuals who share a social representation, seems to 
suggest the causal primacy of social representations. This rather tricky theoretical 
issue is likely to remain a matter for debate for some time to come.
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It should be emphasized that multiple regression was utilized in the present 
context mainly as a simplifying tool to investigate the contribution of the predictor 
variables to variation in the criterion variable. It was not the purpose of the current 
study to develop a causal model of attitudes and opinions to Europe, as Hewstone 
(1986) attempted to do. At this early stage of investigation, we feel it would be 
premature to construct path analytic (c.f. Blalock, 1964) or similar models, especially 
since the links between social identity and attitudes, which have been shown to be 
significant in the current study, have received relatively little attention from other 
researchers.
Predicted vote in European super-state referendum
Table 21 details responses to question 17(b), which asked respondents to predict 
how they would vote if Britain was offered the chance to become part of a single 
European "super-state". One may note how the majority of respondents indicated 
they would vote against Britain becoming a member.
Table 21 - predicted vote in European superstate referendum
frequency %
Vote for 34 31.5
Not voto 26 24.1
Vote against 47 43.5 (ns!07)
This result is highly compatible with British opinion data contained in the 
Eurobarom&tre polls.
Classifying respondents into those who would vote "for" versus those who would 
vote "against" a European super-state
In order to examine how well attitudinal and identity measures could differentiate 
between those respondents who said they would vote for or against a European 
super-state (question I7B), a statistical procedure known as Discriminant Function 
Analysis (DFA) was utilized (c.f. Klecka, 1980). DFA aims to weight and linearly 
combine a set of independent variables, so as to "discriminate" between subgroups
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of a nominal-level dependent variable. For the current analysis, respondents were 
classified into those who would vote "for" or "against" a European super-state. The 
independent or discriminating variables entered into the analysis were the same as 
those used in the multiple regression described earlier, except for the addition of 
Factor 1 - "attitude and involvement". A stepwise method of selecting the best 
subset of discriminating variables was requested. Discriminant analysis is able to 
provide at least two particularly useful pieces of information for the current study 
(c.f. Himmelweit et al., 1981):
1. A measure of the overall accuracy of the 
classification - in this case, in terms of the 
proportion of respondents correctly classified 
as answering "for" or "against".
2. A measure of which variables were most 
important in discriminating between 
respondents who would vote "for" and 
"against" a European super - state.
As Himmelweit et al. (1981) emphasize, it is important to remember that a 
discriminant analysis is not a means of prediction, but of discrimination between 
groups. The DFA indicates the percentage of respondents correctly classified in the 
current study, using actual responses as a criterion for selecting the best subset of 
discriminating responses. However, if the independent variables had little 
relevance to the decision to vote "for" or "against" a super-state, the percentage 
correctly classified by the model would be low. Thus, as Himmelweit et al. suggest, 
we may think of discriminant analysis as providing a form of "pseudo-prediction".
Table 22 provides summary data for the results of the discriminant analysis 
(more detailed results may be found in Table G (Appendix (A.1)).
114
Table 22 - Discriminant Analysis on groups defined by predicted 
vote In European superstate referendum
% of cases correctly classifieds
Vote "for" : 76.5%
Vote "against"! 83.0% OVERALL % CORRECTLY CLASSIFIEDs80.25% 
Canonical Discriminant Functionss
Eigen Canonical Wilk's
Value Corr Lambda Chisquare DF Sig
FUNCTION 1: .687 .638 .593 40.019 5 <.0001
An examination of Table 22 indicates that overall, 80.25% of cases were correctly 
classified by the Discriminant Analysis, an excellent level of accuracy. Wilk's 
Lambda gives some indication of the amount of variance not explained by the 
analysis • the obtained statistic of .593 is generally considered good.
Table 23 lists the "best set of discriminating variables" selected by the 
stepwise procedure. Since the stepwise procedure selected variables to enter into 
the analysis on the basis of largest "F to enter", the order in which variables are 
selected gives an indication of their overall importance in the analysis. One can see 
from Table 23 that Factor 1 - "attitude and involvement" was the single most 
important discriminatory variable. It is also interesting to note that both British and 
European identity are significant discriminatory variables in the analysis.
Table 23 - Best set of discriminating variables elicited by 
stepwise Discriminant Analysis
entered Variable Wilk's Lambda Sig.
1 FACTOR 1 .68270 <.0001
2 BRITISH ID .62383 <.0001
3 AGE (YEARS) .61164 <.0001
4 EUROPEAN ID .60178 <.0001
5 F4 .59267 <.0001
Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients:
FACTOR 1 .829
BRITISH ID -.469
AGE (YEARS) -.305
EUROPEAN ID .264
F4 -.212
Canonical Piscrlminant Functions evaluated at Group Meanss 
vote fort .963 vote against: -.696
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In order to ascertain the nature of the relationship between predicted vote 
in the referendum and these five discriminating variables, we should firstly consult 
the canonical discriminant functions evaluated at the group means (Table 23), 
which indicate that the mean score on the discriminant function for the "vote for" 
group is .963, whilst the mean for the "vote against" group is -.696. This means that 
votes for a European super-state are associated with higher scores on the 
discriminant function than votes against If we turn to the standardized canonical 
discriminant function coefficients, we are now in a position to suggest that scores 
on Factor 1 are higher for those who anticipate voting for a European super-state. 
An examination of the F-test shown in Table G of Appendix (A) confirms this 
interpretation, indicating that, on average, respondents who predict voting for a 
European super-state have significantly higher scores on Factor 1 (F=36.72, d.f.=l,79, 
sig. <.0000).
Scores on the British identity composite variable are significantly lower for 
respondents who anticipate voting for a European super-state CF=7.632, d.f.=l,79, 
sig. .0071). This is not surprising, given the apparent concern the British have about 
sovereignty and the maintenance of a separate national identity (Hewstone, 1986). 
The observed negative correlation between British identity and support for British 
membership of a European "super-state" suggests that respondents perceived such 
membership as a potential threat to national identity. This seems also to support 
the earlier suggestion that British and European identities might be dissonant - i.e. 
the salience or presence of one inhibits that of the other. This would seem 
compatible with much of the mass media treatment of European issues in Britain, 
in as much as the concern for sovereignty has tended to be reflected in the 
construing of British and European identities as "either/or" phenomena (see also 
Sotirakopoulou, 1991). In addition, the observed results seem congruent with 
Hewstone's (1986) finding that the positivity of British "image" is negatively 
correlated with level of support for the European Community.
In contrast, and as one would expect from the above discussion, scores on 
European identity are significantly higher for those who anticipate voting for a 
super-state, compared with those who would vote against (F=9.552, d.f.=l,79, sig. 
.0028). There is thus evidence to suggest that European identity is linked to both
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attitudes and predicted voting intentions concerning European integration and the 
European Community.
The direction of the Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function 
Coefficients for age and variable F4 (similarity of Britain and E.C) suggests that 
higher scores on both variables are associated with voting against a super-state. 
However, the group means are not significantly different, and thus it would seem 
that the nature of the relationship between predicted vote and these variables is 
less than clear-cut, and therefore deserving of further investigation in the future.
4.3 Open-ended questions
The open-ended responses contained in the current questionnaire were analyzed 
by means of traditional Functionalist content analysis (c.f. Holsti, 1969; Weber, 
1990). Holsti (1969) has identified a wide variety of definitions of the term "content 
analysis" - Berelson (1952) refers to the method as "a research technique for the 
objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of 
communication", while Kaplan (1943) prefers a somewhat more ambiguous 
definition - "the statistical semantics of political discourse". In a synthesis of these 
and other definitions, Holsti (1969) describes content analysis as "any technique for 
making inferences by systematically and objectively identifying specified 
characteristics of messages".
Whilst the sympathies of the current author lie with those who appreciate 
the need to integrate both quantitative and qualitative approaches within content 
analyses, there are a number of reasons why the scope for a thorough qualitative 
analysis of the current data is limited. Primary amongst these is the fact that, as one 
would expect from questionnaire responses, there was a tendency to answer in a 
quasi short-hand which is not particularly similar to the much richer data obtained 
from group discussions or open-ended interviews. The latter also allow for the 
probing of answers, a clarifying of ambiguities, and the general negotiation of a 
true inter-view between interviewer and interviewee (Farr, 1982).
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The general content analysis procedure utilized involved the following 
stages, which were repeated for each question:
Stage 1: Careful and repeated reading of responses to the 
question, making notes on recurring patterns, 
word usage, and so forth.
Stage 2: Identification of categories of response, guided 
by research questions. At this stage 
there are likely to be too many categories.
Stage 3: Refinement of category coding frame into a
smaller, more manageable number of categories by 
collapsing those which are semantically similar.
Stage 4: Counting every occurrence of each category, and 
assessment of adequacy of coding frame.
For the purposes of the current study, the recording unit - the specific segment of 
content that is characterized by placing it in a given category - was every 
occurrence of a category within a sentence or part of a sentence, in essence, 
therefore, the focus was on propositions. For the purposes of coding propositions, 
the whole of the response to the current question constituted the context unit which 
defined the widest area of text which could be searched for clarification of 
meaning. Every occurrence of a category was counted, and the resulting frequencies 
by category breakdown the major focus of final analysis. The reliability and 
validity of the coding frame was assessed by having multiple coders discuss sample 
responses and formulate a mutually agreed-upon frame. In addition, the usual 
practice of having multiple coders code the same responses and then compare 
results was used at the initial phase, before the final coding frame was formulated. 
It should be stressed, however, that, once the final coding frame was agreed upon, 
the coding was undertaken solely by the current author.
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Whilst this simple focusing on frequencies has been criticized (see, for 
example, McQuail, 1987) - rightly so in our opinion - alternative or supplementary 
approaches, which, for example, might also look at the intensity of responses, are 
rather difficult to operationalize in the context of text obtained from questionnaire 
responses. Furthermore, content analysis is here used primarily as a tool for 
summarizing text -in other words, as a means of focusing on Holsti's (1969) "What 
is said", rather than his "How it is said" category.
4.3.1 Question B.l: things which make people pleased to he British
Table 24 shows the categories respondents most frequently used to describe the 
things which made them feel pleased to be British.
Table 24 - Thinga which make people feel pleased to be British- 
most frequent categories
category description frequency
1 RICH TRADITION & HERITAGE 49
2 DEMOCRACY 34
3 BEAUTY OP COUNTRYSIDE 31
4 GENEROSITY OF PEOPLE & NATION AS A WHOLE 22
5 ARTISTIC ACHIEVEMENTS 22
6 ROYAL FAMILY 16
7 IMPORTANT ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS 16
8 WELFARE STATE 15
9 SPORTING ACHIEVEMENTS 13
10 SENSE OF HUMOUR 11
11 GENERAL STANDARD OF LIVING 11
An analysis of Table 24 above indicates that the category most frequently utilized 
by respondents refers to pride in the rich tradition and cultural heritage they 
believed being British endows upon citizens. This is in keeping with the previous 
finding that symbolic aspects of national identity are important, and lends weight 
to the suggestion that national identity is especially likely to be reflected in a socio- 
emotional attachment to the nation - at least in the British case. Additionally, this 
supports A.D. Smith's (1991) contention that national heritage and culture has a 
competitive/comparative aspect - after all, one would expect pride to be derived 
partly from comparison processes. Finally, one may note how this finding is 
supportive of Samuel's (1989) contention that British national identity is currently
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linked to a fascination with the past, which is manifested in an interest in national 
heritage and culture.
The salience of pride in the British democratic system and its related values 
is congruent with the earlier findings of Almond and Verba (1963). However, whilst 
a number of the categories which Topf et al. (1989) more recently found to be 
important are also present in the results from the current study, it is noticeable how 
the frequencies of occurrence for these categories are quite different across the two 
studies. This is open to conflicting interpretations. For example, the study by Topf 
et al. utilized a general population sample, whereas the current study focused on 
the arguably un-representative subject group of university students. However, 
leaving this difference aside for the moment, the differences observed between the 
results of Topf et al. and the current study might alternatively be taken as an 
indication of how the salience of national symbols fluctuates. This interpretation 
is in fact congruent with some of the other observations made below. One should 
also add that some of the response categories which emerged in the present study 
did not appear in Topf et al/s study simply because they used pre-defined 
categories, rather than open-ended responses.
One should be aware that the occurrence of category 4 seems to have been 
affected by temporal aspects, in that many respondents made particular reference 
to "Kurd Aid" and other fund-raising events which had occurred in close temporal 
proximity to the questionnaire administration. We would argue that this is 
suggestive of how national symbols - in this case the objects of national pride - are 
subject to fluctuations in salience. There are good intuitive reasons for 
hypothesizing that the mass media play an important part in determining the 
objects of national pride. Even though these objects may differ across sub-groups, 
as Topf et al/s (1989) findings might suggest, the mass media are at least likely to 
provide part of the data base of national symbols and objects of pride from which 
sub-groups and inidividuals sample.
An analysis of Table 24 also indicates that both people and nation-oriented 
responses are reflected in the list of most frequent categories. Thus, for example, 
respondents who reported feeling proud of the welfare state (the National Health
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Service and state benefit systems) tended to be focusing on aspects of the 
state/nation, whereas respondents who were proud of the British sense of humour 
seemed to be focusing on aspects of the national character, rather than the state. 
Furthermore, the intermingling of aspects of the nation and the national peoples 
would seem to suggest that social representations of these phenomena are 
connected.
It was interesting to note how occurrences of category 7 - Britain's important 
role in world affairs - were often past-oriented in their regret of the decline of the 
British Empire and their remembrance of a time when Britain was the world's most 
powerful nation. One might recall that Hewstone (1986) has suggested that 
memories of the British Empire and the former power of Britain may well act to 
inhibit the development of pro-European attitudes. We would extend this argument 
to include the hypothesis that such social representations may also serve to inhibit 
the development of a European identity. However, as results soon to be discussed 
indicated, this apparent concern with power and dominance might also, 
paradoxically, be linked with a pro-European stance.
4.3.2 Question B.2: things which make people regret being British
Table 25 below shows the categories respondents most frequently used to describe 
the things which made them regret being British.
Table 25 - Thing’s which make people regret being British - 
most frequent categories
category dascriptIon frequency
1 FOOTBALL HOOLIGANS 35
2 SENSE OF SUPERIORITY 24
3 LACK OF CONCERN FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 21
4 RACISM 20
5 "COLDM CHARACTER 20
6 THE CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT/ITS POLICIES 19
7 XENOPHOBIA 18
8 VIOLENCE IN SOCIETY/HIGH CRIME RATE 17
9 BEHAVIOUR OF BRITISH ON HOLIDAY ABROAD 16
10 UNFAIR DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH 15
11 LEVEL OF UNEMPLOYMENT 12
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An examination of Table 25 above indicates that football hooligans are most 
frequently cited as an example of what makes respondents regret being British. 
One might hypothesize that this result may well be temporally relative, especially 
since the Heysel tragedy seemed to heighten the salience of football hooliganism 
as a subject for mass media attention. It is interesting to note how football 
hooligans represent a particular, numerically insignificant, sub-group within British 
society, perhaps suggesting that respondents are utilizing them as "black sheep" 
(Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988). Furthermore, we noted with interest how respondents 
stressed the minority status of this sub-group, and were disturbed that such an "un­
representative" sub-group were creating a "false" impression of the British abroad. 
Much the same was evident in responses which focused on category 9 - the British 
abroad. In-line with the self-serving nature of the black-sheep strategy, we also 
noted with interest the frequent tendency for respondents to list sub-groups or 
behaviour which they themselves felt exempt from (e.g. football hooligans, racism).
4.3.3 Question B.3: groups or individuals perceived to be "typically British"
Table 26 details the categories respondents most frequently utilized to describe 
individuals or groups perceived to be "typically British". One should note that, 
since one question of particular theoretical interest was whether respondents 
mentioned individuals or groups, the category coding frame was specifically set up 
to allow for this question to be examined. This being the case, some of the 
categories - such as "the queen", as opposed to "the royal family" - represent 
instances where the focus was either on an individual, or the group to which that 
individual belongs. Since this semantic difference is of interest to the current 
investigation, we are justified in treating such categories as mutually exclusive on 
semantic grounds.
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Table 26 - Individuals £ groups perceived as 
most frequent categories
typically British-
category description frequency
1 THE QUEEN 22
2 MARGARET THATCHER 19
3 THE ROYAL FAMILY 18
A OTHER INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF ROYAL FAMILY 15
5 FOOTBALL SUPPORTERS 13
6 JOHN MAJOR (PRIME MINISTER) 13
7 THE ARMED FORCES 13
8 THE "MIDDLE CLASS" 10
9 BUSINESSMEN 8
10 CHARITY WORKERS 7
11 BRITISH TOURISTS ABROAD 7
An examination of Table 26 indicates that the Queen was the most frequently 
utilized response category. It is noticeable how mentions of the Queen, the royal 
family, and other specific royals together figured very prominently in the overall 
set of responses. This lends empirical weight to the suggestions of Naim (1989) and 
other researchers, regarding the symbolic significance of the British royal family. 
One may also note how the two most frequently used categories - the Queen and 
Margaret Thatcher - represent individuals rather than groups. It is also interesting 
how football supporters appear as a response category, football hooligans having 
previously emerged as being the thing which most frequently made respondents 
regret being British.
One may note how a number of the categories refer to individuals or groups 
who have been, and continue to be, the subject of mass media attention. Whilst 
mentions of the Queen and the royal family would appear to refer to things which 
are fairly stable and unchangeable over time, some of the other responses seem 
intuitively more likely to be reflections of recent events. Thus, for example, there 
was a tendency for mentions of the armed forces to also refer to the recent Gulf 
war. Similarly, the recent aid initiatives discussed earlier were often mentioned 
when charity workers were given as a response.
These observations are significant for the social identity paradigm, since 
they have implications for the notion of prototypes and their operation in large* 
scale social groups. Recent work within Turner's self-categorization paradigm
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(Turner, 1987) has focused on how in-group prototypes tend to represent the 
individual most different to the outgroup and most similar to the ingroup on 
currently valued comparison dimensions. This framework seems particularly 
simplistic when applied to the current context of national identity. There are 
potentially a myriad of possible national prototypes available, some of whom -the 
Queen for example - are rather likely to be situationally stable. Exactly what 
informs the decision process in the choice of national prototypes is unclear, 
although we already have evidence that political affiliation is a potential mediator 
of national identity.
The question of who represents the prototypical British person is an 
important one, since self-categorization theory makes the assumption that the 
beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours of the prototype are internalized by group 
members. We should add the important point that in-group members internalize 
the behaviour and beliefs which they perceive to be associated with the prototype. 
This leaves room for different sub-groups, and different individuals, to differ in 
what they perceive as the prototypical behaviours and beliefs of the in-group. 
Furthermore, it seems likely that sub-groups and individuals might actively attempt 
to persuade other in-group members that their interpretation of social reality is 
"correct".
Intuitively, one might guess from an examination of Table 26 above that the 
responses seem to refer to individuals and groups perceived in both positive (e.g. 
charity workers) and negative ways (e.g. football supporters). It was in fact the case 
that responses to this question were of the nature that affective judgements were 
also given of the particular individuals or groups mentioned. This being the case, 
it was possible to provide a further breakdown into those perceived as positive 
(henceforth called "prototypical") and those perceived as negative (henceforth called 
"black sheep"), as shown in Tables 27 and 28:
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Table 27 - Individuals £ groups perceivsd as typically British: 
"prototypes "
category description frequency
1 THE QUEEN 14
3 THE ROYAL FAMILY 13
4 OTHER INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF ROYAL FAMILY 13
7 ARMED FORCES 10
2 MARGARET THATCHER 7
6 JOHN MAJOR (PRIME MINISTER) 7
10 CHARITY WORKERS 7
(Frequencies indicated represent the number of occurrences of the 
category which were characterized by a positive evaluative tone)
From an examination of Table 27 one may note that the Queen was the most 
frequently mentioned "Prototype" of the British, once again highlighting the 
prominence of royalty as a whole. That the royals are given by respondents as 
examples of people who are "typically British", supports Naim's (1989) suggestion 
that the current emphasis on the "normality" of the royal family does indeed seem 
to have permeated into public perceptions. In the listing of the most frequent 
prototypes, the ratio of individuals to groups is roughly equivalent (4:3). This 
would suggest, as hypothesized earlier in the Introduction, that sub-groups as well 
as individuals might act as prototypes. We would also like to suggest the 
possibility that, especially for large-scale social categories, individuals and sub­
groups might perceive a number of in-group prototypes, and that these may be 
perceived to embody different aspects of the group.
Inspection of Table 28 indicates that football supporters are the most 
frequent "black sheep" or negatively-evaluated example given by respondents. 
Since Margaret Thatcher appears prominently as both a prototype and black sheep, 
we may deduce that affective evaluations of her are relatively polarized. This is 
also a good indication of the point made earlier, that different sub-groups may 
select different in-group prototypes.
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Table 28 - Individuals & groups perceived as typically Britisht 
"black sheep"
category description frequency
5 FOOTBALL SUPPORTERS 11
2 MARGARET THATCHER 10
11 BRITISH TOURISTS ABROAD 7
20 "LAGER LOUTS" 6
(Frequencies indicated represent the number of occurrences of the 
category which were characterized by a negative evaluative tone)
4.3.4 Question G.l: Britain's most important role ivithin Europe
Table 29 details the most frequent categories respondents utilized in answering 
question 1 of section G. One may note from an examination of Table 29 that the 
most frequently mentioned role for Britain was economic - many of the 
respondents who utilized this category expressed the hope that London might 
become the financial capital of Europe/the E.C., or suggested that it already holds 
this position.
Table 29 - Britain's most important role within Europes 
most frequent categories
catogory dascription frequency
1 ECONOMIC 24
2 ACTIVE E.C. MEMBER 19
3 MODERATING/STABILIZING INFLUENCE 16
4 ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 14
5 CONTRIBUTE BRITISH "CUSTOMS"/TRADITIONS 10
6 MAINTAIN SEPARATE NATIONAL IDENTITIES IN EUROPE 10
7 CONTRIBUTE BRITISH SKILLS & KNOWLEDGE 7
8 TO BE IN CONTROL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 6
9 TO SLOW THE PACE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 6
10 TO MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH EUROPEAN NATIONS 6
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There are at least two important points suggested by this result Firstly, the salience 
of Britain's economic role in Europe appears in-keeping with much of the mass 
media treatment of European affairs, and Hewstone's (1986) observation that the 
British mass media have portrayed the debate about Europe in terms of "gains 
versus losses". The second point to make is that the frequent mentions of Britain 
being, or becoming, the Financial capital of Europe, also seem to indicate the desire 
for Britain to play a leading, and perhaps dominant role in European affairs.
One should note that, whilst many respondents wished Britain to be an 
active E.C. member (category 2), in a number of cases this was so as to prevent 
European integration going further than these respondents wished it to proceed. 
Respondents who utilized this category of response were also typical of the 
majority of respondents, in that they focused on the role they would like Britain 
to have in Europe, rather than the role they perceived Britain currently has. This 
apparent desire to control the course of European integration may reflect a deeper 
need for individuals to feel in control of their own destiny. Proponents of identity- 
oriented research within the field of International Relations for example, have come 
to recognize how individuals and groups like to feel in control of identity 
maintenance and changes in identity (see, for example, A.D. Smith, 1986).
In terms of the possibility of a European identity becoming more significant 
than it currently appears to be, one may note the evidence of a number of Social 
Psychological studies which seem to indicate that loyalty to a group, and desire to 
sustain group membership in the face of adversity, appear to be enhanced when 
individuals feel they made the initial decision to join the group (Taylor et al., 1983; 
Turner et al, 1984). The most parsimonious explanation for this phenomenon seems 
to be in terms of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). This would seem to imply 
that, if individuals, or indeed, the British nation as a whole, came to feel that 
membership of the European Community, and involvement in the on-going process 
of European integration, were the results of conscious decisions to be a member 
and to be involved, then loyalty to the European ideal - and, perhaps, to a 
European identity - might have a much firmer foundation than they appear to have 
at present. This, we would suggest, is why it is crucial for the possible
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development of a European identity, that nations and their peoples feel actively 
involved in the process of European integration.
Response category 3 - moderating/stabilizing influence - reflected responses 
which suggested Britain's role is to maintain peace and stability in Europe, and to 
avoid political extremism. It appears that the prevalence of this response category 
may also reflect the desire to feel in control of European affairs, and to steer a 
course for European integration which is in Britain's interest
4.3.5 Question G.2: Europe's most important role in world affairs
Table 30 below details the most frequent categories respondents utilized in 
answering question 2 of section G.
Table 30 - Europe'a moat important role in world affaire: 
moat frequent categoriea
category description frequency
1 PROMOTE/MAINTAIN WORLD PEACE 37
2 ECONOMIC 29
3 AS AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL POWER 23
4 TO PROVIDE AID & DEVELOP THIRD WORLD 17
5 AS A THIRD SUPERPOWER 14
€ TO MAINTAIN BALANCE/STABILITY IN INTERN. RELS. 14
7 TO PROVIDE AID TO ANY NATIONS WHO REQUIRE IT 12
8 TO BECOME A UNITED COMMUNITY 6
9 TO SET AN EXAMPLE OF NATIONS CO-OPERATING 6
10 TO BE INDEPENDENT FROM U.S. INFLUENCE 5
11 TO FORM AGREEMENTS WITH MAJOR WORLD POWERS 5
From an examination of Table 30 one may note that the most frequently cited role 
for Europe was to maintain world peace. There are indications that a number of 
respondents felt Europe as a whole potentially offers more power and influence in 
the world arena than individual nations can offer. This seems to be congruent with
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the view, expressed by a number of respondents, that Europe could become a new 
superpower. One should note that almost all of the respondents who suggested the 
latter, emphasized the benefits that would ensue from such a development Whilst 
a number of respondents made the superpower analogy, they tended to be rather 
vague as to the exact nature of a European superpower - i.e. whether it would be 
economic, military, political, or all of these. Similarly, respondents tended not to 
address the issue of whether a European super-power would comprise separate 
states or a single "super-state".
There are indications from the responses to the current question, that one 
possible way in which a European identity might develop, is if it promises the 
power and influence consummate with being a third "superpower". This seems to 
support Stagner's (1967) suggestion that the desire for power is a motive behind 
identity processes. Paradoxically, the very social representations of the British 
Empire which might serve to inhibit a European identity (i.e. those suggesting the 
power of the British empire) might, therefore, also encourage the development of 
a European identity, if the latter was perceived to augment the current power and 
prestige of Britain, and thus re-instate Britain as the world's most powerful nation. 
This milieu would suggest a European identity which would complement rather 
than replace British identity.
We would also suggest that the desire for Europe to become a third 
superpower is also indicative of the desire for control. This interpretation appears 
to be supported by the frequent suggestion made by respondents that a European 
superpower could act as a stabilizing factor in world affairs, providing an element 
of balance between East and West. We would, of course, expect that such 
representations of the future of Europe are likely to be undergoing revision in light 
of the recent changes in the Soviet Union. Further research might endeavour to 
investigate the consequences for the survival of national identity, associated with 
social representations of Europe which focus on the prospect of a European 
superpower.
It is also interesting to note the significance of economic and political role, 
and the absence of any cultural role for Europe. This seems to support the earlier
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suggestion that, at present, European identity is likely to be "instrumental" rather 
than "sentimental", or to utilize Bales' (1950) dichotomy, to be characterized by a 
"task-oriented” rather than a "socio-emotional" orientation. In fact, whilst A.D. 
Smith (1991) suggests that the most likely prospect for the development of a 
European identity is in terms of the perception of a common European culture, we 
would suggest that the apparent prevalence and strength of the British attachment 
to national culture will make such a process especially difficult
Finally, one should note that, as mentioned earlier, the frequency with 
which category 4 - to aid and develop the third world - was utilized may have been 
associated with the mass media attention devoted to fund-raising events and 
campaigns, which closely preceded the collection of the questionnaire data. It is, 
however, interesting to note how recent events appear to enter into respondents' 
social representations of the role of Europe, suggesting that, whilst such social 
representations are likely to be fairly resistant to change, they also require the 
flexibility to encompass recent events of significance.
In terms of possible outgroups for a European identity, it is instructive to 
consider the appearance of "a third superpower" as a possible role for Europe in 
world affairs. Most of the respondents who utilized the latter category made a 
specific comparison with the U.S.A. - other apparent outgroups included the 
U.S.S.R., China, Asia, and Japan. That the U.S.A. was the most frequently 
mentioned out-group for Europe seems to lend weight to the apparent allure for 
respondents of the prospect of a European superpower.
4.3.6 Section H.2 : Individuals, groups or political parties with
Question 1 which respondents share broadly similar views 
about Britain
The individuals, groups, or political parties respondents most frequently reported 
sharing similar views about Britain with are reported in Table 31.
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Table 31 - Individuala/groups/political parties with which 
viewa are ahared about Britain
category description frequency
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 
9
CONSERVATIVE PARTY 
SDLP/LIBERAL PARTY 
LABOUR PARTY 
GREEN PARTY 
"LEFT WING" GROUPS 
ECOLOGICAL PRESSURE GROUPS 
"NOBODY"/"NONE"
FRIENDS 
"DON'T KNOW"
29
26
23
20
10
9
7
3
3
An analysis of Table 31 indicates that, in general, political parties are cited most 
frequently as examples of individuals or groups with which respondents share 
similar views about Britain. It was usually the case that respondents who listed a 
political party would list the one which they indicated they would vote for in a 
hypothetical general election. However, there was a tendency for those who listed 
the Labour or Liberal parties to also list other parties/groups, and to suggest that 
they agreed with some of the policies of each of the listed groups. One may also 
note how groups predominate over individuals in the list of most frequently 
occurring categories.
4.3.7 Section H.2 : Individuals, groups or political parties ivith
Question 2 which respondents share broadly similar views 
about Europe
Table 32 details the individuals, groups, or political parties respondents most 
frequently reported sharing similar views about Europe with.
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Table 32 - Individual a /groups /political parties with which 
views are shared about Europe
category description frequency
1
2
3
4
5
6 
7
CONSERVATIVE PARTY 
SDLP/LIBERAL PARTY 
LABOUR PARTY 
"NOBODY"/"NONE" 
"DON'T KNOW" 
"LEFT-WING" GROUPS 
FRIENDS
20
16
16
9
6
6
4
As was the case for sharing views about Britain, one may note from Table 32, that 
respondents most frequently report sharing similar views about Europe with 
political parties. There was also the same tendency for respondents who reported 
sharing similar views with the Liberal or Labour Parties to say that they agreed 
with certain policies from a number of parties. Once again, we may note the 
predominance of groups over individuals. Furthermore, we note with interest the 
occurrence of "nobody/none” as a response to both questions 1 and 2. It was 
somewhat unclear as to whether these respondents actually thought their views 
were totally unique, or whether they were simply unaware of others who might 
share similar views. We interpret the occurrence of this response category as 
suggestive of the ideology of individualism prevalent in Britain (c.f. Farr, 1990).
Overall, responses to questions 1 and 2 above, provide support for 
Zavalloni's (1973) finding that political affiliations act to mediate national identity, 
in as much as they suggest that political affiliation and national identity are often 
interconnected. Furthermore, the responses to question 2 suggest that political 
affiliation also mediates European identity. That support for the notion of national 
and European identities being mediated was discovered from both quantitative and 
qualitative analyses we find particularly compelling. We would suggest that such 
results reflect the current prevalence of a number of competing social 
representations of Europe and the European Community.
Which of these social representations becomes dominant is likely to play a 
large part in the development of European integration and its effects upon our 
national identity. It is our contention that the Social Identity paradigm will provide
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a useful conceptual framework for charting this power struggle between alternative 
"constructions of reality1' (Berger & Luckmann, 1967), since the latter is intimately 
associated with the relations between social groups. It should also be emphasized 
that, whilst the current data are supportive of Zavalloni's argument, what they can 
not do is prove her contention that it is political affiliations which mediate national 
identity, rather than the opposite case of national identity acting as a mediator. It 
should be remembered however, that part of the justification for politics mediating 
national identity, is that politics, political parties and so on, are rather more 
concrete entities than nations, the implication being that being a diffuse and 
abstract entity, a nation is only experienced via the mediation of more concrete 
categories (c.f. Zavalloni, 1973).
4.4 CONCLUSIONS
4.4.1 The measurement o f social identity
The results from the current study have indicated that a general "social identity 
scale" might be feasible in the future. However, whilst possible uses for such a 
scale are suggested, it is noted that social identity is a multidimensional construct 
deserving of research which takes a number of perspectives, and makes use of both 
quantitative and qualitative research methods. Furthermore, the research has 
indicated that we may have to modify our understanding of the self-stereotyping 
process if we wish to utilize self-stereotyping as a measure of the strength of social 
identity. Finally, we noted how multidimensional scaling procedures can prove 
useful tools for exploratory analysis of social identity issues.
4.4.2 Social stereotypes
It was shown how variations in the format of survey questions can elicit 
differences in social stereotypes. In particular, we may note how eliciting social
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stereotypes in essentially comparative contexts seems to lead to elements of such 
stereotypes being modified in order to achieve positive in-group distinctiveness. 
Some of the implications for the elicitation of social stereotypes were addressed. 
In addition, it was noted how there is some evidence suggestive of stable core 
elements within social stereotypes, since the stereotypes of the British and Italians 
elicited in the current study bore similarities to those obtained by Hewstone (1986). 
The multidimensional scaling analysis also indicated the possibility of a general 
"Latin" stereotype, as suggested by Peabody (1985).
4.4.3 The self-stereotyping process
The self-stereotyping measures included in the current study seemed to indicate 
that self-serving biases tend to mediate the self-stereotyping process, such that 
there is a tendency to self-stereotype more readily those traits the individual 
perceives in a positive evaluative light. Further evidence for self-serving biases 
mediating social identity processes, was furnished by responses to the open-ended 
questions. In conclusion, it was noted how the results tended to confirm the 
assumption made by the Social Identity paradigm that degree of self-stereotyping 
may be used as a measure of level or strength of social identity. However, it was 
suggested that future measures of self-stereotyping should allow for self-serving 
biases, P.I.P. effects, and other individualistic strategies, which might bias the 
results obtained.
4.4.4 Prototypes
Responses to open-ended questions suggested that large-scale social groups, such 
as national identity group, are likely to be characterized by the existence of 
multiple in-group prototypes. The choice amongst competing prototypes will be 
influenced by self-serving biases, the mediating sub-groups to which the individual 
belongs, and the differential media attention paid to them. Furthermore, evidence 
was found for the existence of both prototypical individuals and prototypical sub­
groups. It was also found that some of the prototypes elicited appeared to possess
134
cross-situational and temporal stability. Finally, evidence was found for the 
perception of in-group "black sheep" - sub-groups which are perceived to embody 
negatively-evaluated aspects of the in-group, and through marginalizing processes 
enable the maintenance of positive self-esteem (c.f. Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988).
Current theorizing within the Self-categorization paradigm, it is suggested, 
has failed to consider such aspects of prototypes, largely due to a restrictive 
emphasis on laboratory experimentation, and somewhat crude operationalisations 
of the social influence process, raising serious questions about ecological validity.
4.4.5 Social Identity Theory and large-scale social categories
Results obtained during the course of the current study suggested that the Social 
Identity paradigm might require further development in order to adequately 
encompass aspects of social identity processes linked to large-scale social groups. 
For example, the current study found evidence that national identity seems to be 
mediated by smaller-scale identities - in particular, by political identity. Whether 
this is indicative of Zavalloni's (1973) suggestion that most or all laige-scale social 
groups are mediated will be a matter for future research to address. Whilst finding 
evidence for the mediation of large-scale social groups, the results obtained in the 
current study were not interpreted as supporting Brewer and Schneider's (1990) 
contention that large-scale social groups can not serve identity needs as well as 
smaller groups. In fact, the evidence for strong "sentimental" attachments to the 
British nation, and indications that national and European identity satisfy control 
and power motivations, would suggest that national and other large-scale Social 
identities can and do satisfy identity needs.
It was also suggested that symbols of the in-group might take on added 
potence for large-scale social groups, since the latter tend to be diffuse and reified 
entities. Furthermore, it was argued that this diffuse quality, and the sheer size of 
social groups like national identity, may afford greater opportunity for the use of 
self-serving and other biases which aim to avoid the self-stereotyping of negatively- 
evaluated properties of the in-group. Finally, the evidence of multiple prototypes,
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sub-groups acting as prototypes, and so on, discussed earlier, may also be 
suggestive of social identity phenomena which particularly characterize large-scale 
social groups, rather than the small groups often focused on in laboratory research.
4.4.6 National identity
Evidence arising from the current research indicated that British national identity 
is characterized by a strong attachment to national culture and symbols - in essence, 
what Kelman (1969) described as a "sentimental" attachment to the nation. It was 
suggested that Kelman's instrumental-sentimental dichotomy is theoretically similar 
to Bales' (1950) notion of socio-emotional versus task orientation to the group. 
Perhaps the most salient symbol linked to British national identity proved to be the 
royal family, a result which was in keeping with previous theorizing (Naim, 1989) 
and empirical research (Topf et al, 1989). Furthermore, open-ended responses which 
focused on the economic and political role of Britain also served to indicate the 
presence of instrumental orientations to the nation (Kelman, 1969), suggesting that 
British national identity at the present time is characterized both by sentimental 
and instrumental attachments to the nation. There was also evidence to support 
Stagner's (1967) contention that national identity serves the individual needs for 
power and autonomy.
As mentioned earlier, political affiliations were found to mediate level of 
British identity, such that Conservative voters possessed significantly higher levels 
of national identity than Labour voters. Furthermore, it was suggested that 
mediating identities are likely to influence choice of national symbols, prototypes, 
and social stereotypes, such that the phenomenological meaning of national 
identity will differ across varying sub-groups within the nation.
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4.4.7 European identity
Overall "strength" of British identity was found to be significantly higher than the 
strength of European identity. In particular, it was found that the salience of British 
identity was greater than that of European identity. Combined with the results 
from the open-ended questions, it seemed that European identity represents a 
poorly defined and as yet rather vague "cognitive alternative" (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979/1986) to national identity. This interpretation was lent weight by the general 
distancing of the European Community from the concept of "self' in the 
multidimensional scaling analysis.
There were also indications that, whilst British national identity involves a 
strong attachment to national symbols and culture, European identity appears much 
more instrumental in character, being linked more to the instrumental dimensions 
of economics and politics. Just as British identity was found to be mediated by 
political affiliation, so it was found that Labour voters expressed significantly 
higher levels of European identity than Conservative voters. There were also 
indications that females expressed a higher level of European identity than males. 
Finally, it was proposed that previous research (e.g. Turner et al., 1984) suggests 
that a European identity is likely to be adhered to with more perseverance if its 
internalization is seen as an act of will, rather than as a result of external 
imposition.
4.4.8 The European Community and European integration
There were indications from both the closed and open-ended responses that British 
and European identities are perceived as dissonant or conflictual. It was suggested 
that this might reflect the treatment of European issues in the British mass media, 
and the resistance to change of existing social representations of the nation. This 
result was in-keeping with Hewstone's (1986) discovery that positivity of British 
national "image" was negatively associated with attitudes towards the European 
Community in his survey study.
137
Evidence was also found which suggested that social identities are related 
to attitudes and social representations. In particular, it was discovered that 
European identity proved to be an important predictor of attitudes to the European 
Community and European integration. There was also evidence to suggest that 
British identity may act to inhibit pro-European attitudes and voting intentions. It 
was also discovered that apparently pro-European Community responses could be 
indicative of a desire to slow the pace of European integration, and enable Britain 
to play a leading role in European affairs, thereby ensuring the protection of British 
interests, and the maintenance of a separate British identity.
Finally, responses to open-ended questions indicated that some respondents 
considered European integration to hold the prospect of the development of a 
European super-state comparable to the United States. This was interpreted as 
supporting Stagner's (1967) contention that identity processes are linked to the need 
for power and control. It was suggested that one way in which a European identity 
might augment or even replace British national identity, is if it is perceived to offer 
greater prestige and power. At present, with the apparent intensity of British 
attachment to national culture and symbols, it was thought unlikely that a 
European identity would develop along cultural lines, as suggested by A.D. Smith 
(1991).
An interesting perspective for future research in this area to take is to focus 
on the struggle between different social groups within nations and within Europe, 
which are attempting to disseminate and propagate their own, often incompatible, 
social representations of Europe, European nations, the European Community, and 
the directions European integration might take. The social psychological 
manifestations of the on-going process of European integration seem especially 
appropriate for this kind of analysis, which might attempt an integration of the 
social identity and social representations paradigms. Such a study, which would 
probably take the proportions of a research programme, would necessitate the 
adoption of a variety of research techniques, and could only benefit from a 
collaboration with scholars from the other social sciences.
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Even though the current study was quite broad in its scope, there were 
inevitably aspects of national and European identities which could not be 
addressed. Thus, for example, future research should also examine variables such 
as race, gender, regional identity, religion, country of origin, language etc 
Furthermore, the single European Market and whole '1992" package would also 
seem a potentially instructive focus for future analyses. In conclusion, we perceive 
the process of European integration to offer an ideal "field-setting" for the study 
of social identity and social representations, and thereby serve to complement the 
current focus on the experimental laboratory, evident in much work within the self­
categorization paradigm.
In the next chapter, the observations arising from the current British data are 
compared with those suggested by data collected in Italy, where it soon becomes 
apparent that, as expected, British and Italian orientations to integration are indeed 
quite different
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Chapter 5
The cross-national questionnaire data - 2: the Italians
5.1 INTRODUCTION
5.1.1 Italian national identity
It is important to concede from the beginning that Social Psychology can contribute 
only a perspective on national identity, one which complements observations arising 
from the other social sciences, such as Sociology and International Relations. At the 
same time it is worth noting that certain schools of thought within European social 
psychology have of late come to advocate an approach to our discipline which goes 
some way towards reconciling socio-historical and social psychological perspectives 
(see, for example, Himmelweit et al., 1981; Moscovici, 1984). It is in the spirit of this 
arguably more "social" social psychology that we now turn to a brief discussion of 
some of the socio-historical factors relevant to our current interest in Italian 
national identity.
In historical terms, the Italian nation is relatively young, deriving from the 
formation of the republic in 1860, which brought together what had previously 
been a collection of relatively independent regions and city-states (c.f. Mack Smith, 
1969; 1985). In the centuries prior to unification, a good number of future Italian 
citizens lived under what was often perceived as harsh and unjust foreign rule. 
This led many to develop a deep-seated distrust of authority and government, 
which may well have its psychological reverberations today. Luigi Barzini (1983)
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has aptly described the problems facing the would-be architects of the Italian 
nation at the time of unification:
The nongeographical divisions among the people were deep and 
irreconcilable. They lived next door to each other, called themselves 
Italians, but were almost as different as inhabitants of foreign 
countries. Most of them seemed to be inhabiting their own personal 
imaginary Italies and to be trying to promote or perpetuate their 
existences. (Barzini, 1983, p.181)
Whilst the culture of the Italian people has a veritable and ancient basis, the 
modem Italian state has at times looked fragile. Commentators such as Barzini (op. 
cit) and Haycraft (1987) suggest that the embarrassment of fascism and the Second 
World War, coupled with relatively poor economic performance, led to something 
of a crisis in what had always been a brittle Italian identity. The threat to national 
identity was compounded by political crises, terrorism, organized crime, and 
widespread corruption. The dream of many Italians - a capable and just 
government (il buongovemo) - continued to elude them (see, for example, 
LaPalombara, 1987). Today, many Italians have come to accept, albeit with a sense 
of disappointment, that political confusion, corruption, and the Mafia, have become 
fairly permanent aspects of life in Italy. Yet by the beginning of 1993, amidst a tide 
of particularly significant scandals, it seems that many Italians are coming to feel 
they have had enough, and perhaps the largest attempt at finally coming to grips 
with corruption is beginning to take shape, as politicians and other notable public 
figures past and present, struggle to repair their badly damaged reputations.
However, it has been argued by some (e.g. Ward, 1990), that Italian national 
identity enjoyed something of a revival during the 1980s, which has continued to 
some extent, to the present day. The 1980s, argues Ward, witnessed a dramatic 
reversal in Italy's fortunes: economically, Italy appeared to be progressing at a 
healthy pace; highly salient political and media figures such as Pertini and Baudo 
engendered pride in the Italian people; and the soccer world cup victory of 1982 
was cherished by a nation of avid sports fans.
The role of the mass media here should not be underestimated (a common 
mistake in psychological discussions of national identity). For Ward, "it was
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television that was to complete Garibaldi and Cavour's work in unifying the 
peninsula, in giving Italy a linguistic and cultural identity previously missing." 
(Ward, 1990, p.129). For all modem nations, television serves a unifying role, with 
nationwide news broadcasts being especially crucial in establishing notions of the 
"national interest". The mass media also provide citizens with a rich resource of 
norms, stereotypes and prototypes from which to construct their national identity.
However proud the Italians may be about their cultural heritage, economic 
prosperity and sporting achievements, it is indisputable that the majority remain 
deeply frustrated with the political system and state services (e.g. postal and 
telephone agencies). During the period 1978-1987, Eurobarometre surveys indicate * 
that on average, 75% of Italians were "not at all satisfied with the way democracy 
works" in Italy. Interestingly, this dissatisfaction with politics does not appear to 
have reduced the public's interest in political matters - turn-out at national elections 
averages an extremely high 90% (Ginsborg, 1990). It is worth noting that, despite 
the perceptions of many foreign observers, Italy is in fact quite stable politically; 
whilst there are frequent government reshuffles, the actual number of general 
elections since the Second World War is no greater than in the U.K., and the 
Christian Democrats (D.C.) have managed to hold political superiority since 1945.
Since the regions and city-states of the past were such important aspects of 
pre-unification life, it is perhaps not altogether surprising that regionalism is still 
a significant aspect of life in Italy today. Whilst the state apparatus, economy, 
transport system, youth culture, and other elements of Italian life are relatively 
nationwide, a number of regional factors remain significant (see, for example, 
Capozza, Bonaldo & Di Maggio, 1982; Procacci, 1988). Thus, for example, regional 
media - both newspapers and television stations - remain extremely popular. Local 
governments often have significant levels of autonomy from the state. Italians trace 
their regional and local heritage with fervour and pride. Culturally, all of the 
regions have their own cuisine, sense of humour, accent, and dialects. Many 
Italians continue to diffuse and accept regional stereotypes - of the Bolognese, the 
Milanese, the Romani, etc. Despite the teaching of standard Italian in all schools 
now, it appears that around 71% of Italians can still speak some form of regional 
dialect (Lepschy, 1990), and some of these remain completely incomprehensible to
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Italian speakers from outside the local area. Such regional practices appear to have 
evinced an impressive longevity, yet at the same time, one should remember that 
they do, after all, outdate the Italian nation by a good few centuries.
5.1.2 Italy and Europe
The Italians have almost always been amongst the most enthusiastic proponents 
of European integration, and Italy can rightly be considered as one of the architects 
of the European Community. Today, Eurobarom&tre opinion poll data from the E.C. 
member states regularly shows the Italians as expressing the highest levels of 
support for the Community and further integration (see also Hewstone, 1986). For 
example, data from Eurobarom&tre #34 (December 1990) indicates that the Italians * 
were the most keen amongst EC members for efforts being made to unify Europe, 
with some 87 per cent being in favour. Commentators have observed how this 
stance is noticeable in parliament, the press, and public opinion (Ward, 1990). In 
contrast to the heated political debate and media criticism witnessed in Britain, the 
major Italian political parties, together with the prominent newspapers, appear to 
have lost any reservations they might have had decades ago, and are relatively 
homogeneous in their support for integration.
It is hoped that the current study might provide some social psychological 
pointers as to why the Italians appear to be so unreservedly pro-European (in 
contrast to the British). Both Barzini (1983) and Ward (1990) suggest that Italians 
hope the E.C. perhaps offers them an escape from inept government and at last the 
promise of il buongovemo. We will see shortly that this does indeed seem to be the 
case for some Italians, but is not the whole story. Similarly, whilst many Italians 
undoubtedly link Italy's economic development with E.C. membership, this alone 
does not seem to account for the degree of pro-Europeanism evinced by the Italians 
- Eurobarom&tre polls for example, indicate that the Italians do not necessarily feel 
Italy has gained a great deal yet from E.C. membership.
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5.1.3 A NOTE ABOUT THE ITALIAN TRANSLATION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE
Although the Italian translation of the questionnaire is as identical as possible to 
the English translation, there was one interesting (though minor) change in 
wording which had to be adopted. It soon emerged that Italians typically tend not 
to talk of "Britain/the British" or "the United Kingdom", but instead talk of the 
"English" and "England". It was beyond the scope of the current study to examine 
the possible psychological consequences of this interesting linguistic phenomenon, 
but it should be noted that throughout the questionnaire, the Italian noun 
Inghilterra (England) was used to refer to Britain. The text of the Italian 
questionnaire is presented in Appendix D. Please note that since a number of 
sections included in the English questionnaire were removed from the Italian 
version, the section headings and question numbers may be different between the 
two versions - for clarification, please consult the questionnaire texts reproduced 
in the appendices.
5.2 RESULTS & DISCUSSION
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5.2.1 Demographic data
A basic demographic profile of the Italian respondents is presented in Table 33 
below.
Table 33 - Demographic data for Italian study
SEX: AGE:
count %
Hean: 21 years
Female 99 72.3 Hode: 19 years
Hale 38 27.7 Range: 18-44 years
Total 137
COUNTRY OP ORIGIN:
count %
Italy 135 98.5
Other 2 1.5
PREDICTED VOTE IN GENERAL ELECTION (HOST POPULAR RESPONSES):
Frequency Percent
PDS 15 10.9
LISTE VERDE 13 9.5
RIFONDAZIONE COMMUNISTA 10 7.3
OTHER 28 20.4
(NOT VOTE) 44 32.1
(HISSING DATA) 27 19.8
Total 137 100
53  FIXED RESPONSE QUESTIONS
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5.3.1 Sections (A) and (E.1): Italian and European identity
Much like the British data, it was noticeable from an exploratory data analysis, that 
the majority of the Italian identity variables have means close to the neutral scale 
midpoint of 4. Similarly, the means of the European identity measures also tend 
to converge on the scale midpoint or towards the positive end of the scale.
Principal Components Analysis
A  Principal Components Analysis (PCA) with Varimax rotation was conducted in 
order to investigate the relationship between the Italian identity variables. Table 
34 below contains a summary of the results obtained from the PCA.
Table 34 - PCA results for Italian Identity variables
The PCA extracted 1 component/factor with an Eigan value of 3.531, 
which accounted for 50.4% of the variance; variable loadings on this 
component were as follows:
Variable Loading
Al .839
A2 .736
A3 .763
A4 .683
A5 .778
A6 .432
A7 .667 (n-130)
(since only 1 component was extracted, rotation was not possible)
In keeping with the British data, one may note that the Italian identity variables 
load highly and positively on the single extracted component, which can therefore 
be labelled "Italian identity". From an examination of the correlation matrix 
(Appendix B.l, Table A), one may note that all of the identity variables correlate 
significantly with each other, except for variables A6 and A7. Since question A6 
refers to respondents sharing views about Italy, it is perhaps not surprising that 
responses to this question, which may well be open to individualistic and P.I.P.
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biases, are less highly correlated with the other identity variables. Question A7 
refers to Italians feeling personally criticized when Italy is criticized. As the 
analysis of the open-ended responses will demonstrate, it appears that some, 
though not the majority of, Italians endeavour to distance themselves from the 
frequent criticisms levelled at Italian politics, corruption, and organized crime. As * 
we discovered in the analysis of self-stereotyping amongst the British respondents, 
it seems quite common for individuals to distance themselves from aspects of a 
social identification they feel unhappy about, or outsiders criticize. This does not 
necessarily imply a lower level of identification compared to those who are willing 
to incorporate negatively evaluated aspects of the ingroup into their own self­
stereotypes.
Table 35 contains a summary of the Principal Components analysis of the 
European identity variables.
TaJbla 35 - PCA results for European Identity variables (Italian data)
The PCA extracted 1 component/factor with an Eigen value of 3.630, 
which accounted for 51.93t of the variance; variable loadings on this 
component were as follows:
Variable Loading
E.l 1 .743
E.l 2 .647
E.l 3 .814
E.l 4 .659
E.l 5 .791
E.l 6 .626
E.l 7 .739 (n-129)
(since only 1 component was extracted, rotation was not possible)
In a similar manner to the Italian identity variables, the European measures all load 
highly and positively on a single component - European identity. An examination 
of the correlation matrix (Appendix B.l, Table B) indicates that all European 
identity variables correlate positively and significantly. This result is in keeping 
with that obtained from the British data.
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Reliability analysis
It can be seen from Table 36 that both the Italian and European identity variables 
are able to form fairly adequate composite scales.
Table 36 - Reliability analyses for sections A and E.l
(Italian ID) (Euro ID)
mean inter-item correlations: section A section E.l
.408 .434
corrected item-total correlations:
Al: .737 El: .629
A2: .610 E2: .526 -Internal consistency reliability-
A3: .637 E3: .710
A4: .556 E4: .533 CRONBACH'S ALPHA: A>.829 E.1-.843
A5: .662 E5: .679
A6: .318 E6: .501 Standardized
A7: .531 E7: .622 Item Alpha: A&.828 E«.843
Note: Section A*Italian Identity; section E»Euro Identity
Cronbach's Alpha for both scales is close to the ideal 0.85 or over recommended for 
psychometric scales (c.f. Kline, 1985). The points made earlier concerning the pros 
and cons of a general social identity scale are equally relevant here: to briefly 
summarize what was argued previously, we would suggest that social identity is 
potentially a multidimensional construct, and should be treated accordingly. This 
is not to say that single social identity scales can not be valuable, but only that they 
should be utilized with the admission that they may well be simplifications of 
complex psychological constructs.
Correlations between identity and other relevant variables
Table 37 below contains the Pearson Product Moment correlations between the 
Italian identity variables and two other variables likely to be associated with them.
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Table 37 - Correlation matrix for Italian identity variables 
with C3, AND F6.
Al A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7
C3 .694 .399 .579 .591 .546 .326 .417
p-.OOl p-.OOl P-.OOl p-.OOl p-.OOl p-.OOl p-.OOl
F6 -.432 -.178 -.165 -.119 -.335 -.216 -.201
p-.OOl NS NS NS p-.OOl NS NS
(Pearson Product Moment Correlations)
(all probabilities are 2-tailed)
C3 -SIMILARITY RATING OF "ITALY - MYSELF" (E/7)
F€ -IN FAVOUR/AGAINST REPLACEMENT OF ITALIAN FLAG £ ANTHEM
From an examination of Table 37 above, one may note that all of the Italian 
identity variables correlate positively and significantly with responses to question 
C3, which measures perceived similarity between Italy and self. This result, which 
is in keeping with that obtained from the British data, adds further weight to the 
earlier observation that measures of the "cognitive closeness" of concepts might be 
related to social identification and self-categorisation. In particular, the observed 
correlations seem in part to validate the use of multidimensional scaling techniques 
in multi-methodological investigations of social identity processes.
It is interesting to note the differences between the British and Italian data 
concerning the associations between national identity variables and willingness to 
have the national flag and anthem replaced by European Community equivalents 
(variable F6). Whereas for the British, all national identity variables were 
significantly (and negatively) correlated with the willingness to see the flag and 
anthem replaced, for the Italians, only variables Al and A5 correlate significantly 
with variable F6. Variables Al and A5 both seem to tap elements of the current 
salience of national identity - thus, since the observed correlation is negative, when 
the salience of Italian identity increases, then one would expect opposition to the 
replacement of the flag and anthem to also increase.
As we will shortly discover, since the Italians appear to be significantly 
more favourable towards European integration than the British, it is not altogether
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surprising that Italian national identity appears less resistant to changing the 
national flag and anthem for an E.C. equivalent, than British identity.
Table 38 below details the correlations between the European identity 
variables (section E.1) and some other variables likely to be associated with 
European identity.
Table 38 - Correlation matrix for European identity variables 
with C5, AND CIS.
E.l 1 E.l 2 E.l 3 E.l 4 E.l 5 E.l 6 E.l 7
C5 -.062 .067 -.018 .059 .046 -.081 .080
NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
C15 .457 .428 .429 .342 .393 .300 .324
P ~ . 0 0 1  pa.OOl p a . 001 p a . 001 P * . 0 0 1  P « . 0 0 1  p a . 001
(Pearson Product Moment Correlations)
(all probabilities are 2-tailed)
C5 * SIMILARITY RATING OF "ITALY - E.C. " (X/7) 
CIS • SIMILARITY RATING OF "E.C. - MYSELF" (X/7)
Once again, from an examination of Table 38 one may note an interesting 
difference between the British and Italian data. For the British respondents, four 
of the British identity variables were significantly (and positively) associated with 
the perceived similarity between Britain and the E.C. However, one may note from 
Table 38 that for the Italians, none of the Italian identity variables correlate 
significantly with perceptions of the similarity between Italy and the E.C. This 
initially puzzling finding is rendered much more comprehensible when considered 
together with the fact that many Italian respondents, regardless of their orientation 
towards European integration, perceived Italy as quite different to the other E.C 
nations, in that they felt Italy was much more prone to corruption, inefficient 
bureaucracy and political instability. These observations derive from open-ended 
responses, highlighting once again how open-ended questions are often crucial 
when one wishes to examine the deeper implications of quantitative measures.
One way in which the British and Italian data are similar, is in the observed 
correlations between the European identity variables and the variable measuring
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the perceived similarity between "self' and the E.C From an examination of Table 
38, one may note that all European identity variables are significantly and 
positively correlated with variable C l5, such that as European identity increases, 
so the concepts "self' and the E.C. are rated as more similar. It is worth making the 
point that, given the magnitude of the observed correlations, one should not rely 
on this type of similarity rating for one's only measure of a social identification - 
for this purpose, a scale based on the seven identity measures themselves would 
be much more suitable.
Italian versus European identity
A within-subjects MANOVA was conducted in order to compare the overall pattern 
of responses on the Italian and European identity variables, and a summary of the 
MANOVA analysis is contained in Table 39 below.
Table 39 - MANOVA comparing Italian and European identity 
(n-130)
Overall multivariate effect (Pillaia Teat) s
Value-.310 F« 7.893 D.F.-7,123 Sig. of F-<.001
Significant univariate effectsi
"To what extent do you feel pleased to be Italian/European?"
Means: Italian-4.238 European-4.962 F(l,129)-17.191 Sig—<.001
"How important to you is being Italian/European?"
Means: Italian-3.969 European-4.546 F(l,129)-9.628, Sig-.002
The MANOVA analysis detailed in Table 39 indicates that overall, there is a 
significant multivariate difference between Italian and European identities (F= 7.89, 
d.f. 7,123, pc.001). Examination of the univariate statistics also presented in Table 
39, indicates that there are two cases where Italian and European identities are 
significantly different.
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Variables A3/E.1 3 refer to the extent respondents felt pleased to be Italian 
or European, and one may note from the univariate F statistics that the Italian 
respondents reported feeling significantly more pleased to be European than 
Italian. This is therefore an instance where at least an element of European identity 
appears to be stronger than national identity. As the discussion of the open-ended 
responses will make clear, this result is not surprising, given that the Italian 
respondents often felt much more positive about Europe and the E.C than they did 
about their own nation. However, it is extremely important to note that one of the 
reasons the Italians were so positive about Europe was precisely because they 
hoped further integration might ease some of Italy's problems regarding politics, 
bureaucracy, and so on. Thus, one should note that whilst European was stronger 
than Italian identity on this measure, the means for both identities were above 4, 
and therefore towards the positive evaluative end of the scale.
Variables A5 and E.1 5 refer to how important respondents feel being Italian 
or European is to them. One can see from Table 39 that the mean importance of 
being European was significantly higher than the mean importance of being Italian. 
This dimension appears to primarily tap the salience of Italian and European 
identities - it thus appears that, to some extent, for the Italian respondents, 
European identity was more salient than Italian identity. Given that European 
integration, the E.C. and related issues were receiving extremely high levels of mass 
media coverage (almost all of which was pro-European) in Italy at the time of data- 
collection, this result is readily understandable, and in keeping with the generally 
pro-European orientation of the majority of the Italian respondents.
Taken as a whole, these results deviate in an interesting manner from those 
pertaining to the British respondents. It is worth recalling that three measures 
indicated a significantly higher level of British, as opposed to European identity. 
For the Italians, at least in terms of quantitative measures of identity, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that European identity is at least as strong as, and in some 
cases stronger than, Italian identity. Since Eurobarometre opinion polls consistently 
suggest the strength of Italian support for European integration, these results are 
to be expected, although it should be noted that the Eurobarometre focuses on 
opinions and attitudes, not on identities. Thus, it is interesting to find that the pro-
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European opinions espoused by the Italians also seem to be complementedbyquite 
a healthy European identity.
5.3.2 Cross-national comparisons o f identities:- 
Italian & British identity: a comparison
A between-subjects MANOVA was conducted in order to investigate any 
significant differences between Italian and British national identity. It should be 
noted that here we are focusing on quantitative aspects of national identity - we 
will address the question of qualitative differences between the samples in our 
discussion of the open-ended responses. Since an analysis of the means indicated 
they appeared to be very similar, it was not surprising to discover that the 
MANOVA procedure indicated the absence of any multivariate difference between 
the Italian and British quantitative identity measures. This result will prove of 
relevance when we later come to examine the nature of Italian opinions about 
Europe and the apparent strength of European identity amongst the Italians. At this 
point in the discussion, it is sufficient to note that there are no statistically 
significant differences in national identity between the British and Italian samples. 
This means that differences in the overall strength or level of national identity can 
not be forwarded as explanations for any differences in European identity between 
the two samples.
Comparing European identity in Italy and Britain
Table 40 below contains a summary of the output obtained from a between-subjects 
MANOVA conducted to examine any quantitative differences in European identity 
between the British and Italian respondents.
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Table 40: MANOVA comparing European Identity in Britain £ Italy 
(n*237 x Italian*130, British«107)
Overall multivariate effect (Plllaie Teat):
Value>. 120 F* 4.465 D.F.~7,229 Sig. of Fx.001
Significant univariate effects:
"To what extent do you feel European?"
British: mean=4.131 Italian: moan*4.769 Sig* .002
"How important to you is being European?"
British: mean*3.860 Italian: mean>4.546 Sig*.003
"When you hear someone vho is not European criticize 
the Europeans, to vhat extent do you feel personally 
criticized?*
British: xaean*3.290 Italian: mean*4.162 Sig«<.001
(Significance levels derive from F-tests, and are 2-tailed)
The results presented in Table 40 above confirm what an eyeballing of the means 
suggested, since it was noticeable that on all measures bar one (where they are 
equal), the Italian respondents reported higher levels of European identity than the 
British respondents. The MANOVA highlighted a significant overall multivariate 
difference between the two samples, and in particular, univariate differences on 
three identity dimensions.
The question which focused on how much respondents felt European, can 
be thought of as tapping elements of the salience of European identity - in 
particular, the current relevance or "fit" of European identity for the respondent (c.f. 
Oakes, 1987). Similarly, the question which refers to how important respondents 
feel being European is, can also be thought of as tapping the salience of European 
identity, perhaps also including elements of the accessibility of the identity - i.e. 
how readily it is activated. There are thus indications from the MANOVA analysis, 
that the salience of European identity is significantly greater for Italian 
respondents.
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The other dimension of European identity on which there appears to be a 
significant difference between the samples, concerns how much respondents feel 
personally criticized when the Europeans as a whole are criticized. Once again, one 
finds that the Italians lead the British on this dimension of Euro-identity. One 
should be somewhat cautious in interpreting this finding, in as much as the 
existence of self-serving and similar individualistic biases might enable people to 
distance themselves from criticisms directed at groups to which they belong, and 
still maintain a strong and positive social identity. Nevertheless, the observed 
difference between the British and Italian respondents does appear to suggest that 
the Italians find it harder to distance themselves from criticisms of Europe than the 
British. It would be in keeping with the results obtained from the other analyses 
conducted, to interpret this difference as indicative of a greater commitment to 
European identity amongst the Italians. It should be noted, however, that this 
finding could also reflect a wider difference in styles of identity maintenance and 
use of self-serving biases between the British and Italian groups. Any such 
differences, although potentially interesting, are somewhat beyond the scope of the 
current study.
Taken as a whole therefore, there are good reasons to believe that the Italian 
respondents possessed a European identity which was significantly stronger than 
that manifested by the British. In conclusion, the observed differences in European 
identity between the British and Italians seem to suggest that the apparent 
differences in attitudes and opinions about European integration highlighted by 
the Eurobarom&tre are also reflected in differences at the level of social identity 
construction.
Do Italian & European identities vary with political affiliation?
Returning to our focus on the Italian data, we now turn to an examination of 
whether Italian national identity and European identity fluctuate across different 
political affiliations. Since there are a large number of political parties in Italy, it 
was necessary to collapse categories into three meaningful political sub-divisions:
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i) COMMUNIST (including PCI and Rifon. Com. parties)
ii) GREEN (Liste Verde party)
iii) SOCIALIST/SOCIAL DEMOCRAT (PSI & PSDI parties)
It is interesting to note how some 32.1% of respondents indicated that they 
would not vote if there were a general election in the near future. Analysis of the 
open-ended responses suggests that this may well reflect a general dissatisfaction 
with the process of politics in Italy, and a feeling of confusion as to what the 
numerous parties actually stand for - both ideologically, and, more concretely, in 
terms of the policies advocated (c.f. Barzini, 1983; Haycraft, 1987). We would 
suggest that the general confusion and apathy associated with views about politics 
may also be reflected in the relatively high proportion of missing answers to the 
political vote question (19.8% of responses) - it is interesting to note that Hewstone 
(1986) also had a high non-response rate for this question (41.1%).
The between-subjects MANOVA analyses indicated that both Italian and 
European identities do not vary significantly across political affiliation - at least, 
in terms of quantitative "strength" of identities. In fact, given the relatively 
homogeneous treatment of European issues in the Italian mass media, one might 
also go on to hypothesize that there is likely to be little difference at the level of 
the social representations being diffused by the political parties, about Europe. This 
is especially likely, given that European integration has not been a subject for 
political conflict in Italy since the late 1960s/early 1970s.
These results are somewhat different to those obtained by Hewstone (1986), 
who found that those respondents in his sample who voted Christian Democrat 
were more pro-Community than those who would vote Communist However, it is 
important to remember that Hewstone's focus was specifically on attitudes towards 
the European Community - our current focus is on national and European identities. 
Similarly, it is interesting to recall how both British and European identity varied 
significantly across political affiliation for the British respondents. The results 
which emerged from the MANOVAs were in keeping with the open-ended 
responses - especially the frequent comments from respondents which expressed 
their surprise that questions pertaining to political affiliation were included in a
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questionnaire on opinions about Italy and Europe. We will return to the issue of 
politics and whether political parties in Italy are associated with particular 
orientations to Europe and Italy, when we come to examine the open-ended 
responses.
Do Italian & European identities vary across sex?
In order to investigate whether quantitative elements of Italian and European 
identities might vary across sex, two between-subjects MANOVAs were conducted. 
In keeping with the British data, there were found to be no significant differences 
in Italian national identity between the sexes.
Table 41 below summarizes the results obtained from the MANOVA 
analysis of European identity across sex.
Table 41 - MANOVA on European Identity acroam max (Italian data) 
(n-130)
Overall multivariate effect (Plllale Test):
Value*.173 F (approx)=3.653 D.F.=7,122 Sig. of F~.001
Significant univariate effectsi
"How Important to you is being European?"
Means: Male=4.029 Female=4.737 Sig*.038
"When you hear someone who is not European criticize
the Europeans, to what extent do you feel personally
criticized?"
Means: Male=3.629 Female»4.358 Sig*.032
(Significance levels derive from F-tests, and are 2-tailed)
If one examines Table 41, again, in a similar way to the British data, one may 
observe that quantitative levels of European identity also vary significantly across 
sex for the Italian sample. In particular, the univariate F-tests indicate significant 
differences on a salience-related question, and a question pertaining to whether
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Italians feel personally criticized when Europeans are criticized. On both these 
questions, female respondents appear to report significantly higher levels of 
European identity than male respondents.
At present there is a dearth of research on the question of gender differences 
in national and/or European identity. Data from the Eurobaromdtre opinion polls 
is somewhat ambiguous on this issue, showing no clear gender differences. There 
is some evidence from these polls to indicate that, in Italy and the United 
Kingdom, females report being more "indifferent" about the European Parliament 
than males (Niedermayer, 1991), but the implications of this finding for European 
identity are far from clear. It has also been suggested that housewives may be less 
favourable towards the E.C. since they feel the brunt of E.C. economic policy, 
however such claims remain as yet little more than un-tested hypotheses. Since the 
majority of the female respondents in the current study were students between the 
ages of 18 and 24, it seems unlikely that many of them could have been categorised 
as "housewives". Other researchers have suggested that males are often more 
interested in political affairs than females (see, for example, Sears, 1969). What the 
current results appear to indicate is that these differences in interest (if they exist) 
do not necessarily affect European identity. The precise nature and origin of these 
sex differences, especially since they occurred in both the British and Italian data, 
and in the same direction (females had a higher Euro-identity), certainly warrants 
further research in the future.
5.3.3 Section F - similarity judgements
As for the British data, the similarity ratings, which included the E.C, "Myself', 
Britain, Germany, France, and Italy as stimulus objects, were subjected to a 
Multidimensional Scaling analysis (MDS). The SPSSX ALSCAL command was 
utilized to conduct a non-metric individual-differences analysis, with an ordinal 
level of measurement specified, and the "ties=untied” option requested (see earlier 
discussion of MDS in Chapter four for further details).
Whilst a three dimensional solution was obtained, this proved not to be 
significantly greater, in terms of fit to the data, than a two dimensional solution,
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and we will therefore focus our discussion on the latter. The 2-dimensional solution 
had an averaged stress over matrices of 0.187 (Kruskall's Stress formula 1) and R- 
Squared averaged over matrices of 0.715. These levels of fit to the data are on the 
low to fair side according to the guidelines given by Rabinowitz (1986). However, 
since our ultimate aim is to use MDS as an exploratory tool, it seems justifiable to 
pursue our analysis, if we accept some of the limitations outlined in our earlier 
discussion of MDS. Figure 2 below, shows in a graphical format the 2-dimensional 
solution obtained from the MDS - since an individual differences methodology was 
utilized we did not employ a rotation, as the initial rotation obtained from this 
method should prove meaningful (see Appendix 6.1, Table C for a more detailed 
breakdown of the MDS analysis).
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If we focus our attention on dimension 1 (horizontal) in Figure 2, it becomes 
apparent that Britain and Germany are contrasted on this dimension with Italy, 
France, and to a lesser extent "Myself"' and the E.C. In this respect, the MDS 
solution obtained is strikingly similar to that deriving from the British data. It 
seems quite likely that this dimension especially reflects perceptions of national 
character and temperament, rather than a focus on aspects of the nations 
themselves, such as economic prosperity or political system. Given the cross­
national similarity on this dimension, there seems good reason to argue for some 
sort of Latin stereotype. Evidence for the latter has emerged from work conducted 
by Peabody on perceptions of national characteristics (Peabody, 1985) as well as 
research examining perceptions of trust within Europe (Inglehart, 1991).
It is an interesting question as to whether such patterns of perceptions are 
conceptualised as shared stereotypes/social representations or merely co-existing 
stereotypes which have common elements. This may well be an important issue, 
although it seems likely that both conceptualisations are correct to some extent 
Given the increasing homogenisation of Western European culture and 
development of mass communications technology, there may be a strong argument 
for at least some internationally shared social representations, and thus social 
stereotypes. Nevertheless, to the extent that the social stereotypes of nationalities 
develop in particular socio-historic environments, and given that they might also 
be linked to other social representations which are peculiarly national, then one 
must be wary in accepting the assumption that common patterns in social 
representations can be taken to signify a single shared representation.
Dimension 2 (vertical) is an interesting reflection of many of the issues 
which will soon be discussed in relation to the open-ended responses. One may 
note that this dimension seems to contrast Britain from the E.G, with the other 
stimulus objects being relatively neutral. Whilst Britain is obviously a member of 
the E.C., a number of commentators have suggested that the Italians, often 
passionately enthusiastic about European integration, have found Britain's cautious 
stance both frustrating and, at times, infuriating. It seems that such perceptions 
may be shared by Italian politicians and the Italian public (cf. Ward, 1990).
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It is interesting to note how Italy is not as close to the E.C as France, 
Germany, or "Myself1 on the vertical dimension. This might at first seem somewhat 
puzzling, given that we have already presented evidence that the Italian 
respondents possessed a strong European identity. However, we have also 
emphasized that responses to the open-ended questions indicated that many 
respondents felt that Italy was not a "model" E.C. member state, and could not be 
until it dealt with its problems concerning political instability, corruption, and 
organised crime. This seems the most likely reason why Italy is not perceived as 
extremely similar to the E.C. and what it represents. Once again, there is also an 
interestingly congruent element between the British and Italian analyses, in that 
both represent France and the E.C. as quite close in conceptual space, perhaps again 
suggesting grounds for some sort of shared social representation (although the 
reasons for perceiving these stimulus objects as quite similar could, of course, be 
quite different, as could the evaluative connotations of such an observation). 
Finally, and in keeping with the apparent differences in level of European identity 
between the two samples, it is noticeable how the concept of "Myself' is not 
prominently distanced in conceptual space from the E.G by the Italians, whereas 
the E.G and "Myself' are noticeably distant in the British analysis.
5.3.4 Italian attitudes & opinions about the EC and European integration
Preliminary remarks
Given that the Italians appear to possess a relatively strong European identity 
(especially compared to the British), it is important to examine whether this is 
reflected at the level of attitudes and opinions. There are already strong reasons to 
expect pro-European opinions, given the consistent support evinced by Italians in 
the Eurobarom&tre opinion surveys.
Appendix B.2 contains descriptive statistics for the Italian responses to the 
attitude and opinion questions contained in the questionnaire. It is apparent from 
Appendix B.2 that the mean attitude towards the European Community is 5.434
161
("slightly in favour") - towards the positive end of the scale, although perhaps not 
as positive as one might have expected from the Eurobarometre findings. 
Nevertheless, some 72.2% of all respondents were in favour of the European 
Community. Similarly, mean attitudes towards European integration were positive 
(5.500), with 79.6% of respondents expressing favourable attitudes towards 
integration. These favourable attitudes towards the E.C. and European integration 
were also complemented by a relatively high level of professed interest in the 
future of Europe - 80.30% of respondents were interested to some extent in the 
future of Europe. As for the British data, it is hoped that, given this level of interest 
in European affairs, we are justified in examining questions concerning European 
identity and opinions, on the assumption that interest generates a need for social 
representations and attitudes.
The structure of Italian attitudes to the E.C. and Europe
A Principal Components Analysis (PCA) with a Varimax rotation requested was 
conducted in order to examine the structure of responses to some of the attitudinal 
questions contained in the questionnaire, and the results arising from this analysis 
are summarised in Table 42.
An examination of Table 42 indicates that the PC analysis extracted two 
components with Eigen values greater than or equal to 1.00. The two components 
together account for some 49.0% of the variance. This is a less satisfactory level of 
variance explained than for the British data, and it is readily accepted that there 
remains some 51% of variance in the data not explained by the components, and 
as such, one must accept that the components offer only a partial account of Italian 
respondents' attitudes towards Europe.
If one inspects the rotated factor matrix contained in Table 42, one may note 
that attitudinal variables Fl, F2, F4, F5 and F8 load highly and positively on the 
first component. This component appears to be somewhat conceptually similar to 
the first component from the analysis of the British data, combining elements of 
attitudinal support for European integration and interest in European matters.
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However, unlike the British, the Italian analysis indicates that how often 
respondents discuss European affairs is not part of this component, whilst the 
compatibility of views about Italy and Europe is included this time in the 
component.
Once again, it is noticeable how the composition of this component suggests 
that attitudes and opinions about the European Community are associated with 
attitudes about European integration in general. An inspection of the correlation 
matrix (Appendix B.l, Table D) indicates that these variables (FI and F4) correlate 
positively and significantly (r=.683, 2-tailed significance <.001). However, this 
correlation, high though it may be, still leaves some 53.3% of the variance 
unexplained. The moral of this seems to be that, whilst attitudes towards the 
European Community and European integration are related, they are still different 
hypothetical constructs since they pertain to different attitudinal objects, and 
should be treated as such.
It is interesting to note from the correlation matrix (Appendix B.l, Table D) 
that, although Hewstone's important concept of instrumental support (variable F8) 
is significantly correlated with overall attitude to the E.C., the absolute magnitude 
of the correlation is quite low (0.271). In fact, the correlations between all the 
attitudinal variables and variable F8, although significant, appear to be of low or 
moderate magnitude, and are noticeably lower than for the British respondents. 
There are thus indications that instrumental assessments of how much Italy has 
gained from E.C. membership are not as crucial to Italian attitudes about Europe 
as similar perceptions might be for the British. We will return to the question of 
instrumental dimensions of Italian identity and opinions concerning Europe 
shortly, when we examine the open-ended responses.
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Table 42 - PC analyaia of attitude queatlona: Italian data
Variablea entered Into the analysis:
FI: overall attitude to the E.C.
F2: interest in the future of Europe
F3: how often respondents discuss European affairs
F4: overall attitude to European integration
F5: compatibility of views about Italy and Europe
F6: willingness to have Italian flag & anthem replaced
F7A: certainty about European super-state vote
F8: how much Italy has gained from membership of the E.C.
PGA extracted 2 componenta with Elgen values over 1.00:
Elgen values % variance Cum % var 
Componenta: 1 2.80 35.0 35.0
2 1.12 14.0 49.0
Rotated factor matrix (varimax rotation aped fled) : 
FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2
FI
F2
F4
F5
F8
F3
F6
F7a
.842
.674
.837
.421
. 688
.568
.588
.806
(loadings below 0.35 not shown; n«135)
The second component consists of a variable examining how often respondents 
discuss European affairs (F3), a question measuring Italian's willingness to have 
their flag and anthem replaced by E.C. equivalents (F6), and a question pertaining 
to how certain respondents are about how they would vote in a European super­
state referendum (F7a). All of these variables load highly on this component, which 
appears to encompass willingness to change potentially potent national symbols, 
active participation in discussion about European issues, and certainty about how 
one would vote in a super-state referendum. It is interesting to note how, even 
though the Italians appear to have manufactured quite a strong and positive 
European identity, and are quite pro-E.C., still only some 29.9% of respondents 
were willing to have the Italian flag and anthem replaced by E.C. equivalents.
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Whilst this figure is certainly higher than its equivalent for the British data (17.8%), 
it nevertheless underlines the significant resistance to change associated with 
national symbols.
In conclusion, this second component appears conceptually meaningful and 
phenomenologically sound. Since there are good reasons to suggest that the 
majority of social representations of European issues circulating in Italy at the time 
of the data collection were pro-European in outlook, it is understandable that 
participation in discussion about Europe, and thus contact with these social 
representations, will be associated with a pro-European sentiment (willingness to 
have the national flag and anthem replaced by E.C equivalents). Similarly, one 
might reasonably expect participation in relevant discussion to help crystallise 
views on the European issue, and thus be associated with increased certainty about 
how one might vote in a European super-state referendum.
Predicting the first component (attitudinal support & interest)
The first component highlighted in the PC analysis may be thought of in terms of 
general attitudinal support for the E.C. and interest in European issues. Since this 
component contains the primary attitudinal measures of support for the E.C and 
the process of integration, it was deemed interesting to pursue a multiple linear 
regression analysis, in order to examine which variables in the questionnaire as a 
whole might prove to be significant predictors of this component. The first 
component, consisting of variables Fl, F2, F4, F5 and F8, thus constituted the 
criterion variable, and was constructed by simply summing the responses to its 
constituent variables. The independent or predictor variables entered into the 
regression analysis are listed below. In order to minimize multicollinearity, 
composite variables were used where responses to questions were significantly 
correlated with each other.
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ITALIAN IDENTITY: composite variable deriving from sum of
7 Italian identity measures (section A).
EUROPEAN IDENTITY: composite variable deriving from sum of
7 European identity measures (section E.1).
FACTOR 2: composite variable deriving from sum of variables 
F3, F6, F7a.
VOTE: variable F7b (predicted vote in super-state referendum), 
dummy-coded as for or against a European super-state.
SEX: variable G2, binary-coded.
AGE: variable Gl, in years.
C3: similarity rating of Italy and self (x/7).
C5: similarity rating of Italy and the E.C. (x/7).
C15: similarity rating of "Myself' and the E.C. (x/7).
A summary of the multiple regression analysis, which was conducted with an 
enter+stepwise method of equation-building requested, is provided in Table 43 
below.
If one examines Table 43, it can be ascertained that the best subset of 
predictor variables to emerge from the analysis consisted of predicted vote in a 
European super-state referendum, component/factor 2, and the European identity 
composite variable. These variables together are able to account for some 31.4% of 
the variance in factor 1, which once again, is a lower level of explanatory power
than that obtained in the equivalent analysis of the British data.
An examination of the standardised regression coefficients (Beta scores) 
indicates that the super-state vote variable has a negative regression weight This 
observation is in-keeping with the notion that increasing willingness to vote for a 
super-state is associated with increasing levels of pro-European attitudes and 
interest in Europe (i.e. factor 1), since this variable was dummy-coded such that 
O=vote for and l=vote against a super-state. This variable was also a significant 
predictor of the primary attitudinal factor in the British data.
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Table 43 - Summary of Italian multiple regression analysis: 
criterion variable-FACTOR 1
Final Equationi-
Multiple R .58202
R Square .33870
Adjusted R Square .31395
Standard Error 3.59890 ANOVA F-13.661 Sigx.0001
Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. B Beta
VOTE -2.473 .864 -.278
FACTOR2 .220 .103 .212
EURO IDEN .178 .054 .316
(constant) 18.533 2.052
t Sig. t
-2.864 .005
2.146 .035
3.295 .001
9.030 (<.001)
Variables not in the Equation
Variable Beta In Partial Min Toler t Sig. t
XTALID .010 .012 .785 .105 .917
SEX -.048 -.056 .828 -.496 .621
AGE .059 .069 .800 .619 .538
C3 .047 .056 .815 .499 .619
C5 -.055 -.064 .813 -.573 .568
C15 .076 .075 .612 .669 .506
It is encouraging to once again observe how European identity has proved to be a 
significant predictor of attitudes and opinions about Europe. Since the Beta 
coefficient is positive, increasing levels of European identity are therefore 
associated with increasingly pro-European opinions, as measured by factor 1. With 
converging evidence from both the British and Italian samples, there are now 
strong indications that questions of social identity are relevant to studies of 
attitudes and opinions. It is hoped that many studies in the future will make 
explicit this conceptual linkage, which has so often remained implicit and 
unexplored in any systematic fashion.
Whilst factor 2 appears to be a significant predictor of factor 1, this does not 
necessarily imply that the original use of an orthogonal factor rotation was 
unsuited to the data. When we conducted an oblimin rotation, one which allows 
for the factors themselves to be correlated, the actual clustering of variables which 
emerged, was functionally identical to that which was produced by the orthogonal 
varimax rotation procedure. What the observed role of factor 2 does suggest, is that
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this factor, which encompasses certainty about vote, participation in discussion 
about Europe, and willingness to have an E.C. flag and anthem replace their 
national equivalents, is significantly associated with the major attitudinal variables 
(factor 1), whilst not being identical to these variables.
In contrast to the equivalent British analysis, there were no indications that 
elements of Italian national identity might stand in the way of pro-European 
attitudes and opinions. This is perhaps the first, but by no means the only, 
indication that the British and Italian respondents construed the relationship or 
networking between national and European identities quite differently. Whilst we 
are not in a position to say that Italian identity encourages European sentiments, 
similarly, Italian identity does not appear to dampen enthusiasm for Europe. For 
the British, a number of findings emerging from both the questionnaire and 
interview studies (to be discussed in Chapter six), serve to indicate that many 
British respondents construed their national and European identifies as conflictual.
5.3.5 Cross-national comparisons o f attitudes:- 
Comparing Italian and British attitudes towards Europe
A series of independent-sample f-tests were conducted to examine the possibility 
of any significant differences on the attitudinal variables between the Italian and 
British respondents. It is worth reminding oneself at this point that the 
interpretation of cross-national data - especially differences which emerge between 
national samples - must proceed with caution, given the large number of 
intervening variables which might be in effect. However, when such differences 
appear to be in-keeping with data collected using a variety of methods (e.g. 
questionnaires and interviews), as seems to be the case in the present study, one 
can at least be a little more confident that observed differences are of theoretical 
and empirical significance.
Table 44 below details those f-tests which highlighted a significant 
difference between the British and Italian samples.
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Table 44 - Comparison of British and Italian attitudes to Europe 
British data: n*107 Italian data: n»136
"Overall, what is your attitude towards European integration?* 
Means: British*4.99 Italian=5.50 t=2.51 Sig*.013
"In general, would you be in favour of, or against the 
replacement of the British / Italian flag and national 
anthem by a European Community equivalent?"
Means: British*2.78 Italian*3.43 t*2.67 Sig*.008
(Significance levels are 2-tailed)
It emerges from an inspection of Table 44 that there are two attitudinal variables 
on which the British and Italian responses differ significantly. One may first of all 
note that the mean for the Italian respondents on the overall attitude towards 
European integration variable is significantly higher than the mean response of 
British respondents. This result is to be expected, given the differences which 
usually emerge in the E.C/s own Eurobaromfctre surveys. However, it is important 
to note that the differences in European identity between the two samples which 
were discussed earlier are also reflected at an attitudinal level, as one would expect, 
if indeed social identities are related to social representations and their related 
attitudes.
There appear to be at least two, probably equally valid, ways to explain the 
observed difference in willingness to have one's national flag and anthem replaced 
by E.C. equivalents. One can see from Table 44, that once again, the Italians appear 
more pro-European than the British, although it is important to remember, as we 
noted earlier, that the majority of respondents in both countries, were opposed to 
the loss of these potentially potent national symbols.
One possible explanation for this cross-national difference is in terms of 
national identities - perhaps the British have a stronger national identity than the 
Italians, and this might explain why they cling-on to national symbols with a 
greater tenacity? Persuasive as this argument might at first appear, we have already 
noted from a MANOVA analysis, that there was no significant difference between
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the two samples in terms of quantitative level of national identity. A more 
promising explanation might focus on qualitative differences in national identity: 
is it the case that the flag and anthem, and perhaps other symbolic aspects of the 
nation, are more important to the British than the Italians ?
It became apparent from the open-ended responses that the Italians may 
indeed lack a civic identity (i.e. an identity associated with the state and what it 
represents). The Italians clearly show signs of sentimental attachments to national 
symbols and culture, but the national flag and anthem, being also symbols of an 
Italian state many citizens feel dissatisfied with, might understandably not be as 
powerful as other, more culture-rich symbols, such as architecture and a rt Italian 
orientations towards European integration and the E.C. are probably also relevant 
here - the Italians are fervent supporters of further integration, and it seems only 
natural that they would oppose an E.C flag and anthem replacing the Italian 
equivalent to a lesser extent than the British, who in many ways remain the 
"reluctant Europeans" (Baizini, 1983).
Whilst we expected to find a significant difference in overall attitude 
towards the E.C. between the two samples, this was not in fact the case. However, 
the mean for the Italian sample was somewhat higher than that observed for the 
British, and the difference between the two means approached the .05 level of 
significance (1-tailed significance = .053). In conclusion, it seems that the Italians 
are not simply more pro-E.C. than the British, but they are also more enthusiastic 
about European integration in general. These differences have emerged from a 
variety of analyses of both identity-related and attitudinal variables.
Predicted vote in European superstate referendum
Question F7(b) of the Italian questionnaire asked respondents to indicate how they 
would vote in a hypothetical referendum addressing the question of whether Italy 
should become a part of a European super-state. Table 45 below provides 
descriptive statistics for this variable.
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Table 45 - vote Is super-state referendum; Italian data
frequency % (British dates %)
Vote for 
Not vote 
Vote against
57
37
38
43.2
28.0
28.8
(31.5) 
(24.1)
(43.5)
(n-132)
One may note from an examination of Table 45 that some 43.2% of Italian 
respondents would vote for Italian participation in a super-state, and 28.8% against 
These figures stand in marked contrast to those pertaining to the British data • for 
the British, a greater proportion of respondents would vote against a super-state 
than for one.
Classifying respondents into those who would vote "for" versus those who would 
vote "against" a European superstate
As for the British data, a Discriminant Function Analysis (DFA), with stepwise 
elimination requested, was conducted in order to investigate which variables might 
be able to discriminate between those respondents who would vote for and those 
who would vote against, a European super-state. The discriminating/independent 
variables entered into the analysis were the same as for the multiple regression 
analysis discussed earlier, except for the addition of component/factor 1 from the 
PC analysis.
Table 46 below contains a summary of the DFA output obtained, with more 
detailed results being presented in Table E of Appendix B.l.
171
Table 46 - Discriminant Analysis on ffroups defined by predicted 
vote in European superstate referendum: Italian data
% of cases correctly classified:
Vote "for" : 79.6%
Vote "against”: 61.1% OVERALL % CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED-72.22% 
Canonical Discriminant Functions:
Elgen Canonical Wilk's
Value Corr Lambda Chisquare DF Sig
FUNCTION 1: .462 .562 .684 30.198 5 <.0001
The overall accuracy of the DFA is reflected in the figure of 72.22% of cases 
correctly classified. Once again, it appears that the Italian attitudinal data are 
somewhat more complex than the British: the level of variance not explained by the 
analysis is higher for the Italian data (Wilk's Lambda for Italian data=.684, for the 
British data=.593).
The best set of discriminating variables designated by the stepwise 
procedure, is presented in Table 47. It is interesting to note that for both the British 
and Italian samples, the major attitudinal factor proved to be the single most 
significant discriminating variable. From an examination of the standardised 
canonical discriminant function coefficients given in Table 47, it becomes apparent 
that scores on factor 1 appear to be higher for those who anticipate voting for a 
super-state. This is confirmed by the results obtained from an ANOVA, which 
indicates that, on average, respondents who predict voting for a super-state have 
significantly higher scores on factor 1 than those who predict voting against a 
super-state CF=17.35, sig.=.0001).
Scores on variable C5, the perceived similarity of Italy and the E.C., are also 
a significant discriminating variable, with those respondents who predict voting for 
a super-state perceiving, on average, a significantly higher degree of similarity 
between Italy and the E.C. than those who predict voting against (F=6.733, 
sig.=.0113). Once again, this result is congruent with the DFA conducted on the 
British data, although there remained a degree of ambiguity about the
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discriminatory role of this variable in the case of the British (see earlier discussion 
of British data in Chapter four).
Table 47 - Bast aat of discriminating variables alicltad by 
stepwise Discrimimmt Analysis: Italian data
entered Variable Wilk's Lambda Sig.
1 FACTOR 1 .82513 .0001
2 C5 .76542 <.0001
3 SEX .73023 <.0001
4 FACTOR 2 .70011 <.0001
5 AGE (YEARS) .68443 <.0001
Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients:
FACTOR 1 .635
C5 .475
SEX -.398
FACTOR 2 .438
AGE (YEARS) -.281
Canonical Discrimimmt Functions evaluated at Group Means: 
vote fort .527 vote against: -.856
The second attitudinal factor, as one may note from Tables 46 and 47, also proved 
to be a significant discriminatory variable, with those respondents who predicted 
voting for a super-state manifesting significantly higher levels of this factor than 
those who predicted voting against CF=9.509, sig.=.0028).
Whilst both sex and age were selected as significant discriminatory variables 
by the stepwise procedure, the precise nature of their discriminatory ability in the 
analysis is not clear, since the univariate J7-tests failed to highlight significant 
differences between those who vote for and those who would vote against a super­
state on these variables. This suggests their contribution to the analysis requires 
further research in the future.
In conclusion, it appears that for the Italian data, the attitudinal variables 
are the most useful in discriminating between those who predict voting for and 
against a European super-state. This result contrasts in an interesting manner with 
that obtained from the British data, in that for the British, both national and 
European identity composite scores were significant discriminatory variables. There
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were indications from the British data that a European super-state posed a threat 
to British national identity. This certainly was not the case for the Italians. From 
these cross-national differences, there are already signs that national and European 
identities in Italy and Britain may be constructed quite differently. We have seen 
from the DFA, for example, that Italian and European identity composite scores 
were not significant discriminatory variables. It seems that European identity for 
the Italians encompasses something more than a simple focus on the E.C. and 
political integration in Europe - this will become increasingly apparent as the 
interpretation of the open-ended responses unfolds.
Finally, it is significant that there are some noticeable differences in the 
DFA analyses across the British and Italian samples. Whatever the problems 
associated with interpreting this kind of cross-national difference, it does seem that 
we are justified in suggesting that they raise the question of whether the social 
psychological manifestations of European integration require a nation-specific 
approach. We do not mean to dismiss the possibility of interesting cross-national 
similarities in identity construction, but rather to suggest that even when apparent 
similarities occur, the underlying reasons behind observed similarities in attitudes, 
social representations, and identities, may well be culture-specific This highlights 
once again, how quantitative and qualitative approaches are both crucial elements 
of any worthwhile study of European integration: where one source indicates 
interesting cross-national similarities and differences, the other will often provide 
significant clues as to the underlying factors behind such phenomena, or at least 
point the researcher in a promising theoretical direction.
5.4 Open-ended questions
In keeping with the analysis of the British data, the Italian open-ended responses 
were analyzed using a variant of the traditional Functionalist content analysis 
advocated by Holsti (1969), and described in detail earlier, in chapter four.
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5.4.1 Things which make people pleased to be Italian (Question B.l)
The categories most frequently utilized by Italian respondents to describe the 
things which made them feel pleased to be Italian are detailed in Table 48. It is 
interesting to note how for both the British and the Italian respondents, the object 
of national pride most frequently mentioned was national culture and heritage. 
Both the British and Italian respondents appeared to believe that they had been 
blessed with a culture more ancient and veritable than most, or in some cases all, 
other nations. As one respondent remarked, "I think of Italy as the centre of Europe 
and the world, from the historical-cultural point of view. We are the oldest 
civilization in the world." This highlights once again the value of A.D. Smith's 
observation that there is a competitive element to culture, with a particularly high 
value being placed on the depth of a culture (A.D. Smith, 1991).
Table 48 - Things which make people feel pleased to be 
most frequent categories
iItalians
category description frequency
1 RICH CULTURE & TRADITION 60
2 ARTISTIC ACHIEVEMENTS 45
3 ' OUTGOING NATURE OF ITALIAN PEOPLE 35
4 BEAUTY OF COUNTRYSIDE 34
5 HELPFULNESS OF ITALIAN PEOPLE 30
6 ITALIAN CUISINE 28
7 ANCIENT HISTORY 22
8 DEMOCRACY 19
9 CLIMATE 14
10 ADAPTABILITY/RESOURCEFULNESS OF ITALIANS 13
In many ways this valuing of one's own culture, usually above that of other 
nations, is a form of ethnocentrism associated with the more symbolic aspects of 
national identity. This is readily apparent from the response of one Italian subject: 
"There are no words to describe the feeling when I walk the soil of Italy, where 
culture has existed for thousands of years. I feel joined with the entire human race 
through the past." There is a further significant observation to be made here, for 
while the ethnocentric orientation to Italian culture adopted by this respondent is 
clear, there are also indications that in some way the respondent's awareness of his 
cultural heritage also endows him with a sense of human identity. There is
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something paradoxical operating here, in that this respondent's very ethnocentrism 
itself also allows him to feel ties with the rest of humanity, even if these ties are 
based on ethnocentric perceptions that Italian/Roman culture has greatly influenced 
the world's peoples. As yet there appears to be little or no existing research on this 
human level of social identity, even though it is frequently mentioned in Turner's 
theory as a possible level of identity (see, for example, Turner, 1987).
It is also quite likely that another factor behind this valuing of national 
culture is the comfort associated with the familiar. The process of socialisation 
attempts to instill a society's norms and culture in the child from an early age, and 
it seems only natural that one might come to value the culture one has been 
immersed in since childhood. This is obviously something of a simplification, in 
that citizens who have lived in foreign countries, been raised in multi-national 
families, etc, may well have different orientations to the national culture. Here, for 
example, it is interesting to note how there are already indications that the learning 
of a second language may be intertwined with matters of national culture (cf. Ball, 
Giles & Hewstone, 1984). There is good evidence to suggest that the familiar - in 
this case one's national culture - is often highly resistant to change, at both the 
level of social representations and social identities, and at the more individual- 
cognitive level of schemata.
The frequent mentions of Italian culture, art and cuisine, together suggested 
that the symbolic dimensions of Italian identity were almost certainly the most 
significant for the Italian respondents. Whereas for the British, these symbolic 
orientations to the nation were complemented by instrumental ties to the nation, 
and pride in national institutions, this dimension of national identity proved much 
more problematic for the Italians.
If one attempts to break national identity down into possible constituent 
elements, one important component might usefully be termed civic identity, that 
is, identification with the nation-state and what it represents - the political system, 
state institutions and services, international role, and so forth. Whilst certain 
ceremonies, such as military parades, may act to associate potent symbols such as 
the flag and anthem with civic identity, it may well be that civic identity usually
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depends more on the endorsement of social representations which foster the 
acceptance of the nation state and what it represents. Thus, civic identity is not 
directly associated with national culture, nor is it particularly associated with what 
is perceived to be the national character (if one is indeed perceived). Evidence 
emerged in Hewstone's (1986) analysis of attitudes towards the E.C. which is 
suggestive of the need to distinguish between civic and other possible elements of 
national identity - he found that the Italians may have quite different and 
incongruent attitudes about the Italian nation and the Italian people.
There were numerous indications throughout the open-ended responses to 
suggest that the majority of Italian respondents did not possess a healthy sense of 
civic identity. The Italians were, however, often proud of their rich cultural 
heritage, and also of what they perceived to be valuable dimensions of the national 
character - helpfulness, an outgoing and friendly nature, and the ability to adapt 
to change. These results are highly congruent with those obtained by Almond and 
Verba, who came to the conclusion that:
Italians in the overwhelming majority take no pride in their political 
system, nor even in their economy or society...to the extent that they 
have national pride at all, it is in their history, the physical beauty 
of their country, or in the fact of being Italian. (Almond & Verba,
1963, pp.102-103).
It is an interesting example of the operation of self-serving biases, to note 
how the respondents were quite willing to suggest, without prompting, that certain 
positively evaluated traits might be regarded as national characteristics, yet, as we 
will discover, when specifically questioned about national prototypes and 
characteristics, they were also keen to stress their own individuality and the 
heterogeneity of the Italian people. This pattern of responses was demonstrated by 
one respondent in particular, who suggested that "It pleases me to be Italian, 
especially since the Italian people are warm and passionate - these are 
characteristics which I possess" yet went on to argue, in their response to a later 
question, that "You cannot talk of an Italian national character - Italians are too 
diverse".
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Whilst many respondents were pleased to live in a democratic nation, this 
was perhaps the only thing which made them feel pleased about the Italian state. 
Whereas the British respondents were proud of the welfare state, Britain's role in 
world affairs, and so forth, the Italians often felt that the Italian state did not serve 
their best interests - as one respondent remarked, "I feel the state should represent 
the nation, but at present it does not" In some respects, there appears to be a lack 
of legitimacy operating here, although this interacts in a complex manner with a 
certain degree of apathy and resignation which was apparent from the open-ended 
responses as a whole - a number of respondents had resigned themselves to the fact 
that inefficient government was simply a part of life in Italy, something one could 
do little about
In many of the open-ended responses to this question, one could observe 
a phenomenon which also emerged in the interviews with British respondents. This 
was the tendency of respondents to feel they should find something to be proud 
of about their nationality, since they had little or no choice about the categorisation 
- for example, one Italian respondent explained that "Since I am bound to Italy - 
I was bom here and live here - I can not ignore the fact that I have ties with this 
country - I have to be satisfied with being Italian." In fact, only six respondents 
indicated that nothing made them feel pleased to be Italian.
In many ways national identity is an excellent example of what sociologists 
have called an ascribed identification or group membership. Tajfel and Jahoda's 
work on the development of national loyalties in young children (Tajfel & Jahoda, 
1966) demonstrated how children seem to learn that they should value their own 
nation above others before they are given (or could indeed understand) any 
concrete reasons for doing so. One methodological implication of such observations 
is that a developmental approach should provide an important perspective on 
certain key social identities (c.f. Duveen & Lloyd, 1986). At a theoretical level, these 
observations are congruent with Tajfel and Turner's (1979/1986) suggestion that 
social identifications which appear to allow little scope for exit may well encourage 
enhanced attempts to manufacture positive distinctiveness - at least, when that 
identity is perceived to be under threat One further point, which we will make 
throughout the following chapters, is that there are some aspects of social
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identifications which are peculiar to the particular identification under 
investigation: while S.I.T. and S.C.T. are attractive for their apparent 
generalisability, it is always valuable to ask "is there anything about this particular 
social identification which is unique ?". If we ask this question about national 
identity, the answer must be a resounding "yes”.
5.4.2 Things which make people regret being Italian (Question B.2)
Table 49 contains the categories Italian respondents most frequently referred to in 
their responses to the question asking about things which made them regret being 
Italian. Once again, it was noticeable how a number of respondents voiced the 
opinion that it was somewhat pointless to regret being Italian, since one had little 
choice in the matter.
Table 49 - Things which make people regret being Italian 
most frequent categories
category description frequency
1 POLITICAL SYSTEM 57
2 ORGANISED CRIME (MAFIA, CAMORRA, ETC.) 43
3 INEFFICIENCY OF PUBLIC SERVICES 21
4 BUREAUCRACY 19
5 CRIME IN GENERAL 18
6 NORTH-SOUTH INEQUALITIES 18
7 RACISM 14
8 EDUCATION SYSTEM 13
9 APATHY 12
10 CORRUPTION 12
11 CURRENT GOVERNMENT 11
12 LACK OF CONCERN FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 9
The differences between the responses of the British and Italian respondents on 
this question are rather interesting. As one would expect, given the observations 
of previous commentators such as Barzini (1983) and Haycraft (1987), the Italian 
respondents are clearly dissatisfied with their political inefficiency, bureaucracy, 
public services, and organised crime. As we suggested earlier, these grievances may 
well constitute a significant barrier to the development of a healthy civic identity. 
For the British, while there was the inevitable opposition to the current government 
(i.e. inevitable in any democracy), there were no reasons to suspect a lack of civic
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identity - in fact, many British respondents were proud of their political system and 
state institutions, suggesting a strong civic identity. If anything, the British were 
more displeased about what they perceived to be negative aspects of the national 
character, such as a cold and emotionless demeanour. The Italians, perhaps partly 
in order to compensate for a weak civic identity, seemed to stress the positive 
aspects of their perceived national character, and tended not to mention aspects of 
national character in response to the current question on things which made them 
regret being Italian.
For the British respondents, football hooligans and British tourists abroad, 
appeared to represent salient in-group black sheep (c.f. Marques et al., 1988) - sub­
groups of the British who are the subject of much criticism, whilst at the same 
time, efforts are made to marginalise them and thus minimalise the threat to the 
social group as a whole. The Italians did not appear to use this strategy, even 
though in the Mafia and similar organisations, they certainly had apt candidates 
for the black sheep process. In fact, the Italian respondents who, not surprisingly, 
felt organised crime did make them regret being Italian, also tended to feel that in 
some respects the Mafia and similar organisations were perhaps the most visible 
symptom of an affliction affecting many aspects of Italian life - i.e. corruption.
One can not emphasize enough the serious consequences for Italian national 
identity of the Mafia, Camorra and N'Drangheta, Italy's most notorious criminal 
organisations. Recent mass demonstrations against the Mafia serve to indicate the 
fear and desperation engendered by the apparent impotence of the state and law 
enforcement agencies in their attempts to combat organised crime. A crucial 
cornerstone of national identity is the perception that the state will protect the 
citizen - security is one of the most basic, and perhaps the most urgent of all 
human needs (Maslow, 1965,*1968). There are growing indications that Italians feel 
the state is failing to protect the citizeniy in this respect, and the consequences for 
civic identity are likely to be dire: as Ginsborg (1990) noted, corruption acts as a 
barrier between the state and its citizens. One aspect of national identity which 
appears to be relevant here, is the likelihood that threats which are relatively 
specific to a particular dimension of national identity, might provoke processes 
which seek to compensate via the other dimensions of national identity. In fact, it
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is often suggested by students of the self that individuals may respond to threats 
in one area of self-definition by affirming alternative aspects of self (see, for 
example, Steele, 1988). There are indications from the current study for example, 
that the Italians may stress Italian culture and national character, partly in order to 
compensate for a relatively negative sense of civic identity.
Finally, it is constructive to briefly consider how a number of both British 
and Italian respondents remarked that their nation's respective environmental 
policies were not sufficiently "green” for their own tastes. This appears to be an 
example of how the particular orientation to political and related issues adopted 
by individuals might act to mediate or colour their national identity. If these 
respondents actively identified themselves as "environmentalists", we would have 
an example of one social identity interacting with another. In fact, in keeping with 
our recent argument for different dimensions of national identity, it may well be 
that the interactions between national and other social identities are often specific 
to particular dimensions of those identities. For example, in this case, the 
perception that one's nation was not giving enough attention to environmental 
issues might have consequences for the civic and national character dimensions, 
but would presumably be unlikely to have repercussions for the cultural 
dimension.
5.4.3 Groups or individuals perceived to he "typically Italian" (Question B.3)
Table 50 contains the groups or individuals most frequently given by Italian 
subjects in response to the question concerning "typical Italians". It should firstly 
be noted that, like the British respondents, the Italians were quite reluctant to 
accept that individuals or groups symbolised the essential characteristics of being 
Italian. This serves to demonstrate once again the complexities involved when one 
attempts to apply Turner's notions of prototypicality and self-stereotyping (Turner, 
1987) to the case of national identity - and perhaps most large-scale social 
categories. As was the case for the British respondents, there was little agreement 
on choice of prototypical individuals or groups, with quite a diverse list of 
examples being drawn upon. Yet despite this confusion over prototypicality, it
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should be stressed that most respondents were happy to accept the label "Italian", 
seemed to have self-categorised themselves as Italians, and to have derived a social 
identity from this self-categorisation.
Table 50 - Individuals £ groups perceived as 
most frequent categories
typically Italian t
category description frequency
1 POLITICIANS 23
2 COSSIGA (PRESIDENT) 19
3 GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 19
4 NEAPOLITANS 18
5 FOOTBALL SUPPORTERS 18
6 ANDREOTTI (A POLITICIAN) 17
7 CRAXI (PRIME MINISTER) 17
8 THE "MIDDLE CLASS" 16
9 SORDI (A COMEDIAN) 15
10 THE MAFIA 14
11 CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS 13
12 THE ITALIAN FAMILY 12
13 THE MILANESE 12
Interestingly, and of much importance for our current discussion, the vast majority 
of prototypes were public figures or nationally salient groups (e.g. political parties), 
rather than idiosyncratic individuals or groups. This signifies that the mass media 
may play a critical role in providing a data-base of prototypes from which to draw 
upon.
Politicians, political parties, and political personalities all figured 
prominently in the Italian responses to this question. Interestingly, the political 
personalities tended to be mentioned in a positive context, whilst the generic 
categoiy "politicians" was almost invariably associated with negative evaluations. 
The politicians mentioned - Cossiga (The President), Andreotti (a skilled Christian 
Democrat), and Craxi (the Prime Minister)- all have quite impressive political 
credentials, although in some cases these have been tainted, perhaps inevitably, by 
investigations for corruption. While the Italians appear to appreciate individual 
political skills, especially when these may bring a semblance of order and stability 
to Italian politics, at the same time they express highly derogatory opinions of 
politicians in general - as one respondent commented, "The politicians are doing 
their best to disrupt, and to bring the country to ruin". Another respondent also
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served to exemplify how these negative opinions of politicians also reflect a general 
feeling that Italian society to some extent is itself corrupt: "The politicians - they 
are totally inefficient, confused and corrupted, as you could only find in Italy." In 
many ways, it appears that the politicians, together with government officials and 
bureaucrats, serve as visible and salient targets for the dissatisfaction many Italians 
seem to have with their civic identity.
It was interesting to note how a number of Italian respondents made 
reference to situations in their responses. For example, one respondent felt that 
"people eating and talking in a pizza parlour" was "typically Italian". Such 
examples seem to suggest that key situations might be associated with the salience 
of social identities. In fact, this kind of response also suggests that situations and 
events might be associated with prototypicality. There may be interesting avenues 
for integrating social and cognitive perspectives here, since in some respects these 
responses seem to draw upon what have been called scripts (Schank & Abelson, 
1977) or event schemata (c.f. Fiske & Taylor, 1984). Whilst one might expect there 
to be a certain amount of overlap in terms of key situations for different 
nationalities (e.g. ceremonies and military parades), the kinds of situations 
mentioned by Italian respondents (e.g. the pizza parlour, coffee bars) tended to be 
relatively specific to Italy. In fact, this issue of situations associated with social 
identities is one we will return to in later chapters.
When we analysed the responses of the British subjects to this question, it 
seemed appropriate to divide these into those which made reference to positive 
prototypes, and those which made reference to negative prototypes ("black sheep"). 
In the case of the Italians, this becomes less straightforward, since affective 
orientations towards the prototypes given were relatively heterogeneous. Perhaps 
the prototype which engendered the most enthusiasm when given, and was never 
the subject of criticism, was Alberto Sordi, a seasoned and well-loved comedian, 
who, in the words of one respondent, "is a perfect model of an Italian -he 
represents extremely well a large majority of the Italians and the Italian character". 
It is fascinating how comedians were mentioned quite frequently in connection 
with national character, by both the Italian and the British respondents. In almost 
all cases, comedians were seen to typify positive aspects of the national character -
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it seems that both the British and Italians like to think they have a good sense of 
humour.
Unlike the British, the Italian respondents tended not to utilise the black 
sheep strategy to marginalise and distance themselves from elements of the Italian 
people they disliked. Thus, as we have already noted, many respondents, whilst 
being highly critical of the Mafia, also felt that to some extent organised crime was 
simply a reflection of Italian society in general. It is rather difficult, and somewhat 
beyond the scope of our present discussion, to elucidate in much further detail the 
nature of social representations of the Mafia in Italy. One of the most interesting 
issues for national identity is whether dissatisfaction with organised crime is 
directed at the Italian state, or the Italian people. Preliminary indications from the 
current study would suggest that dissatisfaction has been directed at both these 
dimensions of Italian identity.
In conclusion, one may note that whilst many Italian respondents felt 
uneasy at the prospect of listing typical Italians, they felt much more at ease when 
discussing regional types. A glance at Table 50 indicates that the Milanese and the 
Neapolitans were mentioned as typical Italians - in this case, these regional types 
were thought to encompass certain aspects or dimensions of the Italian character, 
but by no means were they perceived to encapsulate everything Italian. Whilst 
regional stereotypes were perhaps explicitly drawn-upon by some 30% of Italian 
respondents, the implication to be drawn here is that regionalism is still likely to 
be a significant dimension of Italian national identity. The history of the Italian 
nation is almost certainly relevant here, with indications that at least some Italians 
still feel more at ease with a regional, as opposed to an Italian, identity.
5.4.4 Italy's most important role within Europe (Question D.l)
Table 51 below details the major themes utilised by the Italian respondents when 
they came to discuss what they perceived to be Italy's most important role within 
Europe.
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Table 51 - Italy's most Important rola within Europex 
most frequent categories
category description frequency
1 CONTRIBUTE CULTURALLY 35
2 MODERATING/STABILIZING INFLUENCE 18
3 TO AID THE PROCESS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 17
4 ECONOMIC (GENERAL) 17
5 ACTIVE & SUPPORTIVE E.C. MEMBER 16
6 TOURISM (ITALY AS A TOURIST ATTRACTION) 14
7 MINIMAL 12
8 IMPROVE ITALY THROUGH E.C. 11
9 EXPORT ITALIAN CUISINE 10
10 SET EXAMPLE OF CO-OPERATION 9
In-keeping with the evidence discussed earlier for a particularly strong Italian 
cultural identity, it is apparent from an examination of Table 51 that many Italian 
respondents felt that elements of Italian culture represented Italy's most important 
contribution to Europe. Furthermore, a number of respondents also suggested that 
cultural exchanges were desirable - this may well be a reflection of the confidence 
and pride Italians have in their own culture, which they perhaps consequently feel 
can not be threatened by other cultures.
However ethnocentric the Italians might be about their own culture, what 
this does also indicate is that there is a potential for Italians to develop a 
sentimental orientation to Europe, even if this is based upon the assumption that 
Italian culture, with its ancient origins, is inevitably an important aspect of 
European culture itself. This immediately highlights a significant difference 
between British and Italian orientations to Europe - whilst there are indications 
that the Italians do perceive a European culture, one which, in fact, they feel 
inexorably bound-up in, the British felt there was little or no evidence for common 
strands in European culture. In fact, the overwhelming impression from the British 
questionnaire data, was that the British respondents felt isolated culturally from the 
European mainland. As we shall see in the next chapter, British interviewees also 
expressed highly similar opinions about European culture.
The generally pro-European stance taken by most of the Italian respondents 
is reflected in the appearance of response categories 3 and 5 in Table 51, which
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focus on pushing the process of European integration further, and supporting the 
E.C. in its related endeavours. It is significant that only 2 out of 137 Italian 
respondents expressed the opinion that nothing could be achieved by European 
integration, and that Italy should take no part in the process.
The indications of a sentimental-cultural orientation to Europe are further 
supplemented with evidence for instrumental orientations. In particular, one may 
note that a number of Italian respondents, and this time in-keeping with the 
British, felt that the economic dimensions of European integration were important 
Unlike the British, the Italians felt that Italy could have much to gain from E.C. 
membership economically - it is important to note the future orientation here, 
which is congruent with Eurobarom&tre data indicating that at the moment, the 
Italians tend not to feel they have gained more than any other member state.
One of the most important divergences between the British and Italian 
respondents, concerns the issue of perceived control and interdependence. In general, 
many British respondents appeared to be concerned that further European 
integration would mean a loss of national sovereignty, and thus construed 
European integration as something of a threat to national identity. In contrast, 
perhaps the majority of Italians felt that acceding more power and control to 
European power structures could only benefit Italy, since national institutions 
functioned so poorly. Thus, while many British respondents feared further 
interdependence between Britain and the E.C., the Italians tended to actively desire 
such interdependence. It is interesting to postulate what effect the failure of the 
E.C to meet Italian expectations might have on European identity in Italy. However 
much such a failure might disappoint Italians and perhaps harm the instrumental 
dimension of support for integration, European identity would still possess a 
significant sentimental-cultural element for the Italians.
As was the case with the British respondents, a number of Italians indicated 
that Italy should play a stabilising influence in Europe. However, whilst it 
appeared that, in the case of the British, this desire was tied to a wider ambition 
to gain control over European integration, this was not manifested by the Italian
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respondents, who tended to want increasing powers to be given to European 
political bodies (see also Eurobarom&tre #28, & #29).
5.4.5 Europe's most important role in world affairs (Question D.2)
The themes most frequently used by the Italian respondents to describe what they 
perceived as the most important role for Europe in world affairs, are detailed in 
Table 52 below.
Table 52 - Europe*a most important role in world affairst 
most frequent categories (Italian data)
category description frequency
1 TO MAINTAIN BALANCE/STABILITY IN INTERN. RELS. 33
2 ECONOMIC 28
3 AS A THIRD SUPERPOWER 21
4 TO PROVIDE AID TO ANY NATIONS WHO REQUIRE IT 20
5 AS AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL POWER 18
6 AS AN IMPORTANT ARTISTIC/CULTURAL CENTRE 17
7 PROMOTE/MAINTAIN WORLD PEACE 14
8 TO SET AN EXAMPLE OF NATIONS CO-OPERATING 12
9 TO UNITE EAST AND WEST 10
10 CREATE GREATER UNITY BETWEEN STATES 10
A cursory glance at Table 52 appears to indicate that the Italian and British 
respondents have quite similar desires for Europe and European integration. 
Respondents from both nations for example, hoped that Europe might act to 
maintain world peace and stability in international relations, perhaps taking the 
role of a mediator, not unlike the United Nations. If respondents do indeed 
perceive their ultimate security as linked in some way to Europe as a whole, or to 
the European Community, this would certainly raise the possibility of a European 
identity, since security is such an important motivating force behind the 
identification process. However, the issue is far from straightforward - whilst many 
respondents hoped Europe might promote world peace, at the same time very few 
respondents (in either sample) suggested they desired a European defence force or 
even a European defence policy.
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As was the case for the British data, there are numerous indications from the 
responses to this question that Europe affords multiple avenues for the 
development of instrumental ties. Once again, it is noticeable how an economic role 
for Europe was the second most popular response category. Interestingly, it 
appeared to be the case that those who perceived a strong economic role for Europe 
had particular competitors in mind. Both the U.S.A. and Japan were frequently 
mentioned in this context - as one respondent suggested, "It is very important that 
we are all united against the economic might of Japan and the United States.”
To an extent therefore, both Japan and the United States might be 
considered potential outgroups for a European identity -or at least, for the 
instrumental-economic dimensions of such an identity. We have already discussed 
earlier the complex nature of British perceptions of the U.S.A., and it is intriguing 
to note how there is a similar ambivalence in Italian perceptions. It seems, for 
example, that while the United States might be perceived as an economic out­
group, at the same time many Italians recognise that their security ultimately 
depends upon the umbrella provided by American military firepower - afterall, like 
Britain, Italy has numerous American military bases, airfields, etc.
Further evidence for instrumental orientations to Europe can be obtained by 
noting how a number of Italians, like the British, hoped that Europe might become 
a powerful force in international relations - perhaps even an alternative 
superpower. Once again, and especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
United States is perhaps the most obvious choice for a comparison/out-group. As 
was suggested earlier, such themes appear to reflect a desire for power and control 
which is often linked to social identity processes. There are reasons to believe that, 
given their recent history, the Italians perhaps more than the British, feel they can 
have a greater say in world politics through the European Community. Intertwined 
with the desire to become an alternative superpower is the wish to become 
relatively autonomous. A significant minority of both British and Italian 
respondents felt that Europe as a whole should become autonomous from the 
United States.
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Perhaps the major divergence between the British and Italian respondents 
pertains to the symbolic-cultural elements of European identity. British respondents 
gave little indication that cultural elements of European identity were important 
to them - on the whole, the British stressed the differences between European 
cultures. As one can note from Table 52, a number of Italians appear to perceive 
Europe as a potential cultural centre. In fact, we have already noted how the 
Italians tend to perceive their own culture as intertwined with, as one respondent 
put it, Europe's "vast historical and cultural heritage". In general, the Italians 
appeared much more willing to talk of Italy as a part of Europe than the British 
respondents were to discuss Britain as a part of Europe.
Whilst no formal and exhaustive technique of measuring affect in the open- 
ended responses was utilised, it was, nevertheless, noticeable that in general, the 
majority of responses in both the Italian and British samples, reflected little, or at 
most moderate, indications of affect associated with European identity. This in fact 
is congruent with the results obtained from a comparison of British and Italian 
responses on the quantitative measures of European identity - here, it was found 
that the Italians perceive European identity as more salient, and perhaps perceive 
themselves as more interdependent with Europe, than the British, but they did not 
display significantly different levels of affect in relation to European identity. If 
anything, perhaps the most significant affective difference in European identities 
between the British and Italians pertains to perceptions of the future. The Italians 
seem much more hopeful that European integration can achieve valued objectives - 
both instrumental and sentimental-cultural. This is why on attitude-like measures 
the Italians do indeed express more positive affect about Europe than the British, 
but on identity measures the difference is largely in terms of salience. At the level 
of social identities, the affective differences between the British and Italians may 
be in terms of possible social identities, or what Markus & Nurius have called 
possible selves (Markus & Nurius, 1986).
Finally, it is worthwhile noting that the Italian respondents often felt ill- 
equipped to answer questions concerning European integration. There are 
indications that in both Britain and Italy, the subject of European integration, and 
especially the European Community, is perceived as an expert domain. In the next
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chapter, we will discover that such feelings of inadequate knowledge of the 
relevant issues, were also voiced by British respondents in the interview study. One 
implication to be drawn from this is that any would-be architect of European 
integration would do well to de-mystify the European issue, and encourage debate 
and discussion among the populace as whole.
5.4.6 Individuals, groups or political parties with which respondents share broadly 
similar views about Italy (Question E.2 1)
The Italian political system is a totally obscure universe in which a 
young person, in the attempt to understand it and make the right 
choice, becomes totally disorientated. (Italian respondent)
This comment encapsulates rather well the feelings of the Italian respondents when 
they attempted, usually with considerable difficulty, to answer the questions about 
political parties and their views about Italy. This makes the most popular response 
displayed in Table 53 below - that the respondent shares his/her views about Italy 
with "no one" - immediately more understandable. Where the "no one" response for 
the British appeared to be associated with individualistic orientations, for the 
Italians it largely reflected this sense of political confusion. In addition, one should 
recall that some 32.1% of respondents indicated that they would not vote in a 
general election. A similar explanation seems appropriate for the popularity of the 
"Don't know" response.
Table 53 - Individuals/groups/political parties 
views are shared about Italy
with which
category description frequency
1 NO ONE 39
2 PCI (COMMUNIST) 23
3 GREEN PARTY 18
4 DON'T KNOW 18
5 PDS (DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST) 17
6 PSI (SOCIALIST) 14
7 DC (CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT) 14
8 REPUBLICAN PARTY 10
9 RADICAL PARTY 9
10 LIBERAL PARTY 9
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The proliferation of different parties in Italy, coupled with the general level of 
political confusion, was clearly reflected in most responses to this question. Whilst 
political parties were mentioned, most respondents heavily qualified their answers 
by stating that they were not at all clear what the parties stood for, and that in all 
likelihood they probably shared their views with more than one party. In-keeping 
with the results obtained from the quantitative analysis, one may conclude that 
generally, domestic politics is not as significant an aspect of national identity for 
the Italians as it appears to be for the British. This suggests that the various social 
representations of Italy and the Italians circulating within Italian society are not 
always clearly identified with political parties. In this respect the results observed 
here are congruent with those deriving from the quantitative measures, which 
indicated that overall strength of national identity did not fluctuate significantly 
across predicted vote. Nevertheless, it is perhaps significant that like the British, 
when Italian respondents did mention groups or individuals they felt they shared 
similar views with about their nation, these were political parties. One may 
conclude from this that citizens are perhaps most aware of social representations 
of the nation which are associated with political parties. This does not however, 
mean that there might not also be important sources of social representations 
concerning the nation which are simply less salient to the citizenry - thus, the 
socialisation process, education, and so on, might be much less obvious, but no less 
significant, sources of such representations.
5.4.7 Individuals, groups or political parties with which respondents share broadly 
similar views about Europe (Question E.2 2)
The confusion over politics reflected in many of the responses to the previous 
question, is also relevant when we come to examine the individuals or groups 
Italian respondents felt they shared their views about Europe with (Table 54).
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Table 54 - Individuals/groups/political parties with which 
views are shared about Europe (Italian respondents)
category description frequency
1 NO ONE 32
2 DON'T KNOW 29
3 GREEN PARTY 17
4 PDS (DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST) 14
5 PSI (SOCIALIST) 14
6 DC (CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT) 13
7 PCI (COMMUNIST) 10
8 RADICAL PARTY 10
9 REPUBLICAN PARTY 9
10 LIBERAL PARTY 8
Once again, an examination of Table 54 suggests the confusion of Italian 
respondents, this time over what the various political parties are recommending for 
Europe. This result is also in-keeping with the quantitative analyses discussed 
earlier, which indicated that strength of European identity was not significantly 
different across predicted vote. One further dimension involved here is the 
perception of European integration and the E.C. as an expert domain - this was 
observed to influence some of the "no one" and "don't know" responses. In fact, 
respondents in both the United Kingdom and Italy tended to report feeling much 
more uncertain about the policies of the political parties concerning Europe, than 
they were about their domestic policies. Yet once again, it is noticeable, even 
allowing for the considerable confusion surrounding politics in Italy, that political 
parties appeared to be the most salient source of social representations of Europe 
for respondents.
5.5 CONCLUSIONS
One of the most important theoretical conclusions to emerge from the current 
research concerns the necessity for any social psychological analysis of European 
identity and indeed, European integration in general, to at the same time focus on 
issues of national identity. This is because in many ways, one of the most useful 
questions for a social researcher in this field to ask is: how do citizens in nation x
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construe the relationship between national and European identity? At the same 
time, the posing of this question also addresses, inevitably, the issue of how social 
representations (Moscovici, 1984) of the nation and Europe interact Since social 
identities are likely to be associated with social representations, attitudes, opinions, 
schemata, and ultimately, actions, it seems clear that an approach to European 
issues focusing on social identities is an essential element of any would-be social 
psychology of European integration.
As one would expect from the European Community's own Eurobarom&tre 
opinion polls, we have discovered that the Italians do indeed seem to have adopted 
a different orientation to the E.C. and European integration than the British. Given 
the existing evidence from Eurobarom&tre polls, the observed differences in 
attitudes, with the Italians appearing more pro-European than the British on two 
important questions, were to be expected. However, the Eurobarom&tre is 
frustrating in its inattention to questions of identity, and it is here that the current 
study appears to fill something of a theoretical and empirical gap.
When empirical evidence from both quantitative and qualitative measures 
emerges as congruent, this is often a promising indication of an interesting 
phenomenon. In the current study, it soon became apparent that this kind of 
evidence existed, and that it signified how the British and Italians tended to 
construe the relationship between national and European identities quite 
differently - in fact, in an almost antithetical manner.
British respondents tended to feel their national identity to be threatened 
by the loss of sovereignty and ultimate control over national matters they perceived 
to be associated with European integration. In contrast, the Italians, particularly in 
terms of the salience and perceived importance of European issues, were 
considerably more positive about European integration. In a similar way to many 
British respondents, a number of Italians obviously had developed strong 
instrumental attachments to the European ideal, hoping that further integration 
might improve the Italian economy, and bring the semblance of order and 
efficiency to the nightmare of Italian politics and bureaucracy. However, unlike the 
British, the Italians often supplemented this instrumental attachment to Europe
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with the expression of an awareness and pride in European culture, and thus a 
symbolic attachment to Europe. In answer to our "key question" posed earlier, one 
might therefore conclude that the Italians appear to have construed national and 
European identities as mutually beneficial, whereas the British have often perceived 
the two as 
incompatible.
Social Psychology can provide only some of the answers to why citizens of 
Britain and Italy may be interpreting the process of European integration 
differently. Historical factors, some of which we have addressed in our analysis, are 
clearly an important piece in the jigsaw. There were numerous indications that in 
some sense, many British respondents felt that Britain, especially when one 
considers her colonial history, was still one of the most important powers in the 
world, and as such should not relinquish her powers to a European governing 
body. In contrast, the Italians may well have realised that they stood a much better 
chance of enhancing their influence on the international scene via the European 
Community. Geographically, Britain's isolation from the European mainland was 
reflected by a reluctance to think of Britain as part of Europe. The Italians, on the 
other hand, dwelling on their indisputable cultural heritage, felt if anything, an 
integral part of Europe.
To further develop this last point, it should be stressed that the observed 
differences in level of European identity between the Italian and British 
respondents are not likely to be explained by an assertion that the Italians feel they 
have more to gain from European integration. Certainly, many Italians did feel that 
Italy could only benefit from further integration, but this was only part of the story 
- afterall, a good few British respondents could perceive economic and other 
instrumental benefits from E.C. membership. The crucial point is that the Italians 
already feel an integral part of Europe - this is not something which public 
information campaigns must attempt to instill > it is already observable. Even 
though the Italians are, perhaps inevitably, ethnocentric in their appraisal of their 
cultural heritage, at the same time they perceive this, and indeed, their ultimate 
destinies, as inextricably bound-up with Europe.
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In some respects what we are suggesting is that a European identity comes 
easier to the Italians than the British, albeit for a variety of often complex reasons. 
Furthermore, it is not merely the potential for European identity which is greater 
amongst the Italians, but the reality at present is such that Italians have embraced 
European identity with open arms - or at least can perceive themselves as doing so 
in the future. The British, whilst not turning away from a European identity, are 
cautiously and pessimistically assessing the future from a safe distance, anxious not 
to allow their national identity to be devoured by what could turn out to be a 
European monster. Since what is especially crucial is the perception of the future 
of Europe, of one's possible national and European identities, this whole process 
is linked to social representations of the European economic, political and social 
landscapes of the future, social representations which are disseminated largely via 
mass communication. The fate of national and European identities may thus lie 
ultimately, in the hands of the media.
In the next chapter, a purely qualitative perspective is adopted in order to 
examine in greater detail, aspects of British national and European identities. As 
this analysis unfolds, the utility of qualitative approaches to social identity will 
become even more apparent, as the ability for qualitative and quantitative data to 
complement one another is explored in some depth.
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Chapter 6
An interview study of British and European identities
Still today, when one asks a Briton, any Briton, pointblank, "Are you 
European ?" the answer is always, "European ? Did you say 
European ? Er, err" - a long thoughtful pause in which all other 
continents are mentally evoked and regretfully discarded - "Yes, of 
course, I'm European." This admission is pronounced without pride 
and with resignation. (Baizini, 1983, pps. 64-65).
6.1 Introduction
It has been argued throughout the previous chapters that a social psychological 
level of analysis can constitute a valuable addition to current theorising on the 
subject of European and national identities. However, if the full potential of such 
a contribution is to be realised, a narrow focus on only one research methodology 
must be discouraged, and instead full use should be made of varied techniques and 
perspectives. This kind of multi-method approach, apart from providing the 
obvious and valuable benefit of reducing the effects of error variance in any single 
method, also offers considerable advantages in its ability to provide different and 
usually equally illuminating perspectives on the area of study (c.f. Campbell & 
Stanley, 1966; Sotirakopoulou & Breakwell, 1992). The questionnaire research 
described in earlier chapters endeavoured to combine elements of quantitative and 
qualitative perspectives through the use of both open and closed question formats. 
This chapter describes qualitatively-oriented research designed with the aim of 
exploring in a little more depth, some of the issues raised by the questionnaire 
study. For such purposes, and in order to provide different perspectives from those 
afforded by the questionnaire, an in-depth interview methodology was utilized.
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6.2 Interview procedure
A number of interesting issues emerged from the British questionnaire research, 
and it was thought that a further examination of these could prove beneficial for 
at least three reasons. Firstly, there seems to be a strong argument that converging 
evidence arising from a variety of research techniques is especially compelling. 
Secondly, an interview methodology affords a much more dynamic environment 
for: a) the elicitation and examination of social representations (Moscovici, 1984), 
linguistic repertoires (Potter & Wetherell, 1988), and rhetorical discourse (Billig, 
1985); and b) the investigation of how the latter interact with processes of personal 
and social identity (Tajfel, 1974). Thirdly, it is argued that interviews are especially 
useful tools for examining the interactions between intraindividual, interpersonal, 
and intergroup levels of psychological functioning (Doise, 1978;1988). Whilst the 
benefits of interview methodologies have sometimes been fully exploited by social 
identity researchers (e.g. Bourhis & Hill, 1982), such theorists have, of late, 
appeared more attracted towards the use of quantitative questionnaire and 
experimental procedures. In contrast to such recent trends, the approach to the 
study of identity adopted by Breakwell and her research associates (Breakwell, 
1986; 1991) is much closer to that of the current discussion, in its adoption of a 
multi-method and multi-level approach to research.
Amongst the themes which emerged from the analysis of British 
questionnaire responses, the following were selected for further examination via 
in-depth interview procedures:
i) The nature of European identity (E.I.):
Interaction of beliefs about the E.C. and E.I.
Do respondents have any fears about European integration ?
Are any major problems in the process of integration predicted by 
respondents ?
What do respondents believe should be the goals of European 
integration ?
(continued)
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Possible bases of, and barriers towards, E.I.
Do respondents feel that European nations are interdependent ?
Is Europe perceived as unique in any way ?
Do respondents believe a European culture exists ?
Is there anything which makes respondents feel proud or, alternatively, 
regret, being European ?
ii) The nature of British identity (B.I.):
Are particular situations crucial for B.I. ?
How do respondents define "patriotism" and do they label themselves 
as patriotic ?
iii) How do European and British identities interact ?
iv) The nature of large-scale social category membership:
How do group prototypes operate at this level ?
v) General issues pertaining to social identity processes:
Which other motivations besides self - esteem maintenance are 
important influences upon social identity ?
How do such motivational factors influence social identity mechanisms ? 
How might an idiographic approach enhance our understanding of social 
identity processes ?
How useful is the concept of "types" of attachment to a social group 7
The issues described briefly above were examined via a series of open-ended 
questions posed within the context of a semi-structured interview. Interviews were 
conducted on an individual basis by a single interviewer, with volunteer 
respondents being recruited from various departments of the University of London, 
during the period of December 1991 to February 1992. Respondents were thus 
university students, and the discussion of the validity of such a subject group in 
Chapter Three remains equally applicable to the current interview study. The most 
important point to make is that, whilst students can not be regarded as 
representative of the British populace as a whole, for the purposes of an 
examination of social identity processes, it seems reasonable to suggest that 
students in this context are just as worthy subjects as any other group. Furthermore, 
given the utilization of students in the questionnaire study, it seemed appropriate 
to persist with the same subject group when exploring related issues in the 
interview study.
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Thus twenty-five in-depth interviews were conducted, following an 
interview schedule deriving from the issues outlined above, and reproduced in 
Appendix E. The 25 respondents (13 female, 12 male) had a mean age of 23 years, 
and as with the questionnaire study, all were required to hold British passports. In 
terms of political affiliations, which were elicited via questioning on voting 
intentions, 14 respondents predicted voting Labour, 8 Conservative, 2 Liberal 
Democrat, and 1 respondent was undecided. Interviews tended to take around fifty 
minutes to conduct, and were tape-recorded for the purpose of later transcription. 
This resulted in some 189 pages of interview transcript to analyse.
It should be acknowledged at the outset that the responses of 25 
respondents can not validly be utilized to make some kinds of generalization. In 
particular, it would seem unwise to make assertions about the contents of beliefs, 
attitudes, and opinions held by the British population as a whole, on the basis of 
such data. However, once again a case can be made which justifies generalising 
from this kind of study about the processes under investigation. Of course, any 
such generalisations should be subjected to repeated critical scrutiny and thus 
possible refutation. Furthermore, it is in no way being suggested that identity- 
related and other social psychological processes are necessarily static or universal - 
either temporally or culturally.
There can be few hard and fast rules about the analysis of qualitative 
material. Since responses to some of the questions lent themselves to meaningful 
representation by means of quantitative categories, in these instances frequency-by- 
categoiy breakdowns of particular themes are presented. In such cases the 
traditional Functionalist-oriented content analysis procedure outlined in Chapter 
Four was followed. One of the most important aspects of the latter approach is that 
responses are summarized in terms of major themes which should remain mutually 
exclusive, so that a frequency count can give an indication of those most commonly 
utilized (c.f. Holsti, 1969; Weber, 1990). It is important to note that the frequencies 
presented in the current chapter are based on the number of respondents referring 
to a theme, not on the number of references to the theme itself. Furthermore, in 
general, those themes mentioned by less than five interviewees are not discussed
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at length, although some idiosyncratic belief structures are examined when 
theoretical points about the structure of beliefs and identities are being discussed.
Whilst quantitative content analysis procedures can yield interesting and 
readily appraised results, in-depth interviews also provide a rich source of data for 
a more qualitatively oriented approach (see, for example, Farr, 1982). This being the 
case, the following discussion also takes into account some of the particular uses 
of discourse and rhetoric made by respondents, and makes reference to the social 
representations (Moscovici, 1984) apparently referred to by respondents. This has 
tended to be a somewhat unusual perspective to take, at least within the traditional 
Tajfel-Tumer tradition of social identity research, although in many ways it seems 
a natural extension of many of Tajfel's ideas pertaining to national identity (Tajfel, 
1970) and social stereotypes (Tajfel, 1981).
63 Results and Discussion
6.3.1 General observations concerning European integration and identity 
European integration as an "expert domain"
There were numerous indications throughout the course of the interview research, 
that the subject of European integration was one which respondents felt somewhat 
uncomfortable discussing. The primary reason for this slight anxiety turned out to 
be the feeling, expressed by many respondents, that the issue of integration is in 
some ways an expert domain - that is, a domain which requires the possession of 
specialist or expert knowledge if it is to be adequately comprehended, or in this 
case, discussed. This is not a trivial observation, since the belief that a particular 
issue is an expert domain has significant consequences for peoples' opinions and 
beliefs, as Hilgartner, Bell, and O'Connor (1983) have demonstrated for the domain 
of nuclear power. One of the significant implications of labelling a domain as the 
province of "experts", is the implication that the "general public" are not in a
200
position to fully comprehend such matters, whereas experts are, a belief very 
clearly expressed by one interview respondent: "The European issue is a very 
complex one. I'm not an economist, and it really takes an economist to answer 
questions on it". In fact, the perception of European issues as an "expert domain" 
is compatible with data arising from the E.C.'s own studies, which, for example, 
indicate that young people in the E.C. see European institutions as distant and 
unknown entities (CEC, 1988).
It is also usually the case in domains perceived as expert that, not only is 
there perceived to be a monopoly of knowledge, but also one of control. Once 
again, there was ample evidence from responses to indicate that this dimension was 
also present - as one interviewee remarked, "integration seems to be the domain of 
the politicians". It is, of course, worth noting that there is a strong "objective" sense 
in which control of European integration is held by a small group of people - 
Members of Parliament, European bureaucrats, etc There are thus at least two ways 
in which respondents might have felt - and seemed to report feeling * isolated from 
the process of European integration: firstly, through the lack of "expert" knowledge 
of the issues involved; and secondly, through an essentially realistic recognition 
that they had little or no control over the course of events.
If a large number of British citizens perceive European integration to be 
associated with a loss of control over the nation and other affairs, then it seems 
likely that integration will be opposed, since loss of control is generally perceived 
in a negative evaluative manner. Markus and Nurius (1987) have also made the 
relevant point that possible selves - perceptions of what the self has been and 
might become - associated with lack of control are likely to be evaluated 
negatively. Breakwell (1992) has also recently made the interesting suggestion that 
feelings of low self-efficacy may be associated with political cynicism and 
withdrawal from political participation. If the sense of little control over European 
affairs which seems common amongst the British is, in turn, related to feelings of 
low self-efficacy in this domain, then it goes some way to explaining the general 
apathy with which many British respondents regarded the European integration 
issue.
201
There is something of a paradox to be found in public opinion about 
European integration, in as much as the belief in integration being an expert 
domain seems to conflict with the implicit demands of the opinion pollsters that 
the public should have beliefs about such issues. Yet it was certainly not the case 
that this professed belief in the issue being an expert domain prevented 
respondents from expressing any opinions on the subject On the contrary, some 
respondents appeared to have quite complicated systems of beliefs and 
justifications for this domain. What the expert domain attribution does provide, is 
an excellent justification for expressing ambivalence in one's views, and at the 
same time allowing one's beliefs on the issue to contain an in-built safety 
mechanism: if one later appears wrong, the retort that "the experts know best" or 
"I was not in full possession of the facts" can always be called upon to save face. 
In this respect, the belief that European integration is an expert domain may have 
consequences for what Billig has recently referred to as the implicit properties of 
attitudes (Billig, 1992a).
It is interesting to note that Hewstone (1986) found that his British 
university student subjects actually did seem to have a low level of knowledge 
about the European Community, perhaps suggesting that claims of little knowledge 
might be reflections of reality. If, as seems to be the case, British university 
students profess to having little knowledge of the details surrounding European 
integration, and this actually reflects their state of knowledge, it seems rather 
unlikely that the general public as a whole will feel in any better a position to 
appraise the situation.
As already suggested, some of Michael Billig's suggestions for a rhetorical 
approach to Social Psychology provide useful tools for conceptualizing some of the 
issues raised by the interview responses. European integration, it is suggested here, 
is an issue as rich in contradictions and paradoxes as almost any other one might 
care to investigate, and this was readily apparent from interview responses to 
questions relating to the topic. Respondents themselves were often well aware of 
apparent paradoxes caused by contradictory processes, such as the centralization of 
power versus the devolution of power to regions, or the attempts to forge a wider
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European identity at the same time as national and regional identities are gaining 
in strength.
With respondents often being aware of many of the apparent paradoxes 
concerning the issue of integration, it was not surprising to find that the beliefs 
expressed by respondents tended to be multi-dimensional and often ambivalent 
Whilst van der Pligt and Eiser's (1984) suggestion that different opinions might be 
linked to differences in the perceived salience of issues, seems an attractive one, 
and is indeed useful in certain instances, it proves of less obvious value when one 
attempts to make sense of the kind of multidimensional and often ambivalent 
beliefs which emerged in the current study. An excellent example of this point is 
how the issue of economics was viewed by the majority of respondents to be the 
most important dimension of European integration - respondents who were equally 
likely to make such a belief the justification for supporting or rejecting further 
European integration. This was by no means the only example of situations where 
respondents were in agreement as to the most important issue (i.e. the salience of 
the issue), but adopted different perspectives on the issue itself.
The ambivalence of expressed opinions about European matters was nicely 
demonstrated by the fact that all respondents found something good to say about 
integration, even when the general tone of their responses was strongly anti- 
European. This finding, which is not unusual, could, of course, merely be an 
artifact of the interview method itself, or the particular questions utilized. It is 
certainly likely that the interview situation encourages a degree of rationality and 
a more even-handed approach to controversial issues than might usually be taken 
(c.f. Hoinville et al., 1978). However, this ambivalence, as we have already 
suggested, is quite likely to be linked to the notion of this issue being perceived 
in some respects as an expert domain. This would suggest an artifactual 
explanation of response ambiguity might in this case be unwarranted. It should be 
noted that one of the advantages of in-depth interviews, as demonstrated here, is 
that such ambiguity is allowed full expression - something which quantitative 
attitude scales might otherwise stifle, especially where attitudes are assessed by 
only one or two questions.
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Britain is "different"
One of the most prominent themes to emerge from the responses was evident 
throughout many of the interviews, and clearly affected a variety of beliefs and 
opinions concerning European integration. The basic claim of this theme or 
argument, was that Britain is different - different to the other nations of Europe, 
and in some cases different to every other nation in the world. In the sense that 
this belief was expressed by the majority of interviewees, there are grounds for 
suspecting it might be linked to a shared social representation - such a theme has 
certainly pervaded the British mass media periodically (Hewstone, 1986). 
Furthermore, Lyons and Sotirakopoulou (1991) have recently found that similar 
beliefs were expressed by their random sample of British 16-19 year olds. For a 
variety of reasons, most interviewees in the current study also felt that these 
apparent differences between Britain and Europe were significant Some used the 
perception of such differences to argue against European integration, other 
interviewees, who were pro-European, utilized the theme to help explain what they 
perceived as the general lack of enthusiasm for integration expressed by the British. 
This is an indication of an important point which will be made a number of times 
throughout this and other chapters: namely, that the same social representation can 
be interpreted and utilized by different individuals and social groups in different, 
and even diametrically opposed, ways (c.f. Breakwell, 1991).
In keeping with this theme of Britain being significantly different to other 
European nations, it was interesting to note how in many instances such a theme 
was reflected in linguistic usage. As Zavalloni (1973) once suggested, the use of 
pronouns such as "us/we” and "they/them” can be highly significant, sometimes 
carrying the connotation "in-group" and "out-group” respectively. It was certainly 
interesting to note how the selective use of "us" and "them" did indeed often seem 
to follow the nature of the interviewees' professed identities. It was generally the 
case that "we" were the British, whilst "they" were the Europeans. Furthermore, it 
was interesting to note how many respondents referred to "Europe" as if Britain 
was not included in the concept. This is similar to the fairly common linguistic 
practice in Britain of referring to Europe as "the continent" in a way which again 
excludes Britain itself from the concept.
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There is of course an "objective" sense in which Britain, being an island, is 
not part of the same land mass as the rest of Europe, and a number of respondents 
made reference to just this point, some feeling that this geographical separation 
was itself a contributing factor to Britain's differences, others merely finding it a 
useful visual metaphor. Barzini has also hinted at the possible psychological 
significance of Britain's geographical position: "In a way, Britain sees itself as the 
sceptered isle, cut from the Continent by divine will. If God had wanted to tie it 
to the rest of Europe, He would evidently not have dug the Channel." (Barzini, 
1983, p.59). It will be interesting to note whether the Channel tunnel link between 
Britain and France might have social psychological reverberations, through its 
possible effects upon geographically-oriented social representations of Britain and 
Europe.
Other justifications for the assertion that Britain and the British are 
significantly different from other European nations and peoples centred around 
language and culture. Some respondents felt that Britain's history is very different 
to that of other nations, while others made reference to the British empire and 
Britain's former prominence in world affairs. All of these issues were also raised 
by respondents in the questionnaire study.
It is of course not surprising, especially from a Social Identity perspective, 
that British interviewees seemed to feel that their own nation is somewhat unique 
and different to others. Afterall, it is the perception of differences, and the ability 
to evaluate such differences in a positive light, which underpins social identity 
processes in Tajfel's model (Tajfel, 1974). What is surprising is the ease with which 
respondents talk of Europe as if Britain is not included in their conception of that 
continent. This is not to say that respondents deny they are European, although as 
we will soon discover, many deny feeling any sense of European identity. Thus, 
while we would not wish to make the kind of strong claims associated with 
proponents of linguistic determinism (e.g. Sapir, 1949) it is significant in itself that 
common linguistic usage in Britain often seems to discourage self-categorization as 
European, even if this is little more than a reflection of the psychological 
unwillingness of the British to think of themselves as Europeans.
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Whilst the perception of differences between Britain and other nations is 
perhaps a crucial foundation for national identity, it is significant for the prospects 
of a future European identity, that Europe and other European nations are often the 
objects of comparison for the British (see also Lyons & Sotirakopoulou, 1991; 
Sotirakopoulou, 1991). It certainly seems likely, as A.D. Smith (1991;1992) and other 
commentators have suggested, that if a European identity is to be forged, 
international comparison processes will have to be turned outside of Europe, and 
non-European comparisons encouraged, thus promoting the perception and salience 
of similarities between the European nations.
Britain and the U.S.A.: a special relationship?
At least in the case of Britain, one such non-European outgroup already exists, in 
the guise of the United States. Billig (1992a; 1992b) has recently noted the 
paradoxical nature of British perceptions of the United States, which seem to 
combine an element of envy with a strong desire to stress the differences between 
the two nations. Furthermore, despite the frequent attempts to distance Britain from 
the United States on a variety of dimension, there are many dimensions on which 
the British could construct an identity with their North American cousins. These 
include a common language, culture, and many common traditions (cf. Lewis, 
1987).
Yet the United States appeared to be an extremely salient comparison or out­
group for the respondents taking part in the current study. Furthermore, the reader 
might recall that a number of respondents in the questionnaire study reported in 
Chapter Four, suggested that one of the benefits of European integration might be 
the creation of an alternative super-power, able to equal the political and economic 
power of the United States and the Soviet Union (data were collected prior to the 
collapse of the U.S.S.R.).
The issue of the relationship between the United States and Britain has 
fluctuated in salience quite considerably over the last two decades - at least in 
terms of its appearance in political debate and coverage in the mass media. It is 
interesting to note how what is often termed "our special relationship with the
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United States" by politicians, can have quite contradictory elements. Thus, while 
lip-service is often paid to the notion that the ultimate security of the United 
Kingdom is crucially dependent upon the United States' "nuclear umbrella", at the 
same time, there has been a strong desire to maintain an independent British 
nuclear deterrent, and considerable debate in the early 1980s as to who actually 
controlled American nuclear missiles deployed in the U.K.
This issue of control is surely linked to the ultimate desire for sovereignty 
and autonomy often lying behind national identity construction (Stagner, 1967). 
Billig, in attempting to explain this British desire to be different to the United 
States, suggests that Sigmund Freud's notion of the narcissism of close differences 
might be relevant (Billig, 1992a). The basic premise of Freud's idea is that when 
social groups are quite similar, they will be motivated to emphasize and develop 
differences. Social psychology can add a certain amount of empirical evidence to 
this claim, in as much as research seems to indicate that inteigroup co-operation can 
cause problems, when group members begin to perceive the blurring of intergroup 
distinctions, and come to fear a subsequent loss of the original identity (c.f. Turner, 
1981). This fear of losing one's identity certainly seemed real enough to Billig's 
respondents, who felt that the British royal family was perhaps the most significant 
differentiating factor between Britain and the U.S.A.
Whilst Billig was interested primarily in the interrelations between the 
desire to be different to the United States, and representations of the British royal 
family, it is suggested here that this desire for difference and autonomy has 
implications for the development of a European identity amongst the British. In 
particular, it would seem that the seeds of a European identity - at least for the 
British - are present in Europe's potential for increasing the perceived differences 
between Britain and the U.S.A. This theme will be explored shortly in relation to 
a number of issues pertaining to the form a European identity might take for the 
British.
6.3.2 European identity and beliefs about European integration
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Fears about European integration
Respondents' fears about European integration were examined by questions 
specifically directed at this issue, although interviewees would often reveal such 
fears in their responses to other questions. The primary aim in examining such 
fears is to establish the most salient psychological barriers to European identity. 
One should, however, be somewhat cautious in as much as the relationship 
between opinions about the European Community and feelings of European identity 
is not necessarily a straightforward one. Some respondents were able to express 
quite negative opinions of the E.C. yet identify quite strongly with other Europeans. 
This is indicative of how European identity can transcend the political domain - 
especially when culture is focused upon. Nevertheless, this divorcing of European 
integration and identity from its political context within the European Community 
was the exception, and most British respondents - in both the questionnaire and 
interview studies - equated the issue of European integration with the European 
Community. Such an equation, despite various E.C. cultural initiatives, in some 
ways affords political and economic dimensions a greater level of salience than 
cultural aspects. This was reflected in the way that British respondents seldom 
mentioned cultural aspects of integration before being prompted to do so.
There are fairly good reasons to expect that the perception of any kind of 
large-scale social change is likely to meet psychological resistance. One of the few 
motivational assumptions of Moscovici's theory of social representations 
(Moscovici, 1984) is that the unfamiliar induces fear, while the familiar is 
comforting in its predictability. This is the motivation behind the anchoring of 
representations into existing knowledge structures. Marris (1974) has gone as far as 
to liken significant change in one's environment to bereavement, suggesting that 
both involve feelings of loss of self, and thus identity. It is precisely because the 
structures of meaning which we adhere to become part of our self-concept, that we 
tend to ding-on to them with such determination. Doob has also gone on to 
suggest that resistance to change might become focused on a particular outgroup:
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"How convenient, how meaningful it is to ascribe the pain of change not to abstract 
forces but to some identifiable, distinctive outgroups" (Doob, 1964, p.253).
Cognitively oriented social psychologists have detailed many cognitive 
mechanisms which seem to encourage resistance to change, perhaps the most 
relevant here being the notion of schema perseverance (cf. Crocker, Fiske, & Taylor, 
1984; Fiske & Taylor, 1984). All of these suggest that European integration, in as 
much as it holds the potential for significant social change, might be subject to 
certain psychological mechanisms geared to minimizing or resisting such change. 
We are not, incidentally, suggesting that such mechanisms are only located at a 
cognitive, and thus individual level. On the contrary, social representations seem 
to have in-built mechanisms for self-perpetuation which exist outside of 
individuals, whilst at the same time the members of social groups might 
collectively resist change.
Table 55 below indicates the five most frequent fear-inducing themes to 
emerge from the interviews (frequencies show the number of respondents referring 
to each theme).
Table 55 - Things which worry respondents about European-integration
Theme Frequency
Centralisation of power & loss of sovereignty 11
Loss of British identity 7
Rise of extreme nationalism 3
Britain net contributor to B.C. 3
"Eurocentrism" / "fortress Europe" 3
(nothing) 2
Frequencies refer to number of Interviewees referring to theme
The most common theme which emerged was mentioned by 11 interviewees, and 
referred to fears concerning the centralisation of European power and consequent 
loss of national sovereignty. This theme also emerged in open-ended responses to 
the 1991 questionnaire, and as suggested earlier, pervaded the British mass media 
and political debate in Britain for some time. Many respondents were aware of the 
contradictions between moves towards the centralization of European power, and
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at the same time the rise in regionalism and assertion of separate national 
identities, with Eastern Europe providing a particularly salient example. That 
sovereignty has once again emerged as a barrier to European identity for the British 
is highly congruent with the observations arising from other empirical research 
(see, for example, Sotirakopoulou, 1991). In fact, Fitzgerald (1991) has suggested that 
a challenge to British sovereignty seems almost to deny history itself, with 
sovereignty having extremely deep roots in Britain's past
It should also be emphasized that, while respondents feared centralization 
of power, they remained largely ignorant as to the actual and proposed power 
structures of the E.C., and thus somewhat ambivalent on this issue. Furthermore, 
a number of the respondents who suggested they were concerned at the possibility 
of centralisation, remained enthusiastic about European integration in general. In 
fact, only 2 of the 25 interviewees reported that nothing worried them about 
European integration, suggesting that even those sympathetic to integration have 
doubts and fears about certain aspects of the process.
What this apparent concern with issues of centralisation and loss of 
sovereignty does seem to demonstrate, is the significance of control motivations 
(see also Stagner, 1967). It was suggested in earlier chapters that there is often a 
motivation to feel in control of one's life - as well as a desire to control the lives 
of others • and that this control motivation should not be overlooked in discussions 
of social identity. Of course, what we are in fact talking about, are perceptions of 
control, for just how much control individual citizens have over political decision­
making is questionable. This, in some respects, is where Kelman's (1969) stress on 
perceived legitimacy is especially helpful, since many British citizens presumably 
accept as legitimate the government's right to make decisions on their behalf. What 
is interesting in this respect is that this legitimacy is often not extended by the 
British public to European governing bodies - at least for certain issues. Thus, one 
interviewee who was generally in favour of European integration, felt that whilst 
some decisions could be made at a European level, certain key issues, such as 
taxation policy, should be left to national decision-making bodies. Responses of 
this nature are highly congruent with trends apparent in the Eurobarom&tre opinion
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surveys, which indicate that the British typically lack enthusiasm for anything more 
than economic integration.
In some ways the fear of centralisation theme seems interrelated with the 
concern over the loss of British identity, voiced by 7 of the interviewees. This 
echoes the finding arising from the 1991 questionnaire research, that some 
respondents perceive British and European identities as incompatible, with some 
feeling that European identity poses a significant threat to British identity. Such 
respondents would appear to perceive British and European loyalties as linked to 
alternative, rather than complementary, identities.
Some commentators (e.g. Smith, 1991;1992) have suggested that a European 
identity might be forged if it is perceived as similar to adding another layer to 
national loyalties, a higher level of identity which does not compete with national 
identity. In the latter case, the question of compatibility between the two identities 
does not arise, as both operate at essentially separate levels of inclusiveness. In 
principle, this seems a plausible means of holding both a national and European 
identity, and does not seem very different to the way people are able to apparently 
feel loyalties to both their region and their nation. However, if the results of the 
questionnaire and interviews described here are anything to go by, a significant 
number of British citizens seem to perceive the two identities as incompatible, thus 
presenting a fairly insurmountable psychological barrier against their harmonious 
integration. As one concerned respondent put it, for many Britons, the prospect of 
European integration "just seems so terribly anonymous, and as if we're going to 
have to abandon some of the things which are most British".
The theme of loss of sovereignty is also a powerful illustration of how social 
representations and social identities are intimately related. The belief that European 
integration poses a threat to British sovereignty seems a fairly widespread belief 
in Britain, at least to the extent that it might justifiably be labelled a social 
representation. Furthermore, this social representation appears to have often been 
deliberately diffused by certain social groups - e.g. the Bruges group. The 
acceptance or internalization of such a representation carries with it potential 
consequences for one's social identities. In particular, this social representation
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contains the basis for perceiving British and European identities as incompatible - 
one might therefore say that it affords or suggests how individuals should organize 
their identity structures, albeit implicitly. It seems a fairly natural progression from 
Tajfel's (1980) earlier assertion that societal myths and beliefs (i.e. social 
representations) provide individuals with their repertoire of possible social 
identities, to go on to suggest that social representations might also suggest or 
prescribe the preferred interrelationships between them.
Predicted obstacles to the progress of European integration
Table 56 below details the most common themes which emerged when respondents 
discussed any problems they predicted might interfere with the progress of 
European integration.
Table 56 - Predicted problems for European integration
Problem Frequency
British rsluctancs 15
Diversity of different member states 2
Resistance to centralisation of power 2
Frequencies refer to number of Interviewees referring to theme
It was interesting to note how all respondents felt European integration would face 
some problems, although most predicted that none would be serious enough to halt 
or reverse the process. It is striking that so many interviewees predicted that 
Britain in particular, would be the major cause of problems for the progress of 
European integration. Often this prediction was tied to the theme of Britain being 
different to the other European nations, discussed earlier. Additionally, a number 
of respondents felt that the present British government had been cautious about 
integration.
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Desired goals for European integration
The most frequently mentioned goals which respondents felt European integration 
should be aiming to achieve, are presented in Table 57 below.
Table 57 - Desired goals for European Integration
Goal Freguency
Economic 9
Peace 9
Provide aid for poor nations 5
Promote understanding between people 2
Facilitate greater freedom of movement 2
Frequencies refer to number of Interviewees referring to theme
In both the questionnaire and interview responses, the economic dimension was 
very prominent in colouring the issues respondents thought about when they 
considered the subject of European integration. Specifically, most respondents 
mentioning economic goals thought that integration should aim for the economic 
prosperity and equality of E.C. member states. In fact, these aims tended to be 
shared by pro and anti-Europeans alike, indicating that the economic dimension is 
perhaps less likely than others to be the focus of differences of opinion. 
Furthermore, those who felt economic considerations should be important, also felt 
that integration generally had a good chance of realising economic goals.
Such feelings of optimism did not characterize the responses of those who 
felt the achievement of peace should be an important goal of integration. On the 
contrary, most respondents mentioning such a goal were extremely doubtful about 
the likelihood of its realisation - as one interviewee candidly remarked, "I think 
world peace should be an ultimate goal, but I don't think it's got a snowball's 
chance in hell of being achieved". It is interesting how even though such 
respondents felt that one of the goals they valued was not likely to be achieved, 
this did not seem to dampen their enthusiasm for integration, when such 
enthusiasm was present.
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It is interesting to note how, in a way which seems congruent with the 
responses to the 1991 questionnaire, most of the goals given by respondents are 
quite indicative of an instrumental orientation to European integration and identity 
• i.e. an orientation which focuses more on gains versus losses type analyses than 
emotional and symbolic identification (Kelman, 1969). This kind of orientation 
appeared to be demonstrated quite well by an interviewee who was rather 
ambivalent about European integration, feeling especially concerned that Britain's 
economic input to the E.C. was greater than the benefits it received in return. 
Hewstone's (1986) earlier study of attitudes towards the European Community also 
indicated the significance of this kind of instrumental orientation.
As one might expect, those respondents who gave the overall impression of 
being pro-integration, tended to be more optimistic that the goals they mentioned 
might one day be realized. Those respondents who mentioned a likely time-frame 
for their goals to be achieved, tended to allow between ten and twenty years for 
this. There was only a single interviewee who felt so negative about European 
integration that they believed it should have no goals - in fact, that the process 
should be halted. This is perhaps significant, in as much as it indicates that, whilst 
there exists opposition to certain aspects of the integration process, this opposition 
tends not to be so intense that the project of European integration as a whole is 
rejected.
6.3.3 Elements of European identity 
Perceptions of interdependence
The idea that perceptions of interdependence between individuals constitute an 
important element of group loyalty is an old one (c.f. Lewin, 1948; Sherif, 1966). 
Lewin in particular, stressed the potency of interdependence of fate in forging 
allegiance to a social group. For Lewin, perceptions of task interdependence were 
perhaps even more crucial influences on the development of group processes. 
Social psychologists working in the Lewinian tradition were able to find ample
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empirical evidence to suggest that these two forms of interdependence had 
important effects upon group processes, and that perceptions of interdependence 
were at least sufficient for group formation, even if Tajfel and associates' minimal 
group studies (Tajfel et al., 1971) seemed to suggest that interdependence was not 
a necessary precondition for group behaviour.
Recently however, the minimal group paradigm has been the subject of 
serious criticism, most of which has not focused upon the reliability of the research 
findings, but rather their interpretation. Of most relevance to the current discussion 
is a series of papers by Rabbie, Horwitz, and associates, which posits that 
perceptions of interdependence are both necessary and sufficient elements of group 
behaviour and self-categorization as a group member (c.f. Rabbie & Horwitz, 1988; 
Rabbie, Schott, & Visser, 1989). Furthermore, Rabbie and Horwitz (1988) propose 
a distinction between social groups, which constitute "a 'dynamic whole' or social 
system, characterized by the perceived interdependence among its members", and 
social categories, which represent "a collection of individuals who stress at least one 
attribute in common". Whilst this conceptual distinction is in many ways congruent 
with suggestions raised in this and other chapters of the current discussion, we are 
not fully convinced that Rabbie and Horwitz's distinction is adequate. As we will 
discover shortly, it appears that perceptions of Europe include elements which the 
latter authors would associate with both social groups and social categories, 
begging the question: is European identity associated then, with perceptions of 
Europe as a category, or as a group?
Table 58 below presents the most commonly given dimensions of 
interdependence between European nations, as perceived by the interview 
respondents.
Table 58 -  Perceived dimensions of European Interdependence
Dimension Frequency
Economic 13
Cultural 3
Geographic 2
Frequencies refer to number of Interviewees referring to theme
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In keeping with the dominance of the economic dimension in other responses, once 
again one may note how this dimension, an essentially instrumental one, 
dominated interviewees' perceptions of interdependence between European 
nations. In fact, it is noticeable how only 3 out of 25 interviewees made reference 
to a dimension of interdependence which might be considered reflective of a 
symbolic or sentimental attachment to Europe (cultural). Given the involvement of 
various European nations, including Britain, in a number of military alliances, the 
most prominent of which must be N.A.T.O., it also seems somewhat surprising that 
no respondents reported feeling that the nations of Europe are interdependent in 
terms of security. As we will discover when we come to examine British identity, 
it may well be the case that national security is a domain in which the desire for 
perceived control is especially strong. This, incidentally, might also be a key factor 
behind the paradoxically ambivalent attitude of the British towards the United 
States.
There were important indications from the overall structure of the 
interviews, that perceptions of economic interdependence are not sufficient for 
feelings of European identity. Thus, a number of respondents perceived economic 
interdependence between European nations with regret, and there seemed to be at 
least two psychological underpinnings to such perceptions:
i) Some respondents felt that Britain in particular, is a net contributor 
to the European Community, largely due to the poorer economic 
nations in Europe. As one interviewee stated: "You can't help feeling 
that some of the poorer nations in the E.E.C. are a drain upon the 
better-off ones such as Britain".
ii) An alternative theme was associated with respondents' feelings that 
economic interdependence in some way constrained and reduced the 
ultimate control separate nations have over their own economies.
Thus, one respondent remarked: "Unfortunately, we are now locked 
into a situation where some countries are dependent on others" (our 
emphasis).
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In some respects the example response given in i) above, appears to exemplify a 
perception of negative interdependence, in that the implication is that this 
interviewee regrets the fact that poorer European nations are benefiting from EC 
membership, at the expense of Britain and other wealthy nations. It is rather 
unlikely that individuals who perceive this kind of inequity, and are concerned 
about it, will easily develop a sense of European identity based upon 
interdependence.
Case ii) returns us to a point made several times throughout this discussion, 
that there appears to be a significant desire for control, which can exert a powerful 
influence upon social identity processes. In this case respondents seemed to lament 
the fact that economic interdependence between European nations reduces control 
at the national level. As always, the metaphors and linguistic devices chosen by 
respondents provide further possible hints as to their perceptions: the metaphor of 
Britain being "locked" into economic dependence seems to imply quite well the 
unpleasant feelings of restraint perceived loss of control can engender.
The significance of the two cases detailed above is that both appear to 
demonstrate instances where perceived interdependence has actually acted to 
inhibit group or identity formation (both respondents reported feeling no sense of 
European identity). Perhaps the crucial point to make here, is that everything 
hinges on the interpretation of interdependence - by individuals, but also by social 
groups and other purveyors of social representations. The paradoxical nature of 
British-U.S. relations recently discussed should be enough to demonstrate how such 
interpretations of interdependence can be the cause for considerable political and 
public debate. Here, once again, we may see how interdependence can encourage 
feelings of common identity, but it can also cause resentment, especially where it 
is perceived to be associated with loss of control.
From the preceding discussion, it will be obvious that perceptions of 
interdependence between European nations are clearly not sufficient for the 
development of a European identity - in fact, it seems to be the case that in certain 
instances, such perceptions might inhibit the development of such an identity. It
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was also interesting to note how all of the interviewees felt the nations of Europe 
were interdependent in some way, once again suggesting that perceptions of 
interdependence are not always sufficient to engender social identity, since by no 
means all of the interviewees felt that being European was an important aspect of 
their identities. The conclusions concerning interdependence to be drawn from an 
interview study of this nature must of course be regarded as tentative, but at the 
same time, the value of observing social identity processes and identity 
construction outside of the sometimes artificial constraints of the experimental 
laboratory, should not be underestimated.
Is Europe perceived as unique ?
If a European identity is to develop, or if it already exists, there are several strong 
reasons to suspect that its existence will depend on the perception of Europe being 
distinct or unique in some way, in comparison to other categories, at least if 
Tajfel's social identity theory is correct. Here an interesting question arises: 
distinct or unique compared to what, or to whom ? This question was addressed 
in the previous chapter during the examination of likely outgroups for a European 
identity. It emerged from the questionnaire responses that the most common focus 
of comparisons, at least for British respondents, was between Europe and the 
United States, although this kind of direct comparison between Europe/the 
Europeans and another category was not common. In fact, this relative absence of 
comparisons between Europe and other categories may itself be indicative of the 
relatively low levels of European identity which were found among the 
questionnaire respondents.
This is a complex and emotive issue, not least because many commentators 
interpret Social Identity Theory as implying that outgroups are very likely to be 
denigrated. Robinson (1991) for example, has recently wondered whether a 
European identity will require the selection and denigration of a non-European 
outgroup. In terms of Tajfel's formulation of the theory (e.g. Tajfel, 1981), it is 
important to remember that outgroups fluctuate in salience, and that perceptions 
of in-group superiority and out-group inferiority are only predicted for salient and
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relevant outgroups. In addition, and crucially, ecologically valid empirical fieldwork 
has demonstrated that even where members of two social groups make regular 
intergroup comparisons, hostility and prejudice need not develop, especially where 
each group does not challenge, but actually endorses, the claims of the other group 
for positive distinctiveness (see for example, van Knippenberg and Oers, 1984; 
Oaker & Brown, 1986). The moral to be drawn from such cases, is that whilst in­
group bias tends to be the norm (excepting out-group preference effects in 
underprivileged groups), ingroup-outgroup relations can remain amiable and 
generally hospitable. Thus, the selection of an outgroup, by default, does not 
signify that hostility and severe prejudice will be directed towards that group.
In fact, the outgroup issue, and in particular, the question of whether the 
perception of an outgroup is a necessary precondition for group formation, is 
perhaps one of the most crucial issues facing current social identity theorists. 
Tajfel, like many other prominent group psychology theorists, tended to take for 
granted the assumption that ingroups go hand-in-hand with outgroups: "No group 
lives alone - all groups in society live in the midst of other groups. In other words, 
'the positive aspects of social identity ' and the reinterpretation of attributes and 
engagement in social action only acquire meaning in relation to, or in comparisons 
with, other groups." (Tajfel, 1981, p.256). Yet over the last two years or so, a number 
of commentators have raised the possibility of social identities and social group 
memberships which do not depend upon explicit comparisons with outgroups. 
Rupert Brown and associates for example, have recently suggested that social 
identity construction can derive from comparisons with norms, rather than explicit 
outgroups (Brown et al., 1991;1992).
Whilst Brown and his associates strive to avoid taking the position that non­
comparative social identities can exist, others have been willing to argue just this 
point Hinkle and associates, for example, suggest that future research should take 
into account the possibility of non-comparative group ideologies (Hinkle et al., 
1989). Such a focus on the shared social representations held by group members, 
as well as the general ideological milieu in which social groups operate, would 
represent a much-needed change in perspective for social identity theory. What all 
of these debates suggest, is that there are some doubts being raised as to whether
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comparisons with out-groups are necessary for the formation of social identities. 
This being the case, and at least until more research is conducted in this area, we 
are not in a position to say whether the formation of a European identity does or 
does not require the perception of relevant outgroups. Nevertheless, this does not 
reduce the significance attached to investigating whether any outgroups for a 
European identity exist, and if so, on which dimensions comparisons are being 
made.
In the current interview study, respondents were directly questioned as to 
whether they perceived there to be anything unique about Europe, and the 
dimensions mentioned most frequently by respondents are presented in Table 59.
Table 59 - Perceived dimensions of Europe em uniqueness
Dimension Frequency
Diversity of culture 11
Level of industrial development 6
Geographical location 4
(None) 4
Frequencies refer to number of Interviewees referring to theme
One may note from Table 59 that the most frequently mentioned dimension of 
European uniqueness was the diversity of European culture (referred to by 11 
interviewees). In keeping with the apparent desire for the British to differentiate 
themselves from the United States, it was interesting to note how this apparent 
diversity of European culture was contrasted by a number of respondents with 
what they perceived to be the shallowness and lack o f diversity of North American 
culture. There is something paradoxical about the fact that perceived diversity is 
here being used to differentiate between two categories: European and non- 
European. The apparent paradox lies in the way diversity seems to be being used 
to characterize a categorization ("Europe") - categorization does tend, afterall, to 
derive from perceptions of commonalities and homogeneity. Of course, it is fairly 
well-established that there often exists the tendency to perceive the ingroup as 
relatively heterogeneous when compared to outgroups, and this might especially 
be the case in contexts where a pervasive ideology of individualism is present, as 
may be the case in Britain. However, the use of the perceived diversity of European
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cultures in this case seemed not to be related to the presence of a European 
identity. In fact, as will be discussed shortly, the salience of differences between 
European cultures may be one of the major factors inhibiting the development of 
a European identity - at least in Britain.
In fact, interviewees had considerable difficulty in thinking about the 
possible dimensions on which Europe may be considered to be unique, suggesting 
that the respondents had not given this issue much previous thought. In support 
of this inteipretation, one may note how 4 respondents could think of nothing 
better to say than that Europe is unique only in terms of its geographical location, 
while 4 other respondents could not think of any way in which Europe could be 
said to be unique. In conclusion, it should however, be noted that there are 
indications that the United States can at times, serve the purpose of an outgroup for 
comparisons between Europe and other categories.
A common European culture ?
In previous chapters, the reader was introduced to the sociologist Anthony Smith's 
suggestion that one possibility for the development of a European identity, lies in 
the potentiality that Europeans might come to perceive a common cultural 
background - a family of European cultures, sharing certain key common elements 
(Smith, 1991;1992). Doubts were raised as to the likelihood of such perceptions 
developing amongst the British public, especially if the results of the 1991 
questionnaire were taken into account. Such doubts are also shared by some of the 
other theorists working in this area. Bloom, for example, argues that European 
integration can only succeed if it is based upon a clear set of European symbols. 
Unfortunately, according to Bloom, these European symbols are yet to emerge 
(Bloom, 1990). Since the question of whether respondents do perceive a common 
European culture was not directly put to the 1991 questionnaire respondents, it was 
included as an open-ended question in the interview study currently being 
discussed.
Once again, it may be significant to note how respondents found it quite 
difficult to answer this question - this was apparent from both non-verbal and
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verbal indicators. What exactly was meant by "culture" was deliberately left open 
to the interpretation of respondents, who tended to focus on general behavioural 
patterns, customs, traditions, art, language, and so on, apparently using much the 
same definition as a sociologist or anthropologist might.
Out of the 25 interviewed, 15 expressed the belief that there is no such thing 
as a common European culture. The response of one particular interviewee is 
particularly instructive, since it also serves to demonstrate how an ideology of 
individualism - and perhaps more precisely, the acceptance of such an ideology - 
is likely to affect the development of European and other identities :
No, I don't think there's anything like a common European culture.
I think if anyone was to say yes to that, they'd be basically fooling 
themselves because...I mean...well, I think everybody would certainly 
say that they are totally individual compared to everybody else. I 
mean Italians would never say, "oh we're very similar to the French"
- I'm sure they'd be up in arms. It all comes down to individualities
- that, you know, we ARE different, (interview respondent)
It should be stressed that we are not suggesting that acceptance of this kind of 
individualistic philosophy necessarily prevents individuals having powerful social 
identities as part of their self-concepts. What, yet again, is crucial, is the interface 
between the individual (or social group) and the ideology - i.e. how the ideology 
is interpreted and put to use. For the interviewee whose response is reproduced 
above, it was precisely this philosophy of individualism which comprised an 
important element of his general anti-European perspective. Yet for other 
respondents, individualism, though broadly accepted, was not seen to pose any 
problems for a European identity.
Smith's (1991;1992) notion of a European "family of cultures" is a flexible 
one, in as much as it allows for the possibility that, whilst Europeans might wish 
to continue to perceive their cultures as separate, in addition, they might come to 
perceive certain essential similarities as well. However, Smith seems to fall into the 
trap of intellectualization, when he suggests that the basis for perceptions of this 
family of cultures might stem from an awareness of the religious history of Europe, 
common philosophical roots, the enlightenment, and so on. From the current
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author's experience, and from the questionnaire and interview data reported herein, 
there appears to be little or no evidence that the British public are aware of such 
common roots - this is perhaps not surprising, given that the public as a whole tend 
not to be well versed in religious history, or the history of philosophical thought 
In a way, what Smith is suggesting is that citizens of European states might turn 
towards the past with a new common perspective, and thus re-interpret European 
history. It is the contention of the current author that this kind of re-interpretation 
of culture and history is unlikely, especially for the British, since, as was 
demonstrated by the questionnaire responses, symbolic and cultural attachments 
to the nation can be the most potent elements of national identity. Even when the 
citizens of a nation lose part or even all of their national territory, they seem to 
cling-on to their culture with dogged determination.
Whilst there may be significant factors acting to inhibit the perception of a 
European culture, it is also important to note that 7 out of the 25 interviewees (28%) 
did express a belief in a common European culture. Almost all of these respondents 
however, strove to suggest that the common elements, which they found extremely 
difficult to define, were rather superficial, and they usually went on to suggest that 
the differences between the European cultures are more significant than the 
similarities. It has already been suggested earlier in this discussion, that British 
respondents have a tendency to define European culture(s) in terms of comparisons 
with North American culture, and this trend was readily apparent in responses to 
the current question. Many of those respondents who argued for a common 
European culture, found it easiest to suggest that the common element was in some 
way this difference between European and American culture:
I think the peoples of Europe are much more culturally linked than 
possibly, than we think they are. Some people think we've got more 
in common with Americans, but I think we've got more in common 
with Europeans. I think culturally, we're closer to Europeans - 
German people, or Italians, than we are to Americans (interview 
respondent)
It is rather interesting to note how this apparent concern to differentiate European 
and American cultures, is actually reflected in both academic and political circles, 
in terms of attempts to preserve a European cultural space from what is often
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perceived as American or Anglo-Saxon "cultural imperialism" (c.f. Schlesinger, 
1991).
It was also noticeable how, in general, whether respondents perceived the 
existence of a common European culture or not, was not related to their overall 
stance on the European integration issue, or to whether they expressed beliefs 
congruent with the existence of a European identity. This observation is in keeping 
with the argument made throughout this and other chapters, that British 
orientations to European identity are fairly instrumental in nature.
Given the fact that University students as a subject group are relatively well- 
travelled compared to the general population as a whole, and when one also takes 
into account the additional factor that the University of London tends to provide 
a relatively cosmopolitan and multi-national milieu, it is perhaps rather surprising 
that the majority of respondents were unable to perceive a common European 
culture. This is less surprising however, when one takes into account the fact that 
contact with other nationalities might act to increase the salience of one's own 
nationality, and thus encourage citizens to take more note of differences between 
cultures. A.D. Smith (1991) has suggested a similar process in relation to the 
possibility that communications technology is increasingly bringing foreign 
cultures into our homes, via satellite television and other developments. For Smith, 
such developments are only likely to enhance the perceived barriers between 
national cultures, especially if nationals come to perceive their own culture as under 
threat This last point is of relevance to the European Commission, who appear to 
have taken-on the task of creating and disseminating a European culture. European 
Commission literature already talks of a European culture as if its existence can be 
taken for granted, and as if the perception of this common culture is the major 
factor behind feelings of European identity, which again, are assumed to already 
exist:
A community of culture in Europe is already an undeniable fact 
Beneath the surface diversity of languages, tastes and artistic styles, 
there is a likeness, a kinship, a European dimension or identity 
based on a common cultural heritage. (The European Community and 
Culture, CEC, 1985, p.3).
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It would seem that the European Commission is unaware of some of the 
contradictory themes and paradoxes which are involved in attempting to encourage 
the perception of a European culture. One should, for example, consider how a 
number of respondents actually valued what they perceived as the diversity of 
European cultures. In some ways, this has similarities with what Billig (1985) has 
referred to as the conflict between categorization and particularization. Individuals 
who hold this kind of opinion are rather likely to resist claims that a homogeneous 
common European culture exists.
Objects of European Pride
If some of the interview respondents had truly internalized European identity as 
a self-categorization (Turner, 1987), one would expect this self-categorization or 
social identity to have an element of affect associated with it, at least, if the basic 
tenets of Tajfel's theory are accepted (e.g. Tajfel, 1974). A social identity is said to 
be positive for an individual, when it allows the attainment of positive 
distinctiveness (Tajfel, op. cit.). Ascertaining the affective nature of a social identity 
can be somewhat tricky, and the task can be complicated somewhat by at least two 
factors:
i) We know that a number of individual (e.g. schema perseverance - cf. 
Crocker, Fiske, & Taylor, 1984) and group-level (e.g. the ultimate 
attribution error - c.f. Pettigrew, 1979) processes allow the 
manufacturing of a positive identity in many situations which might 
seem "objectively" likely to cause feelings of negative identity (see 
also R.J. Brown, 1988).
ii) There is evidence that group failures may have the paradoxical effect 
of enhancing positive social identity (c.f. Turner et al., 1984).
What the kind of factors highlighted above suggest, is that the affect associated 
with any particular social identity is determined by a complex and as yet poorly 
understood interaction between "objective" circumstances (e.g. economic wealth),
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perceptions of these circumstances (by both individuals and groups), and a number 
of psychological mechanisms often leading to self or group-serving biases. 
Furthermore, the question of whether all social identities are associated with affect, 
all of the time, may not be as straightforward as many social identity theorists have 
assumed. The possibility of social identities not associated with affect will be 
examined at length later in this discussion.
Given the biasing mechanisms briefly outlined above, and accepting for the 
moment Tajfel's assertion that we will strive for positive social identities - i.e. for 
ones which we come to associate with positive affect - it is relevant to ask whether 
there are any aspects of Europe which British respondents associate with positive 
affect This issue was directly addressed by asking interviewees whether there was 
anything about Europe which made them feel proud to he European, and the most 
popular response categories are detailed in Table 60 below:
Table 60 - Objects of European p r id e
Dimension Frequency
(None) 16
Depth of European history 4
Culture 4
Frequencies refer to number of Interviewees referring to theme
In some respects, the results presented in Table 60 are striking, for it was apparent 
that the majority of interviewees (16/25) were not able to specify anything about 
Europe which made them feel proud to be European - even those who, in general, 
were quite enthusiastic about European integration and the European Community. 
In fact, taking into consideration both the 1991 questionnaire and interview data, 
we might be as bold as to say that in general, it seems to be the case for the British, 
that the possession of a European identity does seem to be associated with positive 
opinions about integration and the E.C., but that the reverse is not the case - the 
holding of positive opinions about integration and the Community is not 
necessarily enough to foster a European identity.
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Many respondents reported feeling that "European" was altogether too 
anonymous a label, and one they were not happy about applying to their own self* 
concepts. It appears that such respondents simply did not identify themselves as 
European, and thus found the task of listing things which made them feel proud 
to be European, an irrelevant one. Others accepted the label "European", but 
attached little or no significance to it, and thus were unable to list objects of 
European pride - "No, it's just a fact - it's not something that I think about" - 
remarked one interviewee. The question of whether such comments suggest a self* 
categorization which apparently has no affect linked to it, is an interesting one, and 
one which will be addressed at a later stage in the discussion.
Those interviewees who were able to list things which made them feel 
proud to be European, did so only after considerable mental deliberation * these 
were clearly things which did not come easily to mind. There seemed little or no 
affect shown when these objects of pride were listed, and the general impression 
gleaned by the interviewer was one congruent with the notion of instrumental, 
rather than sentimental, attachments to Europe. In keeping with the observation 
made earlier, it was the case that those interviewees able to list objects of European 
pride, were all also in favour of European integration and the E.C In conclusion, 
as a crude measure of the level of European identity expressed by the interviewees, 
it is instructive to recall the data obtained from the 1991 questionnaire study: while 
some 64% of interviewees were unable to list any objects of European pride, only 
3% of questionnaire respondents had similar difficulties when asked to list objects 
of British national pride. For anyone interested in comparing the relative 
magnitude, or perhaps level of positive affect, associated with British and European 
identities, in this case the data certainly strongly favour British over European, 
identity.
Things which made respondents embarrassed about being European
We have already discussed some of the likely barriers to the development of a 
European identity amongst the British, and since interviewees were questioned 
concerning possible objects of European pride, it seemed desirable to also question
227
them about aspects of Europe which embarrassed them, or made them regret being 
European. The most frequent themes to emerge in the responses to this question 
are presented in Table 61 below:
Table 61 - Objects of European emba rras ament
Dimension Frequency
(None) 11
Exploitation of Third world 7
Imperialist past 4
Frequencies refer to number of Interviewees referring to theme
Given the knowledge that the most frequent response here was actually to say that 
nothing caused the respondent embarrassment about being European, one might 
speculate that this is promising for the likely development of a European identity. 
It is certainly true that none of the interviewees seemed to possess a negative 
European identity, and that, in general, none expressed a desire to actively dis- 
identify themselves with Europe. Given the general pattern of responses, we would 
argue that the lack of embarrassment reported, is most likely to be another 
reflection of the simple fact that many respondents simply did not possess a 
European identity, even when they generally accepted the label "European'*.
It is perhaps fitting to conclude this section of the discussion on an 
optimistic note for those who might hope to instill a European identity. Optimism 
is perhaps warranted, to the extent that those interviewees who were able to give 
examples of things which made them regret being European, tended to dwell on 
past-oriented themes. Thus for example, it was the case that those who gave the 
exploitation of the Third World as a response, tended to concentrate on past 
exploitation. This may therefore suggest that there is perhaps little about modern- 
day Europe which is seen as worthy of regret, although one must always bear in 
mind other psychological factors likely to discourage a European identity, and it 
is these that we now examine.
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6.3.4 A European identity for the British ?
Resistance to change
It should be relatively clear from the preceding discussion, that a number of 
psychological and social-psychological factors are likely to stand in the way of the 
development of a European identity amongst the British. Amongst the most 
significant of these processes are those associated with the tendency to resist 
change. As we have already suggested, such processes derive from mechanisms 
operating at both the intra-individual level (e.g. schema perseverance), as well as 
the social level (e.g. the anchoring of social representations). In fact, as with most 
social psychological processes of significance, those associated with the resistance 
and acceptance of change can be said to operate at multiple levels (c.f. Doise, 1986), 
and one of the real challenges is to take into account all of these levels, as well as 
the interactions between processes at different levels. Whilst Moscovici's theory 
certainly suggests social representations are imbued with a degree of longevity and 
resistance to change, it must also be acknowledged that change obviously does 
occur. Moscovici, for example, has been especially interested in minority influence 
(e.g. Moscovici, 1985), and it does seem that minorities can persuade individuals 
and social groups to change existing social representations, or to abandon them and 
adopt new ones.
Alternatively, Marris (1974) has made the interesting suggestion that changes 
in widely-held social beliefs and ideologies might occur along similar lines to the 
model proposed by Kuhn (1970) for explaining paradigm shifts in science. In 
particular, Marris suggests that such changes in shared beliefs are especially likely 
when alternative belief systems are perceived to offer a more parsimonious 
interpretation of social reality. We would suggest that although somewhat vague, 
Marris' suggestion is one worthy of further investigation. In the context of the 
current discussion, if Marris is correct, then one might tentatively predict that one 
way in which social representations linked with the resistance of European identity 
might come to change, is if alternative social representations are seen to be more 
informative. Such alternative social representations - ones which propose a
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European identity, a stronger, more united European Community, etc. - certainly 
do exist, in as much as they are being proposed and disseminated by individuals 
and social groups. This rather nicely illustrates how processes of social 
representation and social identity are almost always interrelated - in this case, the 
question of whether a European identity will be adopted is also one of whether 
particular social representations will be abandoned or changed, and new ones 
adopted. In relation to this issue, a further important point must be made. Whilst 
the term "European identity" is used here largely for the sake of convenience, it 
might be more appropriate to think of European identities, since this is a more 
realistic reflection of the fact that there are many possible manifestations a 
European identity might take.
Temporal aspects of European identity
It is relevant at this point in the discussion to raise some of the issues concerned 
with temporal matters, and their relation to the development of a European 
identity. An interesting aspect of many of the more anti-European responses in the 
interview study, was that although these tended to be associated with little or no 
sign of a European identity, at the same time respondents often felt that they might 
develop such an identity within the next ten or twenty years. As an example, it is 
instructive to briefly consider the response of one interviewee, when asked whether 
anything made her feel proud to be European:
I'm British, I've been brought-up to be British, so I can't really sort 
of answer that question. I've just been brought-up British like we all 
have. But if you ask me, you know, in ten years time if I'm proud to 
be European, I might say yes.
One may note from the above response that this interviewee can not think of 
anything which makes her feel proud to be European, suggesting a lack of 
European identity. Furthermore, in keeping with themes already reviewed, one may 
imply from the response that in some way her awareness of being British (i.e. her 
British identity) is acting to inhibit a European identity. Yet at the same time, she 
suggests that in ten years time she may feel proud to be European - in a way 
suggesting that she perceives a possible European identity.
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The question of what effect such perceptions have on identity structures, is 
an interesting issue for future research to explore. One interesting question which 
arises, concerns the possibility of anticipatory identification and its likely effects - 
here, a return to some of the early work on reference groups might be warranted 
(see, for example, Kelvin, 1970). Furthermore, one should not rule-out the 
possibility that such anticipatory identifications might become the focus of a self- 
fulfilling prophecy (Merton, 1957). Finally, it is interesting to note how it was earlier 
suggested that British identity might be linked to a past-oriented temporal outlook, 
whereas here we are seeing evidence suggesting that European identity might 
currently have a significant future orientation. These interesting differences in 
temporal perspective, and their possible consequences for social identification are 
explored in some detail in later chapters.
The important point to make for the purposes of the present discussion, is 
that, despite significant processes which often favour the resistance of change, there 
are at least two factors which might act to enable or at least ease change, and thus 
facilitate the adoption of a European identity. These factors are: i) the possibility 
that the adoption of a European identity comes to be associated with a more 
parsimonious interpretation of social reality; and ii) the possibility that European 
identity is eventually adopted via processes of anticipatory identification. Such 
processes are almost certainly associated with the perception of positive possible 
European selves - a subject which will be explored at greater length in the next two 
chapters.
European identity and perceptions of control
Almost all respondents felt that European integration would continue, and that 
there was little they could realistically do to prevent or facilitate the process. Thus, 
one should note that these fairly common perceptions of a possible European 
identity were accompanied by perceptions of lack of control over the course of 
events. In general, allowing for the odd exception (see for example, Breakwell, 
1986), it is reasonable to assume that perceived lack of control is often an aversive 
and uncomfortable psychological state - for both individuals and social groups. It
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has already been suggested that perceptions of lack of control in the context of the 
European issue, may also be linked to the interpretation of European matters as an 
"expert domain”. In an earlier chapter we made the suggestion, on the basis of 
empirical evidence (e.g. Turner et al., 1984), that encouraging feelings of self-control 
in relation to European affairs might help facilitate a positive European identity. 
Given the apparent salience for respondents of their lack of control over such 
issues, we would re-iterate this point even more forcefully.
Since the possibility of a national referendum on the European question was 
raised in the British parliament during 1991, it seems fitting to briefly explore some 
of the possible psychological effects such an event might have. Here, we are 
primarily interested in the psychological effects upon European identity and related 
opinions, and will defer the analysis of other factors to political scientists, 
sociologists, and other academics. The work of Turner and associates (1984) seems 
to indicate that when individuals feel more in control of their decision to take-on 
a particular social identity, they tend to cling-on to that identity to a greater degree, 
as well as apparently having a greater tendency to maintain positive evaluations 
of the identity. If a referendum on the European issue allows British citizens a 
greater sense of control over the European issue, it might therefore act to facilitate 
or strengthen European identity, if the results obtained by Turner et al. (1984) are 
robust
There are, of course, likely to be many additional factors which might 
interact with perceptions of control. One of the most significant might be the level 
of generality within which the referendum issue is phrased - presumably, the more 
specific the particular European issue focused on, the less likely the referendum is 
to have significant effects on overall European identity. Another point worth 
making about the possible effects of such a referendum, is that we might also 
predict a possible polarization of views on the issue, since dissonance reduction 
(c.f. Festinger, 1957) might encourage justifications of voting behaviour, and re­
interpretations of opinions. Finally, it should, of course, be borne in mind that any 
such referendum would take place amidst a mass media barrage of alternative 
social representations, which would become even more intense if the referendum 
became the subject of political conflict (which it almost certainly would).
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Another possible barrier to European identity, and one which also appears 
to be closely linked to control motivations, is the apparent fear many Britons have 
concerning loss of sovereignty. The language utilised by many interviewees 
certainly suggests the intensity such concerns may engender, with feelings that the 
E.C. is "interfering in a huge number of areas of British life", and that it might 
come in the future to "dictate terms over here" (our emphasis). Significantly, these 
fears exist within the milieu of an apparently widely-held social representation, the 
primary focus of which is the preservation of autonomous states, regions, etc - in 
a way, a celebration of heterogeneity, and a rejection of attempts to manufacture 
homogeneity. Whether this social representation is allied to wider collective 
representations or ideologies of individualism, is an interesting question, but one 
beyond the present scope of this research. As we have already noted, somewhat 
paradoxically, acceptance of such beliefs and representations need not stand in the 
way of a positive orientation to European integration. What we are suggesting here 
is only that they contain the seeds of a potential resistance to integration and thus, 
European identity.
The perception of European integration as a threat to British identity - 
which in some ways is what is represented by the loss of sovereignty theme - is an 
example of how the networking, or interrelationship between British and European 
identities can be organized in a conflictual or inhibitory manner (see also Chapters 
2, 4 & 5). Such an organization of identity structures - either at the individual or 
group level - can be amongst the most serious barriers to the development of a 
positively valued European identity, especially in cases where national identity is 
associated with a high degree of positive affect. One particularly harmful (to 
European identity) way of organizing identity structure, is to posit that European 
identity stifles and ultimately destroys British identity:
We are very British in our ways, in our history, and our traditions, 
and to think of abandoning that to become just a European citizen, 
it just seems so terribly anonymous, and as if we're gonna have to 
abandon the things which are most British, (interview respondent)
Here, as is often the case, the respondent's choice of words seems to convey vividly 
their overall orientation: one can almost feel the emotion the interviewee associates
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with the loss of British identity, and the sense of emptiness resulting from being 
reduced to "just a European citizen".
European identity: identity without affect ?
One of the interesting things to note about the responses of interviewees in the 
current study, was that many, if not most, talked about European integration with 
little or no emotion. As one interviewee commented, "Well, obviously I AM 
European, but it's not important to me - I just am, just by the fact that I live in 
Europe". Given that the interviewees were all university students, it was also 
surprising to note how all claimed that they had spent little time thinking about 
European issues in the past, and tended not to discuss such matters with their 
friends and colleagues. Both these observations would suggest that the interviewees 
possessed little, or no European identity, at least as far as affect and interest may 
serve as indicators. These observations are congruent with trends apparent in the 
European Community's Eurobarometre surveys, which also show that the British 
tend not to think of themselves as citizens of Europe (for example, 74% of Britons 
polled in 1982 and 1983 never thought of themselves as citizens of Europe).
However, it is significant to note that almost all of the interviewees also 
accepted the label "European". A question arises here which is of much significance 
for the Tajfel-Tumer Social Identity paradigm: is this an example of a social 
identity or self-categorization with no associated affect ? For Tajfel, such a 
possibility tends not to arise, since his definition of a social identity specifically 
posits the existence of associated affect (e.g. Tajfel, 1981). Turner (1984; 1987) is 
somewhat vague on the whole issue of affect and its role in social identity, 
however it does not seem an unfair interpretation of Turner's theory to argue that 
it also implies self-categorizations always have a level of affect associated with 
them.
To return to the question raised earlier, we must ask ourselves exactly what 
the assertion "I am European, but it is not important to me" actually implies. It is 
tentatively being suggested here, that this may be an example of self-categorization
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without affect - even if this seems little more than the acceptance of a linguistic 
label to describe the self, this in itself is by no means an insignificant 
psychological phenomenon. This is the kind of observation which is facilitated 
somewhat by the interview methodology. In contrast, responses driven by this kind 
of orientation, would probably result in scores on a quantitative questionnaire* 
based measure of social identity which would often simply be interpreted as 
signifying the absence of social identity or self-categorization.
One must, of course, be careful not to interpret social identity theory too 
literally, and not to stifle the flexibility constructs such as variability in salience 
allow. It certainly seems reasonable to postulate, as Oakes (1987) has in fact done, 
that one determinant of the salience of a self-categorization will be the level of 
affect associated with it, as well as the nature of the affect (i.e. positive or negative). 
Since we have a tendency to try and make social identities which are positive 
salient as much of the time as possible, it perhaps says something about the 
potency of European identity for the British, that British citizens are apparently 
happy for this identity to be hardly salient at all, or even non-existent In fact, the 
real significance of European identity and its related social representations, might 
lie in the threat it apparently poses to many Britons' sense of national identity.
There are interesting parallels between the argument put forward here about 
an affect-less identity, and the observation, which has been made frequently 
throughout this discussion, that European identity, if it exists at all, seems to be 
characterized by an instrumental or utilitarian orientation. Here, we might recall 
the dominance of economic dimensions of European integration in the responses 
of both interview and questionnaire respondents. It is interesting to note how 
Tajfel (1970) suggested that Kelman's (1969) distinction between instrumental and 
sentimental attachments might be likened to a distinction between non-identity and 
identity, respectively. This interpretation is not endorsed here, since it seems that 
there certainly are occasions when instrumental orientations can be associated with 
social identity. One should note, however, as indeed Tajfel (op. cit) did, that at 
times the distinction between the two kinds of orientation seems to blur somewhat
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Whether or not one accepts Tajfel's assertion regarding sentimental and 
instrumental attachments, it is quite probable that sentimental attachments - i.e. 
those associated with positive affect, symbols of the ingroup, etc., are likely to be 
more powerful, as well as being more resistant to change (it is easier for economic 
performance to deteriorate than national culture, heritage and folklore). It is thus 
reasonable to assume that a European identity which is able to engender such a 
sentimental attachment, is likely to be more powerful and secure than one reliant 
on instrumental ties. As we have already suggested, the results obtained from both 
the questionnaire and interview studies suggest a distinct lack of any kind of 
sentimental attachment to Europe. Clearly, much work needs to be done, if the 
European Commission's apparent wish for a common European culture is to be 
realised (at least in terms of British perceptions). One of the primary tasks here, 
will be finding a way in which such a European identity can exist in a Europe 
"utterly congested with historical memories in which nationhood plays a central 
role" (Schlesinger, 1991).
Glimpses o f European identity
Whilst the discussion might appear to have so far implied that the prospects for a 
European identity in Britain are bleak at best, there are brief glimmers of hope, 
times when the potential barriers of national pride, sovereignty, and so forth, are 
momentarily lowered to reveal glimpses of a possible European future. There are 
examples of British citizens, some of whom were interviewed in the current study, 
who are able to integrate British and European identities in such a way that the two 
are complementary. The most common way in which this is achieved is in terms of 
the perception that Britain can benefit from membership of the European 
Community - perhaps, even that Britain needs the benefits of Community 
membership. Even here, therefore, it is noticeable how pro-Europeanism and 
European identity can have a nationalistic undertone, can be driven by motivations 
essentially linked to the maintenance of national identity. Here, with this most 
common kind of apparent co-existence of British and European identities, we also 
see the instrumental nature of European identity, in its frequent reduction to an 
economic purpose.
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This kind of orientation is encapsulated well in one response originating 
from the current interview study:
I think Europe, and being a part of Europe will give Britain many 
advantages that it doesn't have at the moment What I personally 
want is what's best for Britain. It's just that I feel that what's best for 
Britain is a European outlook - being part of a greater whole which 
has better economic growth rates and a better standard of living - I 
mean Britain will gain from that.
Clearly, the interrelationship individuals choose to create between their national 
and European identities is of crucial significance. Some research, such as that of 
IMADI (1984) and CRAM (1985), suggests that perhaps the only way a European 
identity can be meaningful is for it to be tied to national identity in this way, and 
to be perceived as extending the power of one's own nation. However, it should be 
noted that individuals do not have complete artistic license to manage their 
identities as they see fit. They are surrounded by a mass of conflicting and 
competing social representations, some of which are likely to be forwarded by 
social groups to which they belong, or to which they aspire to belong, and others 
which will be associated with outgroups. Yet other social representations, of 
potentially equal relevance, might be associated with influential individuals who 
we might wish to call opinion leaders (after Lazarsfeld et al., 1944). Such 
representations are worthy of the label social if a number of individuals are aware 
of there essential elements, although they might more appropriately be considered 
as potential social representations, in as much as the latter are truly manifested 
only when they become the symbolic property of social groups.
Social representations thus provide the raw materials with which 
individuals and social groups, like artists contemplating a new canvas, may engage 
in the brushwork of identity construction. In this case, one might argue that social 
representations contain both implicit and explicit suggestions as to how British and 
European identities interrelate. It is interesting to note that, whilst individuals and 
social groups may have some variability in how they choose to manage their 
various identities, social representations have an in-built mechanism for longevity, 
and tend to change rather slowly. Thus, there is a sense in which the brushwork 
of identity construction, once completed, can be viewed from various angles and 
perspectives, and thus afford an element of variety, but at the same time, all these
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perspectives are variations on a theme, a theme which may well be quite resistant 
to change.
6.3.5 Elements of British Identity 
Interviewees' definitions of "patriotism"
It is alarming to note that one has to go back to 1964, and Doob's detailed 
discussion, in order to find one of the few detailed social psychological analyses 
of patriotism. For Doob, this important psychological phenomenon could be 
defined as:
the more or less conscious conviction of a person that his own 
welfare and that of the significant groups to which he belongs are 
dependent upon the preservation or expansion (or both) of the power 
and culture of his society. (Doob, 1964, p.6)
One may note how an important dimension of this definition of patriotism, is the 
awareness that what is essentially the security and wellbeing of individuals and 
social groups, is intimately linked to the nation and all it stands for. This theme of 
security as a motivation behind national identity was explored in the previous 
chapters, and remains a useful conceptual tool when one comes to assess the 
interview responses.
However, just as Tajfel (1981) suggested researchers should take note of how 
group members themselves define the group, so it is also useful to note in the 
context of the current study, how interviewees seem to define and understand 
patriotism, and what it means to be patriotic. This being the case, interviewees 
were directly asked for their own definition of "patriotic", with the emphasis being 
placed on how interviewees actually used the label themselves.
One of the interesting theoretical observations to emerge from the responses 
to this question, concerns the apparent validity of Potter and Litton's (Potter & 
Litton, 1985; Litton & Potter, 1985) suggested distinction between the awareness of,
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or reference to, a social representation, and actual use or acceptance of it (we are 
not, however, proposing that linguistic repertoires replace social representations as 
the focus of enquiry). The utility of this distinction is made clearly evident by one 
example interview response:
Often the term "patriotic" is used to describe people who are in some 
way prejudiced. It's got quite a derogatory tone. But that doesn't 
necessarily mean that's the only way you can talk about patriotism.
You could say - and this is how I like to think about it - that anyone 
who accepts day-to-day democracy is a patriot (interview 
respondent)
This kind of response, where various alternative definitions or representations of 
patriotism were discussed, tended to be typical. This indicates some of the dangers 
that can be associated with functionalist content analyses (c.f. Weber, 1990), since 
the latter can often be insensitive to this kind of qualitative difference between 
reference to, and actual acceptance of, a social representation.
For the purposes of the current discussion, we will focus our attention on 
those representations of patriotism accepted and utilized by the interviewees, the 
most frequent of which are listed in Table 62 below.
Table 62 - Interviewees' definitions of "patriotic"
Defini t ion Frequency
Stand up for what's best for one's country 9
Be willing to fight for own country 8
Support British teams in sporting events 4
Have pride in national culture 4
Accept democracy 3
Frequencies refer to number of Interviewees referring to thezne
It was noticeable when discussing patriotism with interviewees, that most seemed 
to feel as if they ought to be patriotic, and thus strove for a definition of patriotic 
which they felt happy applying to themselves. This was the case even on occasions 
when the interviewee had been quite negative about Britain and being British. The 
strategy adopted by one male respondent may serve as an example: when asked for 
his definition, he made reference to a number of fairly derogatory interpretations 
of patriotism, before elaborating his own, rather unusual definition, which focused
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on "having a balanced view of one's country - being able to see the good AND the 
bad". This interviewee would not accept the label of patriotic "in the traditional 
sense", but was happy to be called patriotic in terms of his own definition. One 
might thus go as far as to say that the interview responses were suggestive of a 
social norm prescribing patriotism. This social norm, if it indeed exists in a 
widespread form, may conflict with another societal norm which Billig (1991) has 
recently found evidence for - a norm which precludes prejudice. Thus, many 
respondents struggled to define patriotism in a way which excluded the possibility 
of implicitly condoning prejudice. Hence the most frequent definitions of 
patriotism to be accepted by interviewees were not those which suggested 
patriotism involves an element of prejudice.
There is, of course, quite a real sense in which feeling patriotic might be 
considered to be psychologically functional for both individuals and groups (Doob, 
1964). As A.D. Smith (1991) has suggested, national identity (which is presumably 
linked to patriotism), is potentially the most powerful of all social identities, since 
it allows feelings of common bonds, in principle, between all members of a nation. 
Both Smith and Doob also suggest that national identity and patriotism afford 
citizens a significant feeling of temporal stability, a context for constructing 
harmonious interpretations of the past, present, and future. Doob (op. cit.) also 
makes the important point that the nation has more control over the activities of 
individuals and social groups than any other group identification. This being the 
case, to dis-identify with such a powerful influence upon one's life could be 
psychologically dysfunctional, at least in the sense that it might reduce perceptions 
of control.
An analysis of Table 62 indicates that the most frequently accepted 
definition of patriotism was supporting what is perceived as best for one's own 
counhy. In general, most respondents who utilized and accepted this definition, 
felt that it involved the awareness that the goals of the nation should be perceived 
as synonymous with one's own personal goals. It is somewhat comforting that this 
lay-definition of patriotism shares important elements with that of Doob (1964) and 
other social scientists. The security theme mentioned earlier also seemed to emerge 
in the second most popular definition of patriotism: to be willing to fight for one's
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nation. There are few other social identifications which can demand this level of 
loyalty - even if it may be only be professed loyalty. It is therefore all the more 
surprising that studies of national identity remain largely the province of 
researchers from disciplines other than Social Psychology.
The construction of British identity: an example
At this point in the discussion, it seems useful to provide an example of how 
British identity can be constructed and "customised" by an individual. This kind 
of idiographic focus can provide useful pointers as to the mechanisms of identity 
construction, and is readily facilitated by in-depth interview methodologies (see 
also Deaux, 1992; Rosenberg, 1988). We will examine some of the elements which 
can be associated with what Doob (1964) might call strong patriotism, by focusing 
on the responses of a particular male interviewee. As a starting point, it is 
instructive to begin with this interviewee's response to the question "Is being 
British important to you?" :
I like being British. I like a lot of what we stand for throughout 
quite a lot of history. I'm a bit upset about some of the bad things 
which Britain has done, but almost every country's done bad things 
in the past. As far as I can see, I look at every other country and I 
don't like certain aspects of the country, and things they stand for.
Take France at the moment, where Fascism and the extreme Right is 
very, very strong. I don't like that at all. I mean France to me is 
always...I don't know, I just can't get on with the French at all. I've 
met French people, talked with them, had a drink with them at the 
pub, but I just can't get on with them, (interview respondent).
Firstly, this interviewee's professed pride in being British is quite a strong 
indication that his British identity is important to him, especially when coupled 
with the dimension of Britain's historical stance, which seems quite a sentimental 
orientation. In keeping with most attempts at identity maintenance, this 
interviewee is able to take the quite sophisticated stance that the object of his 
loyalties - Britain - has been associated with undesirable undertakings in the past, 
but this admonition is rationalized, and its potential for negative identity quashed, 
by the accompanying assertion that "almost every country's done bad things in the 
past".
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In support of authors such as Doob and Tajfel, both of whom forward the 
case for outgroups being essential elements of group identification, the focus of the 
interviewee now shifts, without prompting, to a comparison between Britain and 
a relevant outgroup. The logic behind his construction of British identity, which is 
beginning to emerge from the responses, suggests that most nations commit 
regrettable acts, but that Britain commits less than most (or less than all). France is 
obviously a highly salient outgroup for this interviewee, and is easily brought into 
the response, as an example of one of those countries whose properties he does not 
like. One may note how the interviewee's quite negative opinion of the French is 
typical of the traditional out-group derogation one would expect from the 
predictions of social identity theoiy. There are also indications of the out-group 
homogeneity effect - the interviewee seems happy to talk about "the French" in a 
collective, all-encompassing manner.
That France has here been selected as an outgroup for Britain is perhaps not 
surprising, given the apparent depth and history of British distrust of the French 
(see, for example, Hewstone, 1986). As it turns out, in a later response, this 
interviewee would expand his explanation for disliking France and the French, and 
perhaps significantly, was particularly defensive about the British royal family in 
this respect, suggesting that while the French might feel superior for overthrowing 
their monarchy, in fact, underlying their attitude, was envy of the British monarchy. 
Billig (1992a) has in fact discovered that this theme - essentially believing that other 
nations are envious of the British royal family - is an exceptionally common one 
amongst the British public. We may begin to perceive at this point, how this 
interviewee's network of beliefs relating to British identity has been constructed. 
It is, for example, apparent that his choice of outgroup seems in some way to be 
linked to, amongst other things, his fondness for the British royal family, and his 
wish to defend this institution from criticism.
A theme which has already been touched upon to some extent, refers to the 
tendency of many British respondents to perceive Britain as significantly different 
to other nations - including other European nations. For the current interviewee, 
this theme was intertwined with his belief that foreigners - in particular Europeans 
and Americans - tend not to understand the British very well. In fact, the
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interviewee seemed to feel that Europeans and Americans - both of whom we have 
already noted are frequently construed as outgroupers for Britain - not only 
misperceive British attributes/ but do so in an essentially negative way. It should 
be clear that the latter kind of belief, essentially one which posits that outgroups 
mis-perceive the ingroup, might prove an excellent means of countering any foreign 
criticism of the British. This apparent concern with the image other groups have of 
one's own group is an interesting social psychological phenomenon, and one which 
will shortly be discussed at more length. Significantly for the current discussion, 
this belief that other nations fail to understand the British, also seems to have 
affected the interviewee's orientation towards European integration. The short 
excerpt below demonstrates how these themes appear to be interconnected:
The British character as perceived abroad is one of pompous 
arrogance. That actually represents about three per cent of the nation, 
but it's how Europeans and Americans like to see us. When I say 
European, you can see again, how far away we are from integrating 
into Europe, because I don't feel myself part of Europe - I feel like 
I'm sitting on an island a long way away from them.
As a further clue to this person's orientation towards European integration, one 
may note how, when questioned, he suggested that the French constituted a good 
example of "typical Europeans".
However, what this kind of idiographic approach also illustrates, is the 
danger associated with disregarding the freedom of the individual to construe his 
or her multiple identities in an essentially idiosyncratic manner. Whilst it is 
perhaps acceptable for Social Psychology to focus on instances where a collection 
of individuals seem to construe their identities in a similar fashion, there also 
seems a quite strong argument that there must come a time when the latter kind 
of work must be supplemented by ground-breaking research which attempts a 
multi-level approach (c.f. Doise, 1986). Such a multi-level approach to the present 
issue might therefore examine how individuals, given the limitations and 
recommendations of social groups and social representations, manage their identity 
repertoires, and crucially, how these multiple levels of identity construction 
interact
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Hopefully, one example from the present interviewee's responses can serve 
to illustrate how individual and social processes appear to interact What is being 
suggested here is similar to Breakwell's recent proposal that individuals 
"customize" the social representations they choose to accept (Breakwell, 1991). Here, 
we are arguing that individuals, and perhaps sub-groups as well, also customize 
their chosen social identities, as, in fact, R.H. Turner has already hypothesised (c.f. 
R.H. Turner, 1987). One way in which they may do this, is by placing special 
emphasis on attempting to achieve positive distinctiveness for their social 
identities, on dimensions which are especially relevant and important to them. There 
is, of course, a rather tricky issue of the direction of influence here, and we fully 
agree that an individual's beliefs are likely to derive from his social group 
memberships, societal representations, and so on. However, it does seem to be the 
case that some beliefs are not directly related to social groups or cultural 
inheritance, and are relatively idiosyncratic in nature.
\
In the case of the interviewee currently the focus of attention, it emerged 
that he was particularly fascinated by military history and strategy. Careful 
questioning elicited that this interest appeared not to be directly related to any 
social group memberships. What is of significance here, is that this apparently 
idiosyncratic interest seemed to influence the dimensions of British identity which 
the interviewee found most important. Thus, it emerged that Britain's role in the 
Second World War was especially important for him, serving to demonstrate how 
"It's more likely that if there was a conflict, we'd choose a side that is a genuine 
side". Whilst many British citizens seem to feel pride when they recall the 
Falklands war of 1982, this interviewee gave the initially surprising opinion that 
the Falklands conflict was in fact rather embarrassing. However, given the nature 
of the interviewee's almost obsessive interest in military matters, this response was 
utterly understandable, especially when he went on to suggest that the reason the 
Falklands was an embarrassing episode, was because it highlighted significant 
deficiencies in British military hardware, and thus enabled the Soviets to find 
amusement in British military incompetence (again we see the theme of concern 
about the perception of the ingroup by outgroups).
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The purpose of this kind of example/ is to illustrate how taking an 
idiographic approach can provide valuable insights into how individuals customize 
their social identities. In some cases, the nature of the interaction between 
idiosyncratic beliefs and social identities is such that it seems to defy the 
predictions of traditional social identity theory. For example, we have seen that the 
interviewee described above seems to find the French a quite salient outgroup, 
stating quite clearly that "I just can't get on with the French". Social identity 
theorists of the Tajfel-Tumer school might therefore have some difficulty in 
explaining how the same interviewee could later come to say that he could feel 
pride in being European, to the extent that he could feel proud of Napoleon - 
which is what he did in fact come to suggest. How might we explain this claim, 
which apparently demonstrates a case where an individual is able to feel proud of 
an outgroup member ? In fact, when one takes into account the interviewee's 
justification, which centred on the claim that Napoleon was "a brilliant military 
tactician", it is readily apparent that such a statement is congruent with the 
individual's idiosyncratic belief structures, even if it is not in this case what we 
would expect from the predictions of Social Identity Theory.
In conclusion, we should also pre-empt one possible criticism likely to be 
raised by researchers working within Turner's self-categorization paradigm, which 
is that this kind of result is perfectly understandable: it can be explained in terms 
of the interviewee moving from the British to the European level of identity - at 
this level, France is patently not a likely outgroup. The latter kind of explanation 
in this case seems inappropriate, given the fact that the interviewee explicitly 
reported feeling little sense of being "European", and thus seemed not to accept a 
European identity.
Motivational aspects of national identity
It was perhaps Doob who, somewhat indirectly, first became aware that one way 
in which individuals might customize their social identities, is through the way 
they link them to their valued goals and motivations. For example, he suggested 
that "If economic pursuits are more important to a person than political ones, the
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corresponding components of his patriotism will be more economic than political." 
(Doob, 1964, p.105). It is naturally of considerable interest, from a social 
psychological perspective, to ascertain whether groups of individuals organize their 
social identities in similar ways, including whether they arrange their identity 
structures such that particular social identities serve similar motivations for group 
members.
In Chapter Four, it was suggested that British identity is at least linked to 
power, security, control, and self-esteem motivations. In as much as it is reasonable 
to suppose that survival of the organism is perhaps the most powerful of all 
motivations when salient, it may well be the case that security motivations are in 
some ways the most significant motivational forces behind national identity. In the 
nuclear age, there is now a very real sense in which the physical safety of all 
citizens is tied directly to the security of their own nation - perhaps more so now 
than at any other time in history. This may serve as yet another indication of how 
national identity - in this case, in particular, concern over the safety of one's nation 
- can be perceived as functional for individuals and social groups. Put simply, 
national identity may have survival value: looking after the nation is, in some 
sense, looking after oneself.
There are also a number of reasons to suspect that power motivations are 
often associated with British, and perhaps, most national identities. From both the 
interview and questionnaire data, it emerged that this could be a powerful 
motivating force, in some cases dominating respondents' decisions about which 
social identities should be adopted. In fact, the distinction between power and 
control motivations can at times prove almost impossible, since power also tends 
to imply an element of control. Hewstone (1986) pondered as to whether social 
representations of the British empire might still pervade British identity, and if the 
latter were the case, one might well expect the dimension of power over other 
nations and world affairs to be a possible motivational remnant from the past (see 
also Crick, 1991). There certainly were indications in questionnaire and interview 
responses that the former status of Britain as perhaps the most powerful nation in 
the world, is mourned by many British citizens. Some clearly feel that European 
integration should be encouraged, precisely because it offers the chance of Britain
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gaining a semblance of some of its former influence in world affairs: as interview 
respondent explained, "European integration is generally a good thing in the sense 
that it means we, the British, will have a greater influence on the outside world."
In relation to the Oakes (1987) salience framework, which has, on the whole, 
been uncritically adopted by self-categorization theorists, this would seem to 
demonstrate how individuals, when they come to manage their identity repertoires, 
can and do take into account more than one social identity at a time. It is an 
interesting question whether individuals can take a step back from their social 
identities, and experiment with different organizations and networks of social 
identities. The kind of awareness of one's multiple identity structures which would 
be required here, seems incompatible with self categorisation theory's assumption 
that we tend to focus on a single social identity at any one time. Yet the work of 
Goffman (1959a;1959b;1968) seems to suggest that individuals frequently do take 
note of, and actively attempt to structure, their networks of social identities.
Whilst being beyond the scope of the present research, it seems that further 
investigation of the relationship between motivational forces and social identity 
mechanisms is desperately required, if we are to further our understanding of the 
intricacies of identity construction. If individuals, or even members of social 
groups, seem to have relatively stable hierarchies of motivations, this might provide 
significant clues as to the likely salience of social identities which are often or 
always associated with these motivations. There is, of course, also the possibility 
that the links between social identities and motivations depend crucially on 
elements of the situation. Even if this was the case, an examination of situational 
processes might still enhance our understanding, and perhaps enable a crude 
typology of situations, or breakdown of relevant situational factors. It should be 
obvious that what is being proposed here does not simply pertain to national or 
European identities, but, potentially, to all social identities. A degree of optimism 
is perhaps warranted, to the extent that some theorists are slowly beginning to 
appreciate the motivational poverty of social identity theory (Abrams, 1990;1992). 
In Chapters Seven and Eight, we will return to this issue of motivation and its role 
in social identity construction.
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A further way in which a multi-level approach to social identity might be 
developed, is to examine how elements of personality interact with social identity 
maintenance. Breakwell (1991) has recently suggested that a focus on personality 
traits might benefit the theory of social representations, noting that such traits as 
"shyness" and "inquisitiveness" might have significant influence on the way 
individuals interact with social representations. It seems obvious to the current 
author that these and other traits might also have important effects on the way 
individuals construct social identities. Stryker (1987), for example, made the useful 
suggestion that personality characteristics probably influence the salience of 
identities. Interestingly, Tajfel himself suggested that certain individuals might 
find it comforting to organize their social identity repertoire in a simple, clear-cut 
fashion, where in and out-groups are easily differentiated (Tajfel, 1981, p. 246).
Whilst such theoretical endeavours must perhaps be wary of falling into the 
same pitfalls as those exemplified by the work of the Authoritarian Personality 
researchers (Adorno et al., 1950), the potential of multi-level approaches seems 
promising. Hofman's (1988) tentative model of identity may serve as a useful 
pointer as to how future research might proceed. One of the most important points 
made by Hofman, is that individual-personality processes and social identity 
processes interact via a two-way process: they are inextricably interconnected. What 
is perhaps most appealing about Hofman's developing ideas about social identity, 
is that they are driven by the observation over many years of the very real social 
conflict between Arabs and Jews in the Middle East. Clearly, the further 
elaboration of these kind of social identity processes has relevance far beyond that 
of armchair theorising.
Situations associated with British identity
It is highly unlikely that any single social identity will be salient for an individual 
all of the time. Clearly, since we can expect social identities to affect both cognition 
and behaviour, it is important to be able to determine when particular social 
identities become salient. As we have already noted, Oakes (1987) has developed 
a simple model aimed at predicting salience, and this model has already been
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discussed at some length. Yet while there is always value in searching for universal 
models, at the same time it should be noted that in-depth knowledge of specific 
social identities is also desirable. This is especially the case for national identity, 
which has the potential for being the single most powerful and influential social 
identity a citizen might come to possess (A.D. Smith, 1991; Turner, 1984). One way 
in which our knowledge of when and how national identity becomes important, is 
to examine situations. Waddell and Cairns (1986) made an interesting foray into the 
significance of situations for social identification, when they endeavoured to 
investigate the relationship between particular situations and British and Irish 
identities in Northern Ireland. It seems unfortunate that their interesting 
methodological approach has not been further developed.
When considering any large-scale social identity, be it national, racial, 
gender-based, or any other, a focus on situations associated with their salience 
might be especially helpful, given that these identities can be rather difficult to get 
a theoretical grasp of. We might predict that perhaps most social identities probably 
have critical situations - that is, situations in which the particular identity is 
especially likely to become salient (see also R.H. Turner, 1987). Whilst individuals, 
sub-groups, and outgroups might potentially have some influence over these critical 
situations, at times external, relatively "objective" factors will determine, or at least 
influence, which situations are critical for a group. Thus, for the members of a 
professional football team, the nature of the sport dictates that matches are likely 
to be critical situations, highly likely to make team identity salient
A sub-type of the critical situation might be labelled the critical event. 
Whereas critical situations can often be milieux or environments, critical events are 
particular incidents which have specific locations in time, and which hold special 
significance for the social group. Once again, we may note how some of these 
might be actively created by group members, whilst others might be the result of 
external forces. To take the previous example of the football team a stage further, 
one may note how a specific match - say, for example, one which will decide 
whether the team is relegated to a lower division or not - can be thought of as an 
example of such a critical event - in this case, one which is largely determined by 
the "objective" forces of the league table and relegation procedures.
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Prior to examining the situations associated with British identity that 
interviewees spontaneously mentioned, it would be prudent to briefly discuss 
whether the existing literature might suggest any predictions. The socio-historical 
approach to national identity taken by A.D. Smith (1991) and others would suggest 
that symbolic aspects are perhaps the most significant elements of national identity. 
This being the case, one might predict that "most of the occasions when people 
become conscious of citizenship as such remain associated with symbols and semi- 
ritual practices (for instance elections), most of which are historically novel and 
largely invented: flags, images, ceremonies and music." (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 
1983, pps. 11-12). We have already seen in Chapter Four, that there is good reason 
to believe that many British citizens have this kind of sentimental orientation to 
Britain, which is reliant on symbolic events to bolster and support iL
Since Hobsbawm and Ranger (op. cit.) suggest that elections may be 
regarded as "semi-ritual practices" associated with the heightened awareness of 
citizenship, it is interesting to make some tentative social psychological 
observations regarding elections, especially since Britain is in the midst of general 
election "fever" at the present time of writing (April 1992). Whilst Hobsbawm and 
Ranger talk of citizenship, we would go further, and suggest that general elections 
might also be critical events for national identity. It is noticeable, for example, how 
talk of "the national interest", "what Britain needs", "our vision of Britain's future" 
and similar statements in which the nation is the focus, is often prevalent in the 
election rhetoric of politicians.
In some respects, general elections represent a bitter struggle between 
competing social representations. At one, fairly general level, these social 
representations are of the nation itself, and encompass past, present, and future 
temporal elements. In terms of the past and present, the differing political parties 
forward their own social representations which have often been deliberately 
manufactured to favour their own political perspective. Amongst other things, this 
illustrates in a stark fashion just how re-constructive a process history can be. 
Similarly, in some respects, the party manifestos, in their outlining of proposed 
policies, can be seen to rely on social representations of the future, and to offer 
voters "alternative futures" for the nation. Whilst we are by no means forwarding
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a superior alternative to the myriad of other possible variables affecting voting 
behaviour, it is nevertheless likely that at least some voters, in voting for a 
particular party, are also accepting the social representations of the nation proposed 
by that party. In this respect at least, general elections could have profound effects 
on the shape of British identity.
A final observation worth making about general elections, is that they raise 
the issue of whether politics and national identity are always intertwined. Patently, 
and here commentators such as Doob (1964) and A.D. Smith (1991) seem to be in 
agreement, the level and nature of national identity amongst the population can be 
unrelated to the particular government in power at any particular time. 
Nevertheless, we discussed in Chapter Four how the strength of British identity 
was found to be significantly associated with predicted vote in the questionnaire 
study. It would seem therefore, that the degree of interrelatedness between politics 
and national identity fluctuates.
We have just argued that these two domains > politics and national identity - 
are often highly interconnected during general elections, but when might they be 
especially likely to remain separate? At least in Britain, from the recent experiences 
of war in the Falklands and the Persian Gulf, one might note how an implicit norm 
could be seen to operate, a norm which essentially prescribed co-operation between 
all major political parties, in order to suggest that the nation has a single will. In 
some respects this is a bizarre phenomenon, in as much as it implies that for the 
duration of war, the political parties share a common social representation of i) the 
war itself; ii) the enemy/outgroup; and iii) in some respects one's own nation/the 
ingroup. Once the war has concluded, the political parties may, it would seem, 
resurrect their previous social representations, or forge new, revised ones, either of 
which are likely, once again, to become the subject or the cause of political conflict 
and debate. Just how specific to Britain this kind of phenomenon may be is 
uncertain - there appeared to be more initial objection to involvement in the Gulf 
in the United States, although once again, as soon as American military action was 
initiated, the voices of the political critics seemed to fall silent.
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Having just raised the theme of war, we must now consider briefly its 
significance for national identity. Almost every social scientist who has come to 
examine national identity and patriotism, has come to the conclusion that war is 
more likely to have significant effects upon these constructs than any other 
phenomenon. Social psychologists who have focused their attention on group 
psychology for example, have noted how the presence of inteigroup conflict 
enhances intergroup perceptual biases and leads to enhanced perceptions of in* 
group homogeneity (c.f. R.J. Brown, 1988). There is certainly no intergroup conflict 
which can match international war for ferocity and potential destructiveness, and 
it should be no surprise therefore, if war is mentioned by respondents, when they 
are questioned about situations associated with patriotism. In fact, when 
interviewees from the present study were asked about what kind of situations are 
likely to encourage patriotism, 18 out of 25 mentioned war, representing easily the 
most popular response.
In order to investigate in detail the kinds of situations interview 
respondents specifically associated with British identity, they were asked to 
describe: i) any situations or events they could remember which had made them 
feel proudlpleased to be British; and then ii) any situations or events which had 
made them feel embarrassed about, or regret, being British. Early pilot work had 
indicated that a less directed approach to this issue tended to provide interviewees 
with considerable difficulties. In any case, a focus on situations specifically 
associated with positive or negative consequences for national identity, is clearly 
more interesting than an examination of situations devoid of such affective 
implications.
The most frequently mentioned situations associated with national pride are 
shown in Table 63. Whilst there were a number of idiosyncratic responses to this 
question, an examination of the most popular responses immediately indicates how 
all of these represent situations which are inherently conflictual in nature, 
apparently supporting the predictions of much of the social psychology of group 
conflict It is interesting to note how four interviewees reported that they became 
proud of their British identity when foreigners criticized Britain. This is not 
surprising, given our tendency to defend the social identities we value. It does,
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however, indicate how we seem to care about the opinions of others - even out­
group members. This may well be an example of Festinger's (1954) postulated 
desire for "social reality testing", where we feel our own opinions and those of our 
ingroup are validated, the more people that seem to share them. Yet as we will 
soon discover when we come to examine situations associated with national 
embarrassment, there are some situations in which we are likely to be much more 
concerned about the opinions of others than we might usually be. To pre-empt our 
argument somewhat, it is instructive to note how the four interviewees who 
mentioned that criticism from foreigners made them proud to be British, all 
referred to specific face-to-face encounters they had actually experienced. The 
significance of this, and its relation to perceptions of control, will soon be 
examined.
Table 63 - Situations associated with national PRIDE
Situation/event Frequency
Falkland* War 7
(None) 6
Criticism from foreigners 4
International sporting events 4
Gulf War 3
Frequencies refer to number of Interviewees referring to theme
It is interesting at this point, to take as an example, the response of a male 
interviewee, who felt that the Falklands war made him feel proud to be British. 
This interviewee remembered feeling pride at the time of the conflict, and was also 
able to feel pride when looking back and recalling the event. In this respect, we 
might say that the Falklands war is a critical event for this interviewee's national 
identity. Upon further questioning, it became clear that the interviewee felt proud 
of the Falklands war, amongst other reasons, because "we won" - this in itself is no 
surprise, but we should perhaps recall the interviewee discussed earlier, who was 
actually embarrassed about the Falklands conflict, even though he was proud to be 
British, signifying that simply winning a war is not necessarily enough to make it 
a critical event for everyone. This indicates that individuals and sub-groups have 
much potential latitude over critical situations and events. It may well be the case
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that this kind of flexibility associated with national identity is also likely to 
characterize other large-scale social identities, since the capacity to maintain 
homogeneous in-group norms and social representations is much more difficult 
here than in smaller, face-to-face groups.
To return to the current example of a male interviewee proud of the 
Falklands war, it is also instructive to note how the desire for distinctiveness, such 
a central dimension of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1974,) can be seen here to 
intertwine with the desire for control, and the recurrent theme of the United States 
and its relation to Britain. Thus, we find that this interviewee, although finding the 
Falklands conflict a matter of national pride, failed to mention the more recent 
British involvement in the Gulf war. When directly questioned about the Gulf, he 
suggested that a significant barrier to his feeling pride in the Gulf war, was the fact 
that "when you look at it, the British role wasn't really emphasized, it was all 
American." This also raises the significant point that individuals and sub-groups 
make their choices regarding critical situations, often from a pool of media 
representations of those situations and events.
In keeping with the tendency to mention situations associated with fairly 
clear conflicts, one may note how four interviewees suggested that international 
sporting events had made them feel proud to be British. Since sporting events were 
also associated with national pride by many of the questionnaire respondents, it 
seems safe to assume that this thematic connection is not unique to the interview 
respondents. What is interesting to note here, is that none of the interviewees 
mentioning sport actually reported attending international sporting events on a 
regular basis - in fact, only one interviewee had ever attended such an event (a 
soccer international). One wonders just how significant therefore, the particular 
perspectives adopted by the media in their sports coverage might be - presumably 
sports coverage, like most other international phenomena, can be presented in an 
ethnocentric fashion. Televised international sporting events may therefore be 
another semi-ritual practice, often associated with national identity.
A final point worth making here, is how almost all respondents, when 
questioned, were actually thinking about English teams, and this was in fact
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reflective of a general tendency throughout the interviews, for respondents to 
equate England with Britain, and to disregard the other regions of the British Isles 
(all respondents were English). As Kearney (1991) has noted, a persistent 
Anglocentric bias appears to exist in the British Isles. For Kearney, Britain might 
be considered to be "four nations plus one", with the primary self-description for 
members of the British Isles being English, Irish, Scottish, or Welsh, and much 
confusion existing as to what exactly being "British" means. Crick (1991) suggests 
that most Scots, for example, think of themselves as both Scottish and British, as 
if the two represent separate social identities. In contrast, he suggests that the 
English have no sense of this duality: for them, "to be British is simply to be 
English" (Crick, 1991: p.97). Whilst further investigation of this issue falls beyond 
the scope of the current discussion, it should be appreciated that when we talk of 
"British identity", we must accept that this is not an unproblematic and clear-cut 
categorization.
Table 64 below details the most frequent responses given by interviewees 
when they discussed situations or events which had made them feel embarrassed 
about, or regret, being British.
Table 64 - Situations associated with national EMBARRASSMENT
Situation/event Frequency
British behaviour abroad 8
Football hooliganism 5
Racism 4
Falklands war 3
(None) 2
Frequencies refer to number of Interviewees referring to theme
That the most frequently mentioned situation was associated with the behaviour 
of the British abroad is perhaps not surprising, given that questionnaire 
respondents also indicated concern with this phenomenon. Once again, it is 
interesting how all of the interviewees giving this kind of response reported having 
personal experience of this phenomenon - i.e. being embarrassed by the behaviour 
of other British citizens when on holiday in a foreign country. This may serve,
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amongst other things, to demonstrate how visiting a foreign country can often be 
a critical event for one's national identity, not only making one more aware of 
other nations and nationalities, but also making one's own national identity highly 
salient Clearly, the actual effects of foreign visits upon social identities, social 
stereotypes and so forth, are rather complex, and have been dealt with to some 
extent by the literature pertaining to the "contact hypothesis" (c.f. Hewstone & 
Brown, 1986).
As far as level of affect could be judged from the interview responses, it 
certainly seemed that those respondents mentioning the behaviour of the British 
abroad associated such encounters with quite high levels of embarrassment, and 
furthermore, that these instances were quite easy to bring to mind. One of the 
reasons why this experience can prove so embarrassing is likely to be the lack of 
control experienced. In particular, the degree of control individuals have over how 
they are categorized by others is severely limited in this foreign context where 
nationality is highly salient. While in Britain, individuals might be able to distance 
themselves from hooligans, perhaps by marginalizing them as "black sheep" (see 
chapters One and Four), or alternatively, simply by focusing on another identity 
besides British. In a foreign country where the individual, at least in the eyes of 
the locals, appears to have more in common with the hooligans than the natives, 
the options for negotiating a satisfactory social identity can be severely restricted. 
This seems to be an example of an instance where intergroup conflict might be 
especially likely to lead to attempts by ingroupers to enhance ingroup 
heterogeneity.
Those respondents who reported finding football hooliganism embarrassing 
(as many of the questionnaire respondents had also done), in contrast, did not 
report having direct face-to-face experience with the phenomenon. This might well 
explain how such respondents appeared to find football hooliganism less 
embarrassing than those who had directly experienced poor behaviour by British 
citizens abroad. Nevertheless, both are instances where the root of the 
embarrassment appears to be concern with the images non-ingroup members have 
of the British. In particular, respondents in both the questionnaire and interview
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studies expressed the concern that foreign nationals might form what would 
essentially be an "incorrect" image of the British.
It was interesting, and somewhat surprising, to find that interviewees, in 
general, found it much easier to recall situations associated with embarrassment 
than those associated with pride. This tended to be the case even for those 
interviewees who seemed to possess a strong, and positive, British identity. Thus, 
it appeared that ability to recall situations associated with positive or negative 
affect for British identity, was not related to the individual's actual level of British 
identity, at least in any straightforward manner.
There are a number of possible explanations for this finding, and we readily 
admit that in discussing these we are entering into what is essentially a post-hoc 
attempt at explanation, although in any case, it was not our intention in the 
interview study, nor is it very practical using qualitative research techniques, to test 
hypotheses in a rigorous and unequivocal manner.
A social cognition approach to this problem might focus on schema research 
(cf. Crocker, Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Fiske & Taylor, 1984). However, it soon emerges 
that the predictions of schema theory are rather problematic, and at times even 
contradictory, especially when one attempts to ascertain the predictions regarding 
the processing of schema-congruent and schema-incongruent information. The 
schema perseverance effect (c.f. Fiske & Taylor, 1984) would seem to imply that 
schema-incongruent information will either not be paid attention to, or otherwise 
over time, will be re-interpreted so as to be congruent with the schema. Thus, in 
terms of social identities, we might expect that information which is incongruent 
with a person's social identity and its associated stereotypes would lose its salience 
over time, or even be distorted to conform to the social identity. However, some 
schema theorists, such as Hastie (1980), have suggested that schema-incongruent 
information receives special attention. It is unfortunate that the implications of 
such assertions for retrieval seem not to have been developed. Despite these 
ambiguities, the general prediction from schema research would tend to be that 
schema-incongruent information is likely to be filtered-out or modified so as to 
become congruent with schema contents, even though some theorists posit the
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possibility that single events might lead to the "conversion" of schemas (c.f. Fiske 
& Taylor, 1984).
As we have already suggested, the way in which reporting of events 
connected with pride or embarrassment seemed unrelated to general level of social 
identity, also suggests that the schema-based explanation is somewhat problematic, 
especially if we regard social identities as having schematic elements. One further 
significant point to note, is how those situations associated with embarrassment 
tended to be ones in which respondents had been directly involved (e.g. being 
embarrassed by British citizens abroad; racism). In contrast, the situations 
associated with pride tended not to be directly experienced - thus, none of the 
respondents had actually fought in the Falklands war, and only one had ever 
witnessed in person (as opposed to via the media) an international sporting event 
It may, therefore, be the case, that events associated with actual participation are 
more readily recalled.
One of the most appealing possible explanations of these findings is that 
facilitated by McGuire's suggestion that opinions and beliefs which are seldom 
queried or challenged often have poorly-developed justifications (McGuire, 1964). 
Clearly, most of the time, British national identity is not challenged - especially 
while citizens remain in Britain. This might also be related to the fact that much 
of the time, national identity remains relatively dormant and low in salience. The 
argument being tentatively suggested here, is that if McGuire is correct, then 
instances which are associated with pride in being British might not be easily 
accessible, since such pride is seldom questioned. It is acknowledged that this goes 
somewhat beyond McGuire's initial focus on the complexity of justifications, 
although it seems reasonable to suppose justifications might be connected to 
memories of specific events.
Whatever the reason for the apparent disjunctive between recall of 
situations and the actual strength and nature of social identity, the important point 
to note is that the apparent recall or accessibility of in-group relevant events seems 
not to be related to social identity in a straightforward manner, indicating that 
future research into this area might be warranted. One interesting perspective such
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research might take, is to examine how social identities might be related to what 
Martin Conway refers to as autobiographical memories (Conway, 1990). Given that 
researchers in the latter field are already interested in the relationship between the 
self and memory mechanisms, the addition of social identity to the equation seems 
a quite natural progression.
6.3.6 British and European prototypes
An important yet problematic aspect of self categorization theory (Turner, 1987) is 
the notion of the prototypical group member, a member of the group who is 
perceived by ingroupers as most different to the outgroup, and most similar to the 
ingroup, on a currently valued comparison dimension. It is postulated that other 
group members attempt to emulate the beliefs and behaviours of the prototype, and 
this means that the prototypical group member has significant social influence 
within the group. Yet, as we have already noted in Chapter One, the nature of 
prototypicality within Turner's theory is full of ambiguities. It is not clear, for 
example, whether the prototype must be perceived to be a group member, or 
simply a particular position on an issue. In addition, the definition of 
prototypicality adopted is purely situational in nature, apparently denying the 
possibility that group prototypes might actually have cross-situational stability, 
perhaps through the establishment of a power or status structure within the group.
A further problem lies in the fact that the relationship of the concept 
"prototype” in Self-categorization Theory (SCT) to the same concept in other, more 
cognitive theories (e.g. Cantor & Mischel, 1979) is far from clear. While Turner's 
definition seems to make no claims about memory structure, other theorists have 
specifically examined prototypes from a memory perspective, and social identity 
theorists such as Hogg and Abrams (1988) do the theory no favours by assuming 
unproblematically that the various definitions are compatible. If prototypes are 
stored in memory, then they would presumably be quite different to the purely 
situational prototypes which Turner posits.
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Recently, there has been an interest in whether social categorization relies 
on exemplars or prototypes. E.R. Smith and Zarate (1990) suggest that exemplars 
may be thought of as akin to salient and accessible example members of a category, 
whereas prototypes are often thought of as abstract structures meant to encompass 
the features most commonly associated with a category. There appears to be some 
ambiguity as to whether prototypes are also thought to be embodied by particular 
category members, or whether they are abstractions which are not embodied by any 
single instance of the category. Clearly, whether social categorization processes 
depend on exemplars or prototypes is of much significance, since this might affect 
exactly how we categorize, and also the attributes we associate with a particular 
category.
The nature of British and European prototypes was explored in the 
interview study by asking respondents whether they thought any individuals or 
groups could be described as typical Britons or Europeans. In the case of 
Europeans, we are interested in both who the prototypes chosen are, and in the 
mechanisms associated with the selection process. Since the question of who is 
thought of as typically British has already been addressed in the 1991 questionnaire 
study, we are more interested here in focusing in some depth, at exactly how group 
members themselves think about prototypicality. Thus, the question asking for 
typical Britons was followed by further questions pertaining to: i) whether 
interviewees felt other British citizens were likely to share their opinions about the 
prototype; ii) whether interviewees felt their chosen prototype(s) exemplified 
behaviours or opinions which others could emulate; and iii) whether the 
interviewees felt that they themselves had been influenced by the prototype.
We have chosen to discuss both British and European prototypes in the 
same section of the discussion since most of the theoretical points emerging are 
interlinked and pertain to prototypes and exemplars in general. The first thing to 
note from Table 65, which details the most frequent responses to the European 
question, is that the majority of interviewees (16/25) felt that no individual or group 
could be said to be "typically European".
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It quickly became apparent from both the European and British prototype 
questions, that the interviewees felt the need to suggest that they did not adhere 
to stereotypes, and that they believed one could not generalize about individuals - 
as one interviewee struggled to respond, he commented: "I'm doing my best to try 
NOT to think about the media stereotypes". This was the most common 
justification for not giving any European prototypes, and may well be associated 
with the general desire not to be perceived as prejudiced, which Billig (1991) has 
also recently encountered. Furthermore, it may well be the case that these kinds of 
desires are associated with the ideology of individualism which seems to pervade 
much of Western society (c.f. Farr, 1990; Triandis et al., 1988). One promising 
avenue for the further rapprochement of social representations and social identity 
approaches, might be to examine how these social representations of individualism, 
prejudice, and so forth, actually interact with social identity construction. This is 
a subject we will return to in later chapters.
Table 651 Individuals or groups perceived as "Typical Europeans'
Individual /group Frequency
(Nona) IS
The French 3
The Germans 3
Helmut Kohl 2
The Swiss 1
Frequencies refer to number of interviewees referring to theme
It was interesting to see once again, in the response of one female interviewee, how 
the U.S. theme discussed earlier could also colour her choice of European 
prototype, and thus demonstrate how social representations and social identity 
processes can mutually interact. Furthermore, one may note how the desire to be 
different to the Americans can influence both British and European identities. This 
interviewee thought the Swiss could be labelled as typical Europeans "because in 
a way they're everything which the Americans aren't, which again sounds terribly 
stereotypical, but they're much more cultured, much more sort of clean-living, and 
don't sort of, put money before everything else."
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One final point to note about the responses to the European question, is 
that, with a single exception, all of the respondents who were able to give an 
exemplar or prototype, gave broad national categories such as the French or the 
Germans. In this respect, we might therefore say that these respondents provided 
prototypes, rather than exemplars. Here, it might be useful to make a distinction 
between concrete prototypes, which are particular category members thought to be 
typical in some way (as seems to be the case here) and abstract prototypes, which 
represent abstractions of typical attributes. Due to the wording of the prototype 
questions (see Appendix E), it should be noted that interviewees were likely to 
provide concrete prototypes or exemplars, but somewhat unlikely to provide 
abstract prototypes. This emphasis was deliberate, and chosen so as to maximize 
the relevance of the results obtained for Turner's theorizing, which also seems to 
focus on concrete prototypes.
It perhaps says something about the comparative levels of British and 
European identities, that interviewees felt happier talking of "typical Britons" than 
they did about "typical Europeans". This seems fairly congruent with the general 
observation that European identity was relatively low when compared to British 
identity, and often simply non-existent. What is not indicated in Table 66 below, 
and should be made clear, is that many respondents gave both individuals and 
groups as examples, which was in contrast to the responses referring to typical 
Europeans, but in keeping with the questionnaire responses discussed in Chapter 
Four. Whilst a few respondents in both the questionnaire and interview studies 
made reference to personal acquaintances, the majority of those who mentioned 
individuals, focused on well-known public personages (e.g. John Major). Similarly, 
those respondents who talked about particular groups being typical, tended to refer 
to groups which are well-known (e.g. the royal family), or categories which are not 
idiosyncratic (e.g. "businessmen").
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Table 6 6 1 Individuals or groups perceived as "Typical Britons"
Individual/group Frequency
Royal family 7
(Nona) 5
John Hajor 2
Frequencies refer to number of Interviewees referring to theme
Given that there can be considerable variation in those examples chosen as 
"typical" of the British people, it should be obvious that there are a myriad of 
variations of "British identity", since one might justifiably presume that choice of 
prototype or exemplar will have consequences for perceptions of in-group norms 
and stereotypes. As Schlesinger has noted, "national cultures are not simple 
repositories of shared symbols to which the entire population stands in identical 
relation. Rather, they are to be approached as sites of contestation in which 
competition over definitions takes place" (Schlesinger, 1991, p. 174). In as much as 
other social identities might affect the nature of one's national identity, one might 
say that national identity is mediated by other identities. This was argued in earlier 
chapters, where it was suggested that political identity might mediate British 
identity. One further possible mediator of national identity which emerged from 
the interviews was class. Some respondents felt that, while no single individual or 
group could be thought of as typically British, one could think of examples in 
terms of class - i.e. the typical British working class person, middle class person, 
etc.
In general, when interviewees were willing to give examples of typical 
Britons, they felt that this was possible only to the extent that examples of 
particular British traits could be given, and that no single individual or group 
could encapsulate all aspects of being British - as one interviewee explained: "I 
think there are lots of different people that represent aspects of Britain, but I don't 
know that there's one person that typically represents the whole lot...I think 
eveiybody has examples...I don't think one type of person contains the whole". 
Most of the time, it was apparent that interviewees who were able to give 
examples, selected prototypes which were congruent with their affective orientation 
towards British identity. Thus, one interviewee who seemed to possess a strongly
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negative British identity, and felt that racism is rife in Britain, selected the National 
Front as typically British. It may well be the case therefore, that our selection of 
ingroup prototypes and exemplars might fluctuate depending on the affective 
nature of our social identities.
Where interviewees gave prototypes and exemplars which they perceived 
positively, then they also tended to feel that other British citizens probably would 
share their opinions, and that it would be beneficial for others to emulate the 
examples they had given - at least in terms of the particular dimension(s) of 
Britishness they were thought to embody. In contrast, it was very rare for 
interviewees to suggest that they themselves had actively tried to emulate the 
examples they gave. This does raise an interesting issue in relation to Turner's 
prototypicality process - namely, should we expect group members to be aware that 
they emulate the prototype (presuming that they do) ? Unfortunately, at present we 
are not in a position to answer this question, although we may note that the current 
interview study seems to indicate that prototypes and exemplars can be given 
which individuals may deny emulating. It seems clear that there is much work that 
remains to be done, if the nature of prototype and exemplar processing is to be 
satisfactorily examined within the Social Identity/Self-categorization framework.
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6.4 Conclusions
6.4.1 European integration
Considerable psychological and social psychological barriers exist which currently 
seem to militate against the development of any strong sense of European identity 
amongst the British public. Amongst the most potent of these are the depth of 
British motivations to retain sovereignty and autonomy, and the frequency with 
which European identity is perceived to threaten British identity. Nevertheless, at 
least some British citizens clearly do embrace European identity as a valuable 
partner to national loyalties. Yet even here, such European attachments are usually 
perceived as subservient to the needs of Britain. If a truly robust European identity 
is to develop, then it may well be the case that sentimental attachments must be 
encouraged - i.e. those which focus on symbols, culture, heritage, and so forth. If 
the research described herein is any indication, there is much work remaining to 
be done before such a goal is realised. The few glimpses of hope for a European 
identity which did emerge, suggested that a European identity might prove more 
attractive for the British if it is perceived to allow a greater distinction between 
Britain and the United States, or if it is perceived to enhance the economic status 
or political power of Britain on the world stage. At the present moment in time, 
Luigi Barzini's (1983) observation of a British attachment to Europe almost totally 
devoid of affect, seems just as applicable now as when it was originally made.
6.4.2 National and other large-scale social identities
From our brief theoretical excursion into British and European identity, it has 
hopefully become apparent that a conceptual orientation which focuses on both 
social representations and social identities offers much potential. This is especially 
so when combined with the kind of multi-level approach to social psychology 
suggested here, an approach which recognizes that individuals are able to 
customize both their social identities and their social representations, and that the 
construction of social identities is a process which involves social groups, sub­
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groups, and the individual members of such collectives. In the pursuit of multi­
level analyses, the kind of in-depth qualitative methodology adopted here can 
prove a useful addition to the more usual quantitative methods adopted by Social 
Identity theorists.
A number of questions have been raised in the current chapter, most of 
which are not just relevant to national or European identities, but also to the 
general process of social identity construction itself. Among the most significant 
tasks facing Social Identity theorists is that of developing a more sophisticated 
model able to encompass the motivational and affective aspects of social identities. 
At the same time, it should be realised that, just as individuals and sub-groups 
might modify social identities in certain ways, so particular social identities must 
be given a degree of individual attention by social researchers, in recognition that 
all social identities are not completely alike. One distinction which is worth 
making is between face-to-face groups and more abstract large-scale social 
categories like race, gender, and of course, nationality. It was also suggested that 
one way to examine particular social identities, is to focus on critical situations and 
events, since this might enable a greater understanding of when the identity under 
examination might become salient. Finally, the nature of group prototypes, 
potentially a critical element of Turner's theorizing (1987), is badly in need of 
further investigation and clarification.
Some of the issues outlined above, as well as other problem areas and new 
lines of inquiry, are beginning to take Social Identity theory closer towards Tajfel's 
original goal of a theory able to provide a useful analysis of societal problems. The 
more immediate task facing researchers is to achieve such a goal by a road that 
takes full advantage of the opportunities which Social Identity Theory can provide 
for integrating cognitive, personality, social, and societal levels of analysis, into a 
promising new social psychological framework. In the next chapter, we examine 
some of the theoretical avenues which might eventually lead to this kind of new 
approach to social identity.
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Chapter 7
The Social identity paradigm: new horizons
7.1 Some basic characteristics of large-scale social collectives
There is an interesting paradox concerning Tajfel's social identity theory (SIT). 
Much of the early empirical foundation for the theory was derived from minimal 
group studies, often focusing on transitory groups constructed by the experimenter, 
and studied in the controlled setting of the experimental laboratory (e.g. Tajfel et 
al., 1971). The paradox arises from the fact that, despite this early empirical focus 
on "nonsense groups" (Fraser & Foster, 1984; see also Lalonde, Moghaddam, & 
Taylor, 1987), Tajfel maintained a burning desire to elucidate the social 
psychological mechanisms which linked individuals to important "real-life" groups. 
Crucially, for the current discussion, these groups were usually large-scale - based 
on gender, nationality, race, and so on (c.f. Tajfel, 1981).
Despite possible objections to conceptualising a race or a nation as a social 
group, proponents of the social identity approach have been particularly keen to 
argue the applicability of their theory to such entities (Tajfel, 1970; Turner & Giles, 
1981; Turner, 1984). In the current chapter, the assumption that social identity or 
self-categorisation approaches can be unproblematically applied, without 
modification, to large-scale social categories (LSCs) is challenged.
Perhaps one of the reasons why the specific characteristics of large-scale 
social categories (LSCs) have not been addressed by social identity theorists, is that 
there have been no attempts to examine in a systematic fashion the differences 
between various types of social group. This is not particularly surprising, given that 
the positivistic approach to science encourages a search for theories with
267
widespread generalisability. The idea that social identity approaches might have 
to take account of different kinds of social group is not especially appealing to 
theorists striving towards a general social psychology of group processes.
It would be prudent at this stage of the discussion to examine some of the 
typical properties which serve to demarcate large-scale from other social categories. 
Primary amongst these properties is size. Here, the crucial point is not simply the 
number of category members, but the fact that the category is such that members 
will probably not be aware of all other members, nor will they have contact with 
all category associates. In this sense, such categories may be thought of as truly 
imagined communities (Anderson, 1991). Furthermore, the likelihood of all category 
members coming together in a single group experience is remote, or sometimes 
impossible. This means that empirical research on LSCs will almost always involve 
a focus on a sub-group of the category, a sample of category members, but rarely 
the whole category.
Large social categories also tend to evince a marked ambiguity and 
diffuseness of norms and stereotypes. If one takes as an example, gender categories, 
it should be clear that there are a variety of possible gender role-models, 
stereotypes, and norms, and category members thus have a certain degree of choice 
amongst these competing beliefs. The nature of social belief systems in LSCs will 
be explored in more detail shortly - the important point here is that large-scale 
categories often have a wider variety of possible beliefs associated with them, 
when compared to less diffuse categories and groups.
In a similar way, LSCs also tend to have a diffuse and ambiguous structure, 
such that power and status hierarchies within the category are not easily discerned 
or, indeed, implemented. Even though intergroup conflict and increases in the 
salience of such categories might be expected to encourage homogeneity of norms, 
LSCs still manifest in such situations a greater diversity of norms and beliefs than 
smaller or more structured groups. Such differences may have led theorists to refer 
to large-scale entities like nations as social categories, rather than social groups. The 
danger here is that social categories and social groups become posited as completely 
different social entities, subject to quite separate social psychological processes. It
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is our contention that social identity theory merely requires further extension in 
order to encompass large-scale social categories, not that a completely separate 
theory is required to deal with LSCs. This is not to say that a distinction between 
categories and groups is not at times useful - it will be argued during the course 
of this discussion that such a distinction may in fact prove crucial. It is interesting 
to note how as long ago as 1948, theorists were contemplating the need to 
distinguish between categories and groups (e.g. Lewin, 1948).
One worthwhile use for such a distinction in the current context is afforded 
by the different levels of diffuseness associated with large-scale social entities. For 
example, some large-scale social collectives are relatively well-structured, with 
codified and readily identifiable norms and stereotypes, and clear power structures. 
A political party seems a fairly good example of this kind of large-scale social 
collective, which might usefully be called a large-scale social group (LSG), to reflect 
the relatively unambiguous and identifiable group structure present -i.e., it has 
more of the properties traditionally associated with a social group, compared to 
other, more diffuse, large-scale collectives. Social categories such as nationality and 
race, which manifest a more diffuse nature, might usefully be referred to as large- 
scale social categories (LSCs).
It should be noted that this distinction between large-scale categories and 
groups is somewhat different to that proposed by Rabbie and Horwitz (1988), since 
the current distinction makes no assumptions about the presence, or lack of, 
perceived interdependence. Unlike Rabbie and associates, we see no reason why 
allegiance to large-scale categories can not be associated with perceived 
interdependence, at least at certain times - citizens, for example, may often feel 
interdependent during times of war (the reaction of the British public to the Blitz 
during World War Two is an excellent example). Whatever the role of 
interdependence, it does not seem a profitable dimension on which to differentiate 
social groups and categories.
One paradoxical aspect of large-scale social categories and groups is that in 
different circumstances, such categories might afford either a large-scale or a more 
concrete group identification. For example, a group of British tourists in a foreign
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country might invoke the categorisation "British" as a large-scale category, and 
perhaps come to construe social encounters in terms of this activated social 
categorisation. However, the opportunity is also available for the construction of 
a small-group social identity, still based on common Britishness, but focused 
specifically on the current group of tourists. This underlines the inherent flexibility 
of social identity construction, serving to demonstrate how individuals have a 
certain degree of latitude as to how they put a potential categorisation to use.
There are a small number of social categories which researchers, across a 
variety of social sciences, have often suggested are potentially more significant than 
most other possible social identities. Stryker (1987) for example, suggests that social 
categories such as age, gender, and ethnicity, might usefully be termed "master 
statuses", since they tend to have a pervasive influence on the definition of other 
identities. One of the beliefs which such theorists appear to share, is the notion 
that these master statuses, or what we might call core social categories, are almost 
always large-scale and relatively diffuse.
One reason why certain large-scale categories might come to play 
particularly critical roles in social identity construction, is because allegiance to 
such social entities is often fostered, sometimes unintentionally, during education 
and socialisation (Turner & Giles, 1981). Whilst perhaps downplaying the role of 
the individual a little too strongly, Marie Jahoda has, nevertheless, made the 
important point, that a myriad of pre-existing social categorisations clamour for the 
attention and allegiance of social actors: "Society is more than in-group experiences. 
We are bom into social life as it has been formed and institutionalized by our 
ancestors and not into a world to be of our own making" (Jahoda, 1986, p.254). The 
role of perceived interdependence in the initial stages of identification with such 
master statuses may well be minimal, and is certainly not a requirement for 
identification, given the almost unconscious acceptance of some social identities 
which are instilled during socialisation.
National identity is perhaps the most relevant example here - as Bloom has 
suggested, it is very difficult to avoid nationality and its concomitant identity: "to
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be without nationality is to be perceived as almost without identity1' (Bloom, 1990, 
p.74). Numerous studies indicate that children begin to develop an allegiance to 
symbols of their own nation at quite an early age (Boulding, 1975; Doob, 1964; 
Tajfel & Jahoda, 1966), and crucially, before they even have much of an idea about 
what a nation actually is. The kind of "primordial tie" (Inglehart, 1991; Smith, 
1992) which nationality represents is often referred to by sociologists as an ascribed 
social identity. This can be a misleading term, in as much as it tends to downplay 
the agency of the person: however much society expects citizens to internalise a 
national or other core identity, and without disputing the negotiative nature of 
social identity construction, whether an identity is accepted as part of the self 
concept is, ultimately, the choice of the individual. This conceptual orientation 
towards groups is rather similar to what Tajfel termed the dynamic conception of 
groups, which involves the idea that "groups (and intergroup relations) come to life 
when their potential designations as such have acquired a psychological and 
behavioural reality" (Tajfel, 1982b, p.485, emphasis in original).
An intriguing aspect of core identities is how they can often appear 
relatively latent, below everyday consciousness thresholds, indicative of what 
Ralph Turner (1987) has called a "subterranean level of self-conception". This has 
led some empirically-minded identity theorists to dismiss laige-scale social 
categories as insignificant, on the grounds that most measures of social identity 
often show them to be weak in salience and self-reported importance (see, for 
example, Abrams, 1992; Wong-Rieger & Taylor, 1981). It could well be argued that 
one of the most pervasive influences of large-scale social collectives is via systems 
of shared beliefs - stereotypes, norms, etc. Precisely because large-scale social 
categories are often diffuse and not obviously associated with identifiable social 
representations, they have a power to gradually instill social constructions of reality 
over time in an almost unconscious manner (see also Breakwell, 1986). It could also 
be argued that core social identifications fostered during childhood might be 
associated with systems of social representations which are particularly resistant to 
change, and thus form the familiar into which new representations are often 
anchored (c.f. Moscovici, 1984).
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It would be unwise to assume that, since social identities associated with 
large-scale social categories and groups often seem relatively low in salience, they 
are not important influences upon actions and beliefs. Whilst "Who are you” 
measures (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954) and similar techniques for examining the 
identity hierarchies of individuals, might suggest the low accessibility and fit 
(Oakes, 1987) of large-scale categories and groups (see, for example, Zavalloni, 
1973), social categories such as nationality and race often have significant potency 
(Hofman, 1988). In essence, the crux of our argument is that social identities 
associated with large-scale social categories and groups can often remain dormant, 
but retain a powerful potential to influence action and social perception - even 
when the identity remains relatively low in salience.
A useful means of examining the potency of large-scale categories and 
groups is to focus on situations and events which are often triggers for activating 
related social identities. In earlier chapters, it emerged that international conflict - 
especially military or sporting - is especially likely to make national identity 
salient Boulding (1975) has also suggested that national identity often relies on 
shared events and experiences, some of which may have occurred many years in the 
past, but are kept salient by means of ritual or historical record. In critical 
situations, the emotive power of attachments to large-scale categories and groups 
is often much easier to observe, and the connections between particular social 
representations and these entities become clearer than before, as conformity 
pressures partly lose their latent aspects and become more urgent One particular 
manifestation of critical situations associated with diffuse social categories is the 
ritual event - occasions loaded with symbolic significance which help maintain 
dormant but potentially powerful social identities. Those ritualised events 
associated with national identity are often marked by national holidays, flag- 
waving processions, and so forth, which in their potential for invoking emotion 
and solidarity share something in common with what McGuire (1986) has called 
archetypal events (see also Bloom, 1990).
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7.2 Systems of shared beliefs
7.2.1 Referent informational influence
Many aspects of Turner's model of social influence are appealing to the 
positivistically oriented experimentalists within the discipline of Social Psychology. 
There is always something alluring about a theory which appears to take a complex 
social phenomenon and reduce it to basic, mechanistic laws which offer the 
prospect of prediction. Turner's theory of referent informational influence (RID 
(Turner, 1987; 1991; Turner & Oakes, 1986) posits that social influence processes can 
be understood as attempts to construct and interpret metacontrast ratios (Rosch, 
1978), to identify and then internalise prototypical in-group positions. Such 
processes have been explored in detail using group decision-making and similar 
experimental paradigms, which allow the quantification of the social influence 
process via fixed-response questionnaire measures. It is often assumed that 
individuals are able to unproblematically engage in quite complex mental 
calculations of metacontrast ratios, and perhaps even more dubiously, that issues 
of metacontrast are relatively unambiguous. It may well be that the experimental 
conditions created by the researchers make the perception of metacontrast relatively 
straightforward, but this certainly does not mean that metacontrast is unambiguous 
outside the laboratory. Often social influence is concerned with attitudes or wider 
social representations which are not conveniently summarised for group members 
by means of quantitative response scales.
The tragedy here is that Turner's model of social influence contains some 
important theoretical insights which are in danger of being stifled by crude 
experimental operationalisations and an unimaginative focus on laboratory 
experimentation as the major research methodology for their exploration. There 
appears to have been little attempt to complement quantitative measures of social 
influence with more sensitive qualitative techniques such as interviews, which 
might prove especially valuable in exploring the phenomenological experience of 
the influence process. It also seems likely that the utilisation of real-life social 
categories and groups which existed prior to the laboratory experiment would soon 
highlight the shortcomings of the RII model, especially where such groups are 
characterised by status and power structures.
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One of the more valuable insights of the RII model refers to the notion that 
category and group members attempt to identify prototypical group members to 
emulate (Turner, 1987). This is an interesting aspect of the theory to examine in 
detail, especially since it exemplifies how the referent informational influence 
process appears particularly problematic when applied to large-scale social 
categories and groups. There is much empirical evidence to support the 
pervasiveness of prototyping and allied cognitive strategies which are inherently 
associated with the categorisation process (c.f. Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Rosch, 1978). 
The trap Turner and some of his associates appear to have fallen into, despite 
claims to the contraiy (see, for example, Turner & Oakes, 1986), is that of assuming 
such insights from cognitive psychology can be applied zvith little or no 
modification to the social psychological phenomena of group processes.
The perception of a single prototypical stance on an issue is rather unlikely 
in large-scale, diffuse social categories. Here, what may well be crucial are the 
perspectives pedalled by important sub-groups within the category, or by other 
categories which are networked with the present one. Significantly, the various 
perspectives associated with sub-groups within the category could quite easily be 
contradictory. It is doubly perplexing that Turner and Giles (1981) made just this 
point, yet Turner appeared to disregard the possibility of conflicting prototypes in 
his later theorising. Furthermore, it will often be the case that large-scale categories 
and groups do not possess the means to directly enforce normative beliefs and 
behaviours. Pressure for in-groupers to adopt the group's beliefs is more likely to 
emerge from sub-groups, or from other social groups networked with the category 
in question. An example of the latter process is when national identity, together 
with its preferred norms and stereotypes, is fostered in the context of the family 
(see, for example, Bloom, 1990; Kelman, 1969). In fact, it is interesting to note how 
family symbolism is very frequently associated with nationality - witness the use 
of "motherland", "fatherland", "mothertongue", and so on (c.f. Kelman, 1969). This 
raises the interesting possibility of the norms of one social group prescribing which 
other social groups should be identified with, as well as "customising" to an extent, 
the nature of such identities. The important point here is that large-scale social 
categories are especially likely to give rise to multiple prototypes, as was 
discovered when prototypes of the British were explored in earlier chapters.
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It seems likely that certain key social categories, such as political party 
affiliation, nationality, and race, may well have implications for the other social 
identities adopted by individuals. For example, adoption of a particular political 
stance and internalisation of its related ideology might entail the acceptance of 
social representations of other social categories and groups. This is the 
phenomenon we have referred to as mediation, a process which essentially involves 
the social representations of one social category or group having consequence for 
other social groupings. Our use of the term mediation is somewhat different to 
Zavalloni's (Zavalloni, 1971;1973), in that we make no assumptions about mediating 
categories or groups necessarily being smaller than the mediated social entity. This 
is not to say that the core of Zavalloni's argument is incorrect - it often does seem 
to be the case that large-scale social categories are experienced within sub-groups 
of the wider category.
It thus becomes imperative to take into account the networking or 
interconnections between various social categories and groups if one is to gain an 
insight into social influence processes. Recent theorising on the salience of social 
identities (c.f. Oakes, 1987), has led to the implicit assumption that, most of the 
time, in any given situation a single social identity - that which is highest in 
salience - will have the most consequence for individuals. This has had the 
unfortunate consequence of leading most social identity and self-categorisation 
research to ignore the interactions between multiple group memberships which 
might well be simultaneously salient, albeit to different degrees.
The nature of the differentiation and integration individuals create amongst 
their various social identities is what Hofman called multiplexity (Hofman, 1988). 
Such concerns tend to necessitate the assumption that multiple group identities 
interact - a problematic notion for our methodologies, but a realistic reflection of 
the complexity of social identity construction (c.f. Breakwell, 1991; Deaux, 1992; 
Nesdale, 1989). In fact, as Scheibe (1983) argued, the significance of any single 
social identity for an individual depends largely on the other social identities 
contained in that person's identity repertoire. McCall (1987) has gone as far as to 
suggest that the management of one's set of identities is one of the most significant 
problems facing individuals today. One way in which networking appears to
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manifest itself is in terms of sub-typing of social identities, such that two (or more) 
potentially separate categories are intertwined by individuals, who may thus think 
of themselves as, for example, "female Asians" rather than "female" and "Asian" 
(Nesdale, 1989). In as much as many of our most significant social identities might 
be intertwined in complex networks, the assumption that one can study a single 
social identity in isolation seems increasingly dubious. The current research has 
sought to demonstrate, for example, how national and European identities have 
become intertwined through the process of European integration, and to this extent, 
a focus on either identity in isolation would be somewhat naive.
It must be stressed that investigations of mediation, networking, and similar 
phenomena should make use of multi-level perspectives (Lorenzi-Cioldi & Doise, 
1990; Himmelweit, 1990). Networks of social identities and social representations 
might be constructed at the individual, group, and societal levels, and the 
interaction between these levels is likely to be complex. It seems likely that 
networking will often take place in terms of particular dimensions of social 
identities, such that certain aspects of our group memberships are perceived to be 
relevant to particular domains of other group memberships.
Turning the attention of social identity perspectives towards multiple social 
identities in interaction will be a problematic and difficult task, almost certainly 
requiring more sophisticated and varied research methods than are currently 
employed by the majority of researchers in this area. Two of the more interesting 
issues to focus on are: (a) how stable the interconnections forged between different 
social identifications are; and (b) exactly how idiosyncratic networks created by 
individuals, interact with networks deriving from the group and societal levels. To 
the extent that the networking of identities forms a possible topic of conversation, 
and might be implicitly carried in mass media social representations, it should be 
clear that the creation of social identity networks is likely to be a negotiative 
process.
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7.2.2 Reference groups
One avenue for social influence which is rather problematic for the self- 
categorisation approach, was perhaps first highlighted by theorists working within 
the reference group tradition (Hyman, 1942; Hyman & Singer, 1968), and refers to the 
phenomenon of non-membership reference groups. These are social groups in which 
one is not a member, yet one looks towards for certain norms and beliefs. 
Internalisation of the perspectives associated with such non-membership groups 
can often be explained in terms of anticipatory identification (see, for example, 
Merton & Rossi, 1968), and this does not trouble the social identity paradigm, 
especially when Tajfel and Turner's notion of social mobility belief structures is 
invoked (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In fact, there seem to be interesting possibilities 
to develop the apparent similarities between the concepts of anticipatory 
identification and possible selves (Markus & Nurius, 1984;1986;1987). It seems 
highly likely, for example, that anticipatory identification will be associated with 
the perception of positive future possible selves.
However, it has been suggested that non-membership groups might also 
have social influence power over individuals, even when such individuals do not 
aspire to be members of the group (Shibutani, 1955). For Shibutani, one important 
definition of reference groups is as perspectives, which involves reference groups 
becoming "any collectivity, real or imagined, envied or despised, whose perspective 
is assumed by the actor." (Shibutani, 1955). This further highlights the limitations 
of the RII research, which has focused exclusively on how in-groups exert social 
influence upon group members.
In a rather oblique way this also raises the question of what exactly is meant 
by "identification"? Hyman and Singer (1968b) suggest that individuals may 
identify with a group in which they are not a member (see also Rabbie & Horwitz, 
1988), and intuitively, it is not difficult to think of instances where one has 
empathised with a group, perhaps cared about what happened to a group, yet did 
not in any sense feel a part of the group in question. This kind of empathic social 
identification seems quite likely to lead to the target group having a degree of 
social influence over the empathising individual. This is despite the fact that the
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individual in question may not feel a part of the target group, leading to a rather 
wider notion of social identification than that allowed by either Tajfel or Turner, 
both of whom focus specifically on membership groups. The implications to be 
drawn from these insights from reference group theory can largely be summarised 
by the observation that social categories and groups other than those the individual 
has internalised as his or her own, can and often do exert social influence forces 
upon individuals. Theorists interested in the effects of social categories and groups 
upon individuals' beliefs and behaviours must in the future take further account 
of the influence of such non-membership reference groups.
7.2.3 The role of social representations
Social influence processes involve acts of communication. In selecting various 
perspectives to internalise, individuals and social groups communicate important 
information to others, and to themselves. One interesting avenue for the further 
development of social influence theories has recently been highlighted by Abrams 
(1992), who suggests that conformity may be linked to the self-presentational 
demands made by groups. Sociologically oriented social psychologists have 
frequently stressed the importance of self-presentation as an act of communication, 
and how presentations are intimately associated with the construction of social 
identity (Emler & Hopkins, 1990; Goffman, 1959b; Sarbin & Scheibe, 1983).
One interesting way to conceptualise the self-presentational process is to 
think of individuals as attempting to diffuse particular social representations of 
themselves and the social groups to which they belong, amongst various audiences. 
This negotiated aspect of social identification (Abrams, 1992; Emler & Hopkins, 
1990) is noticeably omitted from Turner's model of social influence. It seems likely 
that the self-presentational aspects of social identity construction may be somewhat 
different in small-scale, as opposed to more diffuse social categories and groups. 
In a small face-to-face social group in which all or most group members know one 
another, the audience for self-presentation and the manipulation of in-group 
reputations is almost always the in-group itself. In more diffuse social categories 
and groups, the context for self-presentation will often be within particular sub­
groups of the wider category. In-groupers might court the approval of certain sub­
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groups but not be concerned with their reputation in other sub-groups of the 
category.
The significance of sub-groups within large-scale categories and groups is 
also of relevance to the debate surrounding the importance of perceived 
interdependence (c.f. Rabbie & Horwitz, 1988). In large-scale social collectives, 
perceived interdependence might pervade important sub-groups, but there are good 
reasons to suspect that interdependence between subgroups will not be particularly 
important, at least, until the whole category is threatened, and moves towards 
homogeneity are made. In fact, to the extent that certain sub-groups are particularly 
selected for in-group derogation as "black sheep" (Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988; 
Marques, Yzerbyt & Leyens, 1988), then one would expect other sub-groups to 
actively desire the absence of interdependence between their own and the black- 
sheep sub-group(s).
Abrams (1992) has recently argued that Turner's theory of social influence 
leaves unanswered the question of exactly how group members come to perceive 
the criterial attributes, norms, etc., of the in-group. The concept which is so 
conspicuously omitted from almost ninety per cent of the social identity/self­
categorisation work, and which could prove so useful for answering just this kind 
of question, is that of social representation (Moscovici, 1984). Group members learn 
of the supposed actions and beliefs of various groups through contact with, and 
crucially, negotiation of, social representations. The discernment of in-group norms 
and beliefs becomes much more problematic than Turner assumed, when seen in 
the light of a complex array of intertwined and often conflicting social 
representations.
Social representations can be contained in culture as well as cognition (Farr, 
in press; Moscovici, 1984), and this means that other in-group members are by no 
means the only source of in-group norms and beliefs. We might expect this to 
especially be the case with large-scale social categories and groups. To the extent 
that such entities are likely to be visible to many other social groups, one might 
expect large-scale social groupings to engender a wider variety of social 
representations than smaller, more obscure groups. Large-scale social categories are
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likely to catch the attention of the mass media, whether intentionally or not, and 
this means that any serious attempt to explore social influence processes in large- 
scale categories and groups must take account of the role of the mass media as 
purveyors of social representations.
The mass media are likely to be especially important influences on large- 
scale social groups and categories (see, for example, Bloom, 1990), not least because 
mass communication technology can often be the only means to reach large 
proportions of the target audience. When diffuse categories and groups appear in 
danger of fragmenting into a myriad of different sub-groups, when the category 
itself appears close to disintegration, the mass media can foster re-homogenisation 
by reaching through to category members with messages of the need for in-group 
solidarity, providing unambiguous norms, stereotypes, and so forth, and, of course, 
providing an outgroup to focus hatred or competition upon, something almost 
guaranteed to bring the in-group together.
When individuals come to manage their repertoires of large-scale social 
identifications, they do so within a context of widely diffused and often conflicting 
mass media representations. It should therefore be clear that what Tajfel and 
Turner (1979) referred to as cognitive alternatives, essentially perceptions of 
alternate constructions of identity, are by no means personal constructs, but are 
instead a complex amalgamation of the individual's idiosyncratic perceptions of 
categories and groups, the shared perceptions fostered by the in-group, and those 
possibilities highlighted by the mass media. In one important sense, cognitive 
alternatives might usefully be likened to what Markus and Nurius (1984;1986;1987) 
have called possible selves - perceptions of what the self was in the past, and what 
it might be in the future. The crucial point to remember is that such possible selves 
are not only created by individuals, but come to be shared between group- 
members, and form the subject of mass media representations. What is being 
suggested here is an extension of the possible selves concept to encompass both 
individual and group-located possible selves. Changes in the construction of large- 
scale social identifications usually therefore entail changes in social representations. 
This becomes readily apparent, for example, when one comes to investigate the 
effects of European integration upon national and European identity structures -
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here, issues of social identity and social representation become inescapably 
intertwined.
Since large-scale social category memberships may often lie dormant within 
the identity structures of individuals, the mass media also serve the purpose of 
raising the salience of such categories when needed. It is usually the case that 
when large-scale social categories such as nationality and racfe undergo critical 
periods, the mass media will carry social representations of the categories in 
question. An excellent example is provided by war, which almost always comes to 
be a critical event for national identity, and is typically associated with patriotic 
and propagandist mass media coverage (c.f. Foulkes, 1983; Glasgow University 
Media Group, 1985; Robinson, 1991). Mass media representations of social 
categories and groups might, amongst other things, suggest, usually implicitly, 
acceptable stereotypes and prototypes of both the ingroup and important 
outgroups; propose ways of networking various categories and groups; and have 
substantial influence upon the general levels of salience and affect associated with 
categoiy membership.
Whilst some social identity theorists appear to pay lip-service to the notion 
that the mass media contain important social representations of categories and 
groups (see, for example, Hogg & Abrams, 1988), there appears to be little or no 
attempt to systematically explore the relationship between social identity 
construction and such representations. The role of the mass media in influencing 
group processes is likely to be highly complex, and researchers must be careful not 
to take social representations contained in the mass media at face value 
(Sotirakopoulou, 1991). It is not enough to conduct a sensitive content analysis of 
the mass media, and then assume that important themes and issues are 
unambiguously filtered down to readers and viewers. Much research has indicated 
the highly problematic and complex nature of mass media effects (Roberts & 
Bachen, 1981; Roberts & Maccoby, 1985), and the whole area remains replete with 
conflicting theoretical perspectives and ambiguous research findings.
There is a clear need for detailed examination of the mechanisms by which 
the mass media come to influence social identity construction. At the same time,
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the reverse process - how social groups and categories come to influence mass 
media content > should also be addressed. It is interesting to note that such an 
endeavour should also prove of interest to theorists working within the social 
representations tradition, for whom the question of how social groups and 
individuals interact with media representations could well be crucial.
It is important to note that individuals and social categories/groups do not 
stand in identical positions to social representations. The question of what 
determines the orientation taken towards a social representation is a crucial one. 
Category and group membership are important factors here, and it is useful to 
examine how social representations are appropriated and customised by categories 
and groups, as well as how factors such as personal identity structures, personality 
traits, and motives serve to influence the interplay between identity and social 
representations (Breakwell, 1991). There also appear to be interesting possibilities 
for interlinking social representations and social identity approaches via a focus on 
salience. Both perspectives would benefit from further investigation of the 
mechanisms which serve to influence the salience of social representations and 
social identities. It might even be the case that when social identities become 
salient, they in turn activate their associated social representations. Some of the 
empirical research conducted in the reference group tradition appears to support 
just such a hypothesis - thus, for example, Charters and Newcomb (1958) 
demonstrated that when Catholic identity was made salient to subjects, their 
reactions to statements were substantially different to when such an identity was 
not made salient. The reverse process might also occur - that is, the activation of 
social representations might in turn make related social identifications salient One 
matter which does require further clarification here concerns whether all social 
representations are associated with specific groups or categories. Whilst Moscovici 
(1988) and his followers often make such a claim, it seems that some 
representations, in as much as they are diffused throughout a society, might not fall 
neatly along intergroup boundaries.
7.2.4 Social stereotypes
It has become fashionable over the last ten years or so to stress how attitudes, 
beliefs, images, and similar concepts often appear to be situationally located, to
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vary across locations and time. One of the most persistent challenges to the 
traditional notion that attitudes and beliefs are carried around "in the head", that 
they are somehow represented in cognitive structures, has emerged from the 
discourse analysis perspective. Here, evidence is presented which appears to 
demonstrate how beliefs are constructed and expressed within discourse (c.f. Potter 
& Wetherell 1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1988). Rather than being seen as problematic, 
variability in accounts forms a major research focus, and is interpreted as important 
evidence for the primacy of discourse over cognitive explanations of beliefs.
One of the tragedies for social identity theory is that, in rejecting discourse 
analysis and its implicit behaviourism (c.f. Hogg & Abrams, 1988), the significance 
of language and discourse for the construction of social identities is in danger of 
being overlooked (see, for example, Liebkind, 1992). In the interview study 
discussed earlier, a sensitivity to the use of "us", "them" and similar elements of 
language loaded with symbolic import proved most worthwhile. The important 
point to bear in mind is that, whilst categories are often carried in discourse (Potter 
& Wetherell, 1987), discourse is only one, albeit rather important, element of social 
identity construction. Furthermore, researchers who retain an interest in social 
cognition would do well to note, before dismissing discourse approaches, that by 
no means all discourse analysts share Potter and Wetherell's enthusiasm for doing 
away with cognition (see, for example, van Dijk, 1988).
Social identity research which examines the content of social stereotypes 
would greatly benefit from the inclusion of a focus on discourse and linguistic 
elements, which can reveal much about the implicit metaphors and evaluations 
contained within stereotypes (see, for example, Chilton, 1988). In addition, a focus 
on the rhetorical aspects of social identity construction might also prove useful, 
especially since the negotiation of identities can easily be construed as a process 
of argumentation (c.f. Billig, 1987; Breakwell, 1991; Ullah, 1990).
It is somewhat ironic, given that some social identity theorists have firmly 
rejected the discourse approach (c.f. Hogg & Abrams, 1988), to witness the recent 
emergence within the self-categorisation paradigm of a series of studies apparently 
designed to provide evidence for the situationally variable nature of stereotypes
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(Haslam et al., 1992; Spears and Manstead, 1989). According to Haslam and 
associates, the self-categorisation perspective challenges "the long-held view of 
stereotypes as fixed, rigid and resistant to change." (p.3). Such a perspective would 
clearly be equally appropriate for followers of Potter and Wetherell's discourse 
analysis.
Contextual effects are not particularly difficult to demonstrate in the study 
of stereotypes, and it may well be useful to examine how stereotypes can often 
come to be subtyped, and thus associated with particular contexts and sub-groups 
(c.f. Kleinpenning & Hagendoom, 1991). The study of subtyping also offers 
interesting possibilities for examining the similarities between stereotypes and 
social schemas (c.f. Crocker, Fiske & Taylor, 1984). To this extent, social stereotypes 
often do appear to be contextual. It may well be the case that stereotypes of large- 
scale social entities such as nationalities are especially likely to be broken-down 
into more easily managed beliefs about particular sub-groups, situations, and so 
forth, at least when the categorisation in question forms an in-group. There is a 
good deal of evidence that subtyping is not so common when formulating 
stereotypes of foreign nationalities (Peabody, 1985).
As far as subtyping might be termed a context-effect, then stereotypes can 
certainly be said to have contextual elements. Unlike Haslam and associates (1992), 
Kleinpenning and Hagendoom did not claim that stereotypes are completely 
context-dependent, free to take whatever shape the current situation demands. To 
be fair to Haslam and his colleagues, the precise definition of context is left rather 
vague at best It certainly would be reasonable to argue that the elements of a 
stereotype currently salient are largely context dependent, and here self­
categorisation theory and its notions of salience (c.f. Oakes, 1987) and metacontrast 
(c.f. Turner, 1987) appear to provide an interesting framework for predicting such 
fluctuations in stereotype content. However, this need not mean that the complete 
stereotype structure is context-dependent and situationally variable.
Where Tajfel's notion of the social stereotype deviates from Turner's, is in 
Tajfel's focus on how social stereotypes are akin to theories which serve the 
purpose of rendering social reality more predictable, and indeed, more favourable,
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to the ingroup (c.f. Tajfel, 1981). Such a definition is quite compatible with the 
notion of social stereotypes as social representations (see also Hogg & Abrams,
1988). Whereas the periphery of social representations might change with little 
resistance, the core elements of a social representation can often be resilient to 
change (Abric, 1984; Sotirakopoulou, 1991). It also seems likely that the process of 
anchoring (Moscovici, 1984) serves to enhance the longevity of social 
representations, being rather similar to Marris' notion of the "conservative impulse" 
(Marris, 1974). This is congruent with our earlier argument that social stereotypes 
appear to evince a core structure which is resistant to change (see also R. Brown, 
1988; Tajfel, 1978). Evidence has already been discussed which seems to suggest, 
for example, a marked stability in certain core elements of national stereotypes (see, 
for example, Peabody, 1985). It seems that two particularly promising means to tap 
these core structures may well prove to be longitudinal time-series analyses, and 
meta-analyses of different studies which examined the same stereotypes.
One of the reasons why social stereotypes can be resistant to change is that 
once internalised and associated with identity structures, they become a part of the 
self. While we clearly require an element of flexibility in our self-conceptions, at 
the same time stability and predictability are comforting and reassuring. In 
addition, the summarising and simplifying functions of social stereotypes would 
not be very adequately fulfilled if individuals and groups had to change their 
stereotypes on a frequent basis. Augoustinos and Innes (1990) have made the 
additional point that, whilst social representations will often be dynamic and 
changing, once enshrined in material entities (e.g. books), they become fossilised 
and much more static.
The benefit of conceptualising social stereotypes as a particular type of 
social representation, is that this raises the question of stereotypes in culture as 
well as cognition. Change in the content, evaluation, and structure of stereotypes 
takes place within the wider context of social stereotypes contained in the mass 
media, instilled through education, socialisation, and so forth. In large-scale social 
categories and groups the mass media may well be the primary source of social 
stereotypes - of both the in and out-group(s). Furthermore, to the extent that social 
stereotypes might come to be shared across a number of social groups, we might
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expect such stereotypes to be particularly resistant to major change, since this might 
require change to take place simultaneously across different social groups and 
categories.
In as much as both social identities and representations might be 
intertwined in complex networks (Breakwell, 1991), it is not inconceivable that 
social stereotypes, especially when conceived as social representations, often exist 
in associative networks. As yet there appears to be little research which has 
examined the possible interrelationships between different social stereotypes. There 
are interesting possibilities for example, to further investigate the presence of a 
diffuse Latin stereotype which lies behind more specific stereotypes of the French, 
Greeks, Italians, Spanish and Portuguese (c.f. Peabody, 1985; Inglehart, 1991). It also 
seems valuable for future research to investigate how, like any other social 
representation, a social stereotype is likely to be anchored into a familiar, already 
established, representation (Moscovici, 1984; Sotirakopoulou, 1991).
To some extent, the different positions adopted by the current work and that 
of Turner and associates, can be interpreted as resulting from a difference in 
emphasis. Haslam, Turner, and colleagues have been keen to stress the importance, 
or indeed the primacy, of context effects over stability. We have endeavoured to 
demonstrate the other side of the coin - the pervasive nature of at least the core 
elements of social stereotypes. The position adopted here is more flexible than the 
self-categorisation position, in that we accept the importance of both contextual and 
stability effects. Future research might usefully examine both flexibility and 
rigidity in social stereotypes, and take account of the wider context of social 
stereotypes present in culture.
7.3 The wider ideological milieu of identity construction
7.3.1 Subjective Belief Structures revisited
In their seminal model of macro-level group processes, Tajfel and Turner 
(1979;1986) introduce the reader to the notion of the subjective belief structure 
(SBS), essentially an ideological system of beliefs rather similar to Moscovid's
286
notion of a social representation (Moscovici, 1984). Tajfel and Turner focus 
specifically on two possible systems of belief, which are termed social mobility and 
social change. The social mobility S6S, which suggests that group boundaries are 
permeable and thus, that individual movement between groups is possible, has 
often been construed by theorists as an essentially individualistic ideology (see, for 
example, Brown et al., 1992). In contrast, the social change SBS carries with it the 
notion that group boundaries are reasonably permanent and that group action is 
more viable than individual activity, thus lending itself to an interpretation as a 
collectivist ideology.
While the posited existence of either of these ideologies is often a 
parsimonious means of explaining the different strategies pursued in the 
maintenance of social identities, it could be argued that the social mobility and 
social change ideologies can not be as conveniently mapped onto the individualist- 
collectivist dimension as some theorists have suggested. It should be remembered, 
for example, that even when a social mobility belief system allows individuals to 
move between social groups, the focus of identity construction is still the 
manipulation of social group memberships. Such concerns could hardly be termed 
individualistic. Despite being somewhat less elegant than a neat individualism- 
collectivism dichotomy, it seems more realistic to posit the existence of both types 
of ideology, regardless of the dominant SBS.
7.3.2 Individualism-Collectivism
Even though Tajfel and Turner's subjective belief structures might not lie at 
opposite poles of an individualism-collectivism dimension, this certainly does not 
mean that wider ideological beliefs about individuals and societies should escape 
the scrutiny of social identity theorists. It should be fairly obvious by this stage of 
the discussion, that an investigation of the wider ideological milieu in which social 
identity construction takes place, is perfectly in keeping with late-Tajfellian 
theorising (see, for example, Tajfel, 1984). In addition, P.B. Smith (1991) has 
suggested that the social psychological consequences of individualism and 
collectivism should be investigated, arguing that this might go some way to 
explaining why some theories seem not to hold up well when applied outside their 
culture of origin.
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Given that the majority of social identity theorists have granted social 
representations scant attention, it is certainly not surprising to note the lack of 
apparent interest in wider ideological beliefs, shown within the paradigm. 
However, recently there has been a growing interest in the possible influence of 
individualistic and collectivistic ideologies on social identity construction. These 
recent developments have centred around the research of Rupert Brown, Steve 
Hinkle, and associates (c.f. Hinkle & Brown, 1990; Brown et al., 1991; Brown et al., 
1992). These researchers are particularly concerned with establishing the validity 
of social identity theory across different contexts and cultures, with particular 
reference to the individualism-collectivism dimension.
It is the contention of Brown and associates (1991,*1992), that the predictions 
of social identity theory, and in particular, those concerning in-group bias, might 
be most readily observed in milieux in which collectivist beliefs predominate. At 
present, the measurement tools utilised by Brown and his colleagues derive from 
the work of Triandis and associates (e.g. Triandis et al., 1988). For Triandis, 
individualism and collectivism are potentially represented at three levels. At the 
individual level, the dimension is represented by the personality traits allocentrism 
and idiocentrism. Triandis and colleagues go further, however, and postulate that 
the dimension is also represented at both the group and cultural/societal levels. It 
is particularly relevant to our current interest in large-scale social groups and 
categories, that Triandis and his associates have suggested that in individualistic 
cultures, there tends to be emotional detachment from most large ingroups 
(Triandis, McCusker and Hui, 1990). Given the ability of national identity, racial 
and other similarly large-scale categories, to mobilise large sections of the populace 
at certain times, we would argue that Triandis and associates continue to make 
sweeping generalisations about the consequences of individualism and collectivism 
when what is clearly required is empirical validation of such claims.
There also exists something of a mismatch between Triandis and associates' 
theorising, and their actual empirical research. This stems from the fact that, to a 
large extent, the research has focused exclusively on individual-centred 
operationalisations, looking at individual attitudes, values, and so on, with little 
direct attempt to examine the shared nature of beliefs, and how ideological systems
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might diffuse via the mass media. Individualism and collectivism are reduced to 
clusters of factors originating from individual responses to survey-type questions. 
The problem here is not that survey methods per se are inappropriate tools to 
examine the issue at hand, but rather that they provide one particular perspective, 
a perspective which should be part of a broader multi-methodological approach (c.f. 
Campbell, 1986). It is particularly important that such multi-methodological 
approaches endeavour to investigate the interactions between the individual, group, 
and societal levels, and resist the temptation to conduct studies looking at each 
level separately, with no attempt at synthesis.
One related problem with much of the social psychological work on 
individualism-collectivism (Ind-Col) is the lack of definitional clarity. The term 
ideology is used with little regard for its inherent ambiguity (cf. Scarborough, 
1990), or attempt to delineate how the concept relates to similar notions, such as 
social representations. For example, the work of Ichheiser (1949) on individualism, 
as well as the recent call by Augoustinos (1990) for the study of the implications 
of the ideology of individualism, are all of potential relevance for the work of 
Triandis and associates. In a similar fashion, the concept of culture is utilised 
without any exposition of what culture represents, or its likely mode(s) of 
transmission. Since Triandis and his colleagues also fail to make clear their own 
interpretation of personality traits, one is left wondering exactly what the numerous 
survey studies actually demonstrate - personality traits, ideologies, cultural values, 
or all of these? It is impossible to say without some adequate attempt at defining 
and differentiating key concepts.
Despite these, albeit serious, methodological and theoretical shortcomings 
in much of the Ind-Coll literature, it is still important to attempt to map-out and 
explore the way in which beliefs about the individual and his or her relationship 
to society, manifest themselves. One of the admirable properties of the work of 
Triandis and associates is its cross-cultural nature. The fact that respondents from 
cultures which were assumed to differ on the Ind-Coll dimension typically 
endorsed different values in surveys should not be lightly dismissed. It does seem 
to be the case that North American respondents, for example, highlight values often 
assumed to be associated with individualistic orientations. These include the
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dominance of personal over collective goals, distance from ingroups, self-reliance, 
and membership of a variety of social groups. In contrast, respondents in China 
endorsed values typically labelled as collectivist - subordination to the wider 
collective, interdependence between individuals and groups, and strong allegiance 
to a few highly valued social groups (Triandis et al., 1986; 1988; Triandis, McCusker 
& Hui, 1990; see also Chang, 1982; Hsu, 1971). It is important to note that Triandis 
and his co-workers accept that the actual manifestations of individualism or 
collectivism could well be culturally relative, although there are reasons to expect 
certain similarities, given the interaction of various cultures. There also exists a 
growing body of evidence which suggests a frequent association between the 
economic prosperity of a nation and the incidence of individualistic beliefs, such 
that high economic development tends to be associated with high levels of 
individualism (c.f. Hofstede, 1980; Triandis et al., 1988). This is congruent with 
existing theorising in a variety of the social sciences, which has suggested that 
democracy and capitalism may be associated with individualism (see, for example, 
B£teille, 1977). Yet even here, the danger of such generalisations soon emerges 
when one takes account of research which seems to indicate that the Japanese, 
whose economy is extremely powerful and well-developed, often appear to adopt 
a collectivist orientation to self (c.f. Triandis et al., 1986;1988; see also Cousins,
1989).
Whether or not Triandis and associates have demonstrated cross-cultural 
differences in what could be termed individualist-collectivist ideologies, cultural 
value systems or personality dimensions, there is strong evidence that different 
individuals, groups, and cultures may orient themselves differently to the various 
social groups present in their environment. This being the case, it is crucial for any 
theory of group processes to investigate the possible consequences of such 
differences. Now, more than ever, there is a need for the cross-cultural validation 
of social identity and self-categorisation theories.
However problematic Triandis and associates' operationalisations of cultural 
values might be, it remains crucial to explore the implications individualistic and 
collectivistic belief systems hold for social identity construction. If individualistic 
cultures involve the kind of orientations to social groups Triandis and associates
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have postulated, then one would expect relatively lower levels of social identity in 
comparison to more collectivist cultures. It also seems likely that the kind of self- 
serving biases discussed in earlier chapters, would occur with more frequency in 
individualistic cultures, especially when distance from the ingroup is a feature of 
social identity construction. It seems likely that individualists and individualistic 
cultures are unlikely to fully reflect Turner's notion of group members perceiving 
themselves as interchangeable exemplars (Turner, 1987). In fact, individualistic 
values, as defined by Triandis and associates, seem rather problematic for the 
whole referent informational influence model, with the notion of self-stereotyping 
appearing particularly problematic.
Furthermore, if individualistic cultures encourage a variety of different 
group allegiances, then it would seem that the art of managing multiple group 
memberships, of skilfully organising one's social identity networks, would be of 
paramount importance (see, for example, McCall, 1987). In fact, this picture of 
Western man moving quickly between different social identities, never placing too 
much emphasis on any single role, is in some ways reminiscent of Goffman's 
dramaturgical model of self-presentation (Goffman, 1959b). It also shares much 
with Lifton's notion of the protean individual, whose hunger for new and varied 
experiences allows him or her to change colour in chameleon-like fashion (Lifton, 
1970; see also Zurcher, 1977).
In contrast, the social identity and self-categorisation paradigms appear to 
hold much potential for illuminating social identity construction when collectivist 
values predominate. Here, we would expect relatively high levels of commitment 
to social identities, and social groups to have a much greater chance of instilling 
relatively homogeneous norms and beliefs. If the social identity paradigm proved 
problematic in this context, then its validity would be seriously called into 
question, and rightly so.
If everything were as clear-cut as Triandis and associates would like us to 
believe, the task of the cross-cultural psychologist would perhaps seem less 
daunting than it often appears. However, cultures and nations tend not to fall 
conveniently at one end of a dichotomous individualism-collectivism dimension.
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The key problem here concerns the stability of such beliefs and personal 
orientations. Given that most social scientists would probably accept that Western 
Europe is relatively individualistic in many ways, it seems problematic for 
Triandis' framework to note how intergroup conflict has been, and continues to be, 
of great significance in this area of the world. It is worth remembering that social 
identity theory has proven highly useful in elucidating the nature of a wide variety 
of intergroup phenomena, usually in so-called individualistic societies (see, for 
example, Bourhis & Hill, 1982; Brown 1978; Cairns & Mercer, 1984; Giles & 
Johnson, 1981).
Cultural beliefs, especially those which are enshrined in literature, art, and 
the mass media, are quite likely to evince a certain degree of temporal stability. 
However, the belief systems of social groups - essentially social representations - 
are less static, as are the idiosyncratic sets of beliefs and values associated with 
individuals. To this extent, it seems rather likely that individualistic and 
collectivistic orientations will be subject to fluctuation, even within cultures which 
tend to promote one more than the other. It thus becomes crucial to attempt to 
determine the factors which are likely to influence the emergence and fluctuation 
of these orientations - here, there is clearly much work which remains to be done.
Students of group processes already know, for example, that threats to 
groups can encourage moves towards in-group homogenisation, and thus perhaps 
be associated with collectivist orientations. At the level of individual orientations, 
it seems perfectly reasonable for a person to have an individualistic orientation to 
some groups - for example colleagues in a competitive work environment - while 
at the same time having a collective orientation to other groups, such as his or her 
extended family. Even here, these orientations might not be stable, but perhaps 
keyed to particular situations or events. To pursue the previous examples, certain 
situations might at times reverse the usual orientation. Thus, a competitive, 
relatively individualistic work environment might become a more collectivist one, 
marked by friendship and good-will, during the office Christmas party. Similarly, 
the good of the family as a whole, and its associated collectivist orientation might 
be threatened when relatives fall-out over the contents of a will, perhaps taking-on 
a more individualistic orientation to the family in such circumstances. This also,
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therefore, serves to emphasize the utility of examining situations and how they 
serve to elicit individualistic or collectivistic orientations, in a manner not unlike 
Mischel's notion of studying person X situation interactions (e.g. Mischel, 1977; see 
also R.H. Turner, 1987).
7.3.3 The autonomous-relational dimension
A crucial element of Brown and associates' (1991;1992) argument, is the postulation 
of an autonomous-relational dimension which co-exists, and is supposedly 
orthogonal to, the individualism-collectivism dimension. Autonomous orientations 
to ingroups involve comparisons with norms, but not with specific outgroups. It is 
interesting how social identity theory has, to some extent, ignored apparently 
autonomous groups, and focused instead on groups involved in frequent intergroup 
relations, usually of a conflictual nature. Recently, theorists not directly associated 
with the Tajfel-Tumer school of thought have also started to raise questions about 
non-comparative groups (see, for example, Deaux, 1992). Relational orientations, in 
contrast, are associated with frequent comparisons between one's own group and 
important outgroups - to some extent, the meaning of relational groups has little 
sense without the existence of outgroups. Once again, while this orientation is 
assumed to exist at various levels, empirical studies have so far, focused exclusively 
on the orientations of individual group-members to their ingroup.
Of crucial importance for the social identity paradigm, is Brown and 
associate's assertion that social identity theory functions most adequately as an 
explanatory framework, when dealing with individuals and/or groups with 
collectivist-relational orientations. In contrast, it is suggested that social identity 
theory is, at least in its current state, an inadequate framework for exploring social 
identity construction where individualistic-autonomous orientations predominate. 
In fact, given social identity theory's reliance on the notion of intergroup 
comparisons, it seems that the SIT/SCT paradigms are quite unsuited to explaining 
group processes in any groups associated with autonomous orientations, regardless 
of whether these orientations are accompanied by individualistic or collectivistic 
belief systems (Brown et al., 1992).
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However, it is worth noting that many of the problems raised in regard to 
the individualism-collectivism dimension are also applicable to the notion of 
autonomous and relational orientations. For example, it is far from clear whether 
these orientations are stable or contextual in nature, how orientations at the group 
and individual levels might interact, and whether these orientations mean the same 
thing across different cultures, or even across different groups within the same 
culture. Again one is left wondering exactly what the phenomena under 
investigation represent. Socially shared belief systems? Individually-held value 
systems and cognitive structures? Perhaps both? Brown and associates, like Triandis 
and his co-workers, rather conveniently dodge the issue of how one can study so- 
called ideological structures, without having attempted to define what "ideology" 
actually means. The most the reader is told, is that the autonomous-relational 
dimension is manifested in a "kind of ideology or orientation" (Brown et al, 1992, 
p.330), as if this statement requires no further illumination.
It has been argued throughout this discussion that social identity 
construction might operate somewhat differently in large-scale, diffuse social 
categories and groups, in comparison to smaller or more structured groups. In a 
similar vein Brown and associates conclude their discussion by suggesting that 
social identity and group processes might operate differently across groups and 
individuals which differ on the individualism-collectivism and autonomous- 
relational dimensions. In this sense the conclusions to be drawn from both 
discussions are congruent - we require a social psychology of group processes 
which can take account of both different types of group, and individual differences 
in orientations to these groups.
It could well be argued that one of the most serious problems with the 
social identity paradigm - its typical focus on self-esteem as the only motivating 
force behind social identity - can help explain the inadequacies of the paradigm 
when applied to what Brown and associates have defined as collective-autonomous 
groups. Such groups are likely to be marked by high levels of personal 
involvement and commitment to the group, but few or no explicit intergroup 
comparisons. Clearly, in such groups, which for example, might include therapy 
groups or small groups of close friends, the search for positive distinctiveness
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seems unlikely to be the most important motivating force behind social identity 
construction. This, incidentally, does not necessarily mean that self-esteem 
maintenance is insignificant in such groups, but merely that it is likely to find 
fulfilment in ways which are different to the search for positive distinctiveness. It 
seems reasonable for example, that a group of close friends might praise one 
another, communicate the fact that they like the other members of the group, and 
in this way enhance or maintain one another's self-esteem, without making any 
comparisons between the ingroup and outgroups. Furthermore, it is likely that a 
whole host of other motivating forces are of potential relevance for social identity 
construction, and it is to a discussion of some of these, that we now turn.
7.4 Whatever happened to the individual in social identity theory?
When Henri Tajfel developed and later expanded his ambitious social identity 
theory, he repeatedly argued that his primary aim was to develop a theory of 
intergroup relations. Consequently, while the theory made some assumptions about 
the nature of the self, it was not, argued Tajfel, and need not be, a complete theory 
of self in any sense. Furthermore, to the extent that Tajfel was essentially interested 
in times when individuals all acted in a similar fashion, the possibility of 
interesting individual differences in identity construction was not explored. John 
Turner's self-categorisation theory developed the intra-group implications of the 
social identity paradigm, and in doing so, made some clarifications of the nature 
of self implied by the perspective (Deaux, 1992). However, both Tajfel's social 
identity theory and Turner's self-categorisation theory chose to ignore any detailed 
questions about the nature of self, and, more generally, issues associated with 
individual differences (Schiffman & Wicklund, 1992).
7.4.1 Motivation - is self-esteem maintenance enough?
Recently, it has been suggested, or sometimes implied, that the social identity 
paradigm can not be conveniently divorced from issues of the self and individual 
differences (see for example, Abrams, 1992; Breakwell, 1986, 1991; Deaux, 1992). 
One such issue pertains to the adequacy of motivational constructs contained 
within the social identity paradigm. As previously suggested, it is in some ways
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quite bizarre that self-esteem maintenance via positive distinctiveness has often 
been the only motivation directly addressed by social identity theorists.
This is bizarre in as much as theorists not directly associated with the theory 
have often postulated a variety of other probable motivations associated with social 
identity (see, for example, Deaux, 1992; Doob, 1964; Stagner, 1967). Deaux has made 
the interesting suggestion that attachment to ascribed social identities is more 
related to "fundamental questions of meaning and self-knowledge" than self-esteem 
motivations (Deaux, 1992, p.26). In a similar vein, Mitchell (1981) has proposed that 
being a member of a large-scale social group such as a nation provides the 
individual with a sense of psychological comfort and security. Azar (1986), writing 
specifically about national and similar-scale identities, postulated that needs for 
security, distinctiveness, social recognition of identity, and participation in the 
maintenance of security and identity, are all important motivating forces. Abrams, 
himself generally sympathetic to the social identity paradigm, has proposed that 
consistency, control, material wealth, meaning, power, self-efficacy, and self- 
knowledge all be added to the list of potential motivating factors behind social 
identity construction (Abrams, 1990; 1992). In the current study, evidence has been 
presented which seems to demonstrate how motivations of power and control 
appear to play an important part in the construction of national and European 
identities.
Examining which motivations individuals choose to associate with particular 
social identifications could tell us much about the general management of social 
identity networks, as well as go some way to explaining individual differences in 
identity construction. It will also be important to investigate how stable the links 
between particular motivations and social identities are. Furthermore, the issue of 
motivation can also be examined at a more collective level of analysis, perhaps by 
exploring whether social representations prescribe particular associations, and 
whether different in-group members tend to associate the ingroup with the 
satisfaction of the same motives.
Brown and associates (1992) have recently made the interesting suggestion 
that the ideological dimensions of Individualism-Collectivism and Autonomous-
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Relational beliefs might affect the associations made between group memberships 
and particular motives, suggesting that individualistic groups might engender 
instrumental identities focused on the fulfilment of personal goals. In earlier 
chapters, it was suggested that the distinction between instrumental and 
sentimental attachments to a social entity (Kelman, 1969) is often a useful 
simplifying tool when examining different orientations to national and European 
identities. Recently, Inglehart and Reif (1991) suggested a useful distinction 
between two quite similar constructs - those of utilitarian and affective support 
Utilitarian support tends to be focused on particular, often well-defined, issues, and 
particularly on the fulfilment of desires relating to these issues. In contrast, 
affective support is relatively diffuse in nature. Future research might well examine 
whether such a distinction, based on levels of diffuseness, might be usefully 
applied to the instrumental-sentimental dimension suggested by Kelman, and 
indeed, to motives in general. It seems highly probable that these kinds of 
orientations or types of association will often be associated with quite different 
motivations, and given Brown and associates' recent reference to instrumental 
motives, it might be profitable in the future to further explore the interactions 
between the ideological dimensions identified by the latter authors, and the 
instrumental-sentimental dimension. The empirical investigation of such 
hypotheses seems to offer the social identity paradigm a theoretical lifeline, in as 
much as it points the way towards an adequate treatment of motivation within the 
framework.
It has already been suggested in an earlier chapter, that a knowledge of the 
motives typically associated with a social identity, might prove highly useful when 
attempting to predict when such identities might become salient. In many ways 
what is being suggested is the adoption of a more phenomenological approach to 
identity construction, with the particular nuances individuals give to their social 
identities falling under the social psychologist's scrutiny. Just such an approach 
was utilised by Breakwell in her study of threatened identities (Breakwell, 1986) - 
what is now required is an analogous approach to social identities in general - 
whether threatened or secure. This is congruent with Rosenberg's call for the study 
of individual identity structures (Rosenberg, 1988). It is interesting to note that the 
addition of an idiographic level of analysis might also enable the further
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investigation of the role of differentiation, if Hinkle and associates are correct in 
their assertion that the relationship between identity and differentiation may co- 
vary both with individual differences in style of identity construction, and with 
group ideology (Hinkle, et al., 1989). For some theorists, it is indeed quite 
surprising that motivational constructs have often been neglected within the social 
identity paradigm: Taylor and associates (1989), for example, argue that it is only 
when one knows the motives underlying a social comparison, that one can begin 
to predict the choice of comparison likely. The same authors go on to make the 
useful suggestion that different outgroups may be linked to different motivations.
Another useful approach to the study of motivation and its effects upon 
social identity construction has been forwarded by Hazel Markus and associates 
(Markus & Nurius, 1984,1986,1987), in the shape of their theory of possible selves. 
The latter essentially represent individual's beliefs about what they were in the 
past, what they are at present, and what they might become in the future. The 
crucial link to motivation is afforded by the contention that individuals attempt to 
achieve positively valued possible selves, whilst hopefully avoiding other, 
negatively evaluated possible selves. In as much as possible selves encompass the 
past, present, and future, they involve the kind of manipulations of a temporal 
sense of self discussed with some elegance by Goffman (1959a;1959b;1968), and are 
related to the continuity motive suggested by Breakwell (1986). One particularly 
crucial element of the possible selves approach, is the notion that motives and 
goals may not be particularly specific or well-defined - the underlying motivating 
force behind identity construction is simply the achievement or avoidance of 
possible selves.
The problem of levels of analysis unfortunately rears its ugly head once 
more however, when one attempts to discern in detail the implications of the 
possible selves approach. Potentially, the notion of possible selves is an excellent 
example of how it is often difficult to distinguish personal and social identity: 
"[possible selves] are deft blendings of the representations of one's roles and social 
categorizations...with views of one's particular features, attributes or habits" 
(Markus & Nurius, 1987, p. 158; see also Deaux, 1992). When individuals construct 
their own idiosyncratic possible selves, they are essentially engaged in the process
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of what Breakwell (1991) has termed the customisation of social identities, and 
indeed, social representations. Differences in the possible selves constructed by 
individuals may also be associated with what Hinkle and associates (1989) have 
referred to as style of identity construction.
However, whilst Markus and Nurius (1986) acknowledge, as, in fact, Bruner 
had much earlier (Bruner, 1962), that the mass media may well provide individuals 
with pools of possible selves from which to choose, they retain a focus on the 
individual level of analysis. Once again, one is left wondering exactly how 
individuals select from possible selves present in the mass media, especially when 
one considers the theoretical minefield which characterises the field of mass media 
effects (c.f. Roberts and Maccoby, 1985). Furthermore, the question of whether in­
groupers might come to share possible selves, perhaps due to their enshrinement 
within group belief systems, is not addressed, or even acknowledged. Such shared 
possible selves might be similar to the notion of perceptions of cognitive 
alternatives to the intergroup situation (Tajfel & Turner, 1979/1986) which may 
come to be shared between in-groupers.
Despite such apparent limitations with the possible selves approach, the 
basic notion of possible selves continues to offer much potential for integrating the 
study of individual differences, in both personality and motivation, into the social 
identity paradigm. At the same time, in as much as possible selves appear to be in 
both culture (e.g. the media) and cognition (e.g. self-schemas - c.f. Markus & 
Nurius, 1987), their study offers interesting possibilities for collaboration between 
researchers working within the fields of social identity, social cognition, and social 
representations.
7.5 New methodological horizons
It should be apparent from the previous discussion that the social identity 
paradigm may well need considerable development if it is to offer an adequate 
framework for the study of group processes. Yet this need for further development 
is, paradoxically, a result not of the paradigm's limitations, but rather of its 
promise, of what might be achieved. If the promise of social identity theory is to 
be realised, then new methodological approaches will have to be developed which
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can adequately encompass the multi-level analyses so badly needed (Doise, 1986). 
In previous chapters the utility of interweaving idiographic levels of analysis with 
a wider analysis of social identity construction has been demonstrated. This is 
congruent with the increasingly common calls for the study of individual 
differences in identity construction (c.f. Abrams, 1992; Breakwell, 1991). It has also 
been repeatedly emphasised how quantitative and qualitative techniques should 
be given equal import by researchers - the time has come within the social identity 
paradigm for qualitative research to rise above its often diminutive status as merely 
a component of pilot work.
The study of the kinds of large-scale and diffuse social identities 
exemplified by national and European attachments, also requires a somewhat novel 
approach to studying social identity construction. Such an approach must attempt 
to take account of the relatively dormant nature of many large-scale social 
identifications, and the significance of symbols and critical situations in 
maintaining their salience. Furthermore, research methods must be able to 
encompass the study of both social identity and social representations, since the 
two are often highly related.
There seems little doubt that multi-methodological programmes offer the 
most promise. However, this is by no means a problem-free panacea - if anything, 
the skilful use of multi-method probes is fraught with more danger than the 
simplistic reliance on single methodologies. There is an urgent need for the careful 
scrutiny of available research methods, and the elucidation of their strengths and 
weaknesses, with particular reference to the study of social identities and social 
representations. Clearly, the ideal solution is to capitalise on the strengths of 
various methods, whilst attempting to minimise the effects of any associated 
weaknesses. Furthermore, researchers must have clear ideas as to whether they 
expect the different methods utilised to yield broadly similar or disparate results, 
and the reasons for such expectations. This might help alleviate the problems 
otherwise associated with conflicting results emerging from different methods in 
a multi-method investigation.
It is encouraging to note the exploratory multi-methodical research already 
under way in the field of social representations (see, for example, Sotirakopoulou, 
1991; Sotirakopoulou and Breakwell, 1992). In many ways the further development 
of the social identity paradigm hinges on the willingness of its adherents to adopt 
a broader methodological and theoretical perspective, to take a step back and 
perceive the possible theoretical connections between the paradigm and work in 
social cognition, personality theory, and the social representations paradigm. 
Current world events, including the prolonged civil war in what was Yugoslavia, 
the protracted struggle between Arabs and Jews in the Middle East, and 
innumerable other conflicts, all serve to demonstrate that now, more than ever, 
social psychology needs an adequate theory of social identity and its role in group 
processes.
In the next chapter, some of the areas of the social identity paradigm which 
have been identified as requiring further development, will be examined in an 
exploratory empirical analysis.
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Chapter 8
SOME NEW HORIZONS EXPLORED
In the current chapter, some of the new horizons for the social identity paradigm 
introduced in previous chapters, are placed under the scrutiny of empirical analysis. 
Given the embryonic state of these recent developments, the empirical research 
shortly to be discussed should be inteipreted as largely exploratory in nature: it is 
certainly premature to expect "critical experiments" of a decisive nature.
Since qualitative data have already figured prominently in the preceding 
discussion, and given die sacrifice of breadth for depth usually inherent in 
qualitative work, it was decided to utilise a fixed-response questionnaire 
methodology for the final piece of empirical work to be discussed. A questionnaire 
was constructed and piloted, with the aim of exploring a number of the issues 
raised in recent chapters, pertaining to the current adequacy of the social identity 
paradigm, especially when applied to national, European, and other identities of 
a similarly diffuse and large-scale nature. In order to be able to investigate a 
variety of issues, and to access the largest number of respondents feasible, it was 
decided to construct a questionnaire based on fixed-response type measures, and 
ultimately leading to data of a predominantly quantitative nature. This is by no 
means meant to signify the superiority of quantitative measures, but rather their 
utility when a large number of issues are to be addressed, with a relatively large 
number of respondents.
8.1 Major issues addressed by the questionnaire
(Note: The full text of the questionnaire is reproduced in Appendix F)
The strength of British and European identities (Questions A1-A7; D1-D7)
Since the fixed-response measures of British and European identity employed in 
the earlier questionnaire proved to be relatively successful, they were also included
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in the current study. This allowed a direct comparison between the strength, affect, 
and salience of British and European identities. Furthermore, this facilitated the 
examination of the relationship between these social identities and other important 
variables in the analysis. Given the results obtained from the earlier empirical 
research, it was expected that respondents would manifest a British identity 
significantly stronger than their European identity, especially on salience and socio- 
emotional dimensions.
Interdependence (questions A8-A9; D8-D9)
Since Rabbie and Horwitz, in their important recent critique of social identity 
theory, posit the importance of perceived interdependence as the driving force 
behind group processes, it was deemed useful to include a measure of this 
construct in the current questionnaire (cf. Rabbie & Horwitz, 1988; Rabbie, Schott, 
& Visser, 1989). It was argued in an earlier chapter, that what is perhaps critical is 
the interpretation individuals, or indeed, groups, give to perceived interdependence. 
A number of interview respondents, for example, certainly did perceive an element 
of interdependence between European nations, but, rather than leading to a sense 
of common European identity, if anything this appeared to act as a barrier to such 
sentiments. This was largely because the interviewees regretted such 
interdependence, appearing to associate it with a loss of autonomy. It seems rather 
likely that Rabbie and associates were aware of the importance of the interpretation 
of interdependence, but nevertheless, their writing fails to express this point 
explicitly.
In light of the ambiguous nature of perceived interdependence, it was 
decided to include two questions, one of which referred to whether respondents 
perceived any interdependence, and the other examining whether they felt 
interdependence was desirable or no t Each set of two questions was presented 
firstly, in relation to interdependence between British people, and then later in 
relation to interdependence between the nations and peoples of Europe.
Possible selves (questions A10-A12; D10-D13)
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One of the more subtle factors able to differentiate between those who are broadly 
pro-European and those who feel wary of European integration, is the nature of the 
temporal perspective adopted. In many cases, and in responses from both the 
questionnaire and interview data, it was apparent that those opposed to integration 
tended to dwell to some extent on Britain's past, a past they felt was under threat 
from European integration. This contrasts in an interesting manner with the 
perspective often adopted by supporters of integration, who tended to focus on the 
future, on what might be achieved, given time and effort Differences in temporal 
perspective of this nature were also highly apparent between the relatively un- 
enthusiastic British and the much more hopeful Italian respondents, in the earlier 
questionnaire study.
Since the notion of possible selves (Markus & Nurius, 1984;1986;1987) strives 
to encompass temporal and motivational elements of identity, it was deemed 
interesting to include a related measure in the current questionnaire. A series of 
fixed-response measures focused on whether respondents felt being British would 
gain or decrease in importance by the year 2000, and what respondents actually 
wanted to happen to the importance of being British. Similar measures later 
focused on European possible selves.
The Individualism-Collectivism (Ind-Coll) and Autonomous-Relational dimensions 
(questionnaire section B)
In the previous chapter, the importance of the ideological milieu in which identity 
construction takes place, was emphasized. Considering that Tajfel repeatedly 
emphasized the importance of societal beliefs and ideologies (see, for example, 
Tajfel, 1984), it is surprising that social identity theorists are only just beginning 
to acknowledge and attempt to investigate the role of widespread beliefs pertaining 
to the relationship between the individual and society. It follows, from the earlier 
discussion of Brown and associates' work (Hinkle & Brown, 1990; Brown et al., 
1991; Brown et al., 1992), that one should expect social identity to be strongest in 
a collectivist milieu, and social identity theory most useful in such a context
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Predicting social identity construction in individualistic milieux appears much more 
problematic
According to Brown and associates, the relational-autonomous dimension, 
representing the degree to which groups make explicit intergroup comparisons, 
exists as an orthogonal ideological dimension to Ind-ColL Taking both dimensions 
into consideration, social identity theory clearly has much to say about groups in 
collectivist-relational milieux, but little about groups in individualistic-autonomous 
milieux.
The current questionnaire incorporates a number of quantitative measures 
of both these ideological dimensions. It was originally intended to utilise a sample 
of questions from the Ind-Coll scales developed by Hui, Triandis and associates 
(c.f. Triandis et al., 1985;1986;1988; Triandis, McCusker & Hui, 1990), however, pilot 
work indicated that such a sample from the lengthy Ind-Coll scale was not 
adequate in terms of Cronbach's alpha (standardised item alpha=0.465, compared 
to recommended 0.85), and thus did not form a usable scale. This being the case, 
a generic Ind-Coll measure was dropped in favour of a group-specific scale based 
on three separate measures, repeated once for British, and once for European group 
identities. In many ways, this group-specific measure is somewhat more relevant 
to our current interest in social identity processes, and takes Brown and associates' 
theorising a step further, since while postulating the existence of such group- 
specific orientations, the latter theorists have focused on generic Ind-Coll measures 
in their own empirical research.
In order to examine the importance of the autonomous-relational dimension, 
a single question was included, focusing on whether respondents made 
comparisons when thinking about being British, and then when thinking about 
being European. It should be stressed that such operationalisations, are at 
essentially an individual level of analysis. This is probably the most appropriate 
level of analysis for the questionnaire methodology utilised, but one should 
remember that group and societal levels of analysis are also worthy of 
investigation. It seems, for example, that a variety of theorists agree that Britain and 
other Western industrialised nations are pervaded by a strongly individualistic
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ideology at the societal level (see, for example, Geertz, 1979; Kitzinger, 1992; 
Triandis, McCusker & Hui, 1990). Triandis, McCusker and Hui (1990) have 
suggested that individualism is high in Britain, a claim which is congruent with 
Hofstede's empirical findings (Hofstede, 1980). Despite the limitations of an 
individual level analysis, this does at least allow relatively direct comparisons to 
be made with existing research.
Goals for European integration (questionnaire section C)
In order to gain a further understanding of British orientations to European 
integration, a section of the current questionnaire required respondents to rate ten 
possible goals for integration, in terms of importance. The ten goals represented the 
most frequent goals mentioned by questionnaire and interview respondents in the 
previous studies. It is important to note that some of these goals appear to be 
amenable to differentiation in terms of the instrumental-sentimental dimension 
frequently referred to throughout the current discussion (see also Kelman, 1969).
When responses to a question contained in the previous questionnaire 
concerning the role of Europe were examined, it became apparent that perhaps the 
most popular role for Europe was that of peace-maker. However, the overall 
impression gleaned from questionnaire and interview data was that British 
respondents tended to adopt an instrumental orientation to Europe and the EC, 
such that economic and political issues (e.g. free trade) were given considerably 
more salience than symbolic issues such as those pertaining to forging a European 
identity. These results were highly congruent with those obtained by Hewstone 
(1986), and, more recently, Fumham and Gunter (1989). Thus, we would expect to 
find instrumental dimensions of integration, such as economics, to be rated as more 
important than sentimental dimensions like promoting a sense of common 
European culture.
Motives (questionnaire section E)
In this section of the questionnaire, which consists of a series of fixed-response 
measures, respondents were required to indicate the degree to which they agreed
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or disagreed with a statement suggesting that a particular motive was an important 
aspect of either their British or European identity. Given the currently 
impoverished treatment of motivation within the social identity paradigm (Abrams, 
1992), this section of the questionnaire aimed to expand the usual focus on self- 
esteem maintenance, by also including measures of other probable motivating 
forces behind national and European identities.
It emerged from the cross-national questionnaire and interview data, that 
autonomy, control and power, all appear to be important motivating forces behind 
national identity. This being the case, it was expected that these motives would be 
quite prominent in responses to the current questionnaire. Furthermore, to the 
extent that respondents had often manifested a desire for Europe to exercise control 
over other nations and continents, then it was also expected that control and power 
motivations would be prominent motives in the section of the current questionnaire 
pertaining to motivating forces behind European identity.
In addition to measures of self-esteem, power, and control, this section also 
included measures of autonomy, stability/predictability, distinctiveness, and self­
presentation. While there are, in principle, a multitude of possible motivating 
forces behind social identity construction (c.f. Abrams, 1992), previous research, and 
the results of the cross-national study, indicated that these motives were most 
frequently associated with national and/or European identities.
It should be stressed that, to some extent, what are being scrutinized here 
might better be thought of as goals, rather than motives. This distinction makes 
sense to the extent that some motives may well be at least partly unconscious much 
of the time. The measures included in the current questionnaire seem to tap goals 
consciously associated with national or European identities. Since it seems quite 
feasible that different social identities might be associated with different goals, it 
was decided to use questions which made specific reference to either being British 
or European.
The questions utilised to investigate motives are listed below, with the 
motive they were intended to tap stated in brackets. The validity of these questions
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was examined using both lay-person (n=20) and psychologist (n=5) judges, who 
were given the task of stating which underlying motive they thought was 
represented by each question. Judges were questioned using an informal interview 
methodology which facilitated the probing of ambiguities. Questions which 
elicited poor inter-judge agreement were dropped from the final questionnaire, 
such that the latter only contained questions which 90% or more of judges agreed 
upon as to the motive represented.
MOTIVE QUESTIONS (all were of the agree/disagree type, using a 7-point bipolar
scale):-
It is important to me that being British makes me feel proud (SELF-ESTEEM)
Britain should maintain its autonomy from other nations (AUTONOMY)
What being British stands for should remain stable and predictable over time 
(STABILITY)
Britain should exercise as much influence as possible over world affairs 
(CONTROL OVER OTHERS)
Britain should strive to be one of the world's most powerful nations (POWER)
Britain and the British should be thought of as distinct and different to other 
nations and nationalities (DISTINCTIVENESS)
I like other people to think I'm proud to be British (SELF-PRESENTATION) 
Demographics (questionnaire section F)
This section of the questionnaire requested respondents to supply information 
concerning age, sex, political orientation, vote in the last general election, perceived 
social class, and estimated exposure to the mass media.
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8.2 Respondents
In order to allow comparisons to be drawn with the previous cross-national 
questionnaire and interview data, it was decided to utilise a similar subject group 
for respondents. Thus, volunteer respondents were recruited in a variety of 
Universities across Britain, with the requirement that all respondents be current 
British citizens.
8.3 Pilot work
The questionnaire was piloted using an interview-administration technique. 
Piloting, as usual, proved essential in highlighting ambiguities in question format 
or wording, and was conducted over a 5-week period, using 25 volunteer 
respondents.
8.4 Questionnaire administration
The questionnaire was administered to some 121 volunteer respondents over a 
period between October 1992 and January 1993. Respondents were required to 
complete the questionnaire in the presence of a researcher, and, of course, alone. 
The questionnaire was of the self-completion variety, and given its totally fixed- 
response nature, was straightforward to complete, with respondents on average 
taking 20 minutes to answer all questions.
8.5 SELECTED RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
8.5.1 Demographic profile of respondents
Table 67 below contains a basic demographic profile of the questionnaire 
respondents.
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Table 67 - Demographic profile of respondents 
(n-121)
SEX: AGE:
count %
Mean: 20 years
Female 74 61.2 Mode: 18 years
Hale 42 34.7 Range: 18-41 years
(missing) 5 4.1
VOTE IN LAST GENERAL ELECTION (1992):
Frequency Percent
CONSERVATIVE 18 14.9
LABOUR 9 7.4
LIBERAL 12 9.9
OTHER 5 4.1
(NOT VOTE) 70 57.9
(HISSING) 7 5.8
SELF-ASSESSED SOCIAL CLASS BACKGROUND
Frequency Percent
"Working" 30 26.1
"Middle" 70 60.9
"Upper" 2 1.7
"Don't know" 13 11.3
(missing) 6
8.5.2 Comparing British national identity with European identity
As expected from the previous questionnaire data, the seven fixed-response 
measures of British identity formed an excellent scale (standardised item 
alpha=.864). It was noticeable from an exploratory data analysis (cf. Tukey, 1977), 
that for almost all British identity variables, the distribution of responses was 
negatively skewed, indicating a generally medium-high level of national identity.
In a similar manner, European identity measures were also seen to manifest 
an excellent standardised item alpha of .873, once again suggesting a good 
European identity scale. It was interesting to note how, in marked contrast to the 
British identity measures, responses to the European identity questions were 
predominantly positively skewed, suggesting a generally weak level of European
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identity. These observations were confirmed by a within-sub j ects MAN OVA, the 
results of which indicated that on all identity variables, respondents reported 
significantly higher levels of British, as opposed to European, identity (Table 68).
Table 6 8 1 XANOVA comparing British £ European Identity 
(n-115)
Overall multivariate effect (Plllaia Teat):
Value-.534 F- 17.650 D.F.-7,108 Sig. of F-<.001
Significant univariate effectst
"To what extent do you feel British/European?1 
British: mean-4.852 European: mean-3.183 Sig- <.001
"To what extent do you feel strong ties with other British/European 
people?"
British: mean-4.357 European: mean-3.165 Sig- <.001
"To vhat extent do you feel pleased to be British/European?" 
British: mean-4.478 European: mean-3.748 Sig- .002
"How similar do you think you are to the average British/European 
person?"
British: mean-4.157 European: mean-3.400 Sig- <.001
"How important to you is being British/European?"
British: mean-3.887 European: mean-3.130 Sig-.002
"How much are your views about Britain/Europe shared by other 
British/European people?"
British: mean-4.087 European: mean-3.574 Sig-.001
"When you hear someone who is not British/European criticize 
the British/Europeans, to what extent do you feel personally 
criticized?"
British: mean-4.096 European: mean-2.817 Sig-<.001
( S i g n i f i c a n c e  l a v a l a  d e r iv e  f r o n  F - t e e t e ,  and a r e  2 - t a i l e d )
(R e sp o n se  s c a l e t  1 ( lo w  i d e n t i t y )  -  7 (h ig h  i d e n t i t y ) )
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Since British national identity has proven to be significantly stronger than 
European identity across two separate questionnaire studies, and given the highly 
congruent qualitative observations arising from the interview data, it seems that 
there is good evidence that British national identity is stronger, more salient, and 
more positive, than its European counterpart When considered in the context of 
previous research (e.g. Hewstone, 1986; Fumham & Gunter, 1989; Sotirakopoulou, 
1991), and the extensive Eurobarom&tre surveys, there seems little reason to suggest 
that the current results will not be broadly applicable to the British as a whole. A 
strong British national identity, and a weak, poorly defined European equivalent, 
seems compatible with the existing body of largely attitudinal data.
8.5.3 Interdependence
It is interesting to note that, despite the highly significant differences in the 
strength of British and European identities, there was no significant difference in 
perceived interdependence. This finding appears to be congruent with the 
argument forwarded earlier in the discussion, where it was suggested that it is not 
so much the perception of interdependence per se which is critical, but rather, its 
interpretation - i.e., whether interdependence is considered a good or a bad thing. 
This being the case, when one considers the previous data concerning British 
orientations to Europe, one would expect interdependence between the British to 
be more highly valued than interdependence between Europeans. This expectation 
was in fact confirmed, with the current data indicating that respondents rated 
interdependence between the British as significantly more desirable than 
interdependence amongst the Europeans (British mean=4.55, European mean=4.23, 
2-tailed t-test, p=.041).
Disentangling the relationship between interdependence and social identity 
was not the purpose of the current research, and will probably prove quite a 
demanding task for future research. Both existence and evaluation measures of 
interdependence correlated significantly, and in a positive direction, with composite 
British and European identity scores (Table 69). Whilst indicating a clear association 
between interdependence and identity, this says nothing about causal relationships, 
or the temporal order in which these phenomena might occur. Furthermore, the 
observed correlations were not overly high, suggesting that there is more to social
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identification than perceived interdependence. In fact, to the extent that much 
depends on one's definition of social identity, then whether interdependence is a 
crucial factor in group formation is a matter which perhaps will not be decided 
purely through empirical endeavours. This is especially the case when, as Rabbie 
and Horwitz (op. cit) do, researchers, in a rather tautological fashion, define group 
formation largely in terms of perceived interdependence. It should also be noted 
that there appear no particularly strong reasons to suspect that perceptions of the 
existence of, and general reactions towards, interdependence will remain stable 
over time. If interdependence is the crucial element behind group formation, then 
surely much more research is required into its determinants, and the mechanisms 
behind its possible fluctuation.
Table 69 - Correlations between interdependence and social Identity 
BRITISH INTERDEPENDENCE:
Existence measure: Pearson P.M. correlation with composite British
Identity
r*.354, n-117, p-<.001 (2-tailed)
Evaluation measure: Pearson P.M. correlation with composite British 
Identity
ra.420, n>117, p»<.001 (2-tailed)
EUROPEAN INTERDEPENDENCE:
Existence measure: Pearson P.M. correlation with composite European
Identity
r-.396, n-117, px.001 (2-tailed)
Evaluation measure: Pearson P.M. correlation with composite European 
Identity
r>.480, n«117, p«<.001 (2-tailed)
It is relatively common for theorists writing about the Individualism-Collectivism 
dimension, to postulate that perceived interdependence is typically associated with 
a collectivist orientation (e.g. Triandis et al., 1986). This being the case, and since 
such an assertion seems to make good intuitive sense, it was expected that 
interdependence would be perceived more favourably when respondents adopted 
a collectivist orientation to the group in question (either Britain or Europe). A 
Pearson Product Moment Correlation was calculated to examine the relationship 
between interdependence evaluations and a composite group-specific Ind-Coll
313
score. This indicated, as expected, a significant and positive correlation between the 
evaluation of interdependence, and group-specific Ind-Coll (see table 70). If 
perceived interdependence is primarily associated with collectivist milieux and 
groups, then it would seem that individualistic groups are both problematic for 
social identity theory and Rabbie and Horwitz's argument concerning the 
importance of perceived interdependence.
Table 70 - Correlations between evaluation of Interdependence and Ind- 
Coll meaaurem
EVALUATION OF BRITISH INTERDEPENDENCE:
Pearson P.M. correlation with composite British Ind-Coll score: 
r«.271, n«118, p«.004 (2-tailed)
EVALUATION OF EUROPEAN INTERDEPENDENCE:
Pearson P.M. correlation with composite European Ind-Coll score: 
r*.376, n>118, p-<.001 (2-tailed)
Note: positive correlations indicate a relationship such that
evaluation of interdependence is increasingly positive as collectivism 
increases.
8.5.4 Possible selves
In order to examine the relationship between possible selves and European 
identity, the sample was split into two groups, based on whether respondents felt 
that being European will become more (n=66) or less (n=23) important by the year 
2000. A between-subjects MANOVA was then conducted, with the European 
identity measures as dependent variables (table 71). Despite unequal cell-sizes, 
homogeneity of variance assumptions were met, and the MANOVA indicated a 
significant multivariate difference between groups. Inspection of the univariate 
statistics indicated that, on all European identity measures, those respondents who 
felt being European would become more important, reported significantly higher 
levels of European identity than respondents who felt being European would 
become less important This provides at least suggestive evidence of an association 
between European identity and possible selves. In particular, it seems that a more 
positive orientation towards a European future is often associated with at least an 
embryonic sense of European identity. Such results complement the observations
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arising from the interview study, where the importance of temporal perspective was 
emphasized.
Table 71: MANOVA comparing European identity acroaa possible selves 
<n-89)
Overall multivariate effect (Plllals Test):
Value-.211 F« 3.099 D.F.-7,81 Sig. of F-.006
Significant univariate effects:
"To what extent do you feel European?"
Being European more import.: mean-3.507; lees imp. i mean-2.182 Sig-. 001
"To what extent do you feel strong ties with other European people?* 
Being European more import.; mean-3.463; less imp: mean-1.909 Sig—<.001
"To what extent do you feel pleased to be European?"
Being European more import.: mean-4.134; less imp: mean-2.545 Sigx.OOl
"How similar do you think you are to the average European person?" 
Being European more import.: mean-3.672; less imp: mean-2.455 Sig-.001
"How important to you is being European?"
Being European more import.: mean-3.493; less imp: mean-2.045 Sig-.001
"How much are your views about Europe shared by other European people?" 
Being European more import.: mean-3.701; less imp: mean-3.045 Sig-*043
"When you hear someone who is not European criticize 
the Europeans, to what extent do you feel personally 
criticized?"
Being European more import.: mean-3.090 less imp: mean-1.909 Sig-.006
( S i g n i f i c a n c e  l e v e l s  d e r iv e  { r a n  F - t e s t s ,  and a r «  2 - t a i l e d )
(R e sp o n se  s c a l e t  1 ( lo w  i d e n t i t y )  -  7 (h ig h  i d e n t i t y ) )
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8.5.5 The Autonomous-Relational dimension
An examination of descriptive statistics indicated that the majority of respondents 
answered the current question in a maimer suggestive of a largely relational 
orientation to Britain, although the mean score on the autonomous-relational 
dimension was 4.237, close to the neutral scale-point What was clear, however, was 
that respondents manifested a stronger relational orientation to Britain, than they 
did to Europe. In comparison to the orientation to Britain, orientation to Europe 
was significantly less relational, and more autonomous (2-tailed t=5.08, pc.001; see 
Table 72).
Table 72 - The Autonomous-Relational dimension: comparing orientation 
to Britain with orientation to Europe
Orientation to Britain:
Mean score on Autonomous-Relational scale: 4.237
Median: 5 
Mode: 5
30.5% of responses fell in autonomous range of scale (1-3)
17.7% of responses fell in neutral range of scale (4)
52.5% of responses fell in relational range of scale (5-7)
Orientation to Europe:
Mean score on Autonomous-Relational scale: 3.347
Median: 4 
Mode: 4
45.8% of responses fell in autonomous range of scale (1-3)
27.1% of responses fell in neutral range of scale (4)
27.1% of responses fell in relational range of scale (5-7)
t-test comparing mean score on Autonomous - Relational scale:- 
t>5.08 2-tailed p« <.001 n«117
Intuitively, it seems likely that national identity, which may often be associated 
with critical situations and events of a conflictual nature, might well encourage a 
relational orientation. To the extent that the previous empirical research discussed 
earlier suggested the difficulty British respondents found when attempting to think 
about Europe, it is perhaps not surprising to find a more autonomous orientation
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to European identity. In order to investigate whether a relational orientation is 
associated with a stronger sense of social identity, Pearson Product Moment 
correlations were calculated between the group-specific autonomous-relational 
questions and composite identity scores (Table 73).
Table 73 - Correlation* between group-specific Autonomous-Relational 
measure* and composite British and European Identity scores
BRITISH AUTONOMOUS-RELATIONAL SCORE:
Pearson P.M. correlation with composite British identity score: 
r*.267, n-116, p-,004 (2-tailed)
EUROPEAN AUTONOMOUS-RELATIONAL SCORE:
Pearson P.M. correlation with composite European identity score: 
r*.426, n«117, p-<.001 (2-tailed)
Note: positive correlations indicate a relationship such that
relational orientation increases as identity increases.
It can be seen from Table 73 above, that both British and European autonomous- 
relational measures correlate significantly and positively with their respective 
composite identity measures. This is what one might expect if Tajfel's basic social 
identity theory is to be upheld. What it clearly suggests is that both British and 
European identities are quantitatively "stronger1' when coupled with a tendency to 
make intergroup comparisons. It is important to note that, if Brown and associates 
(1992) are correct, such identities need not be comparative - the important point is 
that they appear to be stronger when associated with a relational orientation. In 
terms of a possible European identity, these findings are congruent with 
Robinson's suggestion that it might be easiest to achieve a strong European identity 
by enhancing distinctiveness and superiority over other continental groupings 
(Robinson, 1991). Given the evidence from the previous questionnaire and 
interview data, as well as the arguments forwarded by Bloom (1990), it would seem 
that the United States of America and Japan are two relatively popular outgroups 
upon which this kind of relational orientation to Europe might be constructed. In 
as much as social identities closely associated with frequent comparisons might in 
time lead to intergroup conflict, perhaps proponents of European integration might 
do well to examine some of the ways in which an autonomous, or non-comparative 
sense of European identity might be fostered.
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According to Brown and associates (Hinkle & Brown, 1990; Brown et al., 
1991; Brown et al., 1992), the autonomous-relational dimension is orthogonal to the 
Ind-Coll dimension. In their own research, for example, the latter authors found no 
significant correlations between measures of these dimensions. Since Triandis has 
argued that the two dimensions are likely to be correlated, it was thought useful 
to briefly explore in the current research, whether there was any evidence of an 
association between these two dimensions.
Prior to evaluating the results emerging from the current data, one should 
consider that the measures of both dimensions used in the current study are not 
identical to those used by Brown and associates or those advocated by Triandis, 
although they were largely based on these previous measures. Perhaps the most 
important difference is that measures of Ind-Coll in the current research were 
group-specific. Despite these differences, it is interesting how, contrary to Brown 
and associates' findings, it was discovered that in the current study, the 
autonomous-relational dimension was correlated with the Ind-Coll dimension (see 
Table 74).
Table 74 - Correlations between group-specific Individualism - 
Collectivism and Autonomous-Relational measures
BRITISH AUTONOMOUS-RELATIONAL SCORE:
Pearson P.M. correlation with composite British Ind-Coll score: 
r*.222, n-118, p«.016 (2-tailed)
EUROPEAN AUTONOMOUS-RELATIONAL SCORE:
Pearson P.M. correlation with composite European Ind-Coll score: 
r*.440, n«118, p«<.001 (2-tailed)
Note: positive correlations indicate a relationship such that
relational orientation increases as collectivism increases.
An inspection of Table 74 above, indicates that both British and European 
Autonomous-Relational scores correlate significantly, and in a positive direction,
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with a composite variable comprising their respective group-specific Ind-Coll 
measures simply summed together. With the current scoring system, the observed 
association indicates that, as orientation to Britain or Europe becomes more or less 
relational, so it becomes more or less collectivist, and vice versa. The direction of 
this association is in fact contradictory to what Triandis (1992) has recently 
suggested. However, Triandis appears to base much of his theorising on 
observations of collectivistic societies which are also relatively primitive in terms 
of economic and technological development This being the case, he has suggested 
that collectivism in such cultures appears to be associated with relatively 
autonomous orientations. However, this neglects the fact that there also appear to 
exist relatively collectivistic cultures which are also highly industrialised and 
economically developed. There seems to be no reason why, within such cultures 
(e.g. Japan), collectivism might not co-exist, or even be positively correlated with, 
a relational orientation. It may, in fact, turn out to be the case that the relationship 
between these two dimensions, or indeed, the question of whether any relationship 
exists, might vary across different nations and cultures, or perhaps even within the 
confines of a single nation or culture. Clearly, the issue of whether these two 
dimensions are orthogonal or not is one which is best suited to a rigorous multi- 
methodological and multi-level approach, ideally involving cross-cultural research. 
What remains clear, is that the resolution of this issue is of much potential 
significance for the social identity paradigm, given that the social identity 
perspective appears much more suited to collectivist-relational groups than 
individualistic-autonomous ones.
8.5.6 The Individualism-Collectivism dimension
In order to investigate whether respondents adopted different orientations on the 
Ind-Coll dimension, depending on whether they were thinking about Britain, or 
Europe, a repeated measures t-test was conducted, examining differences in the 
mean scores of respondents on composite group-specific Ind-Coll measures (created 
by summing responses over the three Ind-Coll measures). An examination of Table 
75 below indicates that the mean orientations of respondents to Britain and Europe 
were significantly different (t=2.24,2-tailed p=.027). In particular, it emerged that
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respondents adopted a significantly more collectivistic orientation to Britain, than 
they did to Europe.
Table 75 - The Individualism-Collectivlam dimension t comparing 
orientation to Britain with orientation to Europe
Orientation to Britain:
Mean score on composite Ind-Coll measure : 14.195
Median: 14 
Mode: 14 
Standard Deviation: 3.467
(Potential rangs«3 (individualistic) - 21 (collectivist) ) 
Orientation to Europe:
Mean score on composite Ind-Coll measure : 13.237
Median: 14 
Mode: 14 
Standard Deviation: 4.185
(Potential range«3 (individualistic) - 21 (collectivist) )
t-test comparing mean score on composite Individualism-Collectivism 
measure:-
t-2.24 2-tailed p m . 027 n-118
To the extent that collectivistic orientations might possibly be linked with a more 
sentimental/symbolic type of identification, then the results obtained appear quite 
congruent with the data obtained earlier, which showed that the British seem to 
have a much stronger sense of symbolic identity when thinking about Britain, than 
when thinking about Europe. However, it should be noted that, overall, 
respondents tended to fall rather close to the mid-point of the composite scale, 
suggesting that a clear-cut differentiation between perceptions of Britain and 
Europe may not be present on the Ind-Coll dimension.
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Table 76 - The Indlvlduallsm-Collectivlsm dimension t comparing Ind-Coll 
score across composite Identity score
British identityx
Mean Ind-Coll score for respondents BELOW median identity score: 13.093 
(n-54)
Mean Ind-Coll score for respondents ABOVE median identity score: 15.421 
(n-57)
t-test on means: t*3.75, 2-tailed px.001)
European identity:
Mean Ind-Coll score for respondents BELOW median identity score: 11.037 
(n-54)
Mean Ind-Coll score for respondents ABOVE median identity score: 15.172 
(n-58)
t-test on means: t>5.88, 2-tailed p*<.001)
Since it is generally assumed that social identities will be stronger when associated 
with collectivistic, as opposed to individualistic, ideologies (Brown et al., 1992), it 
was decided to examine whether such an association was apparent in the current 
data. Taking first British, and then European, composite identity measures, the 
sample was split into two groups, based upon those who had responded either 
above or below the median score. Two between-groups t-tests were then conducted 
to examine whether there were any significant differences on the composite Ind- 
Coll measures between the groups. As indicated in Table 76, it emerged that, for 
both British and European identity measures, respondents who had scores above 
the median manifested a significantly stronger level of collectivism than those 
respondents whose identity scores were below the median. This seems to support 
the notion that collectivism is associated with a stronger level of social 
identification than individualism. This association is also supported by the finding 
that both British and European composite identity scores correlate positively and 
significantly with composite Ind-Coll measures (Table 77).
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Table 77 - Correlations between group-specific Individualism - 
Collectivism and composite identity measures
BRITISH IDENTITY:
Pearson P.M. correlation with composite British Ind-Coll score: 
rB.385, n>116, px.OOl (2-tailed)
EUROPEAN IDENTITY:
Pearson P.M. correlation with composite European Ind-Coll score: 
r*.550, n«117, px.001 (2-tailed)
Note: positive correlations indicate a relationship such that identity 
increases as collectivism increases.
Since the Ind-Coll measures included in the current study focused at individual- 
level orientations, this appears to demonstrate the utility of examining such 
individual differences in identity construction, even if British society as a whole 
is largely individualistic in nature (and this assumption itself is not necessarily 
unproblematic). It should, however, be noted that the precise nature of the 
relationship between Ind-Coll and identification is a matter for future research to 
chart. At present, there appears to be evidence that collectivist ideologies and belief 
systems encourage a stronger sense of social identification. However, it is not 
inconceivable that the adoption of a salient, and positively valued social 
identification might not in turn encourage the internalisation of a collectivist 
orientation. It may well be that causality is bi-directional in such cases, such that 
establishing the prior existence of strong social identity or collectivist beliefs may 
be rather difficult
8.5.7 Goals for European integration
Table 78 below, lists the ten goals for European integration included in the current 
questionnaire, in ascending order of mean importance rating.
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Table 78 - Mean Importance ratings of goals for European integration 
----------------- GOAL---------------------  — MEAN IMPORTANCE-
(C2) Promoting world peace 8.76
(C4) Helping third world nations 7.94
(Cl) Ensuring the economic prosperity of Europe 7.23
(C6) Ensuring the economic prosperity of Britain 7.05
(C7) Guaranteeing the security of Europe 6.75
(C8) Preventing the loss of separate national identities 6.23
(C3) Reducing trade barriers in Europe 5.90
(CIO)Encouraging awareness of common cultural ties within Europe 5.55 
(C5) Encouraging a sense of common European identity 4.31
(C9) Creating a new, alternative superpower 3.37
(Iteapon M  a c a la t  1 (n o t  a t  a l l  im p o r ta n t)  -  10 (a x tr a m a ly  im p o r ta n t ) )
ANOVA (repeated measures): n«119 F-37.011, d.f. 9,110, p <.001
"Protected" t-tests comparing mean ratings - Significance of 
differences (2-talled):
Cl C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8
C2 <.001
C3 <.001 <.001
C4 .011 <.001 <.001
C5 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001
C6 NS <.001 <.001 .015 <.001
C7 .039 <.001 .004 <.001 <.001 NS
C8 .003 <.001 NS <.001 <.001 .003 NS
C9 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .004 <.001 <.001 <.001
CIO .002 <.001 NS <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 NS
From an examination of Table 78, it becomes apparent that promoting world peace 
was rated as significantly more important than any other goal included in the 
question. This result is compatible with that obtained from analysis of the first 
questionnaire data, which indicated that the most popular role for Europe was that 
of peace-maker. It should be noted that the use of multiple t-tests in the current 
analysis is valid as long as the overall F for the analysis is significant When this 
is the case, the f s  are said to be "protected" against the problem of capitalising on 
chance. As Rosenthal and Rosnow state, "For most practical purposes, the use of 
these protected f s  is at least an adequate solution and, quite possibly, an optimal 
one" (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991, pps. 328-329).
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It is also particularly noticeable that goals associated with symbolic 
dimensions, and the promotion of a European identity, are rated as less important 
than most of the other goals. In fact, "Encouraging a sense of common European 
identity" is rated as significantly less important than all other goals, apart from 
"Creating a new, alternative superpower". As expected, therefore, the respondents 
demonstrated little will to forge a sense of common European identity, instead 
focusing on geo-political and economic dimensions of integration.
In order to examine whether there might be any underlying dimensions in 
the importance ratings, a Principle Components analysis (PCA) was conducted. 
Table 79 contains a summary of the results obtained from the PCA, along with a 
matrix indicating the component loadings after an orthogonal, Varimax rotation was 
performed on the data. The PCA extracted three components/factors with Eigen 
values over 1.0, which together were able to account for 60.5% of variance in the 
importance ratings. From an examination of the rotated factor matrix, it is apparent 
that the first component appears a relatively complex one, encompassing three 
economic goals, as well as a security and autonomy-associated goal. In the light of 
the previous questionnaire and interview data, it could be argued that such goals 
may well be construed by respondents in a manner such that they in fact are 
subservient to British interests. Given the superiority British identity enjoyed over 
its European counterpart on all identity measures, it seems reasonable to suggest 
that this component may well be reflective of a desire to further British interests 
using the EC and integration as a vehicle for doing so.
The second factor to emerge from the PCA is somewhat more 
straightforward, involving the importance of encouraging a sense of European 
identity, and the perception of common cultural ties in Europe. Together, these 
goals represent an "encouraging European identity" component It is important to 
note how this identity dimension exists as a separate component, serving to 
demonstrate how British respondents construed the majority of goals for European 
integration in a manner which divorced them from the notion of forging a sense 
of European identity. This serves to reinforce the impression gleaned from the 
interview and open-ended data, that Europe, and a sense of European identity, are 
rather nebulous concepts for many British respondents. In addition, it hints at the
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lack of European symbols available to aid the construction of a Euro-identity 
(Bloom, 1990). Given that Eurobarom&tre and other research (e.g. Fumham & 
Gunter, 1979) indicates the dominance of economics in British perceptions of 
integration, that the economic dimension appears to be dissociated from the 
identity dimension in the current data, once more emphasizes the lack of European 
identity amongst the British.
Table 79 - Principal Components Analysis of goals for Integration
Variables entered Into the analysis:
(Cl) Ensuring the economic prosperity of Europe
(C2) Promoting world peace
(C3) Reducing trade barriers In Europe
(C4) Helping third world nations
(C5) Encouraging a sense of common European Identity 
(C6) Ensuring the economic prosperity of Britain 
(C7) Guaranteeing the security of Europe 
(C8) Preventing the loss of separate national identities 
(C9) Creating a new, alternative superpower
(CIO)Encouraging awareness of common cultural ties within Europe
PGA extracted 3 components with Elgen values over 1.00:
Elgen values % variance Cum % var 
Components: 1 2.85 28.5 28.5
2 1.78 17.8 46.3
3 1.41 14.2 60.5
Rotated factor matrix (varlmax rotation specified) : 
PACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3
Cl
C3
C6
C7
C8
C5
CIO
C2 
C4
C9
(loadings below 0.35 not shown; n*119)
.679
.419
.830
.578
.651
.825
.836
.765
.772
-.604
In many ways the third factor emerging from the varimax rotation may be thought 
of as an "altruism" dimension, encompassing the goals of helping the third world, 
promoting peace, and NOT creating a new superpower. In a similar manner to the 
two European-identity goals which constitute the second factor, the goals making
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up factor 3 would probably not be conducive to construal in a manner which made 
them subservient to British national interests.
Given that social identities are likely to be associated with social 
representations, attitudes, and opinions, it was deemed interesting to conduct a 
further analysis of these goals, this time examining whether level of European 
identity affected the importance attributed to the goals. Since European identity 
forms a good scale (standardised item alpha=.873), a composite European identity 
score was calculated simply by summing together responses to the seven separate 
Euro-identity measures. The sample was then split into two groups, on the basis 
of whether respondents scored above the median Euro-identity score (n=54), or 
below the median (n=57). This median split allowed the calculation of a between- 
subjects MANOVA with the importance ratings of the goals for integration entered 
as dependent measures, and the European identity group (above or below the 
median), as a between-subjects factor.
It can be seen from Table 80, that there is evidence for an overall 
multivariate difference in the importance assigned to the goals for European 
integration, between respondents who are above and those who scored below, the 
median Euro-identity score (Multivariate F=3.892, d.f.=10,100, pc.001). An 
examination of the significant univariate differences indicates that, in the case of 
four goals, those respondents who scored above the median Euro-identity score, 
rated these goals as significantly more important than those who scored below the 
median Euro-identity score. Given that two of these goals seem to pertain to a 
sense of European identity (C5 and CIO), it is not surprising that those expressing 
a greater sense of Euro-identity also rate such goals as of greater importance than 
those expressing a lower Euro-identity. One can also note that those above the 
Euro-identity median rate reducing trade barriers, and helping the third world, as 
significantly more important than respondents expressing a Euro-identity below the 
median. Finally, it is interesting how respondents below the Euro identity median 
rated ensuring the economic prosperity of Britain as more important than 
respondents with a Euro-identity above the median. This result seems congruent 
with Hewstone's (1986) finding that the British often feel they contribute much 
more to EC funds than the economic benefits of Community membership warrant,
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thus suggesting that a focus on the economic side of integration might inhibit the 
development of a Euro-identity amongst the British. Taken as a whole, such 
observations support the notion that social identities are likely to be associated 
with social representations. In this case, it seems that differences in the level of 
European identity expressed by respondents are also reflected in differences in the 
importance assigned to various goals for European integration. It seems highly 
likely that these differences in valued goals are likely to be a reflection of wider 
differences at the level of social representations.
Table 80s MANOVA comparing goals for Integration across Euro-identity
Overall multivariate effect (Pillals Test)s
Value-.280 F- 3.892 D.F.-10,100 Sig. of F-<.001 (n-111)
Significant univariate effectss
REDUCING TRADE BARRIERS IN EUROPE (C3)
Above Euro-Id mediant mean-6.404; Below mediant mean-5.333 Slg- .026 
HELPING THIRD WORLD NATIONS (C4)
Above Euro-id mediant mean-8.281; Below mediant mean-7.444 Slg- .045
ENCOURAGING A SENSE OF COMMON EUROPEAN IDENTITY (C5)
Above Euro-id mediant mean-5.368; Below mediant mean-3.241 Sig-<.001
ENSURING THE ECONOMIC PROSPERITY OF BRITAIN (C6)
Above Euro-id mediant mean-6.702; Below mediant mean-7.852 Slg- .020
ENCOURAGING AWARENESS OF COMMON CULTURAL TIES WITHIN EUROPE (CIO) 
Above Euro-id mediant mean-6.123; Below mediant mean-5.019 Sig- .030
( S i g n i f i c a n c a  l a v a la  d a r iv a  Cron F - t a a t a ,  and  a r a  2 - t a i l a d )
(R aaponaa a c a la t  1 (n o t  a t  a l l  im p o r ta n t)  -  10 (a x tr a m a ly  im p o r t a n t ) )
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8.5.8 Motives behind British identity
It can be seen from Table 81, that control over others, autonomy, and 
distinctiveness were perhaps the most strongly endorsed motivations associated 
with British identity. Taking into account the suggestion, made throughout the 
previous chapters, that autonomy and control often constitute important 
motivations behind British national identity, this should come as no surprise.
Table 01 - Mean endorsoment of British identity motives
------ MOTIVE------- ABBREVIATION------------  — MEAN RESPONSE—
Control over others CON 4.252
Autonomy AUT 4.241
Distinctiveness DIS 4.198
Power POW 3.826
Stability STA 3.776
Self-esteem S-E 3.713
Self-Presentation S-P 3.661
(RESPONSE SCALE: 1 (DISAGREE WITH MOTIVE) - 7 (AGREE WITH MOTIVE))
ANOVA (repeated measures): n>112 F-4.162, d.f. 6,106, p >.001
"Protected" t-tests comparing mean ratings - Significanca of 
differences (2-tailed) t
S-E AUT STA CON POW
AUT .007
STA NS .006
CON .003 NS .016
POW NS .042 NS .008
DIS .002 NS .0 1 1 NS .028
S-P NS .002 NS .003 NS
What is particularly interesting, is that the self-esteem measure was endorsed 
significantly less than the top three motives. Whilst the importance of 
distinctiveness as a motive is certainly supportive of social identity theory, the 
relatively low level of support for the self-esteem motive is also rather problematic 
for Tajfel's variant of the social identity paradigm. There certainly does seem to
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be evidence that respondents at least acknowledge the importance of other motives 
besides simply self-esteem. That distinctiveness appeared to be one of the more 
prominent motivations behind British identity is also congruent with the 
suggestion made earlier that, since national identity is often associated with 
conflictual situations such as war, it may well often be associated with relational 
or comparative orientations (cf. Brown et al., 1992). Furthermore, it seems likely 
that the specific motivations individuals associate with different identities might 
fluctuate across situations and time. In the context of British perceptions of 
European integration, it may well be that distinctiveness is valued, regardless of 
whether such distinctiveness is perceived as positive, negative, or relatively neutral 
in terms of inter-group comparisons. It also seems highly likely, given the saliency 
of the national sovereignty issue for the British, that the motives for autonomy and 
control might be especially linked to British identity when this identity is 
considered in the context of European integration. One interesting avenue for 
further research on motivation and identity to explore, is to attempt to map out and 
perhaps predict what kinds of situations and identities are associated with various 
motivations, and whether fluctuations in these associations are at all systematic.
8.5.9 Motives behind European identify
It can be seen from Table 82, that the pattern of motives typically endorsed by 
respondents when they thought about European identity, is rather similar to that 
associated with British identity. In particular, one may note the primacy of control 
over others as a motivation, which was in fact, endorsed significantly more than all 
other motives in the analysis. Once again, it is also important to observe how self­
esteem appears to be amongst the least important motivators included, being 
endorsed significantly less than control, power, autonomy, distinctiveness, and 
stability.
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Table 82 - Mean endorsement of European Identity motives
------ MOTIVE----- ABBREVIATION------------------ — MEAN RESPONSE—
Control over others CON 4.283
Power POW 3.973
Autonomy AUT 3.774
Dletlnctlveness DIS 3.614
Stability STA 3.605
Self-esteem S-E 3.211
Self-Presentation S-P 3.070
(RESPONSE SCALE: 1 (DISAGREE WITH MOTIVE) - 7 (AGREE WITH MOTIVE))
ANOVA (repeated measures): n«112 F*7.963, d.f. 6,106/ p <.001
"Protected" t -tests comparing mean ratings - Significance of 
differences (2-tailed):
DISS-E AUT STA CON POW
AUT .003
STA .029 NS
CON <.001 .012 <.001
POW .001 NS .017 .045
DIS .050 NS NS <.001 .032
S-P NS <.001 .003 <.001 <.001 . 002
It is also interesting to note how self-presentation appears to be the least popular 
motive amongst those included in the analysis, for both British and European 
identity. Taking into account the fact that large-scale categories such as those 
associated with being British or European, are often relatively dormant and low in 
salience, it is not particularly surprising if they exert self-presentational demands 
relatively infrequently. What is likely, however, is that during what we have 
termed critical situations, there will be some pressure towards self-presentation as 
a loyal in-grouper. The patriotic fervour often associated with war, for example, 
carries with it a powerful set of norms discouraging criticism of the nation and 
actions taken on its behalf. As a final note, it should also be considered that many 
personality theorists, and especially those of a psychodynamic orientation, would 
argue that important aspects of motivation may well be relatively unconscious, such
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that their existence can only be indirectly assessed via projective techniques. 
Whatever the merits and pitfalls of such approaches, it does seem likely that some 
motives may not be tapped by self-report measures of the type utilised in the 
present questionnaire. In many ways therefore, the aspect of motivation addressed 
herein is probably best described as part of the self-concept, i.e. that part of the self 
readily accessible to the respondents.
In order to compare the level of endorsement of motives associated with 
Britain, with those associated with Europe, a within-subjects MANOVA was 
conducted, the results of which are summarised in Table 83.
Table 83: MANOVA. comparing British and European identity motives
Overall multivariate effect (Plllals Test):
Value-.206 F- 3.829 D.F.-7,103 Slg. of F-.001 (n-110)
Significant univariate effects:
SELF-ESTEEM
British mean-3.691; European mean-3.236 Sig- .028
AUTONOMY
British mean-4.200; European mean-3.755 Sig- .032
DISTINCTIVENESS
British mean-4.200; European mean-3.618 Sig- .001
SELF-PRESENTATION
British mean-3.655 European mean-3.145 Sig- .015
( S i g n i f i c a n c a  l a v a la  d a r iv a  from  F - t a a t a ,  and a r a  2 - t a i l e d )
(R aaponaa a c a la t  1 ( lo w  andoraam ant o f  m o tiv a )  -  7 (h ig h  a n d o ra a m a n t))
Since British identity proved to be significantly stronger than its European parallel, 
it was not surprising to discover that, overall, respondents endorsed British identity 
motives more than European motives (Multivariate F=3.829, p=.001). Analysis of the 
univariate tests indicated that, in particular, motives associated with self-esteem, 
autonomy, distinctiveness, and self-presentation were all endorsed to significantly
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higher levels for British, compared with European, identity. This provides 
suggestive evidence that differences in the strength of social identities may also be 
associated with differences in the degree to which motivations are associated with 
those identities.
8.5.10 Correlations between identity and motives
In order to assess the associations between motives and quantitative measures of 
identity, composite British and European identity scores were created by simply 
summing together each of their seven separate constituent variables. Responses to 
the motives questions were then correlated with their respective identity score. 
Table 84 below details the correlations between British identity and responses to 
the British identity-motives questions. Whilst all motives correlate positively and 
significantly with the overall identity measure, it is noticeable that self-esteem and 
self-presentation seem to manifest correlation coefficients markedly greater than 
those associated with the other motives.
Table 841 Pearson Product Moment correlations between British Identity 
and British Identity motives
KEY:
------ MOTIVE----- ABBREVIATION--------------
Control over others CON
Power POW
Autonomy’ AUT
Dlstinctlveneae DIS
Stability STA
Self-esteem S-E
Self-Presentation S-P
Correlation coefficients:
CON_____ POW______ AUT_____DIS_____ STA_______S^E_____ S-P
BRITISH .408 .438 .455 .537 .534 .736 .675
ID
p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 p<.001
( p r o b a b i l i t i e s  a r e  1 - t a i l e d ,  e x p e c te d  d i r e c t i o n  b e in g  + v e)
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Table 85 below, contains the correlation coefficients for the associations 
between the European identity motives and overall European identity score.
Table 85: Pearson Product Moment correlations between European identity 
and European identity motives
KEY:
------ MOTIVE----- ABBREVIATION--------------
Control over others CON
Power POW
Autonomy AUT
DlstlnctlvSness DIS
Stability STA
Self-esteem S-E
Self-Presentation S-P
Correlation coefficients:
CON______POW_____ AUT_____ DIS______STA______S^E______S-P
EUROPEAN .356 .206 .109 .160 .186 .512 .548
ID
p<.001 p«.015 NS p*.029 p«.025 p<.001 p<.001
( p r o b a b i l i t i e s  a r s  1 - t a i l a d ,  e x p e c t e d  d i r e c t i o n  b e in g  + v e)
Once again, it is noticeable that self-esteem and self-presentation seem to correlate 
more strongly with overall identity than the other motives. All motives correlated 
significantly and, as expected, positively, with European identity, apart from 
autonomy, which did not correlate significantly with overall identity score (1-tailed 
p=.127). When considering the results of both the British and European analyses, 
it is clear that there is a considerable divergence between the motives respondents 
actually endorsed, and those which correlate most highly with overall identity 
measures. Whilst self-esteem was endorsed to a significantly lower level than a 
number of other motives by respondents, the preceding analyses demonstrate that, 
paradoxically, self-esteem correlates most highly with both British and European 
identity.
One problem in interpreting such correlations is that the measures of social 
identity employed were specifically derived from the Tajfel-Tumer model of social 
identity, and as such, can not be assumed to reflect all aspects of British and
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European identity. Furthermore, just because self-esteem seems highly correlated 
with these quantitative measures of British and European identity, this need not 
mean that self-esteem is as important an aspect of some of the more qualitative 
dimensions. From pilot studies conducted across all three phases of the current 
research, it became evident that some aspects of identification at the national and 
European level are rather difficult for respondents to conceptualise clearly and 
discuss in questionnaires and interviews. As we have already suggested in previous 
chapters, social identities associated with large-scale categories can often lie 
dormant, with individuals perhaps not being fully aware of the relationship 
between their sense of self-esteem and self-presentational strategies, and the 
identity in question. This supports the notion, raised earlier, that some aspects of 
motivation may be partly unaccessible to individuals. Furthermore, the current 
results serve to emphasize the need for further research into the most profitable 
ways the associations between motives and social identities might be investigated.
Despite the relatively low correlations between most of the motivations and 
the overall identity measures, it should be stressed that almost all motives 
correlated significantly and positively with the identity measure. This means that, 
whilst self-esteem and self-presentation were dominant, the other motives are still 
associated in some way with British and European identities, and should not be 
dismissed. Even if self-esteem maintenance does underlie much of social identity 
construction, this does not detract from the fact that other motives can be linked 
with identities, perhaps serving at a basic level, the self-esteem motive, which 
might therefore lie behind other, more specific motives. Given the actual motives 
respondents consciously endorsed in the current study, it can be concluded that 
there is at least enough evidence to warrant a broadening of the motivation issue 
in social identity so that the drive for positive distinctiveness is not assumed to 
hold a monopoly in terms of motivational effects upon social identity.
8.5.11 Political Orientation
Since some 59.7 per cent of respondents indicated that they did not vote in the last 
British general election, it was decided to focus on responses to a question 
concerning self-perceived left-right wing orientation. However crude such a 
dimension might appear, pilot interviews indicated that it made sense to
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respondents, who had relatively little difficulty in placing themselves on the 
dimension. In order to facilitate comparisons, the sample was split into those 
whose responses broadly came under the label "left-wing" (scores 1-3, n=43), and 
those who might be labelled "right wing" (scores 5-7, n=36).
From the previous questionnaire research, and given trends apparent in the 
Eurobarom&tre surveys, it was expected that both British and European identities 
would vary according to the political sympathies of respondents. In particular, it 
was predicted that British identity would prove significantly stronger for 
Conservative voters. In contrast, it was expected, given the results of the previous 
questionnaire and Eurobarom&tre data (e.g. Eurobaromdtre #34), that European 
identity would prove stronger for Labour voters.
As indicated in Table 86 below, a between-subjects MANOVA analysis 
comparing British identity amongst left versus right-wingers, indicated an overall 
tendency for right-wingers to manifest a significantly stronger sense of British 
identity (multivariate P= 3.55, p=.003). Univariate measures indicated that this 
difference occurred on five out of the 7 quantitative identity measures.
Since British identity has proven stronger for respondents tending towards 
the right of the political spectrum in two separate studies now, it seems that this 
association may be relatively stable at present However, against expectations, a 
further MANOVA analysis indicated that there were no significant differences in 
overall level of EUROPEAN identity, between left and right-wingers (n=80; 
multivariate F=1.542, d.f.=7,72, p=.166, no univariates approaching significance). It 
seems to be the case that this merely serves to demonstrate how issues associated 
with the EC and European integration fluctuate in terms of their associations with 
particular political ideologies and parties. Whilst in Europe, there is an overall 
trend for left-wing parties and their supporters to be more pro-European than their 
right-wing counterparts, in Britain it is often much more difficult to perceive clear- 
cut party differences. The key in many ways often appears to be the desire to 
simply take the opposite stance to that adopted by one's opponents. As a further 
example of this fluctuating relationship between politics and European issues in 
Britain, it is worth recalling Himmelweit and associates' finding that during the
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late 1970s, orientation to Europe was associated with dear-cut party differences in 
the U.K., and a good predictor of voting intentions (c.f. Himmelweit et al., 1981). 
In conclusion, the networking between British identity and political orientation 
seems more stable than that between European identity and politics, at least in 
Britain.
Table 86: MANOVA comparing British Identity across political 
orientation
Overall multivariate effect (Plllals Test):
Value-.259 F- 3.550 D.F.-7,71 Slg. of F- .003 <n-79)
Significant univariate effects:
"To what axtent do you feel British?"
Left-wing: mean-4.558 Right-wing: mean-5.472 Sig- .005
"To what extent do you feel pleased to be British?"
Left-wing: mean-4.209 Right-wing: mean-5.417 Sig-.001
"How important to you is being British"
Left-wing: mean-3.395 Right-wing: mean-4.778 Sig-.002
"How much are your views about Britain shared by other British people?" 
Left-wing: mean-3.977 Right-wing: mean-4.583 Sig-.030
"When you hear someone who is not British criticize the British, to 
what extent do you feel personally criticized?"
Left-wing: mean-3.698 Right-wing: mean-4.861 Sig-.004
( S i g n i f i c a n c e  l a v a la  d a r iv a  from  F - t e a t a ,  and  a r e  2 - t a i l e d )
(R aeponae a c a le t  1 ( lo w  i d e n t i t y )  -  7 (h ig h  i d e n t i t y ) )
However, orientations to Britain and Europe have their qualitative as well as 
quantitative aspects, and this being the case, a MANOVA was conducted to 
investigate whether left and right-wingers differed in the importance they attached 
to the goals for European integration included in the questionnaire (Table 87).
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Table 87s MANOVA comparing importance of goala for integration acroam 
political orientation
Overall multivariate effect (Plllala Teat) s
Value*.268 F* 2.565 D.F.*10,70 Slg. of F«.011 (n~81)
Significant univariate effectas
Ensuring the economic prosperity of Britain 
Left-wing mean*6.773; Right-wing mean*8.000 Slg* .033
Preventing the loss of separate national Identities 
Left-wing mean*5.432; Right-wing mean*8.081 Sig*<.001
( S i g n i f i c a n c a  l a v a la  d a r iv a  from  F - t a a t a ,  and  a r a  2 - t a i l a d )
(R aaponaa a c a la i  1 (n o t  a t  a l l  im p o r ta n t)  -  10 (a x tr a m a ly  im p o r ta n t ) )
It can be seen from an examination of Table 87, that there is evidence for a 
multivariate difference in importance ratings (Multivariate P=2.565, p=.011). 
Significant univariate differences occur on two questions, with right-wingers in 
both cases rating the goal as more important than left-wingers. The first goal 
pertains to the economic prosperity of Britain, with the second suggesting that the 
preservation of separate national identities is important. Given the fact that right­
wingers appear to manifest a stronger level of British identity, it is not surprising 
that they should stress these two dimensions, both of which have dominated the 
mass media coverage of European issues (c.f. Sotirakopoulou, 1991), as well as 
being prominent themes in responses to the previous questionnaire and interview 
studies. What is perhaps most pertinent about these two goals, is that they both 
tend to have the interests of Britain at their heart, as indeed, many right-wing 
respondents appear to have. In as much as goals endorsed are reflective of the 
acceptance of social representations of European integration, then the results 
obtained may be taken as an indication that right and left-wingers may adopt 
somewhat different social representations of European issues. It may also be the 
case that whilst general level of identity and attitudinal support for the EC and 
European integration might fluctuate considerably, the endorsement of social 
representations might be expected to be more stable, given their tendency towards 
self-perpetuation.
8.6 CONCLUSIONS
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8.6.1 British and European identities
Across three separate studies, evidence has now accumulated suggesting that British 
identity is significantly stronger, more salient, and more positively evaluated, than 
European identity, on quantitative and qualitative measures of social identity. Data 
from the current questionnaire indicated the supremacy of British over European 
identity, on all social identity measures. In fact, taken as a whole, the data suggest 
that as yet, British respondents feel little sense of European identity - a conclusion 
which is highly congruent with the findings of past research, which has indicated 
a distinct British dislike of the prospect of European integration going any further 
than its economic dimensions (CEC, 1988; Fumham & Gunter, 1989; 
Sotirakopoulou, 1991). Clearly, caution is required in making generalisations from 
the current research, which has used student respondents, to the British population 
as a whole. However, given the congruence of the results reported herein and those 
obtained by other researchers, as well as the Eurobarom&tre surveys, there is good 
reason to expect similarly low levels of Euro-identity amongst the British 
population as a whole.
8.6.2 Interdependence
Despite there being highly significant differences in the strength, salience, and 
evaluation of British and European identities, perceptions of the existence or lack 
of, interdependence in Britain and Europe were not significantly different. In 
support of our previous argument that what is critical is the evaluation of 
interdependence, rather than its existence per se, it was found that respondents 
rated interdependence amongst the British as significantly more desirable than 
interdependence between the nations and peoples of Europe. Whilst the association 
of common fate with perceptions of interdependence (c.f. Rabbie & Horwitz, 1988) 
certainly does encourage group formation and self-categorisation, interdependence 
can also be associated with perceptions of control. This is precisely how 
interdependence can actually act as a barrier to European identity, since some
338
British respondents felt that interdependence - even if economically beneficial - 
somehow meant a loss of control and autonomy for Britain.
Evidence in the current questionnaire study suggested that evaluations of 
interdependence are correlated with the Ind-Coll dimension, such that 
interdependence is evaluated more positively as orientation becomes more 
collective. In as much as perceived interdependence is supposedly associated with 
collectivist orientations and cultures (Triandis et al., 1986, 1988), then future 
research might profitably seek to investigate whether Rabbie and Horwitz's 
arguments are limited to collectivist milieux, or individuals who have internalised 
collectivist beliefs (what Triandis and associates refer to as the allocentric 
personality).
8.6.3 Possible selves
The issue of European integration is clearly one which encourages, perhaps 
demands, that citizens take a look at their national identities, and their 
corresponding perceptions of the past, present, and future possibilities for such 
identities (Schlesinger, 1991). Despite being an era in which many social identities 
may be undergoing change and re-formulation, individuals usually attempt to 
manufacture some sense of stability and continuity for their self-concepts (Marris, 
1974; Goffman, 1959a, 1959b; Breakwell, 1986). In the current study there was 
suggestive evidence that respondents often attempted to bring their sense of self 
in line with their predictions of the future. Thus, analyses indicated that those 
respondents who felt being European would become more important, had 
significantly higher levels of European identity than those who felt being European 
would become less important This result is congruent with the phenomenon of 
"anticipatory identification" apparent in interview responses and discussed at 
length in earlier chapters. Despite the alternative possibility of social identification 
actually leading to a positive sense of a future possible self, at this stage the 
anticipatory identification hypothesis appears most congruent with the data.
8.6.4 The Autonomous-Relational dimension (c.f. Brown et al., 1992)
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Analysis of the questionnaire data indicated that respondents reported making 
more frequent intergroup comparisons when thinking about Britain than when 
thinking about Europe. This suggests that orientations to Britain are perhaps more 
relational in nature than orientations to Europe. In-keeping with what one would 
expect from the hypotheses of Brown and associates (1992), and, indeed, from social 
identity theory in general, strength of relational orientation proved to be 
significantly and positively correlated with strength of identity, for both British and 
European identity. It seems to be the case that those respondents who adopted a 
European identity also engaged in intergroup comparisons. Further research might 
endeavour to discover whether it is in fact the case that manifestations of European 
identity in Britain tend to be associated with relational orientations. In the light of 
the qualitative data already collected, it might be argued that engaging in 
comparisons is perhaps one of the most practical means of conceptualising Europe 
and a possible European identity. It was certainly the case that comparing 
Europeans with North Americans, for example, seemed to help interviewees 
perceive being European in a manner which made phenomenological sense.
Contrary to the findings of Brown and associates (1992), evidence emeiged 
in the current study for a positive correlation between relational and collectivist 
orientations. Despite differences in terms of operationalisation of these concepts, 
this does, nevertheless raise the question of whether one can assume a priori, that 
a relationship will not exist between two systems of beliefs, or indeed, whether 
there is sufficient evidence to predict the direction of any association, as Triandis 
has done (Triandis et al., 1986; 1988; Triandis, McCusker & Hui, 1990). It seems 
more realistic to adopt an exploratory perspective at this early stage of research, and 
endeavour to determine under what circumstances an association might be found, 
how stable it might be, and so forth.
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8.6.5 Individualism-Collectimsm
The work of both Triandis and Brown predicts that sodal identities will be 
adhered to with more vigour when they are constructed within collectivist milieux, 
or by individuals adopting a collectivist orientation. In the current questionnaire 
study, data supported such a hypothesis, indicating that both British and European 
identities were significantly stronger for those respondents who endorsed a 
collectivist orientation. In keeping with the discovery that British was significantly 
stronger than European identity, it was also discovered that respondents tended to 
adopt a more collectivistic orientation to Britain than they did towards Europe. 
There remain some rather awkward, and perhaps even potentially insoluble issues 
here concerning order of causality: for example, what comes first, social 
identification or collectivist orientation? Despite such troublesome issues, it 
remains imperative to further investigate the significance of such belief systems for 
social identity construction.
8.6.6 Goals for European integration
In a manner highly congruent with the data emerging from the previous 
questionnaire and interview studies, it emerged that respondents tended to focus 
on economic and geo-political goals. In contrast, goals associated with 
symbolic/sentimental attachments to Europe, and the forging of a European 
identity, tended to be amongst the least important to respondents. This serves to 
indicate that it is not just level of enthusiasm which is different for the British, 
compared to, for example, the Italians, but also the nature of hopes and fears about 
integration - i.e. social representations of Europe and the EC, of what might be 
achieved, and crucially, of what should be achieved. As one might expect if social 
identities are related to social representations, a MANOVA also indicated that 
respondents who had a European identity score above the median differed 
significantly in their ratings of the importance of various goals for integration, 
when compared to respondents who had Euro-identity scores below the median.
8.6.7 Motives behind British and European identities
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In the previous questionnaire and interview studies, evidence emerged suggestive 
of the need to add autonomy, control, and power, to the list of potential motivating 
forces acting upon social identity construction. In the current questionnaire, 
respondents endorsed statements associated with these motivations to a greater 
extent than statements associated with the self-esteem motive which has been the 
solitary focus of the Tajfel-Tumer school. This was the case for motives behind 
both British and European identities. A MANOVA analysis comparing motives 
associated with British and European identities indicated that on four of the 
motives, respondents endorsed statements to a greater extent when thinking about 
Britain, than when thinking about Europe. This also provided evidence suggestive 
of the possibility that weaker social identities might engage the individual's 
motivations to a lesser extent than stronger identities, as Oakes (1987) and others 
have hypothesised. Despite these results, it was also found that self-esteem and 
self-presentation correlated particularly highly with composite identity measures, 
raising the possibility of an element of incongruence between self-report measures 
and underlying motivational associations between identity and motives. Such 
observations underscore the urgent need for a more detailed examination of the 
methodologies most suited to investigating the important links between motivation 
and social identity.
Despite the possibility of unconscious motivating forces, the current results 
nevertheless support Abrams' recent call for a much more detailed analysis of 
motivation and its role in social identity (Abrams, 1992; see also Deaux, 1992). It 
may well be the case that the motivations associated with social identities are also 
partly linked to particular situations. Given the frequent association of the 
sovereignty issue with British perceptions of European integration, it was not 
surprising to note how autonomy and distinctiveness appeared to be important 
motives behind British identity in the current study. Since the link between 
motives and identity may be the key to improved predictive power in our theories 
of social identity, there is much to recommend the further development of research 
in this area (see also Markus & Nurius, 1986; 1987).
342
8.6.8 The role o f politics in British and European identity construction
Once again, evidence emerged from the current questionnaire data that respondents 
who labelled themselves as "right-wing" had significantly higher levels of British 
identity than those who labelled themselves "left-wing". Taking into consideration 
similar trends apparent across Europe in the Eurobarom&tre data, as well as data 
from the previous questionnaire and interview studies, there seems good reason to 
suggest that this networking between political affiliation and sense of national 
identity is likely to be relatively stable.
In contrast, while left-wingers were expected to manifest a significantly 
stronger sense of European identity than right-wingers, there were found to be no 
significant differences on this dimension. This is interpreted as further evidence 
of how European issues have been used as something of a political football in 
Britain, with different parties appearing to adopt different stances in order to 
simply appear different to their opponents. However, it is interesting to note that 
right-wingers in the current study rated goals associated with maintaining the 
economic prosperity of Britain, and protecting national identities, as more 
important than left-wingers. It seems that such differences in the goals associated 
with European integration may be reflective of more general differences at the level 
of social representations of integration. The possibility exists that despite the 
unstable nature of the networking between political and European identities, 
differences in terms of the social representations adhered to, may be somewhat 
more stable.
The data emerging from the current questionnaire appear to confirm the 
utility of studying European integration, as a vehicle for the further development 
of the social identity paradigm. Many of the issues concerning motivation, the role 
of social representations and wider belief systems, as well as possible selves, have 
the added benefit of further developing our rather scant knowledge of the social 
psychological implications of European integration. Some of the more profitable 
ways this promising focus of research might be continued are addressed in the next 
two, and final, chapters.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions 1: National and European identities
9.1 O n the nature o f national identity
Data collected over the three phases of the current research has proved useful in 
illuminating some of the facets of national, and particularly, British, identity. Of 
course, in many ways the notion of a "British" identity is a simplification, since 
many British citizens feel more comfortable exerting their English, Irish, Scottish, 
or Welsh identities (c.f. Crick, 1991; Parek, 1989). Nevertheless, to the extent that 
there are elements of British life which tend to impose a "British" identity, then it 
is valid to analyse the constituent elements of such an identity, whilst accepting 
that it might be accompanied by a more specific regional type of identity. A similar 
argument can be made concerning Italian identity.
National identity, despite gaining relatively little attention from social 
psychologists, is potentially the most powerful social identity an individual might 
come to adopt (Scheibe, 1983; Tajfel, 1970; Turner, 1984). This being the case, it is 
rather unfortunate that when social identity theory is applied in unmodified form 
to the study of national identity, it often appears rather inadequate. In this sense 
the study of national identity is particularly useful - it may essentially act as a 
devil's advocate for social identity theory, highlighting areas where the paradigm 
is particularly weak, and at the same time, allowing theorists to experiment with 
possible solutions which might extend SIT in useful directions.
One of the reasons for the potency (Hofman, 1988) of national identity, is 
because national sentiments are often instilled from an early age, during education 
and socialisation (c.f. Doob, 1964; Tajfel & Jahoda, 1966). This may well be a time 
in which social identities and representations are particularly malleable. National
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identity is uniquely placed to offer all citizens of a nation a common sense of 
identity and comradeship, and to link such an identity to a national past rich in 
historical and cultural significance (A.D. Smith, 1991). Furthermore, national 
governing bodies have the potential to exert a powerful influence upon the citizens 
of a nation, and are perhaps in a better position than most other groups to 
influence the dissemination of social representations (Doob, 1964).
Like many large-scale social identities, national identity may often lie 
dormant, relatively low in salience, but, crucially, maintaining an inherent ability 
to exert a powerful influence upon citizens when aroused (see also Samuel, 1989a). 
In the interview study, it emerged that national sporting events, and, of course, 
wars, are highly likely to make British, and, most likely the majority of national 
identities, salient One additional property of national identities, is a tendency for 
their intertwining with other social identities in individuals' identity repertoires, ► 
such that the social representations associated with national identity may well be 
largely determined by some of the other social identities adopted by citizens. The 
primary candidate here is often political identity. In both the 1991 and 1993 
questionnaire studies, it emerged that political affiliations affected the quantitative 
dimensions of British identity, such that Conservative voters expressed a stronger 
and more positive sense of British identity, than Labour voters. It seems likely that 
such interconnections between social identities will also be manifested at the more 
qualitative level of social representations, and, furthermore, that a number of other 
social identities might well also interact with national identity - racial, regional, 
and religious identities, for example, are all possible mediators of national identity.
It was interesting to note how the Italians, for example, often seemed to mediate 
their national identity with regional identities, but that, in contrast to the British, 
political identity did not seem to mediate Italian national identity, at least in 
quantitative terms. One of the most important conclusions to be drawn here is that 
national identity, being large-scale and diffuse in nature, allows a variety of 
conceptualisations, such that "being British" might well mean something quite 
different to different citizens in Britain. The key point, is that much depends on 
the social representations of Britain which are endorsed, this choice being made 
from quite a variety of sometimes diametrically opposed representations. One of 
the ways in which individuals are helped in making their selection from these
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available social representations, is via the recommendations of other social 
identities which might be networked with national identity.
National identity, being a rather complex construct, might usefully be
broken down into some of its more crucial elements. These include, amongst other
things:
i) Geographical representations of the nation, its landscape, climate, etc.
ii) Representations of national culture and heritage.
iii) Awareness of the nation as a historical entity.
iv) Civic identity - that part of national identity specifically associated 
with the state and national institutions.
v) Linguistic identity - especially in nations with one or more unique 
languages.
vi) Representations of the national populace - of special significance are 
perceptions of national characteristics.
Since national and other similarly complex social identities appear to possess 
multiple dimensions of this nature, it is certainly over-simplistic, and rather 
difficult to justify, the operationalisation of the national identity dynamic in over- 
simplistic ways which may do injustice to the complexity of the concept. Reducing 
the cultural and historical elements of national identity to quantitative variables, 
for example, seems absurd, and this being the case, such complex phenomena 
demand a variety of research methodologies and perspectives, if their many facets 
are to be fully appreciated. Furthermore, it seems likely that all elements of these 
identities need not be in harmony. Where one element of the identity might be 
associated with embarrassment or regret, this might be compensated for by another 
dimension of the identity. An excellent example of this appears to be the tendency 
of Italian respondents in the current research to express considerable distaste at the 
inefficiency of Italian bureaucracy, corruption, and so forth, but to compensate for 
this, and still be able to manufacture a positive national identity, by stressing the 
value of Italian culture, and perceived aspects of the Italian national character.
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There is a sense in which individuals might come to customise their social 
identities, much in the same way that Breakwell (1991) has suggested they 
customise social representations. For example, this might be manifested in the 
orientation or type o f attachment individuals adopt towards the identity. Kelman 
(1969), for example, himself specifically interested in national identity, proposed 
that some individuals develop sentimental attachments to the nation, which are 
based on emotional ties to national culture and symbols. National identity based 
upon sentimental attachments is likely to be particularly robust and affect-laden, 
and is usually accompanied by the internalisation of a nationalistic ideology. Those 
individuals who reject such ideologies might still develop an attachment to the 
nation, but one which is based on instrumental dimensions, such as gains versus 
losses type analyses of the benefits associated with citizenship, satisfaction with 
political organisations and public services, etc. While the distinction between 
sentimental and instrumental attachments may sometimes appear blurred, Kelman 
has nonetheless provided a useful conceptual tool for examining the different 
manifestations of national identity, and, it is suggested here, such a distinction can 
also be usefully applied to the subject of European identity. Despite the limitations 
of such potentially simplistic heuristic devices, it is, nevertheless, interesting to 
note how the sentimental-instrumental distinction is highly congruent with similar 
notions suggested by Hewstone (1986), Inglehart & Reif (1991), and others. In as 
much as different orientations might in turn be reflected in differences at the level 
of motivations associated with identities, then such constructs might aid the further 
investigation of the motivational bases of social identification. There would be 
much utility in future research which attempted to investigate the situations, social 
representations, and so forth, which influence the orientation adopted towards a 
social identity.
In the current study, open-ended questionnaire and interview responses 
suggested a multi-dimensional British identity, encompassing instrumental 
orientations based largely upon satisfaction with democratic and other state 
institutions, but also strong sentimental orientations to Britain, deriving from a 
powerful attachment to national culture and heritage. The royal family proved to 
be an especially salient symbol of Britain (c.f. Billig, 1992; Naim, 1989; Samuel, 
1989a; 1989b), although it is worth noting that aspects of British prototypes and
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general objects of national pride also evinced a degree of situational fluctuation, 
such that events occurring in close temporal proximity to the data collection were 
often mentioned by respondents. This being the case, given the recent problems 
experienced by the British monarchy, it may well be that their role as symbols of 
Britain is threatened. For the Italians, the kind of "gains versus losses" type 
analyses associated with instrumental attachments to the nation were much more 
difficult to maintain, meaning that Italian national identity was largely symbolic 
in nature. This is a qualitative difference in identity construction - at the more 
quantitative level of strength, salience, and affect, associated with national identity, 
Italian identity proved no different to its British counterpart.
One further aspect of national identity in Britain and Italy is particularly 
significant for the social identity paradigm. In the course of the current study, it 
became apparent from qualitative responses that motivations for control and power 
were important aspects of national identity, in both Britain and Italy. These 
suspicions were further confirmed when a quantitative analysis of the 1993 
questionnaire data suggested that motivations for control and power were more 
closely associated with British identity than the motive for self-esteem. Such 
observations serve to confirm the theorising of Doob (1964) and Stagner (1967), and 
raise doubts as to the adequacy of Tajfel and Turner's (1979/1986) Social Identity 
Theory, which focuses exclusively on self-esteem maintenance as the sole 
motivating force behind social identity construction.
9.2 The social psychological manifestations of European integration
9.2.1 Attitudes are not enough
The vast majority of scholarly work which has examined the psychological import 
of European integration has adopted an attitudinal approach (see, for example, the 
Eurobarometre surveys; Hewstone, 1986; Inglehart, 1971, 1977; Inglehart & Reif, 
1991). Whilst attitudes are potentially important aspects of beliefs and actions, an 
equally relevant issue is where these attitudes come from. In their seminal 
discussion of the relationship between attitudes and social representations, Jaspars
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and Fraser (1984) suggest that we might usefully conceive of attitudes as shared 
between the members of social groups, and as serving to differentiate between 
groups in society. The conception of the attitude they develop also rests heavily on 
the assumption that shared attitudes in turn presuppose shared representations. 
Since social representations might, in turn, be associated with social identities, then 
it should be clear that attitudes are also likely to be linked to social identity (Hogg 
& Abrams, 1988). In fact, it is interesting to note that functional theories of the 
attitude (e.g. Katz, 1960; Abelson & Prentice, 1989) have often included the notion 
that attitudes serve an identity function. Furthermore, the association between 
group membership and attitudes was explored quite thoroughly by theorists 
working within the reference group tradition (see, for example, Charters & 
Newcomb, 1958). There would, therefore, seem much utility in adopting an 
approach to attitudes in the future, which also takes into account their basis in 
social identities and representations.
The current research may be interpreted as attempting to redress this overly 
attitudinal bias in work on European integration. One of the primary aims of the 
current research has been to chart the effects of integration on national identity in 
Britain and Italy, and to examine the evidence for a European identity. It has 
become clear over the course of the research that this is a critical period for national 
and European identities in Europe, with the fate of one being intertwined with that 
of the other. Moves towards further European integration demand that citizens re­
think the meaning and nature of nationhood. At the same time, one should note 
that existing social representations of nations and Europe constitute a context and 
background within which new social representations may be negotiated. These new 
representations may therefore derive in part from a re-working of existing social 
beliefs, with new and potentially challenging social representations being anchored 
into more comfortable, existing systems of beliefs (Moscovici, 1984). The major 
vehicle for the dissemination of these social representations is the mass media - 
especially newspapers and television (Schlesinger, 1991). When citizens come to 
construe their national, European, and other social identities, they do so only after 
taking stock of the pertinent social representations available to them.
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It is, therefore, almost impossible to ask questions about national and 
European identities without also raising the issue of relevant social representations 
on which such identities are based. Since representations of European nations, and 
even of European integration, have been circulating in society for a good few 
centuries now, the study of European integration is certainly not just the study of 
new social representations - it is the study of how new representations are 
networked and anchored into existing ones, and, furthermore, how such networks 
of representations lay the foundations for the construction and re-formulation of 
social identities.
9.2.2 European integration as an "expert domain"
Despite expressing a certain amount of interest in European integration, the general 
public in most European nations possess a disturbingly low level of knowledge 
about European matters and the E.C. (Hewstone, 1986). In the current research it 
became apparent that both the British and Italian respondents felt confused about 
integration, as if the whole issue demanded much more knowledge than they had 
in their possession. This perception of European integration as an "expert domain" 
was compounded by a feeling of distance and lack of control - citizens did not feel 
they had the opportunity to influence the progress of integration. To an extent, 
therefore, citizens perceive themselves as isolated from the whole European process 
- in this light, it is perhaps not surprising that many citizens remain rather ignorant 
of European politics. The danger of perceiving European issues in this light is that 
it may act as a barrier to the development of a European identity - as Breakwell 
(1992) has recently suggested, perceptions of low self-efficacy tend to promote 
withdrawal from political activity.
9.2.3 European integration and the British
Almost all of the existing empirical research on European integration suggests that 
the British are, at best, rather sceptical about the European project (see, for example, 
Eurobarom&tre opinion polls; Fumham & Gunter, 1989; Hewstone, 1986; 
Sotirakopoulou, 1991). While the British remain generally in favour of E.C. 
membership, Eurobarom&tre opinion polls usually show them both to be the least
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enthusiastic supporters of the EC, and to be particularly unhappy at the prospect 
of integration proceeding beyond its economic dimensions.
British national identity proved to be significantly stronger than European 
identity across two separate questionnaire studies conducted as part of the current 
research. These differences emerged on fixed-response measures of social identity 
which have enjoyed widespread use amongst followers of the Tajfel-Tumer 
tradition (c.f. Tajfel, 1974; J. C. Turner, 1987). Evidence that the European identities 
manifested by British respondents were relatively weak when compared to their 
national identities, was also forthcoming from the interview study. Here, it was 
apparent that British respondents found it quite difficult to think of anything 
which made them feel proud to be European, but had far fewer problems when 
discussing objects of national pride. In fact, not only did the British respondents 
express significantly lower levels of European than national identity, but they often 
construed these two social identities as mutually incompatible, or what Hofman (op. 
cit) might have called dissonant.
Given the congruence of qualitative and quantitative data across all three 
phases of the current research, it seems that there is good evidence that British 
national identity is stronger, more salient, and more positive, than its European 
counterpart. When considered in the context of previous research (e.g. Hewstone, 
1986; Fumham & Gunter, 1989; Sotirakopoulou, 1991), and the extensive 
Eurobarom&tre surveys, there seems little reason to suggest that the current results 
will be limited to the student subject groups on which they were based. A strong 
British national identity, and a weak, poorly defined European equivalent, seems 
compatible with the existing body of, albeit largely attitudinal, data.
The current analysis of European integration was not meant to be 
exhaustive. Thus, whilst suggesting some of the reasons for this lack of European 
sentiment in Britain, it should be noted that there may well be other important 
bases for such feelings which are not addressed herein. One of the primaiy barriers 
to European identity in Britain appears to be the frequent construal of British and 
European identities as incompatible. Many British respondents perceived 
integration as a threat to British sovereignty, and associated further European
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integration with losing control over national matters, something which is likely to 
be aversive, especially if national identity is associated with a desire for control. 
Thus, British and European identities were networked as incompatible, or what 
Hofman termed dissonant (Hofman, 1988). These observations, which largely derive 
from analysis of qualitative data, are highly congruent with Hewstone's 
quantitative analysis of attitudes to the E.C. (Hewstone, 1986). Here, it was found, 
for example, that attitude towards Britain was negatively correlated with attitude 
towards the E.C.
This fear of losing national sovereignty, which has also been manifested in 
the British mass media (c.f. Sotirakopoulou, 1991), is linked to social 
representations of Britain's imperial past. In some ways, therefore, to accept a loss 
of sovereignty demands that British citizens abandon or reject social 
representations which stress Britain's past glory, which dwell on a time when, 
ironically, Britain's sphere of influence was expanding rather than shrinking (see 
also, Crick, 1991; Hewstone, 1986). That social representations of the imperial past 
appear to enjoy a marked longevity is not surprising, given that national identity 
often involves a glorification of the national past (Samuel, 1989a; A.D. Smith, 1991).
A further element behind the lukewarm orientation of the British to Europe, 
is their tendency to construe European issues in purely instrumental terms. Thus, 
British respondents focused on the economic aspects of integration, feeling that the 
most important role for Britain to play in Europe is an economic one, and limiting 
their perceptions of integration to the E.C. In general, British respondents showed 
a marked unwillingness to perceive some of the wider possibilities for European 
integration which exist, beyond those associated directly with the European 
Community. Thus, for example, British respondents felt that the differences 
between European cultures were more important than any superficial similarities, 
and found it immensely challenging to think of any symbolic or cultural basis for 
European integration. This being the case, it was not surprising to find a distinct 
lack of symbolic attachments to European identity, with integration typically being 
discussed with little or no emotion.
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Rather than perceiving similarities between Britain and other European 
nations, the British respondents found these other European nations to be useful 
outgroups to compare Britain with, stressing that Britain was essentially different 
to all other European nations. This result, which is highly congruent with that 
obtained by Lyons and Sotirakopoulou (1991), was based on representations of 
Britain which suggested that culturally, geographically, historically, and 
linguistically, Britain is different to other nations, and that these differences should 
not be ignored.
Given that the underlying base of social representations required for the 
formation of a large-scale social identification, is perhaps in a rather embryonic 
state as far as European identity is concerned, it is not altogether surprising that 
current manifestations of such an identity in Britain remain rudimentary and 
fragile, with a tendency towards instrumental, rather than sentimental, orientations. 
However, it is significant that the existing social representations of European 
integration circulating in Britain appear to be predominately negative, especially 
in terms of the prospects for integration going beyond the economic dimension (c.f. 
Hewstone, 1986; Sotirakopoulou, 1991). The British mass media in particular, have 
frequently used negative metaphors when discussing European matters, sought to 
fuel the deep-seated British distrust of the French, and voiced considerable concern 
over the threat integration poses to sovereignty and national identity (c.f. 
Hewstone, 1986; Robinson, 1991; Sotirakopoulou, 1991).
It should be stressed that some British respondents certainly did appear 
willing to adopt a pro-European stance and perhaps to augment this with some 
form of European identity. Usually, such positive European sentiments were 
accompanied by a temporal outlook focusing on the future, rather than the past- 
oriented orientation adopted by many anti-European respondents. In fact, an 
analysis of the 1993 questionnaire data, indicated that respondents who felt being 
European would become more important by the year 2000, expressed significantly 
higher levels of European identity than those who felt it would become less 
important This suggests that a more positive orientation towards a European future 
is often associated with at least an embryonic sense of European identity. It also 
raises the question of whether the notion of possible selves might be useful in our
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analysis of European integration, and this is a subject we will return to later in the 
current discussion.
However, it tended to be the case that, where the semblance of a European 
identity did appear to exist, usually in a fragile embryonic form, this was an 
identity relatively devoid of affective associations, one lacking in any perception 
of a European culture and repertoire of accessible European symbols. Often, 
European sentiments were construed as subservient to British identity, such that 
European integration was supported only to the extent that it could be perceived 
to be in Britain's interest.
One further element of British orientations to European integration, concerns 
the frequent interconnections forged between political affiliations and European 
sentiments. These interactions between political and European identities in Britain 
are often rather more complex than seems to be the case in other European nations, 
such as Italy. Whilst in Europe, there is an overall trend for left-wing parties and 
their supporters to be more pro-European than their right-wing counterparts (cf. 
recent Eurobarom&tre surveys), in Britain it is often much more difficult to perceive 
clear-cut party differences. This fluctuating relationship between political and 
European identities was apparent in the current research. In the first phase 
questionnaire, Conservative respondents expressed a significantly weaker, and 
more negative European identity than Labour voters. However, in the third phase 
questionnaire, there were found to be no significant differences on European 
identity measures between left-wing and right-wing respondents, in-keeping with 
the unstable relationship between politics and European issues in Britain. However, 
it is interesting to note that there was suggestive evidence that the social 
representations of integration endorsed by respondents might be associated with 
political affiliation. Thus, in the third phase questionnaire study, it became 
apparent that right-wing respondents were more concerned with matters of 
sovereignty and protecting Britain's economic interests, than left-wing respondents. 
Given the fact that right-wingers often appear to manifest a stronger level of British 
identity (see chapters 4 & 8), it is not surprising that they should stress these two 
dimensions, both of which have dominated the mass media coverage of European 
issues (cf. Sotirakopoulou, 1991).
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9.2.4 European integration and the Italians
Eurobarom&tre opinion polls almost always indicate that the Italians are perhaps 
the most enthusiastic of E.C. citizens when it comes to supporting the E.C. and the 
general notion of European integration. In contrast to the British, the Italian 
respondents in the current research manifested a European identity which, overall, 
was significantly stronger than their Italian national identity. In particular, it 
appeared that the Italian respondents expressed higher levels of European than 
national identity specifically on salience and affective dimensions. As one might 
expect, the Italians expressed a significantly stronger European identity than the 
British respondents, with a particularly noticeable tendency for European identity 
to be more salient for Italian respondents. Thus, the current research serves to 
demonstrate how the attitudinal differences highlighted by previous research also 
seem to be manifested at the level of social identities.
This difference in level of European identity between the British and Italian 
respondents can not be explained simply in terms of quantitative differences in 
national identities, since there was no evidence for the latter. However, there were 
important qualitative differences in social identity construction. Of particular 
significance was Italian respondents' tendency to construe national and European 
identities as mutually compatible, and even mutually reinforcing. This finding was 
compatible with Hewstone's observation that Italians' attitudes towards Italy 
proved to be positively correlated with their attitudes towards the E.C. (Hewstone,
1986). In the E.C. and European integration, many Italian respondents perceived an 
opportunity to counter the corruption and inefficiency which has become the 
trademark of Italian national politics and public services. While the British find 
integration a threat to national sovereignty, in many ways the Italian respondents 
desired the E.C. to have more control over national matters, in a manner highly 
congruent with attitudinal data emerging from the Eurobarom&tre polls. Certainly, 
therefore, one aspect of Italian pro-Europeanism appeared to be an attempt to 
compensate for a relatively weak and threatened Italian civic identity (see also 
Barzini, 1983).
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Another qualitative difference between Italian and British orientations to 
Europe, was the Italian respondents' tendency to adopt a European identity 
characterised by both instrumental and sentimental dimensions. Italian respondents 
certainly were aware of the economic benefits of integration, however they also felt 
the cultural dimensions were valuable. Whilst Italian respondents were often 
ethnocentric in evaluating Italian culture, at the same time they were able to readily 
perceive links between their own and other European cultures. Many Italian 
respondents perceived the fate of Italy to be ultimately bound up with that of 
Europe. Thus, whereas the British tended to perceive a largely economic and 
political role for Europe in the future, the Italians also perceived the possibility of 
Europe being a cultural centre. The important point here is that Italian perceptions 
of their cultural ties with Europe offer the possibility of sentimental-symbolic 
orientations to a European identity. Furthermore, the Italian perception of cultural 
ties in Europe signifies how Italian constructions of European identity are not 
simply confined to the EC and the perceived benefits of Community membership. 
This may well demonstrate the need for future research to appreciate that the social 
psychological manifestations of European integration need not be restricted to a 
focus on the EC, but may incorporate wider perceptions of European culture, 
history, and so forth.
The Italian construction of national and European identities as mutually 
compatible is crucially dependent upon the existence of social representations in 
Italy which are favourable towards European integration and the E.C Unlike 
Britain, in Italy the subject of European integration has caused considerably less 
political debate, and it was therefore not altogether surprising to find in the current 
research that European identity in Italy did not vary with political affiliation. In 
addition, the mass media in Italy have tended to adopt a rather positive orientation 
towards European integration and the EC. There has certainly been much less 
concern about the EC encroaching upon national sovereignty than that voiced in 
Britain. This favourable mass media attitude appears to be mirrored in that of the 
Italian people, at least, as far as opinion poll data are concerned.
One of the more subtle factors able to differentiate between those who are 
broadly pro-European and those who feel wary of European integration, is the
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nature of the temporal perspective adopted. Those few Britons who were eager to 
embrace a European identity tended to adopt sl future-oriented perspective, dwelling 
on what might be achieved. In a similar manner, the Italian respondents were much 
more concerned with the future, typically feeling that European integration was an 
endeavour with great potential. Such opinions are congruent with Eurobarom&tre 
data which indicate that the Italians do not necessarily feel they have gained a 
great deal yet from EC membership - the crucial point is that they feel they may 
do so in the future. In essence, therefore, there are indications that a European 
identity is more likely when a positive and future-oriented temporal perspective 
towards Europe is adopted.
It is hoped that the current research demonstrates the utility of an approach 
to European integration which examines both social identities and social 
representations. Given the fact that evidence arising from the current research 
suggests that European identity may be a significant predictor of attitudes towards 
Europe and the E.C., it seems that future research in this area might profitably 
examine in greater detail the associations between attitudes, identities, and 
representations. It is becoming increasingly difficult to justify research which 
assumes such constructs exist in relative isolation - clearly then, the study of 
European integration, in a sense itself demands an integration of social 
psychological perspectives and theories. Furthermore, to the extent that theorists in 
other social sciences are also studying European integration, and often using 
psychological constructs to do so, it seems there exists an excellent opportunity for 
inter-disciplinary collaboration.
9.2.5 Strengthening and weakening European identity: some suggestions
The integrative approach which begins to emerge from the perspective forwarded 
in the current discussion has certain implications for the future of European 
integration. If integration is to be readily embraced then it requires both favourable 
social representations and, to an extent, the acceptance of some form of European 
identity. Both of these pre-requisites are in many ways already in existence in Italy. 
Thus, below, we limit the discussion to Britain. It is possible, given the 
observations of the current and previous research, to sketch out in a general way
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some of the factors which might facilitate a more favourable climate towards
integration and the EC in Britain. These might include:
A) Encouraging perceptions of an outgroup with which to compare 
Europe with. There is certainly nothing quite like an outgroup, in 
terms of power to encourage in-group homogeneity and solidarity.
From the current research, it emerged that the U.S.A. and Japan are 
already used by some British and Italian respondents as out-groups 
for Europe (see also Billig, 1992a, 1992b, regarding the USA as an 
outgroup). However, given that recent research in the social identity 
paradigm has pointed towards the possibility of groups which make 
few intergroup comparisons (Brown et al., 1992), one should perhaps 
ask the question: should a comparative European identity be 
encouraged when it might lead to potentially conflictual intergroup 
relations?
B) Make European identity and orientations towards integration more 
multidimensional in Britain. If the Italian example is informative, 
then it might be wise to encourage a greater awareness of the 
cultural possibilities inherent in European integration, and to stress 
that these do not in any way threaten national culture, but rather 
complement it. Such a development largely depends on changes in 
the identity orientation adopted by British citizens, which in turn 
relies on social representations of integration being broadened to 
include cultural dimensions. The key point here is that European 
integration can be perceived as more than just the EC and economic 
integration, and if perceptions are broadened, then they might be 
more resilient when EC membership sometimes appears detrimental 
to Britain in economic terms.
Q  Networking national and European identities so that they are 
perceived as mutually compatible, rather than conflictual. One way 
in which this might be achieved is by turning temporal perspective 
from Britain's past, to its possible future. The encouragement of
positive possible European selves might in turn come to be associated 
with a degree of anticipatory identification (c.f. Chapter 6) with 
Europe. Alternatively, national and European identities might be 
construed as unrelated. Italy, the U.S.A., and other nations, serve to 
demonstrate the viability of both regional and national identities 
which can co-exist in a relatively harmonious manner. There is no 
reason to suppose that a homologous construction of national and 
European identities might not also be possible. If European identity 
is posited as a truly continental-level identity, then it could co-exist 
with national identities. The crucial point here is to remove the 
destructive perception of European integration and Euro-identity as 
a threat to national identity in Britain.
Give citizens a greater sense of participation in European integration, 
whilst at the same time de-mystifying European issues so that 
citizens feel such issues should concern them.
Balancing mass media representations of integration and the EC. As 
the primary source of social representations concerning European 
issues, the mass media must be encouraged to adopt a more balanced 
approach to such matters, and to avoid where possible the kind of 
trivialisation so tempting to the tabloids. It is only by means of a 
change in the social representations circulating in society, that the 
changes in social identity construction recommended in points A-C 
above might be possible. As Breakwell (1986) noted, it is difficult to 
maintain a social representation when representations at the societal 
level are against you. At present, it seems that societal 
representations of integration in Britain militate against the 
development of a European identity.
A European socialisation and education. Attitudes and general 
emotional orientations to nations are forged rather early in 
childhood, before children are even able to fully comprehend what
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nations and continents actually are (Tajfel & Jahoda, 1966). 
Furthermore, education often instils a particularly nationalistic 
perspective on world history, such that the similarities, cultural and 
historical ties between European nations, tend not to be presented 
(see also Robinson, 1991). It seems, therefore, that a European 
identity would be most robust if also instilled during this critical 
period, when socialisation in the family and via education has such 
power to instil favoured social representations and identities. There 
are already encouraging indications from the Eurobarom&tre opinion 
polls that, across Europe, the young are perhaps the most 
enthusiastic about integration. This suggests, perhaps, that social 
representations and social identities might be more malleable at an 
early age. It is also compatible with the notion that future-oriented 
possible selves (Markus & Nurius, 1987) might be especially 
important for younger people.
These suggestions are tentative in nature, and by no means meant to exhaust the 
list of possible strategies by which a European identity might be instilled. In as 
much as social psychologists often have little power to influence the mass media, 
educational practices, and so on, then the realisation of these strategies might be 
over-optimistic. We do not feel the need to detail possible strategies which might 
be employed by those who would wish to prevent or stifle a sense of European 
identity - such people, it would appear, are realising their aims quite successfully 
in Britain at present, without any need for advice from social psychologists. It is 
worth noting, however, that the antithesis of many of the strategies outlined in 
points A-F could also be employed by those who wished to prevent the emergence 
of a European identity and pro-European orientation. For example, such individuals 
might choose to downplay the possibility of any European outgroup(s); attempt to 
maintain a unidimensional and instrumental orientation to Europe; suggest that 
national and European identities are incompatible; continue to distance European 
issues from the general public; diffuse negative social representations of integration 
via the mass media; and ensure a strongly nationalist and anti-European 
environment in early socialisation and education.
Chapter 10
Conclusions 2; Social identity theory; where next?
10.1 Charting the fluctuating boundaries of social identity theory
Tajfel's original Social Identity Theoiy (Tajfel, 1974) has stimulated a very wide 
variety of research, and undoubtedly contributed to our knowledge of intergroup 
relations (c.f. Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Doise, 1988). Part of the 
attractiveness of Tajfel's theory was its simplicity: much of intergroup behaviour, 
it was argued, could be explained in terms of categorisation processes and the 
search for positive distinctiveness. Tajfel assumed that questions concerning 
individual differences and the nature of the self could be conveniently ignored, 
especially given his focus on iTxte^group processes and times when collections of 
individuals acted in relative unison (c.f. Tajfel, 1981).
Despite some innovative and successful implementations of social identity 
theory (c.f. the edited volumes, Tajfel 1978,1982), there remained something of a 
cleavage between Tajfel's theorising and the operationalisation of social identity 
by many of his followers (see also Doise, 1988). This is particularly noticeable 
when one considers Tajfel's later writings, when he came to stress on numerous 
occasions the importance of social representations and widespread beliefs for social 
identity construction (c.f. Tajfel, 1984). Coupled with an important paper on social 
stereotypes (Tajfel, 1981), this later stage of Tajfellian thinking was clearly quite 
far removed from the early experiments on categorisation which had proved the 
catalyst for social identity theory (c.f. Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963; Tajfel et al., 1971). It 
is ironic that, just as Tajfel was stressing the significance of these social factors, 
many of his followers were exploring social identity using experimental 
operationalisations of highly dubious external validity, having latched onto the 
minimal group paradigm and the cognitive notion of categorisation, but ignored the 
later Tajfellian ideas (c.f. Fraser & Foster, 1984; Lalonde, Moghaddam, & Taylor,
1987).
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When John Turner collaborated with Tajfel to create a model of macro-level 
group processes (Tajfel & Turner, 1979/1986), the outcome was an innovative 
attempt to introduce notions of the underlying social beliefs concerning groups in 
a society, into a social psychological analysis of intergroup relations. As such, the 
model has much to say about the bases of prejudice and relative deprivation. 
Despite a slight "looseness" of definition (c.f. Abrams, 1992), the macro-level model 
developed by Tajfel and Turner remains one of the most valuable theoretical 
insights to emerge from Tajfel's social identity theory, and it is unfortunate that in 
many ways the model has not been explored to the extent that it deserves. One of 
the reasons for this relative neglect of the Tajfel-Tumer model is perhaps the 
dominance of cognitive perspectives on group processes, which has arisen in recent 
years, especially in North America (see, for example, Stephan, 1985).
If Tajfel seemed to move away from cognitive approaches to social identity 
as his thinking developed, John Turner seemed to do the opposite. By the time 
Turner's ideas about social identity had fully matured, they had become "a 
cognitive redefinition of the social group" (Turner, 1982). When the collection of 
papers constituting Rediscovering the Social Group were published in 1987 (Turner 
et al., 1987), the social identity theory originally developed by Tajfel was modified 
and extended in order to encompass the complete range of both inter and intra­
group phenomena. In this sense, this marked a transition, when the Tajfel-Tumer 
approach to social identity ceased being a theory, and became a paradigm, a 
particular way of looking at group processes and a whole range of other issues, in 
much the same way that the psychoanalytic perspective has been applied to a wide 
variety of topics.
This audacious attempt by Turner and his followers to extend the 
boundaries of social identity theory rests on the key assumption that self­
categorisation underlies all group processes. Whilst Tajfel was always willing to 
recognise the validity of other concepts besides social identity, which might also 
illuminate intergroup relations, Turner is much more eager to stress the primacy 
of self-categorisation: while variables such as perceptions of common fate, 
interdependence, and so forth, might be relevant, they only operate after self­
categorisation has taken place, or so Turner would have us believe.
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However, whilst simple, elegant theories are the dream of many a social 
scientist, the array of different phenomena encompassed by the umbrella term 
"group processes" makes it rather unlikely that a single theory can do justice to all 
phenomena concerned. Some of the current flaws in self-categorisation theory 
(SCT) are problems which have been carried-over from Tajfel's theory, and remain 
unresolved. Other weaknesses arise from Turner and associates' extension of the 
boundaries of the social identity paradigm. It is imperative that these problems are 
dealt with if the social identity paradigm is to develop in a useful manner in the 
future.
10.2 Current weaknesses in the social identity paradigm
10.2.1 Individual differences and the nature of "self" are ignored
As mentioned earlier, Tajfel assumed that matters of individual differences and the 
self-concept could be ignored in social identity theory. It would appear that this 
assumption has been carried-over into Turner's SCT (c.f. Abrams, 1992; Schiffman 
& Wicklund, 1992), although the latter theory does have more to say about the 
nature of self (Deaux, 1992). Recently, it has been suggested, or sometimes implied, 
that the social identity paradigm can not be conveniently divorced from such issues 
any longer (see for example, Abrams, 1992; Breakwell, 1986,1991; Deaux, 1992). The 
adequacy of motivational constructs contained within the social identity paradigm 
is one case in point. It is noticeable that self-esteem maintenance via positive 
distinctiveness has often been the only motivation directly addressed by social 
identity theorists. Even if self-esteem does lie at the heart of many group processes, 
it is not necessarily the case that positive distinctiveness is the most likely way 
self-esteem will be maintained.
Tajfel's primary interest was in developing a theory which enhanced our 
knowledge of the dynamics underlying intergroup conflict (Tajfel, 1981). In the 
sense that his social identity theory was based on the notion of categorisation and 
comparison processes, it is not altogether surprising that positive distinctiveness 
was posited as the means by which self-esteem maintenance was undertaken. 
Turner's SCT is much less specific about the motivations underlying social
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identification or self-categorisation, appearing to endorse Tajfel's additional focus 
on simplification as a motivation behind categorisation, but leaving the question 
of positive distinctiveness and self-esteem rather open. Where Tajfel's SIT is 
flawed in its exclusive reliance on positive distinctiveness, Turner's theory is just 
as problematic in the sense that it says virtually nothing about motivation. This is 
rather surprising, given Turner's desire for SCT to become a general theory of 
group processes. A cursory glance at any detailed textbook on group dynamics 
would soon indicate the plethora of motives which have been forwarded as the 
basis for group behaviour (see, for example, Forsyth, 1990). In distancing SCT from 
individualistic theories of group behaviour, such as Lott & Lott's (1965) attraction 
theories, it would seem that Turner has also chosen to ignore the huge body of 
existing research on group dynamics, which certainly has much more to say about 
individual differences and motivations than the social identity paradigm.
Theorists not directly associated with the social identity paradigm have 
often had illuminating insights into the role of motivation in social identity, which 
Turner and associates would do well to examine. Deaux, for example, has made the 
interesting suggestion that attachment to ascribed social identities is more related 
to "fundamental questions of meaning and self-knowledge" than self-esteem 
motivations (Deaux, 1992, p.26). In a similar vein, Mitchell (1981) has proposed that 
being a member of a large-scale social group such as a nation provides the 
individual with a sense of psychological comfort and security. Abrams, one of 
social identity theory's champions (c.f. Hogg & Abrams, 1988), has proposed that 
consistency, control, material wealth, meaning, power, self-efficacy, and self- 
knowledge all be added to the list of motivating factors associated with social 
identity (Abrams, 1990; 1992).
Despite the utility of Tajfel's focus on intergroup conflict, groups do not 
always engage in conflict, and it is just as important to explain everyday social 
identity construction in relatively pacific groups (see also Breakwell, 1991). Caddick 
(1982) has made the excellent point, for example, that, if social identity theorists 
paid more attention to co-existence between groups, the paradigm might have much 
more to say about the resolution of intergroup conflict In addition, recent 
theorising in the social identity paradigm suggests the possibility of groups which
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do not rely on frequent intergroup comparisons, groups which seem much more 
involved in intra, rather than inter-group dynamics (c.f. Hinkle & Brown, 1990; 
Brown et al., 1992). In such autonomous groups (Brown et al., op. cit), positive 
distinctiveness often seems to take second place to motivations such as 
psychological security, stability, and so forth. If the social identity paradigm is truly 
the complete theory of group processes John Turner (1987) claims it is, then the 
motivations behind autonomous groups must be examined, and urgently.
Over the three empirical phases of the current study, evidence emerged 
which seemed to demonstrate how motivations of power and control appear to play 
an important part in the construction of both national and European identities, 
especially in Britain. British respondents demonstrated in open-ended responses 
a marked concern for matters of sovereignty, and a desire to exert control over 
world affairs, both of which seem suggestive of the importance of control and 
power motivations in the current context.
In the third phase of research, British respondents were asked to indicate 
the extent to which they either agreed or disagreed with a variety of motives which 
might potentially be associated with British and European identities. It was found 
that control, autonomy, and distinctiveness were the most strongly endorsed 
motivations associated with British identity, with the self-esteem measure being 
endorsed significantly less than the top three motives. In a similar manner, control 
was endorsed significantly more as a motive behind European identity, then all 
other motives included in the analysis. However, it was also found that 
endorsements of the self-esteem motive correlated highly with overall measures of 
British and European identity. Taken as a whole, these results do not suggest that 
self-esteem is not an important motivating force behind national and European 
identities. What they do suggest, is that self-esteem is unlikely to be the ONLY 
motivation behind social identity construction, and also that positive distinctiveness 
is only one of many possible means for the achievement of positive self-esteem. 
Given the relative success of Tajfel's SIT in the field of intergroup conflict, it may 
be that positive distinctiveness is often the primary motive behind social identity 
in such contexts. The addition of alternative motivations seems particularly useful, 
and necessary, when theorists attempt to apply the social identity approach to non­
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comparative groups and situations. It may even be the case that the motives 
associated with a particular social identity, and the means by which such motives 
might be satisfied, could fluctuate across different situations. For example, given 
the salience for the British of the sovereignty issue in relation to European 
integration, it may be that control and autonomy motivations are highly likely to 
be salient when British identity is made salient in the context of European 
integration.
One of the more problematic issues here concerns the nature of motives: in 
particular, are the motives gleaned from self-report measures valid? Some 
personality theorists, and especially those adopting a psychodynamic perspective, 
might suggest the significance of unconscious motivations which might only be 
accessed by projective techniques. In the current research, there was found to be 
something of a discrepancy, for example, between self-report measures of motives 
and the actual correlations of motives with social identity scores. This is clearly one 
of the many potential areas of social identity construction which touches other 
areas of psychology. In this case, it is important that social identity theorists do not 
waste time engaging in debates which have already been aired in the fields of 
personality and motivational psychology. In order to make the study of social 
identity processes manageable, researchers must ensure their focus is specifically 
based on an analysis of motivations in relation to group processes. One of the more 
promising avenues for further research may be a development of the notion of 
possible selves, which constitute individuals' notions about their self in the past, 
present and future (Markus & Nurius, 1984;1986;1987). The simple but elegant idea 
that individuals are motivated to achieve valued possible selves and to avoid feared 
ones, may be one promising means of making the link between social identity and 
motivation more concrete. There also seem interesting possibilities to integrate 
work on possible selves with the quite compatible work emerging from symbolic 
interactionist perspectives on self-narratives (see, for example, Mancuso & Sarbin,
1983). It seems likely, however, that the possible selves concept will need to be 
expanded in order to allow for the possibility of shared possible selves which 
might develop within a group. Such possible selves might thus come to be 
contained within social representations which might exist in both culture and 
cognition.
One of the ways an individual might come to "customise” his or her social 
identities, in the same way that Breakwell (1991) has suggested they might 
customise social representations, is by creating networks of associations between 
different identities. For example, an individual might come to perceive links 
between their political affiliations and their sense of national identity. These 
associations between multiple social identities raise questions about how such 
associations might be organised, whether organisational structure might be 
relatively stable, and so forth. It is unfortunate that much social identity research 
continues to endorse, usually implicitly, the assumption that, in any given situation 
a single social identity will have the most consequence for individuals, usually 
because it is highest in salience. Assumptions of this nature have resulted in the 
neglect of issues pertaining to the nature of interactions between multiple group 
memberships (c.f. Allen, Wilder & Atkinson, 1983; Breakwell, 1991; Deaux, 1992; 
Nesdale, 1989). If social identities are networked together, then this also has 
consequences for social representations, in as much as it raises the possibility of 
social representations associated with two or more social identities intermingling. 
Furthermore, to the extent that social identity networks might come to be shared 
between group members, and even enshrined in social representations, then it 
should be clear that networking does not just take place at an individual level, but 
at multiple levels.
The current research sought to demonstrate how national and European 
identities have become intertwined or networked through the process of European 
integration, and to this extent, how a focus on either identity in isolation would be 
somewhat naive. To the extent that social representations contained in the mass 
media have sought to present European integration as a threat to British national 
identity, then it seems that, at the societal level, there is pressure to network British 
and European identities as incompatible and dissonant (Hofman, 1988). Whilst 
individuals have the ultimate choice in how they organise their multiple social 
identities, in as much as social identity maintenance is a negotiative process, then 
they will be constrained by the networks recommended by society and the groups 
to which they belong.
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The further development of our knowledge of individual differences and 
their effects upon social identity might also enhance our understanding of the 
processes through which social identities change. Clearly, change in identities takes 
place at multiple levels, and might involve the group as a whole, or particular 
individuals. Changes might involve the modification of group boundaries, the 
adoption of different strategies of identity maintenance, etc, with many such 
changes relying on consummate changes in the social representations associated 
with the group. Whilst the Tajfel-Tumer model of macro-group relations (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979/1986) provides a useful framework for exploring changes in social 
identity, there remain some crucial questions associated with change at the 
individual level. For example, when an individual abandons a social identity, what 
happens to the social representations associated with that identity? Are these also 
abandoned by the individual, or have such representations become internalised to 
such an extent that they are no longer strictly associated with the group in 
question? Can once abandoned social identities re-emerge when situations 
encourage their salience? Questions such as these must be addressed if our 
knowledge of social identity construction is to be complete (see also Breakwell, 
1986; Deaux, 1992).
10.2.2 Social representations and widespread beliefs are often ignored or reduced to 
quantitative variables
Whilst many current social identity theorists pay lip-service to the notion that social 
identities and social representations are intimately related (see, for example, Hogg 
& Abrams, 1988), there is a conspicuous absence of social representations from 
much of the empirical and detailed theoretical work within the social identity 
paradigm. One of the reasons for the lack of enthusiasm towards social 
representations is undoubtedly the imprecise nature of the concept Yet the key 
notion of beliefs which are socially constructed and come to be shared between 
group members, is one which most social psychologists would have difficulty 
disagreeing with. The crucial point is that there are many alternative perspectives 
one might adopt in order to investigate social beliefs. In many ways the social 
representations approach offers a perspective, rather than a well-defined theory.
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Apart from the notions of anchoring and objectification (Moscovici, 1984), social 
representations theory has tended to promote a wide variety of empirical studies, 
but rather fewer theoretical studies of the process of social representation.
One of the most important points to emerge from the social representations 
approach is the fact that representations come to constitute ways of seeing the 
social world (Moscovici, 1984), such that they lie behind more concrete and finite 
beliefs like attitudes (Jaspars & Fraser, 1984), and attributions (Ichheiser, 1949; Farr 
& Moscovici, 1984). Furthermore, to the extent that social representations might 
become enshrined in the mass media and cultural artifacts, then they can be said 
to exist in both culture and cognition (Farr, in press). Perhaps one of the major 
reasons why the social representations approach does seem different to many 
similar perspectives, is the stress given to the content of social beliefs, with 
Moscovici forwarding a strong argument that content and process can not be 
divorced (cf. Moscovici, 1984; 1988). Whilst social cognition and other approaches 
have tended to dwell on the processes influencing content, the social 
representations approach is often used to investigate the opposite mechanism - how 
the content of social beliefs influences social perception and behaviour (see also 
Moscovici, 1988).
One way in which the social representations approach has often seemed 
incompatible with the social identity paradigm is in terms of the methodologies 
typically employed. Despite some interesting uses of quantitative measures of 
social representations (see, for example, Sotirakopoulou, 1991), it is usually the case 
that the focus on the contents of social beliefs best suits a qualitative research 
methodology. This stands in marked contrast to the predominantly quantitative and 
experimental approaches to social identity often employed by Turner and his 
followers. Since Tajfel's original social identity theory and his later theorising 
contained an implicit, and sometimes explicit (see, for example, Tajfel & Forgas,
1981), acceptance of the role of social representations, it is not surprising to note 
that there is much more qualitative work on social identity which derives from 
Tajfel, rather than Turner's, theorising (see, for example, Bourhis & Hill, 1982; Giles 
& Johnson, 1981). However, whereas in studies of social identity, qualitative data
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are usually relegated to preliminary pilot studies, in the social representations 
paradigm, they are more often given pride of place.
An excellent example of an area which would benefit from a synthesis of 
social identity and social representations perspectives, is the study of stereotypes. 
Despite Moscovici and Hewstone's argument that stereotypes are simpler and more 
rigid than social representations (c.f. Moscovici & Hewstone, 1983), we would argue 
that much hinges on how one cares to define stereotypes. Tajfel's notion of the 
social stereotype (Tajfel, 1981) as akin to a theory about groups and intergroup 
relations in a society, seems very similar to the notion of a social representation. 
When stereotypes do appear rather more limited than social representations, is 
when they are reduced to overly-simplistic quantitative measures of the personality 
traits associated with various social groups (see for example, Katz & Braly, 1933). 
Whilst Tajfel stressed the complex nature of social stereotypes, Turner, especially 
in developing his theory of social influence, has encouraged the kind of 
operationalisation of stereotypes which reduces the richness of language and visual 
imagery to a quantitative concept of stereotype which is as far removed from Tajfel 
and Moscovici's concepts as it could conceivably be.
This cleavage between Turner's definition of stereotypes and that forwarded 
by Tajfel, is particularly noticeable in the recent wave of studies which have sought 
to demonstrate the situational nature of stereotypes (see, for example, Haslam et al., 
1992). Whilst some elements of stereotypes may well fluctuate with situational 
demands, like social representations, stereotypes also seem to evince relatively 
stable core structures which often prove quite resistant to change, and can even 
come to be shared across a variety of different social groups, as appears to often be 
the case with stereotypes of national characteristics (c.f. Peabody, 1985; Chapter 
Four of the current study). Furthermore, stereotypes can also become enshrined in 
mass media social representations, and as such, these representations create a 
context within which individuals and social groups must manoeuvre when 
constructing their own interpretations of the associated stereotypes. Tajfel's notion 
of the social stereotype, especially when seen in the context of his accompanying 
ideas regarding social representations and myths informing social identity
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construction (Tajfel, 1980), seems perfectly compatible with the notion of 
stereotypes evincing a resilient core structure, and, furthermore, being contained 
in both culture and cognition. In contrast, the recent theorising and 
operationalisations of Turner and associates seem quite incompatible with the 
notion of stereotypes as a form of social representation.
In fact, whilst Tajfel's late theorising stressed both the individual and, 
crucially, group-related functions of stereotypes (Tajfel, 1981), Turner and 
associates' theorising and operationalisations of the stereotype concept seem to 
focus on how individuals make stereotypic judgements. It is indisputable that 
individuals make stereotypic judgements which often serve their valued group 
memberships. However, the operationalisations of stereotypes used by Turner and 
associates fail to take account of how stereotypes can be communicated between 
group members, and thus come to be shared social constructions, in essence, social 
representations. Whilst referent informational influence and self-stereotyping 
provide pointers as to how individuals perceive the stereotypes pertinent to their 
group, the SCT model seems an impoverished treatment of the shared, consensual 
nature of stereotypes, how they are communicated, contained in language and 
imagery, and might come to be carried in the mass media. To this extent, Turner's 
SCT provides only half an analysis of stereotypes, focusing on individual 
stereotypic perception, but leaving the nature of social stereotypes rather under­
explored.
Another form of social representation or widespread belief which has been 
neglected until recently, pertains to the existence of individualistic and collectivistic 
beliefs in society (c.f. Brown et al., 1991,*1992). As discussed at some length in the 
previous chapter, conceptual thinking on these issues is somewhat imprecise and 
muddled, with some of the thorniest issues being the operationalisation of 
concepts, and the level(s) at which such constructs operate. It certainly seems 
indisputable however, that beliefs about the nature of groups, and the individual's 
role in society, are likely to have a considerable influence upon group processes 
and, therefore, social identity construction. In the current study, it was discovered, 
for example, that overall level of social identity seems to be positively correlated 
with the adoption of a collectivistic orientation, at least as far as national and
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European identities for the British are concerned. Furthermore, the possibility that 
the individualism-collectivism and autonomous-relational dimensions might be 
correlated should be examined in greater detail since, despite Brown and associates' 
findings indicating no association, in the current research, data suggested a positive 
correlation between collectivism and relational orientations.
Brown and associates (op. cit.) may well be correct in suggesting that 
individualistic orientations to groups raise some serious problems for both SIT and 
SCT, and it remains to be seen whether the social identity paradigm will be able 
to survive the threat to its ecological validity posed by individualistic orientations 
to groups. There are, however, two highly valuable consequences of this line of 
enquiry for the social identity paradigm. Firstly, such issues demand that social 
belief systems are given much more emphasis than has previously been the case. 
Secondly, given the apparent existence of interesting cross-cultural differences in 
individualism-collectivism (c.f. Triandis et al., 1985,*1986,*1988; Triandis, McCusker 
& Hui, 1990), this line of enquiry also encourages further investigation of the cross- 
cultural validity of the social identity paradigm, something which can only benefit 
both the paradigm and the study of group processes in general (c.f. P.B. Smith, 
1991).
10.2.3 All social groups and categories are treated equally
Part of the attraction of both SIT and SCT was that both theories seemed applicable 
to all manner of social groupings (Tajfel, 1981; Turner, 1984). The social identity 
paradigm has given rise to a large body of empirical research which has focused 
on an extremely wide variety of different groups. Unfortunately, despite the 
undoubted attraction of a general theory of group processes, one should not ignore 
the fact that certain groups do often appear to be quite different to one another, 
both in terms of their essential characteristics, and, crucially, in terms of the social 
psychological processes which they encourage. In the current discussion, our focus 
has been on large-scale social categories such as national and European groups, and 
their associated social identities. It has been our argument that social identity 
processes in such large-scale entities may operate somewhat differently to the ways 
traditionally forwarded by the social identity paradigm.
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One useful conceptual distinction is worth making here, between large-scale 
categories (LSCs) and large-scale groups (LSGs). Large-scale categories such as 
nationality, are usually associated with diffuse and varying norms and social 
representations, and often appear to lack a clear-cut group structure. In contrast, 
large-scale groups, such as political parties or pressure groups, may have more 
clearly perceptible and homogeneous group beliefs, and a more rigid and 
noticeable group structure. What both LSCs and LSGs share in common is a scale 
which means that group processes often occur within sub-groups of the wider 
grouping, with it sometimes being impossible for group members to have 
knowledge of, or interact with, all other group members. This means that social 
influence processes are much more complex in such groups, where John Turner's 
prototypical positions are potentially constructed in much more complex ways than 
his operationalisations would suggest (see, for example, Turner, 1987;1991; Turner 
& Oakes, 1986;1989).
In large-scale social entities, in-groupers might conform to the norms of 
particular sub-groups, but not be overly concerned with those forwarded by other 
sub-groups of the wider category. In a similar manner, self-presentation and 
audience effects may be specifically associated with particular sub-groups. It is 
when examining large-scale social categories and groups that the significance of 
networking also becomes even more evident. Here, since the sub-groups within 
which the wider grouping is experienced, can themselves come to constitute the 
source of social identifications, then LSCs and LSGs can often be said to be 
networked with, or mediated by, other social identities. Abstract social categories 
associated with rather fuzzy and indistinct social representations, may well make 
more sense when perceived through the perceptual filter of another, more concrete 
social identity, and its associated social representations. For example, it seems to 
be the case that political affiliations are often associated with social representations 
which encourage the perception of the nation in a particular manner. In this sense, 
national and political identities can be said to be networked, with the perception 
of national identity being mediated by the social representations associated with 
political identity.
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Since perceiving the beliefs and norms of large-scale categories and groups 
is potentially problematic, the mass media play a crucial role, since it may be only 
via newspapers,, television, and film, that large numbers of category members can 
be reached. The media also serve to increase the salience of LSCs at certain times. 
It seems to be the case that identities based on potentially diffuse social category 
memberships often lie dormant and below everyday consciousness thresholds (R.H. 
Turner, 1987). This, however, should not disguise the inherent potency (Hofman,
1988) such identifications have when aroused, and it is the media who often play 
a large part in encouraging their re-emergence. Future research might endeavour to 
investigate what we might call critical situations - these are events, situations, 
perhaps just locations, which are especially likely to make particular social 
identities salient. It is already fairly obvious that war, for example, almost always 
represents a critical situation for national identity. The charting of such critical 
situations might enable a better understanding of when large-scale social categories 
and groups may come to influence behaviour and social perception. In part, such 
recommendations are reminiscent of Walter Mischel's call for a social psychology 
of situations (Mischel, 1977; see also R.H. Turner, 1987).
Since the mass media play such a crucial role in defining representations 
and manipulating the salience of large-scale categories and groups, there is an 
urgent need for further analysis of the mechanisms by which the media achieve 
such effects. It can not be assumed that mass media effects are easily predicted and 
studied (cf. Roberts & Bachen, 1981; Roberts & Maccoby, 1985; Sotirakopoulou, 
1991), and there remains much work to be done if media effects are to be usefully 
examined in the context of group processes and social representations. Clearly, 
further social psychological investigation of this field would benefit both the social 
representations and social identity paradigms.
One of the more significant conclusions to be drawn from this examination 
of large-scale social categories and groups, is essentially that there may be a need 
to distinguish between different types of social group. Whilst SIT and SCT have 
assumed the widespread applicability of the social identity paradigm to all groups, 
this should be an empirical issue, a hypothesis to be tested, rather than a taken-for- 
granted assumption. Despite the undoubted success of many empirical studies in
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the social identity literature, there have been no attempts to explore in a systematic 
manner the possible differences between types of group. In the current discussion 
we have attempted to delineate some of the typical properties of large-scale social 
categories and groups which seem particularly problematic for the social identity 
paradigm, at least in its current manifestation. There may well be other types of 
group which also pose problems for the paradigm (dyads, for example), and this 
being the case, there would seem much utility in future research which sought to 
classify, in a systematic manner, some of the different categories of groups, and 
their typical properties.
10.2.4 Social identity processes have been explored using operationalisations of 
questionable validity
The self-categorisation approach to social influence (Turner, 1987; 1991) provides 
an excellent example of how key concerns in the field of group processes have been 
examined within SCT using experimental operationalisations which should be a 
cause for concern. Turner's referent informational influence model of social 
influence (Turner, 1991; Turner & Oakes, 1989) is largely based upon laboratory 
experiments where the process of social influence is reduced to brief, decision­
making encounters, during which group norms and beliefs are conveniently 
reduced to positions on fixed-response scales, with potentially disastrous 
consequences for external validity. Unfortunately, outside the environment of the 
psychological laboratory, conflicting norms, stereotypes, and social representations 
clamour for the attention of in-groupers, who are typically not armed with a battery 
of questionnaires for their fellow in-groupers to complete and thus aid them in 
discerning the group's beliefs. The referent informational influence model leaves 
the possibility of group beliefs becoming enshrined in relatively stable social 
representations unexplored. Furthermore, the treatment of group leadership and 
status structures, which might conceivably have cross-situational stability and, 
crucially, interact with social influence forces, is woefully inadequate. Leadership, 
for example, seems to involve much more than simply being perceived as 
prototypical of the category, despite what Turner and his associates would have us 
believe (see, for example, Turner & Oakes, 1989).
375
Relying as it does on the notion of in-groupers attempting to perceive and 
internalise prototypical group positions, the referent information influence model 
is seriously compromised by its failure to adequately define the nature of 
prototypes and how they come to be perceived. For example, the particular 
definition of prototype adopted by Turner and associates is not adequately 
differentiated from the myriad of existing definitions in cognitive psychology (see, 
for example, Cantor & Mischel, 1979; Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Rosch, 1978). One is left 
wondering whether group prototypes are abstractions, notions of "ideal" group 
members, or perhaps related to the notion of currently salient exemplars of the 
category (c.f. Smith & Zarate, 1990). During the course of the current research, it 
emerged that perception of in-group prototypes pertaining to the British may be 
rather difficult, lending further weight to the argument that social influence is more 
complex in large-scale social entities. Here, the existence of multiple prototypes, 
and prototypes which evince a greater degree of situational stability than Turner 
seems to allow, both suggest weaknesses in Turner's model of social influence. 
Furthermore, Turner and associates, perhaps due to a reliance on decision-making 
methodologies, have tended to ignore situations in which groups might come to 
exert a degree of indirect influence on individuals when they are actually alone, 
perhaps via group-related communications, or even just by individuals thinking 
about the group's beliefs and norms.
If Turner's SCT is to offer a complete theory of social influence, then it 
should perhaps have more to say about those occasions when non-membership 
groups exert influence over individuals. Whilst there have been quite successful 
attempts to explain minority influence using social identity processes (see, for 
example, Mugny & Papastamou, 1982), Turner's model still appears problematic 
when one considers the possibility that social groups which are not minorities, 
might still influence individuals. Such possibilities were highlighted by Shibutani 
and others working within the reference group tradition of research (c.f. Shibutani, 
1955). It is possible, for example, that a group in which one is not a member, a 
group which one has no desire to become a member of, might still exert a degree 
of social influence over oneself. This might be achieved by the group in question 
forwarding social representations which we accept, since we respect the opinion of 
the group in question, or perhaps because we are coerced into accepting the social
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representations of this group. The latter phenomena might be related to differences 
in intergroup power structures, and is compatible with Deschamps interesting 
analysis of power and its possible consequences for social identities (Deschamps,
1982).
10.3 Towards a new social identity perspective: methodological and theoretical 
suggestions
The tendency towards questionable operationalisations of concepts in Turner's SCT 
outlined above, is perhaps a consequence of a rather narrow-minded approach to 
methodology. A great number of different methodologies have been utilised by 
social scientists in order to examine social identity construction, and it is unlikely 
that any single methodology offers a satisfactory tool for the study of such a 
complex construct (Hofman, 1988).
Across the three phases of the current research, a variety of different 
methodologies and operationalisations have been employed in order to investigate 
questions of social identity and social representation. The cross-national 
questionnaire study indicated that graphical methods of summarising and 
displaying data can be highly useful, with multidimensional scaling proving to be 
a useful tool for the investigation of social identity. The traditional quantitative 
measures of social identity used so frequently by followers of Tajfel and Turner, 
also proved to be useful, highlighting interesting differences between national and 
European identities, and facilitating the kind of straightforward comparative 
analyses which quantitative data seem well suited to. However, one of the most 
noticeable methodological observations to emerge from the current research, was 
how quantitative and qualitative data complement one another, providing different 
but equally valid perspectives on issues, as well as highlighting dimensions of 
social identity construction which the other measures may have missed. During the 
course of the current research, open-ended questioning, in both interviews and self­
completion questionnaires, proved to be particularly useful, especially when the 
focus of interest was on how social identities might be associated with social 
representations. This is primarily because social representations lose some of their 
vitality and dynamism when they are reduced to quantitative measures.
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Furthermore, interviews proved particularly suited to exploring the finer ways in 
which individuals manage their identity repertoires and come to "customise" both 
their social identities, and their social representations.
The theoretical perspective which emerges from the current discussion is 
one which suggests the need to amalgamate the study of social identity and social 
representation. This hybrid perspective has numerous implications for 
methodology, some of which have already been examined. One of the notions to 
emerge from the current research, for example, is the need to appreciate that social 
identities and representations are likely to be intertwined in networks of varying 
complexity. To the extent that both individuals and social groups might come to 
create and manipulate such networks, they may be said to exist at multiple levels - 
i.e. at the individual and group levels. Some of the most crucial questions 
concerning networks of identities have been puzzling social scientists for many 
decades now. These include how individuals might cope with potentially 
incompatible social identities, whether individuals manage their multiple identities 
in an organised manner, and how the overall identity repertoire possessed by 
individuals might affect particular social identities.
One reason why social identities might come to be tied together, is because 
they might be associated with the same, or highly compatible, social 
representations. It is just as crucial to trace the interrelationships between different 
social representations, as it is to do likewise for social identities (Breakwell, 1991). 
Unfortunately, it can be extremely difficult to perceive where one social 
representation starts and another ends, but this does not mean that networking can 
be discarded, simply because it is difficult to trace.
The addition of networking to the study of social identities does not 
necessarily mean that it is no longer feasible to study a single social identity in 
depth. What networking does suggest, however, is that the relationships between 
different social identities should be given more attention. Where the social identity 
in question proves to be especially associated with one or two other social 
identities, then it might then prove beneficial to broaden the investigation and 
examine all of the concerned identities, giving special emphasis to their interaction.
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An excellent example of the utility of such an approach is provided by the current 
research, which seems to suggest that national and European identities can usefully 
be examined in terms of two identities in interaction. It may well be that 
qualitative, graphical methods might prove especially useful in studies of 
networking, since they have proved to be quite effective in studies of belief 
structures and causal reasoning (see, for example, Antaki 1988), all of which topics 
share with networking, a need to examine the relationship between concepts.
The further development of the role of the individual in social identity 
construction, also necessitates something of a change in the typical methodological 
practices employed by researchers working in the Tajfel-Tumer tradition. Whilst 
the social identity processes which characterise groups as a whole, and instances 
where all group members act alike, are clearly consequential and worthy of study, 
it is also valid to investigate individual differences in identity construction 
(Abrams, 1992). In the current research, for example, it emerged that self-serving 
biases seem to influence the self-stereotyping process such that a positive sense of 
self is often achieved by selectively self-stereotyping only those group traits which 
are perceived in a positive evaluative light. This means that in-depth empirical 
investigation of individual social identity construction is necessary if we are to gain 
a greater insight into how individuals come to customise their social identities, 
perhaps by means of associating them with particular motivations, and by 
organising their repertoire in relatively idiosyncratic ways. It seems likely that 
interviews will prove the most useful means of accessing such aspects of identity 
construction, although the most appropriate interview methodology is a matter for 
further debate.
Identification with large-scale social entities like nations also presents some 
unique methodological problems for social psychologists. A methodology is 
required which is able to take into account, amongst other things:
i) How identification with certain large-scale entities is encouraged 
during early socialisation, before the cognitive faculties of the child 
are fully developed (c.f. Tajfel & Jahoda, 1966). This suggests the
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utility of a developmental approach to such identities, and a 
synthesis of work on socialisation and social identity.
ii) How large-scale category and group memberships often come to 
exert an influence over the other social identities in individuals' 
repertoires, especially in terms of recommended social 
representations. Large-scale social entities may well play crucial roles 
in the social identity networks individuals and groups create.
iii) The often dormant nature of social identification with large-scale 
entities, and the association of their salience with critical situations.
The research of Waddell and Cairns (1986) is worthy of note here, for 
its innovative use of methodology to explore the situational aspects 
of social identity in Northern Ireland. Clearly, social identities which 
often lie dormant and low in salience raise interesting 
methodological questions. It may be useful to examine both their 
usual dormant state, and times when such identities are "awakened", 
and how there characteristics might vary across such conditions.
iv) The common mediation of large-scale social entities by interaction 
with sub-groups of the wider category or group. Crucial issues here 
concern which sub-groups mediate the larger entity, whether the 
sub-group itself constitutes a separate social identity, and how the 
sub-group in question might colour the qualitative nature of 
identification with the wider entity, perhaps via particular 
interpretations of social representations.
The above are only some of the ways identification with large-scale entities calls 
for a different methodological and theoretical approach to that employed when 
investigating smaller, more concrete social groups (see Chapter 7 for a more 
detailed discussion).
A hybrid synthesis of social identity and social representational approaches 
has much to offer both theoretical traditions. Unlike Moscovici, we remain
380
unconvinced, however, that all social representations come to be associated with 
particular social groups. It seems to be the case, for example, that some social 
representations are so widely shared that they exist at a societal level, somewhat 
transcending group boundaries. Other representations, in the sense that they lie 
dormant, encapsulated in print, film, or other mediums, but not shared between 
people at the moment, are clearly not the property of social groups, although they 
have the potential to become so. To this extent, it might make sense to make a 
distinction between dormant and active social representations, with the latter 
actively engaging individuals and social groups, and the former being in a frozen 
state which holds the inherent potential of diffusion in the social world.
The notion that social representations constitute a background for social 
identity construction is a crucial aspect of our current argument Social 
representations circulating in society serve not only to suggest what are the key 
categories and groups in society, but also to carry notions of what being a member 
of such entities entails, of what a "group" actually is. When a social identity is 
adopted, it is accompanied by a set of social representations serving to define the 
group's normative and stereotypical beliefs, its favoured means of identity 
maintenance, and often its preferred outgroups. Given the notion of networking 
outlined earlier, it may also be the case that these social representations suggest 
which other social groups individuals should or should not identify with, as well 
as suggesting particular ways to perceive the other groups and categories available 
to the individual.
At least some groups in society seem to exist precisely because their 
members share a social representation or set of representations (Breakwell, 1991). 
This kind of observation has led some researchers to suggest that there is a danger 
of circularity when social groups are equated with social representations (see, for 
example, Potter & Litton, 1985). It is our contention that self-categorisation as a 
member of a category or group does not require the sharing of a social 
representation between category or group members. However, a shared social 
identification by default seems to imply a shared conception of the group in 
question, even if there are idiosyncratic differences in the perception of the group, 
its norms, etc. Circularity is avoided since we do not agree with the notion that all
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social representations are always associated with specific groups. For example, some 
social representations might be shared between groups, perhaps being the product 
of more than one group, such that it makes little sense talking of such social 
representations as being influenced by intergroup boundaries. Furthermore, it is 
important to note how the same social representation might give rise to or support 
quite different social identities (Lloyd & Duveen, 1988)
A crucial aspect of any social identification therefore, concerns the social 
representations associated with the category or group in question. The researcher 
needs to ascertain both the processes by which such representations serve to 
influence social identification, and, crucially, the content of such representations. 
Despite being relatively clear in Tajfel's late writings (see, for example, Tajfel,
1984), such concerns seem quite far removed from at least the majority of Turner's 
theorising. Methodologically, therefore, it is crucial to realise that the social 
representations associated with categories and groups constitute a key element of 
social identification. There have already been some interesting attempts to examine 
the association between groups and social representations (see, for example, 
Carugati, 1990), and such studies must be encouraged. One key question which 
must be tackled before empirical work in this area can really flourish, concerns 
level of analysis and the related issue of operationalisation of concepts. At what 
level do social representations operate? This is an issue which is in dire need of 
further investigation, with some theorists apparently favouring the notion that 
social representations are not carried around "in the head", but are only manifested 
in social interaction. This kind of definition is similar to Harry's notion that 
individuals carry only a part of the representation around with them, with the 
complete representation only being manifested in social contexts (cf. Harrl, 
1984/1985), and also seems compatible with discourse-oriented perspectives (see, for 
example, Potter & Wetherell, 1987). An alternative notion, and the one suggested 
here, is that while the social representation itself might only exist in a collective 
sense, individuals create their own interpretations of social representations and 
these are cognitively represented. This means that, at a methodological level, it is 
valid, and perhaps necessary, to explore both these idiosyncratic interpretations of 
representations, and the wider, shared representations. It is highly likely that
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different methodologies will be required to adequately encompass these different 
aspects of social representations.
However, such debates seem to pertain largely to what we have termed 
active social representations. The mass media are a rich source of dormant social 
representations which are often directly relevant to social categories and groups in 
society. This being the case, it is just as crucial to examine how such dormant 
representations are able to become active ones, and how they come to affect social 
identity construction. As we have repeatedly emphasised throughout the current 
discussion, knowledge of the mechanisms whereby mass media communications 
come to influence individuals and groups remains somewhat primitive and less 
than clear-cut. In as much as mass media representations have the potential to 
influence social identification, it should be clear that their study should be 
undertaken by social identity theorists, and not left to sociologists and other social 
scientists.
The current emphasis has stressed how social representations seem to 
influence social identities, and this has served the purpose of highlighting the 
utility of including empirical examinations of social representations in studies of 
social identity. However, there are also mechanisms by which social identity 
construction may come to influence social representations. For example, the social 
identities adopted by an individual are likely to have consequences for the degree 
to which various sources of social representations are given credibility. It is 
unlikely, for example, that social representations clearly associated with outgroups 
will be given much credence. It seems, then, that social identities might have an 
effect upon the legitimacy of social representations, especially when such 
representations are associated with in or out-groups. Social representations might 
also be adapted in order to better serve social identity needs (see also Breakwell, 
1991). One example of this, especially where Tajfel's need for positive 
distinctiveness is prominent, might be when a social representation is modified in 
order to allow a greater distinction between this and another representation which 
is associated with an outgroup. In this way, two groups in conflict might in time 
come to endorse completely opposite social representations, as a direct result of the 
desire to maintain positive distinctiveness. Alternatively, when there is a desire for
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greater intergroup harmony, the similarities between the social representations of 
different groups might be emphasised. It is important to stress that social 
representations of a variety of issues might be subject to such manipulations, which 
are by no means limited to manipulations of stereotypes of the in and out-group.
Since active social representations are so often associated with social 
categories and groups, then the study of social influence processes within and 
between groups should also have relevance for social representations. Moscovici, 
for example, remains rather vague as to the precise mechanisms whereby social 
representations are created and diffused. Despite the notion of "myth makers" 
(Moscovici, 1984) such as Freud and Marx, who have come to stimulate the 
diffusion of social representations, it seems unlikely that all social representations 
are diffused by such brilliant minds. There may be an opportunity in the future to 
integrate theories of leadership in groups with those of the genesis and diffusion 
of social representations. In as much as Turner's recent definitions of leadership 
stress power to define prototypicality (c.f. Turner & Oakes, 1989), then his 
definition of leadership is quite compatible with the notion of leaders being myth- 
makers - i.e. those who have the power to define and diffuse social representations. 
This definition of leadership also bears similarity to Tajfel's equation of power 
with the ability to originate and diffuse "social myths" (Tajfel, 1984). Unfortunately, 
however appealing such a definition of leadership seems, both the social identity 
and social representations approaches provide few pointers as to how individuals 
attain the position of leader. There is an interesting divergence here, since, in the 
social representations approach, agency is given to the leader him or her self, in 
that it is in their hands to create the social representation. In contrast, Turner's SCT 
suggests that perception of the group prototype, and thus, the leader, is almost out 
of the leader's hands initially, in that it is up to the group as a whole to perceive 
the prototype. Both perspectives on leadership seem to require further 
development, especially in terms of their ability to accommodate the fact that 
leadership may be enshrined in complex group power and status structures. 
Furthermore, it seems likely that studies of the diffusion of group beliefs and 
norms, the effects of different communication patterns within the group, and so 
forth, are all of potential relevance for the diffusion of social representations, and 
the perception of prototypicality.
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One further area of research which is of potential consequence for both 
paradigms, is that of salience. Despite a useful framework for assessing the salience 
of social identities being suggested by Oakes (1987), there remain many 
ambiguities in this area, which is so crucial to the predictive power of the social 
identity paradigm (see also Deaux, 1992). In terms of the interrelationship between 
social identities and representations, some interesting questions emerge around the 
theme of salience. For example, when a social identity becomes salient, do its 
associated social representations also come to be salient? The opposite process 
might also be possible, with the activation of social representations associated with 
groups in turn leading to the activation of the social identity associated with the 
group. It is interesting to note how the further investigation of the salience issue 
might in some sense require a re-appraisal of the reference group studies which, 
although conducted before the emergence of either social identity or social 
representations theory, sought to investigate in detail the associations between 
groups and social beliefs (see, for example, Charters & Newcomb, 1958).
10.4 One wav forward: social identity as a perspective
If the social identity paradigm is to overcome its current methodological and 
theoretical weaknesses, a change in direction is called for. Perhaps one of the 
barriers which must be overcome if change is to be achieved, is the desire to 
promote social identity and/or social categorisation theories as complete 
explanations of group phenomena. To an extent, theorists working in both the 
social identity and social representations traditions have been guilty of theoretical 
myopia, which has been manifested in a persistent refusal to perceive the many 
strands which offer an integration between the two perspectives. Despite notable 
exceptions (see, for example, Breakwell, 1986,1991), there is an ironic sense in which 
theorists in both camps have come to adopt their own theoretical identities which 
they are determined to keep distinct. This is damaging, in that it fragments social 
psychology, when in fact, it could be drawn together and become open to the kind 
of integration suggested in the current discussion. This integration is not simply 
a theoretical, but also a methodological one, requiring the adoption of multi- 
methodological approaches, and a greater understanding of how methods serve to 
complement one another. European integration is an excellent topic for
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experimentation with such integrative endeavours, in that its very complexity seems 
to rapidly highlight the poverty of any single theoretical or methodological 
approach.
What is being suggested in terms of the social identity paradigm, is a change 
in the kind of questions often asked, especially in the SCT tradition. Rather than 
asking, "How can social identity or self-categorisation explain phenomenon x  ?", it 
may make more sense in the future to ask "What can a social identity perspective 
add to our knowledge of phenomenon x  ?" This opens up the opportunity for 
further collaboration and integration of social identity and other approaches. A 
further, and no less important change of emphasis should centre on an 
investigation of relatively non-comparative or autonomous groups, which continue 
to raise serious doubts about the adequacy of the social identity paradigm as a 
general theory of group processes.
Whatever the ambiguities, flaws, and drawbacks, of the European ideal, it 
has as its basis the notion that certain goals can best be achieved by people 
working together, rather than at odds. Such a concern is equally applicable to social 
psychology: it seems crucial to our knowledge of group processes that different 
theories, perspectives, methodologies, and levels of analysis, are brought together, 
at least at regular intervals. If integration proves impossible, then at least the 
attempt at integration should facilitate a greater understanding of the relationship 
between different perspectives, and of the most promising directions for future 
research. European integration might just prove to be the catalyst for exciting new 
developments in social psychology, developments which will no doubt raise as 
much debate as European integration has done.
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APPENDIX A - 1991 questionnaire: British data
Appendix A.1 - Inferential statistics
Table At correlation matrix for Section A (British Identity) vara.
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6
A2 .671
A3 .680 .620
A4 .461 .512 .447
A5 .603 .576 .725 .389
A6 .530 .585 .555 .442 .562
A7 .573 .500 .503 .313 .552 .377
(all have 2-tailed p <.001)
Table B:correlation matrix for Section H (Euro. Identity) vara.
HI H2 H3 H4 H5
H2 .708
H3 .736 .621
H4 .631 .569 .657
H5 .672 .536 .778 .634
H6 .584 .470 .605 .691 .651
H7 .473 .358 .470 .483 .583
(all have 2-tailed p <.001)
Table C:breakdown of mean stereotyping difference acorea
Trait Mean Difference
Intelligent +2.554
Progressive +3.133
Conceited -1.120
Reserved - .107
Domineering - .067
Industrious +1.333
Aggressive -1.067
Passionate +2.360
Quick-tempered + .507
Ext. Nationalistic -1.613
-ve difference indicates > stereotyping to British than self 
+ve difference indicates > stereotyping to self than British
Table Dsmean evaluations of stereotype traits
Trait Mean Evaluation: l(-ve) to 7(+ve)
Intelligent 6.168
Progressive 5.991
Conceited 2.402
Reserved 3.832
Domineering 3.604
Industrious 5.953
Aggressive 2.813
Passionate 5.439
Quick-tempered 2.224
Ext. Nationalistic 3.168
Table E - MDS analysis of similarity rating's: detailed results
Stimulus coordinates for 2-dimensional solution:
BRITAIN DIM 1m 1.1578 DIM 2- 1.0424
ITALY DIM 1- -1.5174 DIM 2- -0.4269
FRANCE DIM 1- -0.4701 DIM 2- -0.9691
GERMANY DIM 1- 1.3579 DIM 2* -0.4913
EC DIM 1- 0.0122 DIM 2- -0.8412
MYSELF DIM 1- -0.5403 DIM 2m 1.6861
Iteration history (Young's 8-Stress Formula 1 used) t
ITERATION S-STRESS IMPROVEME]
0 0.31289
1 0.30453
2 0.29232
0.01221
3 0.28740
0.00492
4 0.28382
0.00358
5 0.28094
0.00287
6 0.27858
0.00236
7 0.27666
0.00192
8 0.27521
0.00145
9 0.27417
0.00104
10 0.27338
0.00079
Table  F -  c o r r e l a t i o n  m a t r i x  f o r  a t t i t u d i n a l  v a r i a b l e s
11 12 13 14 15 16
12 .610
13 .491 .573
14 .605 .529 .438
15 .275 .270 .067 .133
16 .259 .146 .174 .359 -.129
17A -.030 -.055 .072 -.099 -.054 -.115
18 .584 .472 .257 .389 .294 .339
Correlations in bold type are significant at .0001 to 0.010 
level (2-tailed)
389
Table G - Discriminant Function Analysis on groups defined by 
predicted vote In European superstate referendum
Prior Probabilitiess Group 1 (vote for)
Group 2 (vote against)
.41975 (n-34)
.58025 (n=47)
-------  Variables In the analysis after final step---------
Variable Tolerance F to remove Wilk'a L. DF Coeffs.*
BRITISH ID .835
EUROPEAN ID .659
FACTOR 1 .741
AGE .875
F4 .829
6.079
1.435
19.635
2.572
1.153
,641
,604
,748
613
602
-.469
.264
.829
-.305
-.212
^standardized Discriminant Function Coefficients
----- Variables not in the analysis after final step
Variable Tolerance F to enter Wilk's Lambda
SEX .926 .162 .591
FACTOR 2 .653 .131 .592
I7A .951 .238 .591
FI .371 .391 .590
F15 .648 .397E-02 .593
Group means:
BRITISH ID EURO ID
for 1 26.91176 31.29412
against 2 31.93617 25.27660
Total 29.82716 27.80247
FACTOR2 I7A
for 1 7.14706 4.94118
against 2 5.74468 5.10638
Total 6.33333 5.03704
F4 FI
for 1 3.38235 3.44118
against 2 3.59574 4.14894
Total 3.50617 3.85185
Significant univariate F-ratlos (with 1 an<
SEX
.44118
.57447
.51852
AGE
22.02941
22.48936
22.29630
FACTOR1
28.23529
2 1 . 0 0 0 0 0
24.03704
F15
4.67647
3.65957
4.08642
Variable
BRITID
EUROID
FACTOR1
FACTOR2
F15
FI
7.632
9.552
36.720
8.581
7.326
4.190
Significance
.0071
.0028
. 0 0 0 0
.0044
.0083
.0440
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A.2 : Descriptive statistics for attitudinal variables
i l OVERALL ATTITUDE TOWARDS EC
Frequency distribution
Cum
Mean 
Variance
Value Frequency Percent Percent
strongly against 1 2 1.9 1.9
moderately against 2 4 3.7 5.6
slightly against 3 10 9.3 15.0
neutral/undecided 4 21 19.4 34.6
slightly in favour 5 15 13.9 48.6
moderately in favour 6 36 33.3 82.2
strongly in favour 7 19 17.6 100.0
TOTAL 107 100.0 100.0
5.121 Mode 6.000 Std Dev 1
2.259 Minimum 1.000 Maximum 7.000
Valid Cases 107 Missing Cases
12 INTEREST IN FUTURE OF EUROPE
Frequency distribution
Cum
Mean 
Variance
Value Frequency Percent Percent
not at all interested 1 1 .9 .9
2 3 2.8 3.7
3 5 4.6 8.4
4 8 7.4 15.9
5 22 20.4 36.4
6 34 31.5 68.2
extremely interested 7 34 31.5 100.0
TOTAL 107 100.0 100.0
5.664 Mode 6.000 Std Dev 1.
1.829 Minimum 1.000 Maximum 7.000
Valid Cases 107 Missing Cases 0
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13 HOW OFTEN RESPONDENTS DISCUSS EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
Frequency distribution
Value Frequency Percent
Cum
Percent
hardly ever 1 23 21.3 21.5
2 18 16.7 38.3
3 12 11.1 49.5
4 14 13.0 62.6
5 22 20.4 83.2
6 10 9.3 92.5
very often 7 8 7.4 100.0
TOTAL 107 100.0 100.0
Mean 3.523 Mode 1.000 Std Dev 1
Variance 3.780 Minimum 1.000 Maximum 7
Valid Cases 107 Missing Cases 0
14________OVERALL ATTITUDE TOWARDS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
Frequency distribution
Value Frequency Percent
Cum
Percent
strongly against 1 2 1.9 1.9
moderately against 2 12 11.1 13.1
slightly against 3 9 8.3 21.5
neutral / undecided 4 16 14.8 36.4
slightly In favour 5 16 14.8 51.4
moderately In favour 6 27 25.0 76.6
strongly In favour 7 25 23.1 100.0
TOTAL 107 100.0 100.0
Mean 4.991 Mode 6.000 Std Dev 1
Variance 3.009 Minimum 1.000 Maximum 7
.944
. 0 0 0
.735
. 0 0 0
Valid Cases 107 Missing Cases 0
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15 COMPATIBILITY OP VIEWS RE . OWN NATION & EUROPE
Frequency distribution
Value Frequency Percent
Cum
Percent
totally opposed 1 9 8.3 8.4
2 15 13.9 22.4
3 25 23.1 45.8
4 23 21.3 67.3
5 22 20.4 87.9
6 11 10.2 98.1
totally compatible 7 2 1.9 100.0
TOTAL 107 100.0 100.0
Mean
Variance
3.701
2.268
Mode
Minimum
3.000
1.000
Std Dev 
Maximum
Valid Casea 107 Missing Cases
16 IN FAVOUR/AGAINST REPLACEMENT OF FLAG & ANTHEM
Frequency distribution
Mean
Variance
Value Frequency Percent
Cum
Percent
strongly against 1 37 34.3 34.6
2 19 17.6 52.3
3 14 13.0 65.4
4 18 16.7 82.2
5 11 10.2 92.5
6 2 1.9 94.4
strongly in favour 7 6 5.6 100.0
TOTAL 107 100.0 100.0
2.785 Mode 1.000 Std Dev
3.189 Minimum 1.000 Maximum
.506
. 000
.786
. 000
Valid Cases 107 Missing Cases 0
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I7A EURO SUPER-STATE REFERENDUM:CERTAINTY RE. VOTE
Frequency distribution
Mean 
Variance
Value Frequency Percent
Cum
Percent
extremely uncertain 1 11 10.2 10.3
2 15 13.9 24.3
3 10 9.3 33.6
4 13 12.0 45.8
5 8 7.4 53.3
6 17 15.7 69.2
extremely certain 7 33 30.6 100.0
TOTAL 107 100.0 100.0
4.636 Mode 7.000 Std Dev
4.706 Minimum 1.000 Maximum
Valid Cases 107 Missing Cases
I7B EUROPEAN SUPER-STATE VOTE
Frequency distribution
Vote for 
Not vote 
Vote against
Value Frequency
34
26
47
Cum
Percent Percent
31.8 
24.3
43.9
31.8
56.1
1 0 0 . 0
TOTAL 107 100.0 1 0 0 . 0
.169
. 000
Mode 3.000
Valid Cases 107 Missing Cases 0
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18 HOW MUCH BRITAIN HAS GAINED FROM B.C. MEMBERSHIP
Frequency distribution
Mean
Variance
Value Frequency Percent
Cum
Percent
nothing at all 1 3 2.8 2.8
2 12 11.2 14.0
3 14 13.1 27.1
4 16 15.0 42.1
5 33 30.8 72.9
6 21 19.6 92.5
a great deal 7 8 7.5 100.0
TOTAL 107 100.0 100.0
4.486 Mode 5.000 Std Dev
2.384 Minimum 1.000 Maximum
.544
. 0 0 0
Valid Cases 107 Missing Cases 0
APPENDIX B - 1991 Questionnaire: Italian data
B.l - Inferential statistics
Table A;correlation matrix for Italian identity vara. (aec A)
Al A2 A3 A4 A5 A6
A1
A2 .521
A3 .567 .518
A4 .553 .386 .428
A5 .637 .500 .527 .330
A6 .324 .178* .245* .290 .301
A7 .441 .500 .398 .407 .463 .106“
(all have 2"tailed p. <.001 except * ■ .05 or less, “ «not
Table B:correlatlon matrix for Euro-ldentlty vara (aection E.l)
E.l 1 E.l 2 E.l 3 E.l 4 E.l 5 E.l 6
E.l 1
E.l 2 .497
E.l 3 .544 .435
E.l 4 .405 .379 .487
E.l 5 .441 .424 .644 .398
E.l 6 .323 .203* .444 .340 .450
E.l 7 .503 .361 .471 .357 .553 .450
(all have 2-tailed p. <.001 except * * .05 or less)
Table C - MDS analysis of similarity ratingst detailed results 
Stimulus coordinates for 2-dlmenslonal solutions
BRITAIN DIM 1m -1.3245 DIM 2* 1.3768
ITALY DIM 1* 0.9897 DIM 2= 0.2667
FRANCE DIM 1« 1.1112 DIM 2m -0.5548
GERMANY DIM 1* -1.4872 DIM 2- -0.5967
EC DIM 1* 0.3254 DIM 2m -0.8355
MYSELF DIM 1* 0.6422 DIM 2m -0.1237
Iteration history (Young's S-Stress Formula 1 used) t 
ITERATION S-STRESS IMPROVEMENT
0 0.31636
1 0.31169
2 0.29710
0.01459
3 0.29267
0.00443
4 0.29049
0.00217
5 0.28906
0.00143
6 0.28802
0.00105
7 0.28721
0.00081
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T a b l e  D -  c o r r e l a t i o n  m a t r i x  f o r  a t t i t u d i n a l  v a r s .  ( I t a l .  d a t a )
FI F2 F3 F4 F5 F6
FI
F2 . 3 8 3
F3 . 1 8 7 . 3 3 4
F4 . 6 8 3 . 4 8 8 . 2 0 6
F5 . 3 0 1 . 2 1 0 .103 .274
F6 . 2 7 8 . 2 2 9 . 2 4 1 . 2 7 1 . 1 8 4
F7A .025 .097 . 1 7 0 .130 .169 . 2 0 7
F8 . 2 7 1 . 3 4 9 . 2 0 0 . 2 7 7 . 2 1 6 .159
Correlations in bold type are significant at .0001 to 0.050 
level (2-tailed)
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Table E - Discriminant Function Analysis on groups defined by
predicted vote in European superstate referendum (Ital.data)
Prior Probabilities: Group 1 (vote for) - .61905 (n»52)
Group 2 (vote against) ■ .38095 (n>32)
Variables in tbe analysis after final step
Variable Tolerance F to remove Wilk's L. DF Coeffs.*
FACTOR 1 .900 10.111 .825 .635
C5 .957 5.720 .765 .475
SEX .983 4.034 .730 -.398
FACTOR 2 .862 4.306 .700 .438
AGE (YEARS) .899 1.793 .684 -.281
^Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficients
Variables not in the analysis after final step
Variable Tolerance F to enter Wilk
ITALIAN ID .896 .826 .680
EURO ID .764 .311 .681
C15 .889 .45831E-01 .684
C3 .883 .175 .682
Group means:
for 1 
against 2
Total
for 1 
against 2 
Total
for 1 
against 2 
Total
ITALIAN ID 
30.36538 
31.50000 
30.79762
FACTOR2
13.23077
10.46875
12.17857
C3
4.78846
4.71875
4.76190
EURO ID
33.40385 
29.84375 
32.04762
AGE
21.23077
22.09375
21.55952
SEX
.63462
.81250
.70238
C15
4.69231
4.09375
4.46429
FACTOR1
27.40385
23.68750
25.98810
C5
4.01923
3.25000
3.72619
Significant univariate F-ratlos (with 1 and 82 degs. freedom) x 
Variable F Significance
EURO ID 4.4040 .0389
FACTOR 1 17.3501 .0001
FACTOR 2 7.3263 .0083
C5 6.7222 .0113
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B.2 : - Descriptive statistics for attitudinal variables
FI OVERALL ATTITUDE TOWARDS EC
Frequency distribution
Mean 
Variance
Value Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cum
Percent
strongly against 1 2 1.5 1.5 1.5
moderately against 2 6 4.4 4.4 5.9
slightly against 3 5 3.6 3.7 9.6
neutral / undecided 4 24 17.5 17.6 27.2
slightly in favour 5 14 10.2 10.3 37.5
moderately in favour 6 51 37.2 37.5 75.0
strongly in favour 7 34 24.8 25.0 100.0
(missing) 9 1 .7 MISSING
TOTAL 137 100.0 100.0
5.434 Mode 6.000 Std Dev 1.469
2.159 Minimum 1.000 Maximum 7.000
Valid Cases 136 Missing Cases
F2 INTEREST IN FUTURE OF EUROPE
Frequency distribution
Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent
not at all interested 1 2 1.5 1.5
3 8 5.8 7.3
4 17 12.4 19.7
5 21 15.3 35.0
6 47 34.3 69.3
extremely interested 7 42 30.7 100.0
TOTAL 137 100.0 100.0
Mean
Variance
5.657
1.742
Mode
Minimum
6 . 0 0 0
1.000
Std Dev 
Maximum
1.320
7.000
Valid Cases 137 Missing Cases 0
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F3 HOW OFTEN RESPONDENTS DISCUSS EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
Frequency distribution
Mean
Variance
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
hardly ever 1 22 16.1 16.2 16.2
2 33 24.1 24.3 40.4
3 17 12.4 12.5 52.9
4 24 17.5 17.6 70.6
5 11 8.0 8.1 78.7
6 20 14.6 14.7 93.4
very often 7 9 6.6 6.6 100.0
(missing) 9 1 .7 MISSING
TOTAL 137 100.0 100.0
3.478 Mode 2.000 Std Dev 1.889
3.570 Minimum 1.000 Maximum 7.000
Valid Cases 136 Missing Cases
F4 OVERALL ATTITUDE TOWARDS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
Frequency distribution
Value Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cum
Percent
strongly against 1 1 .7 .7 .7
moderately against 2 5 3.6 3.7 4.4
slightly against 3 6 4.4 4.4 8.8
neutral / undecided 4 15 10.9 11.0 19.9
slightly in favour 5 24 17.5 17.6 37.5
moderately in favour 6 56 40.9 41.2 78.7
strongly in favour 7 29 21.2 21.3 100.0
(missing) 9 1 .7 MISSING
TOTAL 137 100.0 100.0
Mean 5.500 Mode 6.000 Std Dev 1.328
Variance 1.763 Minimum 1.000 Maximum 7.000
Valid Cases 136 Missing Cases 1
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F5________COMPATIBILITY OF VIEWS REGARDING OWN NATION & EUROPE
Frequency distribution
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
totally opposed 1 6 4.4 4.4 4.4
2 11 8.0 8.1 12.5
3 36 26.3 26.5 39.0
4 40 29.2 29.4 68.4
5 25 18.2 18.4 86.8
6 15 10.9 11.0 97.8
totally compatible 7 3 2.2 2.2 100.0
(missing) 9 1 .7 MISSING
TOTAL 137 100.0 100.0
Mean 3.912 Mode 4.000 Std Dev 1.347
Variance 1.814 Minimum 1.000 Maximum 7.000
Valid Cases 136 Missing Cases
F6 IN FAVOUR/AGAINST REPLACEMENT OF FLAG & ANTHEM
Frequency distribution
Valid Cum
Mean
Variance
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
strongly against 1 30 21.9 22.1 22.1
2 25 18.2 18.4 40.4
3 18 13.1 13.2 53.7
4 22 16.1 16.2 69.9
5 17 12.4 12.5 82.4
6 8 5.8 5.9 88.2
strongly in favour 7 16 11.7 11.8 100.0
(missing) 9 1 .7 MISSING
TOTAL 137 100.0 100.0
3.434 Mode 1.000 Std Dev 1.995
3.981 Minimum 1.000 Maximum 7.000
Valid Cases 136 Missing Cases
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P7A EURO SUPER-STATE REFERENDUM*CERTAINTY REGARDING VOTE
Frequency distribution
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
extremely uncertain 1 18 13.1 13.2 13.2
2 18 13.1 13.2 26.5
3 16 11.7 11.8 38.2
4 18 13.1 13.2 51.5
5 20 14.6 14.7 66.2
6 16 11.7 11.8 77.9
extremely certain 7 30 21.9 22.1 100.0
(missing) 9 1 .7 MISSING
TOTAL 137 100.0 100.0
Mean 4.265 Mode 7.000 Std Dev 2.098
Variance 4.403 Minimum 1.000 Maximum 7.000
Valid Cases 136 Missing Cases
F7B EUROPEAN SUPER-STATE VOTE
Frequency distribution
Valid
Value Frequency Percent Percent
vote for 1 57 41.6 43.2
not vote 2 37 27.0 28.0
vote against 3 38 27.7 28.8
(missing) 9 5 3.6 MISSING
TOTAL 137 100.0 100.0
Cum
43.2
71.2 
1 0 0 . 0
Mode 1.000
Valid Cases 132 Missing Cases 5
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F8_________ HOW MUCH THE ITALIANS HAVE GAINED FROM EC MEMBERSHIP
Frequency distribution
Value Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cum
Percent
nothing at all 1 3 2.2 2.2 2.2
2 13 9.5 9.7 11.9
3 7 5.1 5.2 17.2
4 30 21.9 22.4 39.6
5 42 30.7 31.3 70.9
6 34 24.8 25.4 96.3
a great deal 7 5 3.6 3.7 100.0
(missing) 9 3 2.2 HISSING
TOTAL 137 100.0 100.0
Hean 4.619 Hode 5.000 Std Dev 1.392
Variance 1.937 Minimum 1.000 Maximum 7.000
V a lid  C ases 134 Hissing Cases 3
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APPENDIX C
The English-language questionnaire ("rate both" variant)
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Questionnaire on your views about Britain and Europe
The questions in this booklet form part of a study looking at the opinions 
people have about the United Kingdom and Europe. Please attempt to answer all 
the questions in the order in which they appear in the booklet, and as fully 
as you can. It will also help in our enquiry if you could write clearly, and 
avoid using pencil. Please note that there are no right or wrong answers to any 
of the questions - we are only interested in your opinions. In addition, your 
answers will be treated as strictly confidential, and remain anonymous - you 
will not be asked to give your name at any time.
Please attempt to answer all the questions, and as fully as possible. Some 
sections of the questionnaire have their own specific instructions - please 
follow these carefully. Should you have any difficulty answering any of the 
questions, or find seme questions ambiguous, please use the "comments” section 
at the end of the questionnaire to inform us of this. We hope you find the 
questionnaire interesting and straightforward, and thank you for your help. In 
answering this questionnaire, you are helping us to develop a greater 
understanding of this important subject area.
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SECTION A
The questions in sections (A) and (B) are concerned with how you feel about 
being British. In this section, the questions require you to answer by placing 
a X in ONE of seven boxes. The nearer you place your X to one end of the scale, 
the more you agree with the label at that end.
1. To what extent do you feel British?
extremely |____|_|____| |____ | |____|_|____ | |___ | | I not at all
British British
2. To what extent do you feel strong ties with other British people?
extremely |____|_|____| |____ | |____|_|____ | |___ | | | no ties
strong ties at all
3. To what extent do you feel pleased to be British?
extremely I____I_I____I |____ I I____I_I____ I I___ I I I not at all
pleased pleased
4. How similar do you think you are to the average British person?
extremely__|____| |____| |____ | |____|_|____ | |___ | | I not at all
similar similar
5. How Important to you is being British?
extremely__I____I I____I I____ I I____I_I____ | I___ I I I not at all
import cuit important
6. How much are your views about Britain shared by other British people?
shared by__|____| |____| |____ |_|____| |____ I_|___ I_I___ I not shared
all by any
7. When you hear someone who is not British criticize the British, to 
what extent do you feel personally criticized?
extremely__|____| |____| |____ | |____|_|____ | |___ | | | not at all
criticized criticized
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SECTION B
please write clearly, and answer as fully as possible
1. What things about Britain and the British people make you feel pleased 
to be British?
2. What things about Britain and the British people make you regret being 
British?
Describe 3 or more individuals, or groups of individuals, who you 
think reflect especially well the British national character. 
Briefly describe who each example is, and in what way each of 
your examples is typically British.
please write clearly
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SECTION C . l
In this section, we are interested in your views about different nationalities. 
As examples, we have selected the British and the Italians, and will be asking 
you to describe both nationalities. Firstly, you will be asked about the 
British. Below, you are presented with a list of ten words. For each word, make 
your best guess as to what percentage of the British people YOU THINK possess 
the particular characteristic, and write a number between 0 and 100 in the box 
marked by each word. You do not have to include the % sign after your
numbers. We realise that it may sometimes be difficult to arrive at an exact 
number - in cases of doubt please enter your best guess. Please write the 
numbers clearly.
%
intelligent_____|___
progressive |___
conceited |___
reserved
domineering
industrious
aggressive
passionate
quick-tempered
extremely
nationalistic
Now, please look at the ten characteristics above, and write below which you 
think are the three most important in describing the British.
most important 
2nd most Important
3rd most important
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SECTION C .2
In this section, you will be presented with the same list of ten words. This 
time, we would like you to describe the Italians. Below, you are presented with 
a list of ten words. For each word, make your best guess as to what percentage 
of the Italian people you think possess the particular characteristic, and 
write a number between 0 and 100 in the box marked by each word. You do not 
have to include the % sign after your numbers. We realise that it may sometimes 
be difficult to arrive at an exact number - in cases of doubt please enter 
your best guess. Please write the numbers clearly.
*
intelligent____|__
progressive I__
conceited I__
reserved
domineering
industrious
aggressive
passionate
quick-tempered
extremely
nationalistic
Now, please look at the ten characteristics above, and write below which you 
think are the three most important in describing the Italians.
most Important 
2nd most Important
3rd most Important
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SECTION D
In this section, we are interested in your views about yourself. You will be 
presented with the same list of ten words. This time, decide how well you think 
each word describes your own character, and write a number between 0 and 10 in 
the box marked "myself" by each word. The higher the number you assign to each 
word, the better you think that word describes you.
For example, if you assign "intelligent" a value of 10, this indicates that you 
feel the word intelligent describes you very well. Similarly, if you assign the 
word "industrious" a value of 0, this indicates that you do not think the word 
describes you at all.
Please write the numbers clearly.
myaelf
intelligent_____|_____ |
progressive |_____ |
conceited |_____ |
reserved
domineering
industrious
aggressive
passionate
quick-tempered
extremely
nationalistic
Now, please look at the ten characteristics above, and write below which you 
think are the three most important in describing your own character.
most Important __________________________________
2nd most important __________________________________
3rd most Important __________________________________
SECTION E
In this section, you will be asked to rate each of the ten characteristics 
below, indicating how good or bad you think it is to possess each one. You 
should answer by placing a X in one of seven boxes. The nearer you place your 
X to one end of the scale, the more you agree with the label at that end.
Place your X Id ONE of the boxes for each question
1. INTELLIGENT
extremely |____ |
good
I I I I. I I I I I I I extremely
bad
2. PROGRESSIVE
extremely | I |_
good
I I I II || || | extremely
bad
3. CONCEITED
extremely |____ | |_
good
I I I I I I I I I I I extremely
bad
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4 . RESERVED
extremely |____| |____ | |____| |____| |___ |
good
5 . DOMINEERING
extremely |___ | |____ | |____| |____| |____| I.
good
6 . INDUSTRIOUS
extremely |___ | |____ | |____| |____| |____| |_
good
7 . AGGRESSIVE
extremely |___ | |____ | |____| |____| |___ |
good
8 . PASSIONATE 
extremely |___ I |_
good
| |____ | extremely
bad
| I extremely
bad
I I I
extremely
bad
extremely
bad
I I I I I I I I I I. | extremely 
bad
9. QUICK-TEMPERED
extremely |_____I I_____I I_____I I_____I I_____I I.
good
10. EXTREMELY NATIONALISTIC
extremely |_____| I_____| |_____I I____ I I____ I I.
good
| |____ | extremely
bad
I | I extremely
bad
SECTION F
In this section you will be presented with pairs of concepts. Rate each pair 
In terms of SIMILARITY# using whichever criteria you find meaningful. You 
should answer by placing a X In one of seven boxes. The nearer you place your 
X to one end of the scale, the more you agree with the label at that end.
Place your X In ONE of the boxes for each (juestlon
1. BRITAIN - MYSELF
extremely | I I I | I I I I I I I I I extremely
similar
2. BRITAIN - ITALY
dissimilar
extremely I____I I____ I I____ I I_____I I_____I I____ I I____ I extremely
similar dissimilar
3. ITALY - MYSELF
extremely___I____ I I____ I I____ I I_____I I_____I I____ I I____ I extremely
similar
4. BRITAIN - THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (E.E.C.)
dissimilar
extremely I I I I I I I I I I I I I I extremely
similar dissimilar
5. ITALY - THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (E.E.C.)
extremely | I
similar
6. BRITAIN - FRANCE
.1 I I I I I I I I I I extremely
dissimilar
extremely |___ | |____| |____ | |_____| |_____| I_____I I____I extremely
similar dissimilar
7. ITALY - FRANCE
extremely |____I |____| |____ | |_____| |_____| |_____I I____I extremely
similar dissimilar
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8. BRITAIN - GERMANY
extremely | I I,
similar
9. ITALY - GERMANY
.1 I I I I I I I I I.
extremely |_ 
similar
10. FRANCE - MYSELF
extremely |____
similar
11. GERMANY - MYSELF
I I I I I I I I I I I I.
I I I I I I I I I I I I.
I I I I I I I I I I I I.extremely |_ 
similar
12. FRANCE - THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (E.E.C.)
extremely |____ | |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |____ |
similar
13. GERMANY - THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (E.E.C.)
extremely |____ | |_____| |_____| |_____I I_____I |_____I I,
similar
I I I I I I I I I I.
14. FRANCE - GERMANY
extremely |____ | |_
similar
15. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (E.E.C.) - MYSELF
extremely I I I I I I I I I I I.
similar
I I.
I extremely 
dissimilar
I extremely 
dissimilar
I extremely 
dissimilar
I extremely 
dissimilar
I extremely 
dissimilar
I extremely 
dissimilar
I extremely 
dissimilar
I extremely 
dissimilar
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SECTION 6 - in this section we are interested in your views about Britain 
and Europe.
please write clearly and answer as fully as possible
1. What do you see as Britain's most Important role within Europe?
Briefly explain your answer.
2. What do you see as Europe's most important role in world affairs? 
Briefly explain your answer.
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SECTION H . l
The questions in this section are concerned with how you feel about being 
European, and require you to answer by placing a X in ONE of seven boxes. The 
nearer you place your X to one end of the scale, the more you agree with the 
label at that end.
1. To what extent do you feel European?
extremely |_____| |____ | |_____|_|_____ | |_____| |____| |_____ | not at all
European European
2. To what extent do you feel strong ties with other European people?
extremely |_____| |____ | |_____|_|_____ | |_____| |____| |_____ | no ties
strong ties at all
3. To what extent do you feel pleased to be European?
extremely I_____I I____ | |_____|_|_____ | |_____| |____| |_____ | not at all
pleased pleased
4. How similar do you think you are to the average European person?
extremely |_____|_|____ | |_____|_|______| |_____| |____| |_____ | not at all
similar similar
5. How important to you is being European?
extremely |_____|_|____ | |_____|_|______| |_____| |____| |_____ | not at all
important important
6. How much are your views about Europe shared by other European people?
shared by |_____|_|____ | |_____|_|______| |_____| |____| |_____ | not shared
all by any
7. When you hear someone who is not European criticize Europeans, to 
what extent do you feel personally criticized?
extremely |_____| |____ | |_____|_|______| |_____| |____| |_____ | not at all
criticized criticized
SECTION H.2 - in this section we are interested in your views about Britain 
and Europe, and in your political beliefs.
please write clearly and answer as fully as possible
1. With which individuals, groups or political parties do you share 
broadly similar views about Britain?
2. With which individuals, groups or political parties do you share 
broadly similar views about Europe?
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3. If there were a parliamentary election over the next few days, how 
would you vote? Write clearly below the name of the party you would 
vote for, or "not vote" if you would not vote in the election.
4. How important to you are your political beliefs? Place a X in ONE of 
the boxes below - the closer you place the cross to one end of the 
scale, the more you agree with the label at that end.
Place a X In ONE of the boxes below: -
extremely I I I I J I I I I I I I I I not at all
important Important
SECTION I
The questions in this section are concerned with your opinions about Europe. 
Some of the questions require you to answer by placing a X in ONE of seven 
boxes - the nearer you place your X to one end of the scale, the more you 
agree with the label at that end. Other questions ask you to choose from a 
number of labelled answers, by placing a X in ONE of the boxes.
1. Overall, what is your attitude towards the EEC (European Community)? 
Place a X In ONE of the boxes below:-
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
strongly moderately slightly neutral or slightly moderately strongly
against against against undecided in favour in favour in favour
2. How interested are you in the future of Europe?
Place a X In ONE of the boxes below: -
extremely__I___ | |____ I_|____ I I___ I I____ I_I___ I I____I not at all
interested interested
3. How often do you discuss European affairs with other people?
Place a X In ONE of the boxes below:-
very I___ I I____ I I____ I I___ I I____ I I___ I I____I hardly
often ever
4 .  Overall, what is your attitude towards European integration?
Place a X in the box which best reflects your own opinion.
strongly moderately slightly neutral or slightly moderately strongly
against against against undecided in favour in favour in favour
5. When you think about Britain, and everything Britain stands for, 
and you compare this with your view of Europe, and everything Europe
stands for, are these views compatible with each other, or opposed?
totally |____| | | | | |____| | | |____| |____| totally
compat ib1e opposed
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6. In general, would you be In favour of, or against the replacement
of the British flag and national anthem by a European Community
equivalent?
Place a X In ONE of the hoxea belowt-
strongly |_____| | | |_____| |_____I |____ | |____ I I____I strongly
In favour against
7a. If there were a referendum over the next few days on whether Britain
should become part of a European super-state with centralised
government, bank, armed forces, and so on, how certain are you about 
how you would vote?
extremely |_____| |____ I I I I_____I I_____I I____ I I____I extremely
certain uncertain
7b. At the moment, how do you think you would vote In such a referendum?
I I I____ I I____ I
vote for membership not vote vote against membership
8. How much do you think the British have gained from membership of the 
European Community (E.E.C.)?
A great I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Nothing
deal at all
SECTION J
In this section of the questionnaire, you are asked for some personal 
Information. Please remember that your answers will remain confidential and 
anonymous. Please write clearly.
1. How old are you? __________  years
2. What sex are you? (put a X In one box) | | male |____ I female
3. In which country were you b o m ?  ____________________________________
4. What nationality are you? ___________________________________________
5. Please list below any newspapers that you read regularly:
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SECTION K - COMMENTS
Before completing this section, we would be grateful if you would look back 
through the questionnaire and make sure that you have not missed-out any of the 
previous questions. In this final section we invite you to make any comnents 
regarding the questionnaire. We are particularly interested in whether you 
found any of the questions difficult to answer or ambiguous in any way. If you 
have any comments about particular questions, please also make a note of the 
section they appear in, and the question number. Thank you again for your help.
APPENDIX D
THE ITALIAN QUESTIONNAIRE
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QUESTIONARIO RIGUARDANTE I SUOI PUNTI DI VISTA SULL'ITALIA E L'EUROPA
Le domande poste in questo libretto fanno parte di uno studio su cio' che le 
persone pensano circa l'ltalia e l'Europa. La preghiamo di riepondere alle 
domande nel modo piu' esteso possibile, rispettando l'ordine in cui sono state 
poste. La preghiamo di scrivere chiaramente evitando di scrivere a matita: 
cio' ci Sara' di grande aiuto nelle nostre ricerche. Le facciamo, inoltre, 
presente che per ogni domanda del questionario non ci sono ne' risposte giuste 
ne' sbagliate: noi slamo solo interessati alle sue opinioni. Le sue risposte 
saranno considerate strettamente confidenziali e rlmarranno pertanto anonlme. 
II suo nome non verra', d'altra parte, ne' richiesto ne' menzionato.
La preghiamo ancora di rispondere a tutte le domande come meglio puo' e per 
esteso. Alcune sezioni di questo questionario hanno specifiche istruzioni: la 
invitiamo a seguirle scrupolosamente. Se poi lei decidesse di portare via il 
questionario per compilarlo a casa, le saremmo grati se volesse campletarlo 
senza alcun aiuto e in una sola volta. Se trovasse poi alcune domande difficili 
e/o ambigue, le saremmo grati se volesse fare le sue osservazioni in merito 
nell'apposita sezione "Commenti" posta alia fine del questionario. Ci auguriamo 
che il questionario sla ben formulato e di suo interesse e la rlngrazlamo per 
la sua collaborazione. Nel rispondere a codesto questionario ci aiutera' a 
definire meglio l'area dell' argomento trattato che riveste una grande 
importanza per tutti noi.
UNA VOLTA COMPLETATO IL QUESTIONARIO, SI PREGA DI CONSEGNARLO PRESSO
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SEZIONE A
Le sezioni "A" e "B" si riferiscono ai suoi punti di vista circa l'essere 
italiano. Le domande in questa sezione richiedono che lei risponda inserendo 
una X in una delle sette caselle. Piu' la sua X e' posta vicino ad una 
estremita' della scala piu' lei e' in accordo con l'af fermazione
corrispondente.
1. Fino a che punto si sente Italiano?
estremamente |_____ | |__ I |__I I_____I I I | I |__ I non del tutto
italiano italiano
2. Fino a che punto si sente fortemente legato con altri italiani?
da fortissimi | | | | |___ | |___ | I | |___I I I da nessun
le garni legame
3. Fino a che punto si sente soddisfatto d'essere italiano?
estremamente | | I____I I I I___ I_I____ I I__I I____ I non del tutto
soddisfatto soddisfatto
4. Quanto pensi di essere simile all'Italiano medio?
estremamente | | |___ | | I I___ I_I____ I I__I I____I non affatto
simile simile
5. Quanta importanza ha per Lei l'essere italiano?
estremamente | | |___ | | | |___ I_I____ I I__I I____I non del tutto
importante importante
6. Come sono condivise le sue opinioni dagli altri italiani riguardo 
1'Italia?
condivise | | |____| | | | I |____ I | I I____ I condivise
da tutti da nessuno
7. Quando sente una persona che non e' italiana criticare gll italiani,
fino a che punto si sente personalmente criticato?
fortemente I I I I I I I I I I I I I I non del tutto
criticato criticato
422
SEZIONE B
SI prega dl scrivere con cblarezza, nel modo piu' esteso posslblle
1. Quali cose riguardo 1'Italia e gli Italiani la rendono soddisfatta 
d'essere italiano?
2. Quali cose riguardo 1'Italia e gli italiani la fanno rimpiangere 
d'essere italiano?
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3. Descriva 3 o piu' indlvidul, oppure gruppi di individui i quali 
secondo Lei rispecchino particolarmente il carattere nazionale 
italiano. Descriva brevemente ciascun esempio, e in quale modo 
ciaacuno del suoi esempi sono tiplcamente italiani.
Si prega dl scrivere con chlarezza
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SEZIONE C
In queata sezione le presentiamo una coppia di concetti. Valuti ogni coppia in 
termini di SOMIGLIANZA, giudicando quanto ritiene simili o disaimili i due 
concetti della coppia. Le chiediamo di riapondere inserendo una X in una delle 
aette caaelle. Piu' la aua X e' posta vicino ad una estremita' della scala, 
piu' lei e' in accordo con l'affermazione corriapondente.
Inaerlaca una X In UN.A delle caaelle per ognl dcmanda
1. INGHILTERRA - HE STESSO/A
estremamente | I I___ I I____I I____ I I I I___ I I___I eatremamente
simile diasimile
2. ITALIA - INGHILTERRA
estremamente | | I___ | I____I I____ I I I I___ I I___I eatremamente
simile diasimile
3. ITALIA - ME STESSO/A
estremamente | I I___ I I I I____ I I I I___ I I___I estremamente
simile diasimile
4. INGHILTERRA - LA COMUNITA' EUROPEA (E.E.C.)
estremamente | | I___ I_I____ I_I____ I I I I___ I I___ I eatremamente
simile diasimile
5. ITALIA - LA COMUNITA' EUROPEA (E.E.C.)
eatremamente | | I___ |_I____ I_I____ I I I I___ I I___ I eatremamente
simile diasimile
6. INGHILTERRA - FRANCIA
eatremamente | I I___ I_I____ I_I____ I I I I___ I I___ I eatremamente
simile diasimile
7. ITALIA - FRANCIA
estremamente | I I___ I_I____ I_I____ I I___ I I___ I I___ I estremamente
simile diasimile
8. INGHILTERRA - GERMANIA
estremamente I I I___ I_I____ I_I____ I I___ I I___ I I___ I estremamente
simile diasimile
9. ITALIA - GERMANIA
estremamente | | I___ |_I____ I_I____ I I___ I I___ I I___ I estremamente
simile diasimile
10. FRANCIA - ME STESSO/A
estremamente | I I___ I_I____ I_I____ I I___ I I___ I I___ I estremamente
simile diasimile
11. GERMANIA - ME STESSO/A
estremamente | | I___ I_I____ I_I____ I I____I I___ I I___ I estremamente
simile dissimile
12. FRANCIA - LA COMUNITA' EUROPEA (E.E.C.)
estremamente I J I I I____ I I____ I I___ I I___ I I___ I estremamente
simile dissimile
13. GERMANIA - LA COMUNITA' EUROPEA (E.E.C.)
estremamente | I I I I____ I I____ I I____I I___ I I___ I estremamente
simile dissimile
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1 4 . FRANCIA - GERMANIA
estremamente |___ | | I |____ | I___I I | I___ I I___ I estremamente
s im ile  d iss im ile
1 5 . LA COMUNITA' EUROPEA (E.E.C.) - ME STESSO/A
estremamente |___ | |___ | |____| I___I I | I___ I I___ I estremamente
s im ile  d iss im ile
SEZIONE D - in questa sezione siamo interessanti alle sue opinionl 
riguardo 1'Italia e l'Europa.
Si praga di acrlvara con chlarezza, nel modo plu' aataao poaalblla
1. Quale pensa che sia 11 ruolo piu' Importante dell'Italia nell'ambito 
dell'Europa? Spieghi brevemente la sua risposta.
2. Quale pensa sla 11 ruolo plu' importante dell'Europa negli affari 
del mondo? Spieghi brevemente la sua risposta.
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SEZIONE E.l
Le dcmande in questa sezione richiedono le sue opinioni riguardo l'essere 
Europeo. Le chiediamo dl rlspondere inserendo una X In UNA delle sette caselle. 
Plu' la sua X e' posta vicino ad una estremita' della scala, plu' lei e' In 
accordo con l'affermazione corrlspondente.
1. Flno a che punto si sente Europeo?
estremamente |__ | |___ | |___ | I___ | |___ I I___ I I___ I non del tutto
Europeo Europeo
2. Flno a che punto si sente fortemente legato con altrl Europel?
da fortissiml |___| |___ | |___ | |___ | I | I I I____I da nessun
legaml legame
3. Flno a che punto si sente soddlsfatto d'essere Europeo?
estremamente |__ | |___ | I I |___ | |___ I |___ I |___ I non del tutto
soddlsfatto soddlsfatto
4. Quanto pensl dl essere simile all'Europeo medio?
estremamente |__ | |___ | |____| I___ I I___ I I___ I I___ I non affatto
simile simile
5. Quanta lmportanza ha per Lei l'essere Europeo?
estremamente__ |__ | |___ | |___ | |___ | |___ | |___ | |___ | non del tutto
Importante Importante
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6. Come sono condivise da altri Europei le sue opinioni rlguardo 
l'Europa?
condivise |___ | |___ | |___ | |___ | |___ | |___ | |____ | condivise
da tuttl da nessuno
7. Quando sente una persona che non e' Europeo crltlcare gll Europei, 
flno a che punto si sente personalmente criticato?
fortemente I___ I I___ I I___ I I___ I I___ I I___ I I I non del tutto
criticato criticato
SEZIONE E.2 - In questa sezione slamo lnteressatl alle sue opinioni 
rlguardo 1'Italia e l'Europa; inoltre slamo lnteressatl 
alle sue preferenze politiche.
Si prega dl scrlvere chlaramenta a per aataao
1. Con quail gruppi, individual! o partiti politici condivide 
ampiamente gll stessi pareri circa L'ITALIA?
2. Con quail gruppi, individual! o partiti politici condivide 
ampiamente gll stessi pareri circa L'EUROPA?
3. Supponendo che entro pochi giorai ci fossero le elezioni
parlamentari, come voterebbe ? Scriva chiaramente qui sotto 
per quale partito voterebbe, oppure "nessun voto" se scegliesse 
di non votare alle elezioni.
Quale importanza hanno per lei le ideologie politiche? Le chiediamo 
di rispondere inserendo una X in una delle sette caselle. Piu' la 
sua X e' posta vlcino ad una estremita' della scala, piu' lei e' 
in accordo con l'affermazione corrispondente.
Inserlaca una X In UNA dalle caaelle dl cul sotto:-
estremamente |___| |___ | |___ | |___ | |____| |____ | I__ I non del tutto
Importante importante
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SEZIONE F
Le domande in questa sezione riffuardano i suoi punti di vista sull'Europa. 
Alcune domande richiedono come risposta una X in UNA delle sette caselle. Piu' 
la sua X e' posta vicino ad una estremita' della scala, piu' lei e' in accordo 
con l'affermazione corrispondente. Altre domande invece, richiedono che lei 
scelga una delle risposte, ponendo una X in UNA delle caselle.
1. In generale, quale sarebbe la sua posizione verso l'E.E.C. (La 
Comunita' Europea)?
Inaerlaca una X  In UNA delle caaelle dl cul aottoi-
I___ I I____I I____I I___ I
fortemente moderatamente leggermente neutrale o
contrario contrario contrario indeciso
I___ I I____I I___ I
leggermente moderatamente fortemente
favorevole favorevole favorevole
2. Quanto e' interessato nel futuro dell'Europa?
Inaerlaca una X In UNA delle caaelle dl cul aottot-
estremamente |___| |___ | | I | I | I | I I____I non del tutto
interessato interessato
3. Quante volte discute question! di carattere Europeo con altri? 
Inaerlaca una X In UNA delle caaelle dl cul aottot- 
sovente |___ | | I | I I I I_____ I I I I I quasi mai
4. In generals, come vede la sua posizione verso un'integrazlone 
Europea? Inserisca una X in UNA delle caselle che riflette meglio 
la sua opinione.
I I
fortemente
contrario
I I
moderatamente
contrario
I I
leggermente
contrario
I I
neutrale o 
indeciso
I I I___ I____________ I___ I
leggermente moderatamente fortemente
favorevole favorevole favorevole
5. Quando lei mette a confronto cio' che pensa dell'Italia insieme a 
tutto quanto quest'ultima rappresenta, con il suo punto di vista 
sull'Europa e su quello che quest'ultima rappresenta, trova questi 
punti di vista campatibili l'uno all'altro od opposti?
interamente | I | I | I I I I I I I I I totalmente
compatibili opposti
6. In generals, sarebbe contrario o a favore alia sostituzione sia 
dell'inno che della bandiera Italiana con equivalents inno 
e bandiera della Comunita' Europea?
Inaerlaca una X In UNA delle caaelle dl cul aottot-
fortemente I I I I I I I I I I I I I I fortemente
favorevole contrario
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7a. Nel caso ci fosse un referendum tra pochi giorni per determinare 
se 1'Italia dovesse far parte o meno dl uno stato super Europeo 
con govemo centralizzato, banche, forze annate, ecc., sarebbe 
certo su came votare?
certlsslmo |___ | |___ | |___ | |____ I | I I I I__I lncertissimo
7b. A1 momento attuale, come voterebbe In un simile referendum?
I I I I I I
favorevole astenuto contrario
8. Quanto rltiene che gll Italiani abbiano tratto beneflcl nel 
dlventare Membri della Comunita' Europea (E.E.C.)?
moltissimo I I I I I I I I I I I I I I per nulla
SEZIONE G - In questa sezione del questionarlo si richiedono lnformazioni 
personali. Tenga presente che le sue risposte saranno 
strettamente confidenziali ed anonlme. Si prega dl scrivere 
chiaramente.
1. Quantl annl ha? _____ anni 2. Quale sesso? t___ tM t___ :F
3. In quale nazlone e' nato/a ? ____________________________________
4. Dl che nazionalita' e'y lei ? ______
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SEZIONE H -  COMMENTI
Prima di completare questa sezione le saremmo grati se volesse dare uno sguardo 
alle domande precedenti, in modo da assicurarsi che non ne ha tralasciato 
alcuna. In questa sezione finale, la invitiamo a fare del commenti rlguardo il 
questionario. Saremmo particolarmente lnteressatl nel sapere se ha trovato 
difficili o ambigue alcune domande. Nel caso dovesse fare commenti particolari 
su alcune domande la preghiamo anche di segnare la sezione e il numero delle 
domande in questione.
UNA VOLTA COMPLETATO IL QUESTIONARIO, SI PRE6A DI CONSEGNARLO PRESSO:
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APPENDIX E
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
1. CAN YOU DESCRIBE YOUR OWN POSITION ON THE CURRENT 
DEBATE REGARDING BRITAIN AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ?
2. WHAT DO YOU UNDERSTAND BY THE USE OF THE TERM "FEDERALIST' 
IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT ?
3. WOULD YOU CALL YOURSELF A FEDERALIST ?
4. WHEN YOU WEIGH-UP THE PROS & CONS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
WHICH ISSUES ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT IN DETERMINING YOUR 
OWN FEELINGS ON THE SUBJECT ?
5. DO YOU THINK EUROPEAN INTEGRATION WILL PROCEED WITH 
RELATIVELY FEW PROBLEMS, OR DO YOU SEE SOME MAJOR PROBLEMS 
ARISING IN THE FUTURE ?
(PROBE) what makes you say that ?
what kinds of problems ?
6. IS THERE ANYTHING ABOUT EUROPEAN INTEGRATION WHICH 
WORRIES YOU ?
(PROBE) why does that worry you ?
7. SOME PEOPLE HAVE ARGUED THAT BEING PRO-EUROPEAN IS 
SOMEHOW INCOMPATIBLE WITH BEING PATRIOTIC AND 
LOYAL TO BRITAIN. WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT THIS 7
(PROMPT) for example, there has been talk of "losing"
our national identity, and a great deal of 
debate over the issue of national sovereignty.
(PROMPT) do you think becoming pro-European somehow
requires a reduction in patriotic feelings 
about Britain ?
8. DO YOU THINK VERY MUCH ABOUT HOW EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
MIGHT AFFECT YOU PERSONALLY ?
(PROBE) How do you think it might ? 
(PROBE) How do you feel about this ?
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9. DO YOU THINK THE NATIONS AND PEOPLES OF EUROPE ARE 
INTERDEPENDENT IN ANY IMPORTANT WAYS ?
10. IS BEING EUROPEAN IMPORTANT TO YOU ?
11. WHAT DO YOU THINK SHOULD BE THE MAJOR GOALS OF EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION ?
(PROBE) How likely is it that these goals will be 
realised ?
12. WOULD YOU SAY THERE'S ANYTHING WHICH MAKES YOU FEEL 
PROUD TO BE EUROPEAN ?
13. WOULD YOU SAY THERE'S ANYTHING WHICH MAKES YOU 
EMBARRASSED ABOUT BEING EUROPEAN ?
14. DO YOU THINK THERE IS SUCH A THING AS A COMMON EUROPEAN 
CULTURE?
15. CAN YOU THINK OF AN INDIVIDUAL OR GROUP OF INDIVIDUALS, 
WHO YOU THINK OF AS TYPICALLY EUROPEAN ?
(PROBE) why do you say that ?
16. DO YOU THINK THERE IS ANYTHING UNIQUE ABOUT EUROPE AND 
THE EUROPEANS ?
[NOW I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU ABOUT HOW YOU FEEL ABOUT BEING BRITISH]
17. IS BEING BRITISH IMPORTANT TO YOU ?
18. WHAT DO YOU THINK A PERSON NEEDS TO BE OR DO, TO DESERVE 
THE LABEL ’’PATRIOTIC’ ?
19. IS IT IMPORTANT TO YOU WHETHER ANOTHER BRITISH PERSON IS 
PATRIOTIC OR NOT ?
20. DO YOU THINK OF YOURSELF AS PATRIOTIC ?
21. DO YOU THINK THERE ARE PARTICULAR SITUATIONS WHICH ARE 
LIKELY TO ENCOURAGE FEELINGS OF PATRIOTISM IN BRITISH 
PEOPLE ?
(PROBE) Why do you think this happens ?
22. CAN YOU RECALL ANY SITUATION OR EVENT IN THE PAST WHICH 
LEFT YOU FEELING ESPECIALLY PLEASED OR PROUD TO BE 
BRITISH ?
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23. CAN YOU RECALL ANY SITUATION OR EVENT IN THE PAST WHICH 
LEFT YOU FEELING REGRETFUL ABOUT BEING BRITISH ?
24. CAN YOU THINK OF AN INDIVIDUAL, OR GROUP OF INDIVIDUALS, 
WHO SEEM TO REFLECT ESPECIALLY WELL THE BRITISH NATIONAL 
CHARACTER?
(PROBE) in what way do you see  as typically British ?
would you say  sets a good example for other
Britains to try and emulate ?
would you say that you have been influenced in any 
way b y  ?
do you think most other Britains would agree th a t__
is typically British ?
[I'D LIKE TO CONCLUDE THE INTERVIEW BY ASKING YOU YOUR AGE, AND 
YOUR POLITICAL PREFERENCE. I'D LIKE TO REMIND YOU THAT YOUR 
ANSWERS WILL REMAIN ANONYMOUS. THE REASON THAT I  NEED TO 
KNOW THIS INFORMATION IS SO THAT I  CAN GAIN SOME IDEA OF HOW  
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GENERAL POPULATION THE PEOPLE I  AM  
INTERVIEWING ARE. OF COURSE, IF YOU OBJECT, YOU NEED NOT ANSWER 
THESE QUESTIONS.]
25. WHAT IS YOUR AGE IN YEARS ?
26. IF THERE WERE A GENERAL ELECTION OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS, 
WHICH POLITICAL PARTY WOULD YOU VOTE FOR ?
[IHANKYOU]
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APPENDIX F
The 1993 questionnaire text
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OPINIONS ABOUT BRITAIN Sc EUROPE QUESTIONNAIRE
This booklet contains a series of questions concerning your opinions about 
Britain and Europe, as well as some broader questions looking at your general 
attitude towards m o dem life. Please attempt to answer all the questions in the 
order in which they appear in the booklet, and to USE INK rather than pencil. 
Please also note that there are no right or wrong answers to any of the 
questions - we are only interested in your own opinions. IN ADDITION, YOUR 
ANSWERS WILL BE TREATED AS STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL, AND REMAIN ANONYMOUS - YOU 
WILL NOT BE ASKED TO GIVE YOUR NAME AT ANY TIME.
If you find any questions ambiguous or difficult to answer, or if you have any 
general comments about this questionnaire, we have provided a section at the 
end of the booklet in which we would welcome your feedback.
We hope you find the questionnaire interesting and straightforward, and thank 
you for your help. In answering this questionnaire, you are helping us to 
develop a greater understanding of this important subject area.
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SECTION A
The questions in this section are concerned with how you feel about being 
British. Tou should answer by placing a X in ONE of seven boxes. The nearer you 
place your X to one end of the scale, the more you agree with the label at that 
end.
1. To what extent do you feel British?
extremely |___ | |____ | I___  | I___ I I___ I I___ I I___ I not at all
British British
2. To what extent do you feel strong ties with other British people?
extremely |  | |___  I I___  I I___ I I___ I I___ I I___ I no ties
strong ties at all
3. To what extent do you feel pleased to be British?
extremely |  I I___  I I___ I I___ I I___ I I___ I I___ I not at all
pleased pleased
4. How similar do you think you are to the average British person?
extremely |  | |___  I I___  I I___ I I___ I I___ I I___ I not at all
similar similar
5. How important to you is being British?
extremely |  | |___  | |___  | I___  I I___ I I___ I I___ I not at all
important important
6. How much are your views about Britain shared by other British people?
7. When you hear someone who is not British criticize the British, to 
what extent do you feel personally criticized?
8. The people of Britain depend on each other in important ways
agree |___ |_|___  |_I___  | I___ I I___ I I___ I I___ I disagree
9. Do you think British people relying on one another is generally 
a good or a bad thing?
a good thing I  I I  I I  I I  I I  I I  I I  I a bad thing
10. Do you think that by the year 2000, being British will be more OR 
less important to you than it is now?
more |  I |  I I___  I I___ I I___ I I___ I I___ I less
Important important
11. Would you LIKE being British to be more OR less important to you by 
the year 2000, than it is now?
shared by |___ | |  I I___  I I___ I I___ I I___ I I
all
I not shared 
by any
extremely |___ | |  I I___  I I___ I I___ I I___
criticized
|___ | not at all
criticized
more I  I I  I I  I I  I I  I I  I I  I less
important important
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12. In general, do you think most British people will feel being British 
is more OR less important to them by the year 2000 than it is now?
more |___  I I___  I I___ I I___ I I___ | I___ I I___ I less
important important
SECTION B
In this section of the questionnaire, we are interested in some further aspects 
of your feelings about Britain and Europe. Once again, you should answer by 
placing a X in ONE of seven boxes. The nearer you place your X to one end of 
the scale, the more you agree with the label at that end.
1. With the current economic recession in Britain, I feel concerned 
for the nation
agree |____  | |___ I_I___ | I___ I |____ I I___ I I___  I disagree
2. The people of Britain should work together to help Britain out 
of the current economic slump
agree I  I   I I  I I  I I  I I  I I  I disagree
3. I feel proud when foreign people label me as a typical British 
person
agree |____  | |___ I_I___ |_I___ I |____ I |___ | I  I disagree
4. When I think about being British I often make comparisons with other 
nations and nationalities
agree |____  | |___ I_I___ I_I___ I I___ I I___ I I___  I disagree
5. With the current economic recession across much of Europe, I feel 
concerned for Europe as a whole
agree__|___ | |___  | |___ | I___ I |___ I I___ I I___ I disagree
6. The people of Europe should work together to help Europe out 
of the current economic slump
agree__|___ | |___  I |___ I I___ I__I___ I__I___ I__I___ I disagree
7. I feel proud when foreign people label me as a typical European 
person
agree__|___ I |___  I |___ | I___ I__|___ I__|___ | I___ I disagree
8. When I think about being European I often make comparisons with 
non-European nations and peoples
agree__|___ | |___  | |___ | I___ |__|___ |__|___ |__I___ I disagree
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SECTION C
In this section of the questionnaire, we are interested in your opinions about 
European integration.
Below is a list of ten possible goals for European integration. In the box 
beside each goal, please write clearly a number between 1 and 10 to represent 
how important you think each goal is. A score of 1 would indicate that you do 
not think the goal is important at all, whereas a score of 10 would indicate 
that you feel the goal is extremely important.
(use numbers between 1 & 10; l>not at all important, 10«extremely important) 
PLEASE WRITE CLEARLY
IMPORTANCE
1. Ensuring the economic prosperity of Europe I___ I
2. Promoting world peace I___ I
3. Reducing trade barriers in Europe I___ I
4. Helping third world nations I___ I
5. Encouraging a sense of conmon European identity_____________ I___ I
6. Ensuring the economic prosperity of Britain__________________I___ I
7. Guaranteeing the security of Europe I___ I
8. Preventing the loss of separate national identities_________ I___ I
9. Creating a new, alternative superpower_______________________ I___ I
10. Encouraging awareness of conmon cultural ties within Europe |____ I
SECTION D
This section of the questionnaire is concerned with how you feel about being 
European, and requires you to answer by placing a X in ONE of seven boxes. The 
nearer you place your X to one end of the scale, the more you agree with the 
label at that end.
1. To what extent do you feel European?
extremely |__ | |___  | |___  | I___  I I___ I I___  I I___  I not at all
European European
2. To what extent do you feel strong ties with other European people?
extremely__|__ I |___  I__I___ I I___  I__I___ I I___  I I___  I no ties
strong ties at all
3. To what extent do you feel pleased to be European?
extremely__|__ | |___  |__|___  | I___  |__|___ I I  I I  I not at all
pleased pleased
4. How similar do you think you are to the average European person?
extremely__|__ | |___  |__|___  | |____ |_|___ | |____  I |___  | not at all
similar similar
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5. How Important to you is being European?
extremely |  I I___ I I___ I I___ I I___ I I___ I I___ I not at all
Important important
6. How much are your views about Europe shared by other European people?
shared by |  | |___ | |___ | |  | |  | |___ | |___ I not shared
all by any
7. When you hear someone who is not European criticize Europeans, to 
what extent do you feel personally criticized?
extremely |  I I___ I I___ I I___ I I___ I I___ I I___ I not at all
criticized criticized
8. The nations and peoples of Europe depend on each other in Important ways
agree |___ | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |___  I disagree
9. Do you think European nations and peoples relying on each other is 
generally a good or a bad thing?
a good thing |___ | |___  I_|___  I |____ |_|____ I I___ I I___ I a bad thing
10. Do you think that by the year 2000, being European will be more OR 
less important to you than it is now?
more |  | |  | |___  |_|____ | |___  |_|___ | |___  | less
important important
11. Would you LIKE being European to be more OR less Important to you by
the year 2000, than it is now?
more______|__  I |__  I I___ I I___ I I___ I I___ I I___ I less
important important
12. In general, do you think most Europeans will feel being European 
is more OR less important to them by the year 2000 them it is now?
more______|__  | |__  I I___ I |  I I___ I I___ I I___ I less
important importemt
13. Do you think most BRITONS will feel being European is more OR less
important to them by the year 2000 than it is now?
more______|__  | |__  | |___ | |  | |___ | |___ | |___ I less
important important
SECTION E
This part of the questionnaire is concerned with what you think should be the 
most importemt goals of Britain emd Europe. Each of the questions presented 
below consists of a statement about Britain or Europe. You should indicate 
whether you agree or disagree with the goal represented by the statement, by 
placing a cross in ONE of the seven boxes after each question.
1. It is important to me that being British makes me feel proud
agree I  I I  | I  | |___ I |___  I_|___  |_|___  I disagree
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2. Britain should maintain its autonomy from other nations
agree |___  | |  | |___ | |___ | |  | |____  | |___ | disagree
3. What being British stands for should remain stable and predictable 
over time
agree |___  | |  | |___ | |___ | |  | |____ | |___ | disagree
4. Britain should exercise as much influence as possible over world affairs 
agree |___  | |___ | |___ | |____  | |___  | |___  | |___ | disagree
5. Britain should strive to be one of the world's most powerful nations 
agree |___  | |___ | |___ | |____  | |___  |__|___  | |___ | disagree
6. Britain and the British should be thought of as distinct and 
different to other nations and nationalities
agree |___  | |___ | |___ | |____  | |___  |__|___  |_|___ | disagree
7. I like other people to think I'm proud to be British
agree |___  | |___ | |___ | |____  | |___  |__|___  |_|___ | disagree
8. It is important to me that being European makes me feel proud 
agree |___  | |  | |___ | |  | |  | |___  | |___  | disagree
9. Europe should maintain its autonomy from other continents and non-European 
nations
agree |___  | |  | |___ | |  | |  | |___  | |___  I disagree
10. What being European stands for should remain stable and predictable 
over time
agree |___  | |  | |___ | |  | |  | |___  | |___  I disagree
11. Europe should exercise as much influence as possible over world affairs 
agree |___  | |___  | I___ | I____ I I___  I__|___  I I___  I disagree
12. Europe should strive to be one of the world's most powerful continents 
agree |___  | |___  | |___ | |____  | I___  |__|___  | |___  | disagree
13. Europe and the Europeans should be thought of as distinct and 
different to other continents, non-European nations and nationalities
agree |___  | |___  | |___ | |____  | |___  |__|___  | |___  | disagree
14. I like other people to think I'm proud to be European
agree I  | I  | I  | I  | I  |____ |___  | |___  | disagree
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SECTION P - In this section, you are asked some questions about yourself.
Please remember that your answers will remain anonymous.
1. What is your age in years ?   years
2. What is your sex ? Female   Hale ______
3. In general, how would you describe your political preferences?
PLEASE TICK ONE BOX ONLY 
left-wing |___ I_|___  I I  I I  I I  I I  I I  I right-wing
4. How did you vote at the last British general election?
PLEASE TICK ONE BOX ONLY
Conservative |____ | Labour |  | Liberal/SDLP |___ |
Other I___  | I did not vote |___  |
5. In general, how often do you deliberately watch the
PLEASE TICK ONE BOX ONLY 
I  I________I___ I I___ I I___  I
every a few times a few times a few times
day a week a month a year
6. In general, how often do you read a newspaper?
PLEASE TICK ONE BOX ONLY 
I  I________I___ I I___ I I___  I I___ I
every a few times a few times a few times never
day a week a month a year
7. In general, how do you think of your social class background?
PLEASE TICK ONE BOX ONLY
I  I I___  I I___  I I___  I
working class middle class upper class don't know
news on TV?
I  I
never
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SECTION G - YOUR COMMENTS
BEFORE COMPLETING THIS SECTION, WE WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD LOOK BACK 
THROUGH THE QUESTIONNAIRE AND MAKE SURE THAT YOU HAVE NOT MISS ED-OUT ANY OF THE 
PREVIOUS QUESTIONS.
In this final section we invite you to make any comments regarding the 
questionnaire. We are particularly interested in whether you found any of the 
questions difficult to answer or ambiguous in any way. IF YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS 
ABOUT PARTICULAR QUESTIONS, PLEASE ALSO MAKE A NOTE OF THE SECTION THEY APPEAR 
IN, AND THE QUESTION NUMBER. Thank you again for your help.
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